THE
MEANING
OF
MODERN
LIFE

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

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THE MEANING OF

MODERN LIFE

A Series of Addresses Selected and Approved
by a Committee of Scholars headed by

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

Civilization

THE MEANING OF
MODERN LIFE

AS SOUGHT FOR AND INTERPRETED IN A SERIES OF LECTURES AND ADDRESSES BY THE LEADERS OF MODERN THOUGHT AND MODERN ACTION : : :

THIS SERIES HAS BEEN ARRANGED IN SEQUENCE, AND EDITED WITH FOREWORD, INTRODUCTIONS AND NOTES BY

CHARLES F. HORNE, PH.D.

Editor of "Great Men and Famous Women," Editor of "The Story of the Greatest Nations," Co-Editor of "Great Events by Famous Historians," Author of "History of France," "History of Germany and Austria," "The Story of Our Country," Etc.

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FOREWORD

WHEN, as sometimes happens, a tattered manuscript of mediæval times is resurrected from amid forgotten rubbish heaps, scholars hesitate and argue as to the century of its production. Accidental outward marks may guide them; but as to the thought, the outlook, the opinions, there is little to discriminate one century from the next, or the next. Mankind did march onward, it is true, but with such slow step that they seemed often to be merely marking time without advance. The unsolved problems of one generation were still disputed by their children's children.

Now, however, we move at railroad speed. The problems of to-day are not those of two decades ago; and at such accelerating rate do we rush onward that soon a year may see changes such as once engrossed a century. Nay, so swiftly are we swept face to face with new issues that the dead past at times forgets to bury its dead. There are elderly gentlemen among us, held by a comfortable income in some eddy of the current, who still maintain that the only vital issue of to-day is England's attitude towards us in the Civil War or the fact that Japan began her modern career under our tutelage in 1854.

To these pleasantly reminiscent gentlemen, charming after-dinner speakers, interesting relics of an extinct age, the present series of addresses can possess little interest, except for its "newness," the radical spirit of its thought. But to more active brains, to the men who, in office, in factory, or in field, are "making the nation" of to-day, it must have an obvious value. Each one *of us is so busy in his own life that he cannot keep abreast of the lives of others. A well-known literary man, a twenty years' graduate of my college, wrote me the other day for a copy of the college register. By mistake a clerk forwarded him instead a pamphlet containing the requisites for admission to the freshman class, whereon my literary friend wrote back to me, only half in jest, that despite my vigorous hint he must abandon any idea of re-taking his college course, as he could not possibly pass the entrance examinations.*

The schools of to-day do not teach what was taught twenty years ago. Our colleges are wholly different institutions. The man who closed his scholastic education in the "eighties," perhaps even in the "nineties," and went out into life, his brain awhirl with certain problems which he and his generation must some day solve perforce, that man is surprised now by stumbling, in his newspaper, on some casual reference to his special difficulty as a thing done with, dismissed, and half forgotten. He realizes for a moment that the age has somehow swept along without him, that progress has passed him by. Then, being a busy man, he turns again to his own personal problem, with perhaps only a half-formed wish that he had kept more nearly abreast of the times, a half-formed resolve that "some day" he will "read up" again.

To that man, and to every one among us who seeks to maintain the fulness of his heritage as "heir to all the ages," is offered the present series of addresses. They give the most recent thought on each vital issue of the moment. They are written by men and women, the foremost leaders of the battle. Each name is a guarantee not only that the address is notable and worth the reading, but also that it is broadly thoughtful and deeply true. These are no hurried, superficial views, held to-day to be dismissed to-morrow; they are the meditated opinions of the greatest *specialists. Each address is worth incorporating into the reader's permanent body of thought, his outlook upon life.*

Several of the series have already received the stamp of public approval. They have been delivered as recent speeches, some before vast audiences of the people, others before learned societies, small bodies of the selected few. Surely, under such circumstances if ever, under the criticism and approval of his fellow men, restrained from exaggeration by the sceptic's smile, stimulated to passion and power by the applause of all whose voiceless thoughts he has nobly interpreted in speech, then if ever does a speaker rise above his hearers, above himself, and become "inspired." Essays of inspiration these, and needful indeed was it that their earnest words should not perish on the breeze that caught them, but should be here preserved in print and given permanent weight—heralded to a wider audience. Others of the series have been written specially for this occasion. Others again have appeared in some temporary printed shape, and are now given permanent form. These, wherever necessary, have been revised by the author, or under his supervision, for the present purpose.

For there is a purpose, an "increasing purpose," which runs through them all. They are not a hap-hazard collection of famous speeches, chance thrown together. Their themes have been laboriously selected, their sequence studied, their expression placed in the hands of those best fitted for the task. Thus, though each author speaks upon a different subject, there is a carefully outlined harmony runs through the whole. Here is, in brief, not many books, but one book. Each address does but face another aspect of the same great riddle and gives a strong man's reading of its secret. Taken as a whole, the series may be found to answer better than any one volume could, better than any one man could, the question that faces each among us, the question *suggested by the title as to the meaning, the cause, and the issue of the life we live.*

A special introduction for this opening number of the series seems scarcely needful. Seth Low is so widely known for his long and honorable career, as President of Columbia University during its period of widest development, as Mayor of New York in days of peculiar stress and strain, as one of the foremost citizens of our land in every moment of need, that his voice must everywhere receive attention, his views command respect. This address, delivered by him before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Harvard, was published in the Atlantic Monthly and is here reproduced by the kind permission of the publishers, after being revised under Mr. Low's supervision for its present use. It looks, as its title page suggests, over the general field of life, and indicates briefly the general character of some of the problems which the ensuing addresses must view at closer range.

Perhaps he who will go step by step with our authors through each one's thought may before closing with the last find himself strengthened to give his own answer to the riddle. He may take a new attitude more confident, more self-assured towards life itself.

C. F. H.



I

THE OUTLOOK

"THE TREND OF THE CENTURY"

BY

SETH LOW

FORMER PRESIDENT OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

EVERY century has its own characteristics. The two influences which made the nineteenth century what it was seem to me to be the scientific spirit and the democratic spirit. Thus, the nineteenth century, singularly enough, was the great interpretative century both of nature and of the past, and at the same time the century of incessant and uprooting change in all that relates to the current life of men. It was also the century of national systems of popular education, and at the same time of nation-great armies; the century that did more than any other to scatter men over the face of the earth, and to concentrate them in cities; the century of a universal suffrage that is based upon a belief in the inherent value of the individual; and the century of the corporation and the labor union, which in the dominion of capital and of labor threaten to obliterate the individual. I want to trace, if I can, what has been the trend of this remarkable century in the domain of thought, of society, of commerce, of industry, and of politics. Especially I want to do this as it concerns life in the United States.

I speak first of the trend of thought; for thought, immaterial though it be, is the matrix that shapes the issues of life. The mind has been active in all fields during this fruitful century; but, outside of politics, it is to science that we must look for the thoughts that have shaped all other thinking. When Von Helmholtz was in this country, a few years ago, he said that modern science was born when men ceased to summon nature to the support of theories already formed, and instead began to question nature for her facts, in order that they might thus discover the laws which these facts reveal. I do not know that it would be easy to sum up the scientific method, as the phrase runs, in simpler words.

It would not be correct to say that this process was unknown before the past century; for there have been individual observers and students of nature in all ages. The seed idea is to be found at least as far back as the time of Bacon, not to say of Aristotle. But it is true that only within the last century has this attitude towards nature become the uniform attitude of men of science. The results that have flowed from this general attitude towards nature have been so wonderful that the same method has been employed by students of other subjects, with results hardly less noteworthy. To this attitude towards nature on the part of men of science we owe the great advances in our knowledge of natural law which the century has witnessed; and from this increased knowledge of natural law the manifold inventions have come that have changed the face of the world. To the scientific method applied to the problems of the past by men of letters, we owe our ability to understand the hieroglyphs of Egypt and the cuneiform inscriptions of Babylonia.

One of the chief results of the scientific method as applied to nature and the study of the past is the change that it has wrought in the philosophic conception of nature and of human society. By the middle of the century, Darwin had given what has been held to be substantial proof of the theory of the development of higher forms out of lower in all living things; and since then the doctrine of evolution, not as a body of exact teaching, but as a working theory, has obtained a mastery over the minds of men which has dominated all their studies and all their thinking. The consequences of the doctrine have been very different in different fields of mental activity. In the field of religious thought it has undoubtedly been a source of very serious perplexity, because it has confronted men with the necessity of reshaping their conceptions of the divine method of creation according to a theory exactly the opposite of that which had been previously held. When Copernicus, in the sixteenth century, began to teach that the earth revolved about the sun, it must have seemed to be doctrine that disputed the most evident of facts. All men in all ages had seen the sun rise in the east and set in the west, and therefore the new doctrine must have appeared, at first sight, to be utterly subversive both of the science of that day and of the religion of that day. The men of science, then as now, easily accommodated themselves to the new teaching as its truthfulness became clear, despite its revolutionary character; for to them it meant only a fresh start along a more promising road. But the opposition of the Church reveals the agony of mind that was involved for the Christian believer in the effort to restate his conception of man's importance in the sight of God, from the point of view of the newly recognized truth instead of from the point of view of the old error. Still, men were able to do this, though it took them a long time to do it. The discovery of Copernicus was announced in 1543; yet I read the other day, in the life of Samuel Johnson, the first president of King's College in New York city, that it was by him and his colleagues of Yale, in the early part of the eighteenth century, that even the learned people of Connecticut were led to accept the Copernican theory of the universe instead of the Ptolemaic. Indeed, so late as the first Commencement of King's College, in 1758, one of the students, "in a clear and concise manner, demonstrated the revolution of the earth round the sun, both from astronomical observations and the theory of gravity, and defended the thesis against two of his classmates." These incidents illustrate happily how far America was from Europe in those days. It is easy to believe, therefore, that the evolutionary conception of creation, with its sublime suggestion of the limitless possibilities of endless development, will in time be accepted as the basis of men's religious thinking as universally as religious men now accept the Copernican system of the universe. In the mean while, it should be a source of comfort to every man whose mind has been troubled by this new teaching of science that, in this experience, nothing has happened to him which has not happened before; and it may be observed that if the man of science has thus taught, in a new way, that man is allied to the beasts that perish, he has also shown, by his own wide reading of natural law, that man is capable of tracing the processes of the infinite, thus setting the seal of science to the doctrine of revelation, that man, in his essence, is the child of God.

The effect of the scientific method and of the doctrine of evolution upon philosophy, during the century, has been to bring the philosopher and the man of science closer together. In ancient times, the philosopher was in his own person a man of science; that is to say, he not only knew all of the science that was known, but he was himself the principal agent in advancing man's scientific knowledge. Through the centuries, as man's knowledge of nature has increased, one science after another has been set aside from the domain of philosophy, so to speak, as a field apart. Thus, astronomy, physics, and chemistry have long been recognized as independent fields of knowledge; and the philosopher has left it to the astronomer, the physicist, and the chemist to enlarge man's knowledge in those fields. During the nineteenth century, even psychology has become, to a great extent, an experimental science, so that philosophy, in our day, has come to concern itself once more with all knowledge rather than with special fields of knowledge. Accordingly we find the greatest philosophers basing their philosophies upon the widest possible survey of facts; and the greatest scientists turning from their facts to account for them, as they may, by some adequate philosophy. Thus, the theory of evolution, resting as it does upon the observed facts of nature, has come to dominate the philosophy of the century no less than its science.

In the domain of education one sees the same philosophy at work, having for its handmaid the democratic tendency which has marked the political development of the century. Every public educational system of our day, broadly speaking, is the child of the nineteenth century. The educational system of Germany, which in its results has been of hardly less value to mankind than to Germany itself, dates from the reconstitution of the German universities after the battle of Jena. Whatever system France may have had before the Revolution went down in the cataclysm that destroyed the ancient régime, so that the educational system of France also dates from the Napoleonic period. In the United States, while the seeds of the public school system may have been planted in the eighteenth, or perhaps even in the seventeenth century, it has only been in the nineteenth century, with the development of the country, that our public school system has grown into what we now see; while in England, the system of national education, in a democratic sense, must be dated from 1870. This attempt on the part of the great nations to provide systematic instruction for the people, from childhood to manhood, from the elementary school to the university, reflects, as it seems to me, the commingling of the two great tendencies of the century, the democratic and the evolutionary. Out of the growth of the democratic principle has come the belief that it is worth while to educate all the children of the state; and out of the scientific method, which has led to the general acceptance of the evolutionary theory, has been developed the advance in educational method which is so marked a feature of the last decades of the century. Formerly, it was satisfactory to educate a child according to some preconceived theory, or as it had always been done. To-day, the best systems of education are increasingly based upon the laboratory method, and upon the observation of facts relating to childhood and youth. The new disciplines, also, are freely admitted on even terms with the old.

In other domains of knowledge, such as history and literature, the application of the scientific method has resulted not only in the overthrow of many of our preconceived conceptions in regard to the past, but also in the opening up of vast fields of information which formerly were closed to the seeker after truth, because he did not command the open sesame to their treasures. I think, therefore, the statement is justified which I made at the beginning of this address, that it is to science we must look for the thoughts which, in the nineteenth century, dominated and fructified all other thinking. The illumination of the century proceeded from that source, and the light that has been shed, especially by the study of nature, has been carried into every nook and corner of human history and human life.

But the consequences of the general scientific attitude towards nature which was characteristic of the century have been twofold. Not only has the scientific method furnished a philosophy of nature and of human life, but, by the great increase in man's knowledge of natural law to which it has led, it has resulted in endless inventions, and these, in turn, have changed the face of the world. It is not my purpose to catalogue these inventions,—not even the most conspicuous of them. I rather wish to point out some of the changes in the life of society which have been caused by them. One of the most noticeable of these results is the great increase in the number and size of cities. What the elevator is to the high building the railroad and steamboat are to the city. They make practicable a city such as without them could not be. In striking contrast with this tendency of people to concentrate in cities, we observe, on the other hand, a world-movement of people which has been facilitated by the same inventions. Man's knowledge of the earth that he inhabits has been made substantially complete, and the ends of the earth and the islands of the sea have been brought into rapid and easy communication with the centres of the world's life. In other ages, tribes often migrated from one part of the world to another. The path by which they went was stained with blood, and the country of which they took possession they made their own by violence and conquest. But in the past century millions of people, not as tribes, but as families and as individuals, migrated peacefully from Europe to America, to Australia, to Asia, and to Africa. This world-wide movement of the peoples has been made possible only by the inventions that have, on the other hand, built up the cities; but it reflects, also, as it seems to me, the influence of the democratic spirit urging men, in vast numbers and upon their own responsibility, always to seek for conditions of life in which they may enter upon life's struggle less handicapped by the past.

The rapid march of invention during the century has been coincident with one far-reaching and progressive change in the habits of society, the importance of which is seldom recognized. I refer to deposit banking. Of all the agencies that affected the world in the nineteenth century, I am sometimes inclined to think that this is one of the most influential. If deposit banking may not be said to be one fruit of democracy, it certainly may be said that it is in those countries in which democracy is most dominant that deposit banking thrives best. One of the first banks in the United States was the Bank of Maryland, opened in Baltimore in 1790. It was opened for a year before it had a depositor. Even fifty years ago the discussions of bankers turned mainly upon circulation. Comparatively little attention was given to the question of deposits. At the present time our banks are comparatively indifferent to circulation; but they aim to secure as large deposits as possible. Deposit banking does for the funds of a country precisely what mobilization does for the army of a country like France. Mobilization there places the entire manhood of the country in readiness for war. Deposit banking keeps every dollar of the country on a war-footing all the time. Some one has said that it would have been of no use to have invented the railroad at an earlier period of the world's history, for there would not have been enough money at command to make the invention available before this modern banking system had made its appearance. If this be so, then indeed the part that was played by deposit banking in the developments of the century cannot be overestimated.

During the century the conditions of the world's commerce radically altered. It is not simply that the steamboat and the locomotive have taken the place of the sailing-ship and the horse; that the submarine cable has supplanted the mails; nor even that these agencies have led to such improvements in banking facilities that foreign commerce is done, for the most part, for hardly more than a brokerage upon the transaction. These are merely accidents of the situation. The fundamental factors have been the opening up of virgin soil in vast areas to the cultivation of man, and the discovery of how to create artificial cold, which makes it possible to transport for long distances produce that only a few years ago was classed as perishable. The net result of these influences has been to produce a world-competition at every point of the globe, both on a scale never before known, and as regards articles that have been heretofore exempt from all competition except neighborhood competition. Thus, not only has it become impossible to raise wheat profitably in England, or even on our own Atlantic coast, but the price of such an article as butter, for example, is fixed in the State of New York by what it costs to produce a similar grade of butter in Australia. Under the influence of these changes, the merchant of the early part of the nineteenth century has become "as extinct as the mastodon."

But if these changes have introduced new and strange problems for the merchant, they have also presented to the statesman problems of no less difficulty. In the first half of the century, China was the great source of supply for both tea and silk. At the present time more than half of the tea consumed in England comes from India and Ceylon, and more than three-quarters of the tea consumed in the United States comes from the island of Formosa and from Japan. Even in silk China has largely lost her market to Japan and Europe. Who shall say that this gradual destruction of China's export trade has not had much to do with bringing the ancient empire to the point where it seems about to be broken up? The outflow from the old empire is not sufficient to stem the inflow; and the aggressive commerce of the outside world appears to be ready to break down the ancient barriers and overflow the country, whether it will or no.

This unification of the world, and its reduction in size from the point of view of commerce, reveal some tendencies that are full of interest. The general tendency to protection was the first answer of the statesman and of the nations to the pressure of competition from new quarters. It represented an effort to make the terms of the world competition between young countries and old, between old countries and new, somewhat more even. The remarkable exception to this tendency presented by Great Britain reflects the exceptional situation of Great Britain among the nations. Her home domain is too small to furnish occupation for either her men or her money, and therefore the people of the little island have swarmed all over the world. As a consequence, Great Britain's commercial policy, is in a sense, a world-policy; but it is noticeable that the other great nations, whether young or old, being obliged to frame their policy from a different point of view, have hitherto relied, with few if any exceptions, upon protection to equalize the terms of the competition. Now, however, a second tendency appears to be discernible. If protection represents the attempt of a nation to hold itself aloof, to some extent, from the competition of the world, the tendency of the aggressive nations of Europe to divide up among themselves the undeveloped portions of the earth, and even the territory of weaker nations, seems to me to represent a growing conviction that the policy of protection, from its nature, must be a temporary one, and also to reveal a dimly recognized belief that the true way for the old countries to contend with the semicivilized, in the long run, is to raise the standard of living in the less advanced countries, so that the semicivilized shall not be able to drag the most highly developed peoples down to their own level. That is to say, if the first response of the civilized nations to the world competition to which I have referred has been the attempt to limit its unwelcome effects by the erection of artificial barriers at every custom-house, the second response seems likely to come in the effort of the strong nations to dominate the weak,—not for their destruction, but for their uplifting. In other words, civilization, being brought face to face with the competition of the uncivilized, appears to believe that the best way to preserve its own integrity is to introduce the conditions of civilization everywhere. If this be a correct diagnosis of the recent developments of foreign policy on the part of several of the great nations, it indicates a disposition to secure protection in the future by aggressive rather than by defensive action as heretofore. I am not discussing the merits of the case, but only trying to point out the possible significance of movements that are likely to have no little influence on the future.

But we should lose sight of one of the most important factors that have been at work in producing these results, and in changing the life of men, if we did not consider for a moment the influence of invention in the great domain of industry. In its relation to agriculture this influence appears in three forms: there has been a much more intelligent application of chemistry to the cultivation of the soil; steam-power has been very largely substituted for hand-power; and the railroad has made accessible vast areas of country which, in any previous age of the world, it would have been impossible to cultivate profitably. In the substitution of machinery for hand-power in the domain of manufacture, two incidental results have proved of far-reaching importance, although neither was necessarily involved in the substitution of the machine for the hand. I refer, first, to the division of labor, and second, to the interchangeability of parts in many standard manufactured articles. It has added enormously to the productiveness of a factory to divide the labor employed according to the processes. By this means the labor becomes more expert, the product is increased, and the quality is improved. It is true that the action of the laborer thereby becomes also, to a great extent, automatic; but so does the execution of the skilled musician, as the result of his practice and his skill. Does this automatic character of the occupation tend to the belittling or the enlargement of the minds of the working-men? It is probable that the mind of a laborer, thus largely set free during his hours of toil, is at work quite as busily as before, and in ways that make him more than ever an active factor in the world's life. The practice of making interchangeable parts in many manufactured articles has also added greatly to the convenience and availability of such articles. The standardizing of the threads of screws, the sizes of bolts, and the like, adds beyond measure to the effectiveness of manufacture and to the convenience of industry. But it is a superficial view of these things to suppose that their effect is exhausted in a tendency to cheapen products and to improve industrial opportunity. It is evident that division of labor is permanently possible under freedom only in communities the members of which are animated by mutual trustfulness and mutual respect. Interchangeable parts are of value only when men trade continually with one another. They involve a recognition of the advantage to be had by considering the general welfare rather than simply one's own convenience. That is to say, both of these things reveal and emphasize the tendency to democracy in industry, which seems to me as marked a feature of our times as the tendency to democracy in the political life of men. In other words, industry rests more and more completely upon the mutual interdependence of the masses of mankind.

Other changes, less material, took place in the commercial and industrial world during this same great century. The wage system became universal, and the corporation and the trade union became dominant in many branches of industry and commerce. Commodore Vanderbilt laid the foundation of his fortune by operating a small boat on a ferry. The business of transportation grew under his hands to such an extent that even so exceptionally able a man as he could not control it in his own person. Under the form of a corporation, he was obliged to associate with himself many others, in order to carry on the immense business which he developed. The corporation in this aspect, therefore, is democratic, resting as it does upon the substitution of the ownership of many for the ownership of one. It may, indeed, be said that the corporation is oligarchic rather than democratic; but the oligarchic tendency in society made corporations even for general business purposes that rested upon exclusive privilege. The corporations of our day seem to me democratic, except as they control exclusive public franchises, in that they are open to all, and must compete with all. A sailing-ship used to cost comparatively little, and many an individual could afford to have one or two or a small fleet of them. The modern steamship, on the other hand, is exceedingly costly; and there would be few of them indeed if there were no more than could be owned by individuals. But just as in political democracy there is a tendency on the part of the many blindly to follow one, so in corporations one man is apt to determine the efficiency or inefficiency of the corporation. Similarly, in the trade union and other organizations of labor, the organizations which are most capably led are the most effective.

The corporation and the trade union interest me especially from another point of view, because of the strange contrast they present to the democratic tendencies of the times. Democracy, as a political theory, emphasizes the equality of men and the equal rights and privileges of all men before the law. The tendency of it has been, in this country, to develop in multitudes of men great individuality and self-reliance. Side by side with this tendency, however, we see the corporation supplanting the individual capitalist, and the trade union obliterating the individual laborer, as direct agents in the work of the world. Strange as this contrast is, both tendencies must be consistent with democracy, for the corporation and the trade union flourish most where democracy is most developed. Indeed, they seem to be successful and powerful just because democracy pours into them both its vital strength. The criticisms that are justly enough launched against both probably spring largely from the fact that, by reason of the rapidity of their development, men have not yet learned how to control them so as to secure the maximum of benefit and the minimum of abuse.

In this country, I suppose, there are few who would deny that the corporate form of doing business is not only inevitable but on the whole advantageous. At the same time, the opinion undoubtedly would be almost as universal that the abuses in corporate management confront the country with some of the most serious problems that lie before it. The impersonality of the corporation lends itself readily to many abuses from which the sense of personal responsibility saves individual men. The corporation, being a creature of legislation, as it has gradually acquired control of more and more of the field of business, has brought all business into relation with the legislator, which is as unfortunate as possible. When business was in private control, legislators interfered comparatively little, because those who conducted the business had votes. Corporations, however, have no votes, but they have money; and it is not exaggeration to say that the people fear, if they do not believe, that the money of the corporations is often more influential in shaping legislation than are the votes of the people. The statement of a railroad magnate, that in Republican counties he was a Republican, and in Democratic counties he was a Democrat, but that everywhere he was for the railroad, was the cynical admission of an attitude easily understood, but none the less dangerous. When one tries to devise remedies for the evident dangers of the situation, it is not easy to be precise. It is possible, I think, to indicate some directions in which to look for improvement, so far as improvement is possible outside of higher standards of public virtue. The fundamental evil in the corporate form of management, undoubtedly, is the loss of personal responsibility. It is a common remark that as directors men will do things which as individuals they would not think of doing. Indeed, the evil lies deeper than this. Because they are directors, and therefore, as they say, trustees for others, they feel constrained to do for the benefit of the stockholders what as individuals they abhor. This reasoning may well be considered fallacious, but that it is very influential in determining the action of corporate directors cannot be questioned. The remedy for this loss of personal responsibility, so far as there is any remedy by legislation, must come from publicity. When the legislature grants the impersonal form for the conduct of business, and grants, in addition, a limited liability, there is no reason why it should not, at the same time, demand that all of the operations of this artificial person —or perhaps I ought to say, of this combination of natural and privileged persons—should be matters of public record. Theoretically I cannot believe that there is any reason why the demand for publicity in relation to the actions of corporations should not be carried to any detail to which it may be necessary to carry it in order to secure the result of absolute honesty as towards stockholders, creditors, and the public. It should be observed, perhaps, that corporations naturally divide themselves into two classes,—those which exercise, by virtue of a public franchise, quasi-governmental functions, and those which conduct purely private business. I think the same rule of publicity, as a general principle, should apply to both kinds of corporations; but it is evident that publicity may have to be carried much farther in regard to the first kind than in regard to the second.

I think there is one other direction in which corporations can be further controlled to the public advantage. In many of the States, already, it is impossible to organize a corporation without paying in the capital in cash. If this requirement could be extended so as to demand that neither stock nor bonds should be issued except for a cash equivalent, it would strike at the root of one of the evils incident to corporate management which has done much to arouse against corporations popular indignation. I do not know why the law might not require, where stocks or bonds are to be issued as the equivalent of invested property, patents, good-will, and the like, that the valuation upon which such issues may be made should be fixed by public authority. The corporation that means to serve the public honestly and fairly is not likely to object to being required to have assets of full value for all the securities which it offers to the public. It is the corporation which wishes to make money out of the public dishonestly that aims to float all manner of securities that have no value at all, or only a nominal value. I believe it to be a righteous demand that the laws regulating corporations should protect the public much more adequately than they do now against such frauds.

But while it is evident that the corporate form of conducting business has been of wide benefit to mankind, despite the abuses that have attached to it, there may not be such general admission of the truth that the trade union and the labor organizations have been equally beneficial. It is sometimes said that labor organizes because capital does, and that it is obliged to do so in self-defence. I am far from saying that there is no truth in this statement, but I think that it is only a partial statement of the truth. Labor organizes, primarily, not simply to contend against capital and for self-defence, but for precisely the same reason that capital does; that is, for its own advantage. It organizes in response to a tendency of the times which labor can resist no more than capital. It is the recognition by labor of the vision of the poet, that "the individual withers, and the world is more and more." It may not be denied that organized labor has often been cruel in its attitude to laboring-men who wish to work upon an individual basis; but it cannot be justly said that it is more cruel than organized capital has been in its own field. The individual competitor has been removed from the pathway of the trust as remorselessly as the individual laborer has been deprived of work by the labor organization. Indeed, I think it may be said that there is no fault that can be charged against organized labor which may not be charged with equal truth against organized capital. The forms in which these faults exhibit themselves, from the nature of the case, are different; but in both instances the faults are the same. In the mean while, one has only to consider the protectionist policy of nations, in order to be able to understand the protectionist policy of the trade unions. No laboring-man can tell at what moment a new invention will appear which will deprive him of his livelihood. It is inevitable, at such a time, that men should draw together, and present a common front to the problems of life, rather than attempt to contend with them as individual atoms. It is evident, also, that in many directions the trade union has improved the condition of the laboring-man, looked at from the point of view of the mass. It seems to me that the true line of development, instead of antagonizing the organization of labor, is to endeavor to make it responsible, so as to substitute for the irresponsibility of the single laborer the adequate responsibility of the great body of laborers. I have been told that in the most progressive labor unions of England, where the question is an older one than it is here, the aim of the union is to determine by joint action and by agreement with the employers the conditions under which the trade shall be carried on, while the tendency is to be indifferent whether the person employed is in the union or out of the union, provided that the standard regulations thus established for the trade are observed upon both sides. Under such a policy the war of the union is waged against inequitable conditions of life, and not against individual laborers who happen to be outside of the union. It is easy to understand that the employer would prefer to have all such matters entirely under his own control; but it is probably true that, under the complex conditions of modern life, this is no longer absolutely possible anywhere; and it is also probably true that, by a general recognition of this circumstance, the standard of living may be raised in any community, to the great benefit of all concerned.

The tendency to democracy in politics was unquestionably the dominant political fact of the century. Not to attempt to trace the operation of this tendency everywhere, it seemed to show itself not only in the wide extension of the suffrage in such countries as England and the United States, but also in the nation-wide army of Germany. It is true that there is little enough of the free spirit of democracy in a military system like that of Germany. On the other hand, the universal suffrage existing in Germany for the election of members of the Reichstag, and the universal demand of the state for military service from all its people, are both of them instances of the use of the democratic spirit of the times in the service of a different polity. In other words, outside of Russia, and possibly even there, monarchical government in Europe is obliged to depend for its support upon the great body of the nation, instead of upon the power of the great and the noble. In England the monarchy, although it retains the forms and expressions of power that were natural in the time of the Tudors, has become so responsive to the demands of the democracy as to give, in effect, a democratic government. In the United States the century, though it began with a limited suffrage, ends with universal manhood suffrage, and even with woman suffrage in some of the Western States. There is one essential difference, however, which ought never to be forgotten, between the democracy of the United States and the democracy of England. The struggle of democracy in England for centuries has been to convert a government of privilege into a modern democracy. This implies an hereditary disposition on the part of the great body of the people to look up to men of education and position as natural leaders—a tendency which still remains to temper very importantly all the activities of

English public life. In the United States there is no such tendency. Hence the problem of democracy here is to learn how to educate itself to higher standards, and therefore to the attainment of better results. In other words, democracy in the United States is building on hard-pan, and every advance gained is an advance that raises the education of the whole people up to a higher level. Undoubtedly, universal suffrage and the large immigration of people without any experience in self-government have given form to many of our problems; but I often think there is far too great a disposition among us to magnify the difficulties which these conditions present. If all our failures be admitted, whatever they are, the history of the United States is certainly a marvellous one. Surely it is bad philosophy to assume that our history is what it is in despite of, and not because of, our democracy. It is a notable fact that hardly an immigrant who remains in this country long enough to become a citizen is willing to return to live in his own home. This is a striking testimony to the fact that, whatever our shortcomings, the average conditions of life are freer and happier here than anywhere else in the world. And our institutions have certainly sufficed to produce people of the very highest average of intelligence.

The fact is, in my judgment, that our problems arise not so much from universal suffrage as from the effect of the multiplication table applied to all the problems of life. I recollect that Mr. James Bryce, when in this country a few years ago, delivered an interesting lecture which he entitled "An Age of Discontent." In the lecture he pointed out that during the early part of this century the great desire of men was for political liberty. But when political liberty had been obtained, he said, instead of ushering in an epoch of universal good-will, it had brought with it apparently only universal discontent. Allowing the statement to pass unchallenged, I should be inclined to say, first of all, if I were to try to suggest an explanation of the prevailing discontent, that a partial explanation, at least, can be found in the immense increase of popular opportunity that is due to the spread of democracy, and which has resulted in so magnifying every problem that the world has not yet learned how to deal with many of them. The problems are not only new; in scale they are thoroughly in keeping with the times, for nothing is more characteristic of the age than the large units of its enterprise. A single building to-day will hold as many tenants as a block of buildings in the beginning of the last century; a single bridge of our time will cost as much as twenty bridges of the earlier day; and so one might go through the entire catalogue of private and public undertakings. But size often makes simple things difficult. Any one building a house in the country, when he has dug a well, has solved the problem of his water supply; but to supply water for a great city calls for the outlay of millions of dollars, and for the employment of the best engineering talent in the land. Yet nothing has happened except that the problem has been magnified. Thus it is clear that the difficulties created by the multiplication table are real; so that the very enlargement of opportunity that democracy has brought with it has faced democracy with problems far harder than were formerly presented to any government.

Another cause of the prevailing discontent, if that be taken for granted, I find in the constant and uprooting changes in life that have been incident to the rapid progress of scientific invention in our day, and from which no class of people have been exempt. The unrest is so general and so world-wide that it is not surprising that men are seeking to find for it some remedy which, by its thoroughness, seems to give promise of a complete cure. Every one is conscious of the new problems, but no one is wise enough to see how they are to be worked out. Men want a universal panacea. Accordingly, the anarchist and the nihilist say that all government, or even society itself, is a failure; that the thing to do is to destroy the foundations of government or of society as they now exist and to start fresh. The communist, less radical, says that society is not at fault, but that the institution of private property is the source of all trouble. If communism could be introduced, and the people could own everything in common, then, he thinks, the inequalities and injustices of life would disappear. The socialist, on the other hand, recognizing the fallacy of both claims, says, No, that is not the trouble. The state, as the one pre-eminently democratic corporation of the day, ought to control the instruments of industry and commerce. When these are controlled by the state, for the general good, instead of being held as now for private advantage then a better day will be ushered in. And so it goes. It cannot be gainsaid that under every form of government the times are trying men's souls in every condition of life; but there is no universal panacea. There is nothing to be done but patiently to meet each problem as it comes, in the best way possible, in the confidence that in the long run the outcome will be advantageous to mankind. This, at all events, I think may be said of our own people and of their equipment for the problems of the times: that the American people, in great crises, by their self-control, by their willingness to make sacrifices, and by their evident honesty of purpose, have gladdened the hearts of their friends, and have encouraged those who love to believe that mankind is worthy of trust. That our country has not perfectly learned the art of self-government goes without saying; but that it has made progress in many and difficult directions I think must also be admitted.

In the mean while, some of the problems of greatest difficulty are those which come simply from our size. Merely to get out the vote of a great city, or of a State, or of the nation requires so much machinery as to give to the machine in politics a power that does not always make for the public good. It is not surprising, therefore, that wherever this problem is greatest, as in the large cities and the large States, there the tendency to the control of the machine by one man, and to the control of the government by one man through his control of the machine, is the most evident. It does not yet fully appear how the country is to secure the legitimate results now obtained through the party machines, without paying to the machines, as such, a price which is out of all proportion to the value of their services. It is not to be believed, however, for one moment, that the wisdom and patriotism of the future will be any less equal to the solution of our problems than the wisdom and patriotism of the past have been. It is apparent that the power of the machine, in the last statement, lies in its control of the power to nominate, because the control of that power opens or closes for every man the door to public life. In some way, it must be made easier for men whose aim is simply to serve the public to get into public life and to stay in it without loss of self-respect. The many movements toward primary reform which look to regaining for the people the control of nominations are movements in the right direction. It is evident that the public instinct has recognized the source of the difficulty, and that everywhere men are at work trying to find a remedy for the evils of which they have become aware. The saying, "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty," did not originate in our day. We are conscious of our own shortcomings and of our own difficulties, and we are apt to forget those out of which the world has grown. We have only to remember these things to gain heart. In a single word, I believe the problem of good government, in our day and country, is largely a problem of education; and in this view it is interesting to recall what was pointed out not long ago by Dr. Stanley Hall, that education is the one thing as to the value of which all men everywhere, at the present time, are agreed. Not that there is agreement on the methods and detail of education; but all men are agreed that education is a thing to be encouraged, a thing to be desired, a thing to be struggled for, and a thing to profit by. In this education our universities have a large part to play. They are already doing much in the direction of a constructive study of politics and of society. Perhaps they are not doing enough in the direction of the constructive study of industry and commerce, for in an industrial and commercial age both political and social questions are largely shaped by commerce and industry. In economics, the work of the universities is largely critical, not to say destructive; but because of their ability to illuminate the problems of the present with a broad knowledge of what is being done the world over, as well as with the knowledge of the past, and because of their own inherent democracy of spirit which puts them in vital touch with the spirit of the times, I am confident that they may, if they will, make valuable contributions to such a study of industry and commerce as will cause the universities to become still more important factors in shaping the future of the country.

To sum up, therefore, I should say that the trend of the past century has been to a great increase in knowledge, which has been found to be, as of old, the knowledge of good and evil; that this knowledge has become more and more the property of all men rather than of a few; that as a result, the very increase of opportunity has led to the magnifying of the problems with which humanity is obliged to deal; and that we find ourselves, at the beginning of a new century, face to face with problems of world-wide importance and utmost difficulty, and with no new means of coping with them other than the patient education of the masses of men. However others may tremble as they contemplate the perplexities of the coming century, the children of the universities should find it easy to keep heart; for they know that higher things have been developed in pain and struggle out of lower since creation began; and in the atmosphere of the university, with its equality of privilege and wealth of opportunity open to all, they must have learned, if they have learned anything of value, the essential nobility of the democratic spirit that so surely holds the future in its hands—the spirit that seeks, with the strength of all, to serve all and uplift all.

II

THE DANGER

BY

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

If the general outlook for our people be fair, as Mr. Low has pointed out, nevertheless we face dangers in the future. Dangers obviously are of two classes. They are warning shadows which may extend either above an individual or above a race; and in this our search for the whole meaning of modern life we must examine the threat of the future in both these aspects. We take here and first its general warning for the race. Unfortunately it is just this broader danger that many of us are quite ready to ignore. We do not understand it; it seems to have no material threat for us, ourselves; and what is called the "social conscience" is not fully developed in us all. Many among us feel no vivid responsibility for our neighbor or for our children's children. "The nation will last my time" is a too common phrase wherewith a man turns back to his own narrow interests. Untrained in history, he does not know that when a racial danger strikes, it strikes with sudden rage. No magistrate expects it; a few ranting prophets proclaim it and are laughed at—as we are laughing at them to-day. Then comes the lightning bolt. Therefore it behooves even the most selfish of us, for his own sake, if he can find no broader standpoint, to take heed to the danger of the future, lest even he in his own narrow body be involved in the disaster.

To these dangers that approach the nation no man is more fully alive than he whom we have set to be our chief. Again and again, in private speech and in public proclamation, has President Roosevelt cried out words of warning, perhaps never more posi-

tively than in the address which is here incorporated in our series with his approval. It was delivered on Labor Day in 1903, at the New York State Fair at Syracuse; and Mr. Roosevelt weaves happily into his opening sentence the fact that he is addressing an audience of farmers and laborers. Later on he emphasizes that he sees also before him merchants and professional men, that, in short, his words are for the whole broad nation. They are worth our listening.

Governor Higgins; my fellow-citizens:

In speaking on Labor Day at the annual fair of the New York State Agricultural Association, it is natural to keep especially in mind the two bodies who compose the majority of our people and upon whose welfare depends the welfare of the entire State. If circumstances are such that thrift, energy, industry, and forethought enable the farmer, the tiller of the soil, on the one hand, and the wage-worker, on the other, to keep themselves, their wives, and their children in reasonable comfort, then the State is well off, and we can be assured that the other classes in the community will likewise prosper. On the other hand, if there is in the long run a lack of prosperity among the two classes named, then all other prosperity is sure to be more seeming than real. It has been our profound good fortune as a nation that hitherto, disregarding exceptional periods of depression and the normal and inevitable fluctuations, there has been, on the whole, from the beginning of our Government to the present day a progressive betterment alike in the condition of the tiller of the soil and in the condition of the man who, by his manual skill and labor, supports himself and his family, and endeavors to bring up his children so that they may be at least as well off as, and if possible better off than, he himself has been. There are, of course, exceptions, but as a whole the standard of living among the farmers of our country has risen from generation to generation, and the wealth represented on the farms has steadily increased, while the wages of labor have likewise risen, both as regards the actual money paid and as regards the purchasing power which that money represents.

Side by side with this increase in the prosperity of the wage-worker and the tiller of the soil has gone on a great increase in prosperity among the business men and among certain classes of professional men; and the prosperity of these men has been partly the cause and partly the consequence of the prosperity of farmer and wage-worker. It can not be too often repeated that in this country, in the long run, we all of us tend to go up or go down together. If the average of well-being is high, it means that the average wage worker, the average farmer, and the average business man are all alike well off. If the average shrinks, there is not one of these classes which will not feel the shrinkage. Of course there are always some men who are not affected by good times, just as there are some men who are not affected by bad times. But speaking broadly, it is true that if prosperity comes, all of us tend to share more or less therein, and that if adversity comes, each of us, to a greater or less extent, feels the tension. Unfortunately, in this world the innocent frequently find themselves obliged to pay some of the penalty for the misdeeds of the guilty; and so if hard times come, whether they be due to our own fault or to our misfortune; whether they be due to some burst of speculative frenzy that has caused a portion of the business world to lose its head—a loss which no legislation can possibly supply; or whether they be due to any lack of wisdom in a portion of the world of labor—in each case the trouble once started is felt more or less in every walk of life.

It is all-essential to the continuance of our healthy national life that we should recognize this community of interest among our people. The welfare of each of us is dependent fundamentally upon the welfare of all of us, and therefore in public life that man is the best representative of each of us who seeks to do good to each by doing good to all; in other words, whose endeavor it is, not to represent any special class and promote merely that class's selfish interests, but to represent all true and honest men of all sections and all classes, and to work for their interests by working for our common country.

We can keep our Government on a sane and healthy basis, we can make and keep our social system what it should be, only on condition of judging each man, not as a member of a class, but on his worth as a man. It is an infamous thing in our

American life, and fundamentally treacherous to our institutions, to apply to any man any test save that of his personal worth, or to draw between two sets of men any distinction save the distinction of conduct, the distinction that marks off those who do well and wisely from those who do ill and foolishly. There are good citizens and bad citizens in every class as in every locality, and the attitude of decent people toward great public and social questions should be determined, not by the accidental questions of employment or locality, but by those deep-set principles which represent the innermost souls of men.

The failure in public and in private life thus to treat each man on his own merits, the recognition of this Government as being either for the poor as such or for the rich as such, would prove fatal to our Republic, as such failure and such recognition have always proved fatal in the past to other republics. A healthy republican government must rest upon individuals, not upon classes or sections. As soon as it becomes government by a class or by a section it departs from the old American ideal.

It is, of course, the merest truism to say that free institutions are of avail only to people who possess the high and peculiar characteristics needed to take advantage of such institutions. The century that has just closed has witnessed many and lamentable instances in which people have seized a government free in form, or have had it bestowed upon them, and yet have permitted it under the forms of liberty to become some species of despotism or anarchy, because they did not have in them the power to make this seeming liberty one of deed instead of one merely of word. Under such circumstances the seeming liberty may be supplanted by a tyranny or despotism in the first place, or it may reach the road of despotism by the path of license and anarchy. It matters but little which road is taken. In either case the same goal is reached. People show themselves just as unfit for liberty whether they submit to anarchy or to tyranny; and class government, whether it be the government of a plutocracy or the government of a mob, is equally incompatible with the principles established in the days of Washington and perpetuated in the days of Lincoln.

Many qualities are needed by a people which would preserve the power of self-government in fact as well as in name. Among these qualities are forethought, shrewdness, self-restraint, the courage which refuses to abandon one's own rights, and the disinterested and kindly good sense which enables one to do justice to the rights of others. Lack of strength and lack of courage unfit men for self-government on the one hand; and on the other, brutal arrogance, envy—in short, any manifestation of the spirit of selfish disregard, whether of one's own duties or of the rights of others, are equally fatal.

In the history of mankind many republics have risen, have flourished for a less or greater time, and then have fallen because their citizens lost the power of governing themselves and thereby of governing their state; and in no way has this loss of power been so often and so clearly shown as in the tendency to turn the Government into a government primarily for the benefit of one class instead of a government for the benefit of the people as a whole.

Again and again in the republics of ancient Greece, in those of mediæval Italy and mediæval Flanders, this tendency was shown, and wherever the tendency became a habit it invariably and inevitably proved fatal to the State. In the final result it mattered not one whit whether the movement was in favor of one class or of another. The outcome was equally fatal, whether the country fell into the hands of a wealthy oligarchy which exploited the poor or whether it fell under the domination of a turbulent mob which plundered the rich. In both cases there resulted violent alternations between tyranny and disorder, and a final complete loss of liberty to all citizens—destruction in the end overtaking the class which had for the moment been victorious, as well as that which had momentarily been defeated. The death-knell of the Republic had rung as soon as the active power became lodged in the hands of those who sought, not to do justice to all citizens, rich and poor alike, but to stand for one special class and for its interests as opposed to the interests of others.

The reason why our future is assured lies in the fact that our people are genuinely skilled in and fitted for self-government and therefore will spurn the leadership of those who seek to excite this ferocious and foolish class antagonism. The average American knows not only that he himself intends to do about what is right, but that his average fellow-countryman has the same intention and the same power to make his intention effective. He knows, whether he be business man, professional man, farmer, mechanic, employer, or wage-worker, that the welfare of each of these men is bound up with the welfare of all the others; that each is neighbor to the other, is actuated by the same hopes and fears, has fundamentally the same ideals, and that all alike have much the same virtues and the same faults. Our average fellow-citizen is a sane and healthy man, who believes in decency and has a wholesome mind. He therefore feels an equal scorn alike for the man of wealth guilty of the mean and base spirit of arrogance toward those who are less well off, and for the man of small means who in his turn either feels or seeks to excite in others the feeling of mean and base envy for those who are better off. The two feelings, envy and arrogance, are but opposite sides of the same shield, but different developments of the same spirit. Fundamentally, the unscrupulous rich man who seeks to exploit and oppress those who are less well off is in spirit not opposed to, but identical with, the unscrupulous poor man who desires to plunder and oppress those who are better off. The courtier and the demagogue are but developments of the same type under different conditions, each manifesting the same servile spirit, the same desire to rise by pandering to base passions; though one panders to power in the shape of a single man and the other to power in the shape of a multitude. So likewise the man who wishes to rise by wronging others must by right be contrasted, not with the man who likewise wishes to do wrong, though to a different set of people, but with the man who wishes to do justice to all people and to wrong none.

The line of cleavage between good and bad citizenship lies, not between the man of wealth who acts squarely by his fellows and the man who seeks each day's wage by that day's work, wronging no one and doing his duty by his neighbor; nor yet does this line of cleavage divide the unscrupulous wealthy man who exploits others in his own interest, from the demagogue, or from the sullen and envious being who wishes to attack all men of property, whether they do well or ill. On the contrary, the line of cleavage between good citizenship and bad citizenship separates the rich man who does well from the rich man who does ill, the poor man of good conduct from the poor man of bad conduct. This line of cleavage lies at right angles to any such arbitrary line of division as that separating one class from another, one locality from another, or men with a certain degree of property from those of a less degree of property.

The good citizen is the man who, whatever his wealth or his poverty, strives manfully to do his duty to himself, to his family, to his neighbor, to the State; who is incapable of the baseness which manifests itself either in arrogance or in envy, but who, while demanding justice for himself, is no less scrupulous to do justice to others. It is because the average American citizen, rich or poor, is of just this type that we have cause for our profound faith in the future of the Republic.

Ours is a government of liberty, by, through, and under the law. Lawlessness and connivance at law-breaking—whether the law-breaking take the form of a crime of greed and cunning or of a crime of violence—are destructive not only of order, but of the true liberties which can only come through order. If alive to their true interests, rich and poor alike will set their faces like flint against the spirit which seeks personal advantage by overriding the laws, without regard to whether this spirit shows itself in the form of bodily violence by one set of men or in the form of vulpine cunning by another set of men.

Let the watchwords of all our people be the old familiar watchwords of honesty, decency, fair-dealing, and common-sense. The qualities denoted by these words are essential to all of us, as we deal with the complex industrial problems of to-day, the problems affecting not merely the accumulation but even more the wise distribution of wealth. We ask no man's permission when we require him to obey the law; neither the permission of the poor man nor yet of the rich man. Least of all can the man of great wealth afford to break the law, even for his own financial advantage; for the law is his prop and support, and it is both foolish and profoundly unpatriotic for him to fail in giving hearty support to those who show that there is in very fact one law, and one law only, alike for the rich and the poor, for the great and the small.

Men sincerely interested in the due protection of property, and men sincerely interested in seeing that the just rights of labor are guaranteed, should alike remember not only that in the long run neither the capitalist nor the wage-worker can be helped in healthy fashion save by helping the other; but also that to require either side to obey the law and do its full duty toward the community is emphatically to that side's real interest.

There is no worse enemy of the wage-worker than the man who condones mob violence in any shape or who preaches class hatred; and surely the slightest acquaintance with our industrial history should teach even the most short-sighted that the times of most suffering for our people as a whole, the times when business is stagnant, and capital suffers from shrinkage and gets no return from its investments, are exactly the times of hardship, and want, and grim disaster among the poor. If all the existing instrumentalities of wealth could be abolished, the first and severest suffering would come among those of us who are least well off at present. The wage-worker is well off only when the rest of the country is well off; and he can best contribute to this general well-being by showing sanity and a firm purpose to do justice to others.

In his turn the capitalist who is really a conservative, the man who has forethought as well as patriotism, should heartily welcome every effort, legislative or otherwise, which has for its object to secure fair dealing by capital, corporate or individual, toward the public and toward the employee. Such laws as the franchise-tax law in this State, which the Court of Appeals recently unanimously decided constitutional; such a law as that passed in Congress last year for the purpose of establishing a Department of Commerce and Labor, under which there should be a bureau to oversee and secure publicity from the great corporations which do an interstate business; such a law as that passed at the same time for the regulation of the great highways of commerce so as to keep these roads clear on fair terms to all producers in getting their goods to market—these laws are in the interest not merely of the people as a whole, but of the propertied classes. For in no way is the stability of property better assured than by making it patent to our people that property bears its proper share of the burdens of the State; that property is handled not only in the interest of the owner, but in the interest of the whole community.

In other words, legislation to be permanently good for any class must also be good for the nation as a whole; and legislation which does injustice to any class is certain to work harm to the nation. Take our currency system, for example. This nation is on a gold basis. The Treasury of the public is in excellent condition. Never before has the per capita of circulation been as large as it is this day; and this circulation, moreover, is of money, every dollar of which is at par with gold. Now, our having this sound currency system is of benefit to banks, of course, but it is of infinitely more benefit to the people as a whole, because of the healthy effect on business conditions.

In the same way, whatever is advisable in the way of remedial or corrective currency legislation—and nothing revolutionary is advisable under present conditions—must be undertaken only from the standpoint of the business community as a whole, that is, of the American body politic as a whole. Whatever is done, we cannot afford to take any step backward or to cast any doubt upon the certain redemption in standard coin of every circulating note.

Among ourselves we differ in many qualities, of body, head, and heart; we are unequally developed, mentally as well as physically. But each of us has the right to ask that he shall be protected from wrongdoing as he does his work and carries his burden through life. No man needs sympathy because he has to work, because he has a burden to carry. Far and away the best prize that life offers is the chance to work hard at work worth doing; and this is a prize open to every man, for there can be no work better worth doing than that done to keep in health and comfort and with reasonable advantages those immediately dependent upon the husband, the father, or the son.

There is no room in our healthy American life for the mere idler, for the man or the woman whose object it is throughout life to shirk the duties which life ought to bring. Life can mean nothing worth meaning, unless its prime aim is the doing of duty, the achievement of results worth achieving. A recent writer has finely said: "After all, the saddest thing that can happen to a man is to carry no burdens. To be bent under too great a load is bad; to be crushed by it is lamentable; but even in that there are possibilities that are glorious. But to carry no load at all—there is nothing in that. No one seems to arrive at any goal really worth reaching in this world who does not come to it heavy laden."

Surely from our own experience each one of us knows that this is true. From the greatest to the smallest, happiness and usefulness are largely found in the same soul, and the joy of life is won in its deepest and truest sense only by those who have not shirked life's burdens. The men whom we most delight to honor in all this land are those who, in the iron years from '61 to '65, bore on their shoulders the burden of saving the Union. They did not choose the easy task. They did not shirk the difficult duty. Deliberately and of their own free will they strove for an ideal, upward and onward across the stony slopes of greatness. They did the hardest work that was then to be done; they bore the heaviest burden that any generation of Americans ever had to bear; and because they did this they have won such proud joy as it has fallen to the lot of no other men to win, and have written their names forevermore on the golden honor roll of the nation. As it is with the soldier, so it is with the civilian. To win success in the business world, to become a first-class mechanic, a successful farmer, an able lawyer or doctor, means that the man has devoted his best energy and power through long years to the achievement of his ends. So it is in the life of the family, upon which in the last analysis the whole welfare of the nation rests. The man or woman who as bread-winner and home-maker, or as wife and mother, has done all that he or she can do, patiently and uncomplainingly, is to be honored, and is to be envied by all those who have never had the good fortune to feel the need and duty of doing such work. The woman who has borne, and who has reared as they should be reared, a family of children, has in the most emphatic manner deserved well of the Republic. Her burden has been heavy, and she has been able to bear it worthily only by the possession of resolution, of good sense, of conscience, and of unselfishness. But if she has borne it well, then to her shall come the supreme blessing, for in the words of the oldest and greatest of books, "Her children shall rise up and call her blessed"; and among the benefactors of the land her place must be with those who have done the best and the hardest work whether as law-givers or as soldiers, whether in public or in private life.

This is not a soft and easy creed to preach. It is a creed willingly learned only by men and women who, together with the softer virtues, possess also the stronger; who can do, and dare, and die at need, but who while life lasts will never flinch from their allotted task. You farmers, and wage-workers, and business men of this great State, of this mighty and wonderful nation, are gathered together to-day, proud of your State and still prouder of your Nation, because your forefathers and predecessors have lived up to just this creed. You have received from their hands a great inheritance, and you will leave an even greater inheritance to your children and your children's children, provided only that you practise alike in your private and your public lives the strong virtues that have given us as a people greatness in the past. It is not enough to be well-meaning and kindly, but weak; neither is it enough to be strong, unless morality and decency go hand in hand with strength. We must possess the qualities which make us do our duty in our homes and among our neighbors, and in addition we must possess the qualities which are indispensable to the makeup of every great and masterful nation—the qualities of courage and hardihood, of individual initiative and yet of power to combine for a common end, and, above all, the resolute determination to permit no man and no set of men to sunder us one from the other by lines of caste or creed or section. We must act upon the motto of all for each and each for all. There must be ever present in our minds the fundamental truth that in a republic such as ours the only safety is to stand neither for nor against any man because he is rich or because he is poor, because he is engaged in one occupation or another, because he works with his brains or because he works with his hands. We must treat each man on his worth and merits as a man. We must see that each is given a square deal, because he is entitled to no more and should receive no less. Finally we must keep ever in mind that a republic such as ours can exist only by virtue of the orderly liberty which comes through the equal domination of the law over all men alike, and through its administration in such resolute and fearless fashion as shall teach all that no man is above it and no man below it.

III

THE BELIEFS

"RELIGION, SCIENCE, AND MIRACLE"

BY

SIR OLIVER LODGE

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THERE is one element of our being that, in many minds, is so deeply interwoven with every aspect of thought, one question so omnipresent, that no search into the meaning of life can far advance without that question being raised. What attitude does the search assume toward religious faith? This does not necessarily inquire into the particular sect or creed of the searcher. We have reached a point where even the most militant apostle, the one most satisfied as to the value and accuracy of his own beliefs, has ceased to enforce their acceptance upon his neighbor. Some of us might even admit that our heretic neighbor was the better man.

We are all, however, more or less fully aware that some time during the last half-century certain Scientists and certain Churchmen engaged in a somewhat vehement and wordy war. With the details of this strife most of us are not wholly familiar. It centred, we know, upon evolution and upon Adam. Perhaps many of us were unwilling to know more. We avoided inquiry lest our religious faith be shaken by scientific ideas of whose value we were incompetent to judge. Yet in this very withdrawal of ourselves, there were elements of uncertainty, of fear. The spirit of faith was disturbed, even if not made doubtful, in each thoughtful mind.

To all, therefore, who have not closely followed the course of the contest, the two following addresses must come as a relief. They show that this controversy, like many another, begins to be regarded as a thing of the past, that religious faith still survives *even in the minds of many philosophers the most "advanced." Sir Oliver Lodge, M.Sc., F.R.S., D.Sc., LL.D., is among the most widely known of British scientists. Perhaps he has done more than any other living man to bring scientific knowledge into the minds of the common people. Moreover, as head of one of the leading English universities, that of Birmingham, he has done much for the cause of higher education. Among the many honors which have come to him is that of being made, in* 1905, *President of the Social and Political Education League. The material of the following address is substantially that of a lecture recently delivered by him to his students at Birmingham, though it was rearranged for publication. The Duke of Northumberland ranks high among the great lords of the British Empire, as well as among the great scientific writers of the world. His religious attitude has always shown closer clinging to old forms of faith than that of the radical scientist and is well worth comparing with that of Sir Oliver.*

In brief, religion has but passed through another of those crises common to all things that live and grow. Again and again in the course of ages, in Luther's time, in Galileo's, in other epochs and with other faiths less widely known, have the very foundations of the "living faith" seemed undermined. In other days even more perhaps than now, have men who loved and feared, shut their eyes in terror and turned away from the threatened downfall. Yet when the despairing mourners looked again, behold, the storm had passed them by; and belief in God, a living principle in the hearts of men, rose up mighty as ever, unshaken and eternal.

I

SCIENCE AND RELIGION

THERE was a time when religious people distrusted the increase of knowledge, and condemned the mental attitude which takes delight in its pursuit, being in dread lest part of the foundation of their faith should be undermined by a too ruthless and unqualified spirit of investigation.

There has been a time when men engaged in the quest of systematic knowledge had an idea that the results of their studies would be destructive not only of outlying accretions but of substantial portions of the edifice of religion which has been gradually erected by the prophets and saints of humanity.

Both these epochs are now nearly over. All men realize that truth is the important thing, and that to take refuge in any shelter less substantial than the truth is but to deceive themselves and become liable to abject exposure when a storm comes on. On the other hand most men are aware that it is a sign of unbalanced judgment to conclude, on the strength of a few momentous discoveries, that the whole structure of religious belief built up through the ages by the developing human race from fundamental emotions and instincts and experiences, is unsubstantial and insecure.

The business of science, including in that term, for present purposes, philosophy and the science of criticism, is with foundations; the business of religion is with superstructure. Science has laboriously laid a solid foundation of great strength, and its votaries have rejoiced over it; though their joy must perforce be somewhat dumb and inexpressive until the more vocal apostles of art and literature and music are able to utilize it for their more aërial and winsome kind of building: so for the present the work of science strikes strangers as severe and forbidding. In a neighboring territory Religion occupies a splendid building—a gorgeously decorated palace; concerning which, Science, not yet having discovered a substantial and satisfactory basis, is sometimes inclined to suspect that it is phantasmal and mainly supported on legend.

Without any controversy it may be admitted that the foundation and the superstructure as at present known do not correspond; and hence that there is an apparent dislocation. Men of science have exclaimed that in their possession is the only foundation of solid truth, adopting in that sense the words of the poet:

> To the solid ground
> Of Nature trusts the mind which builds for aye.

While on the other hand men of Religion, snugly ensconced in their traditional eyrie, and objecting to the digging and the hammer-ing below, have shuddered as the artificial props and pillars by which they supposed it to be buttressed gave way one after another; and have doubted whether they could continue to enjoy peace in their ancient fortress if it turned out that part of it was suspended in air, without any perceptible foundation at all, like the phantom city in "Gareth and Lynette" whereof it could be said:

> the city is built
> To music, therefore never built at all
> And therefore built for ever.

Remarks as to lack of solid foundation may be regarded as typical of the mild kind of sarcasm which people with a superficial smattering of popular science sometimes try to pour upon religion. They think that to accuse a system of being devoid of solid foundation is equivalent to denying its stability. On the contrary, as Tennyson no doubt perceived, the absence of anything that may crumble or be attacked and knocked away, or that can be shaken by an earthquake, is a safeguard rather than a danger. It is the absence of material foundation that makes the Earth itself, for instance, so secure: if it were based upon a pedestal, or otherwise solidly supported, we might be anxious about the stability and durability of the support. As it is, it floats securely in the emptiness of space. Similarly the persistence of its diurnal spin is secured by the absence of anything to stop it: not by any maintaining mechanism.

To say that a system does not rest upon one special fact is not to impugn its stability. The body of scientific truth rests on no solitary material fact or group of facts, but on a basis of harmony and consistency between facts: its support and ultimate sanction is of no material character. To conceive of Christianity as built upon an Empty Tomb, or any other plain physical or historical fact, is dangerous. To base it upon the primary facts of consciousness or upon direct spiritual experience, as Paul did, is safer.[1] There are parts of the structure of Religion which may safely be underpinned by physical science: the theory of death and of continued personal existence is one of them; there are many others, and there will be more. But there are and always will be vast religious regions for which that kind of scientific foundation would be an impertinence, though a scientific contribution is appropriate; perhaps these may be summed up in some such phrase as "the relation of the soul to God."

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[1] It will be represented that I am here intending to cast doubt upon a fundamental tenet of the Church. That is not my intention. My contention here is merely that a great structure should not rest upon a point. So might a lawyer properly say: "To base a legal

Assertions are made concerning material facts in the name of religion; these science is bound to criticise. Testimony is borne to inner personal experience; on that physical science does well to be silent. Nevertheless many of us are impressed with the conviction that everything in the universe may become intelligible if we go the right way to work; and so we are coming to recognize, on the one hand, that every system of truth must be intimately connected with every other, and that this connection will constitute a trustworthy support as soon as it is revealed by the progress of knowledge; and on the other hand, that the extensive foundation of truth now being laid by scientific workers will ultimately support a gorgeous building of æsthetic feeling and religious faith.

Theologians have been apt to be too easily satisfied with a pretended foundation that would not stand scientific scrutiny; they seem to believe that the religious edifice, with its mighty halls for the human spirit, can rest upon some event or statement, instead of upon man's nature as a whole; and they are apt to decline to reconsider their formulæ in the light of fuller knowledge and development.

Scientific men on the other hand have been liable to suppose that no foundation which they have not themselves laid can be of a substantial character, thereby ignoring the possibility of an ancestral accumulation of sound though unformulated experience; and a few of the less considerate, about a quarter of a century ago, amused themselves by instituting a kind of jubilant rat-hunt under the venerable theological edifice: a procedure

decision upon the position of a comma, or other punctuation—however undisputed its occurrence—is dangerous; to base it upon the general sense of a document is safer."—O. L.

necessarily obnoxious to its occupants. The exploration was unpleasant, but its results have been purifying and healthful, and the permanent substratum of fact will in due time be cleared of the decaying refuse of centuries.

Some of the chief hurly-burly of contention between the apparently attacking force and the ostensibly defending garrison arose round that bulwark which upholds the possibility of the Miraculous; and the efficacy of Prayer. It will be sufficient if in this Address I discuss these two connected subjects.

II

MEANING OF MIRACLE

I have to begin by saying that the term "miracle" is ambiguous, and that no discussion which takes that term as a basis can be very fruitful, since the combatants may all be meaning different things.

(1) One user of the term may mean merely an unusual event of which we do not know the history and cause, a bare wonder or prodigy; such an event as the course of nature may, for all we know, bring about once in ten thousand years or so, leaving no record of its occurrence in the past and no anticipatory probability of its re-occurrence in the future. The raining down of fire on Sodom, or on Pompeii; the sudden engulfing of Korah, or of Marcus Curtius; or, on a different plane, the advent of some transcendent genius, or even of a personality so lofty as to be called divine, may serve as examples.

(2) Another employer of the term "miracle" may add to this idea a definite hypothesis, and may mean an act due to unknown intelligent and living agencies operating in a self-willed and unpredictable manner, thus effecting changes that would not otherwise have occurred and that are not in the regular course of nature. The easiest example to think of is one wherein the lower animals are chiefly concerned; for instance, consider the case of the community of an ant hill, on a lonely uninhabited island, undisturbed for centuries, whose dwelling is kicked over one day by a shipwrecked sailor. They had reason to suppose

that events were uniform, and all their difficulties ancestrally known, but they are perturbed by an unintelligible miracle. A different illustration is afforded by the presence of an obtrusive but unsuspected live insect in a galvanometer or other measuring instrument in a physical laboratory; whereby metrical observations would be complicated, and all regularity perturbed in a puzzling and capricious and, to half-instructed knowledge, supernatural, or even diabolical, manner. Not dissimilar are some of the asserted events in a Séance Room.

(3) Another may use the term "miracle" to mean the utilization of unknown laws, say of healing or of communication; laws unknown and unformulated, but instinctively put into operation by mental activity of some kind—sometimes through the unconscious influence of so-called self-suggestion, sometimes through the activity of another mind, or through the personal agency of highly gifted beings, operating on others; laws whereby time and space appear temporarily suspended, or extraordinary cures are effected, or other effects produced, such as the levitations and other physical phenomena related of the saints.

(4) Another may incorporate with the word "miracle" a still further infusion of theory, and may mean always a direct interposition of Divine Providence, whereby at some one time and place a perfectly unique occurrence is brought about, which is out of relation with the established order of things, is not due to what has gone before, and is not likely to occur again. The most striking examples of what can be claimed under this head are connected with the personality of Jesus Christ, notably the Virgin Birth and the Empty Tomb; by which I mean the more material and controversial aspects of those generally accepted doctrines—the Incarnation and the Resurrection.

To summarize this part, the four categories are: (1) A natural or orderly though unusual portent, (2) a disturbance due to unknown live or capricious agencies, (3) a utilization by mental or spiritual power of unknown laws, (4) direct interposition of the Deity.

III

ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE MIRACULOUS

In some cases an argument concerning the so-called miraculous will turn upon the question whether such things are theoretically possible.

In other cases it will turn upon whether or not they have ever actually happened.

In a third case the argument will be directed to the question whether they happened or not on some particular occasion.

And in a fourth case the argument will hinge upon the particular category under which any assigned occurrence is to be placed:

For instance take a circumstance which undoubtedly has occurred, one upon the actual existence of which there can be no dispute, and yet one of which the history and manner is quite unknown. Take for instance the origin of life; or to be more definite, say the origin of life on any given planet, the Earth for instance. There is practically no doubt that the Earth was once a hot and molten and sterile globe. There is no doubt at all that it is now the abode of an immense variety of living organic nature. How did that life arise? Is it an event to be placed under head (1), as an unexpected outcome of the ordinary course of nature, a development naturally following upon the formation of extremely complex molecular aggregates—protoplasm and the like—as the Earth cooled; or must it be placed under head (4), as due to the direct Fiat of the Eternal?

Again, take the existence of Christianity as a living force in the world of to-day. This is based upon a series of events of undoubtedly substantial truth centering round a historical personage; under which category is that to be placed? Was his advent to be regarded as analogous to the appearance of a mighty genius such as may at any time revolutionize the course of human history; or is he to be regarded as a direct manifestation and incarnation of the Deity Himself?

I am using these great themes as illustrations merely, for our present purpose; I have no intention of entering upon them here and now. They are questions which have been asked, and presumably answered, again and again; and it is on lines such as these that debates concerning the miraculous are usually conducted. But what I want to say is that so long as we keep the discussion on these lines, and ask this sort of question, though we shall succeed in raising difficulties, we shall not progress far toward a solution of any of them: nor shall we gain much aid toward life.

IV

LAW AND GUIDANCE

The way to progress is not thus to lose ourselves in detail and in confusing estimates of possibilities, but to consider two main issues which may very briefly be formulated thus:

(1) Are we to believe in unbreakable law?
(2) Are we to believe in spiritual guidance?

If we accept only the first of these issues we accept an orderly and systematic universe, with no arbitrary cataclysms and no breaks in its essential continuity. Catastrophes occur, but they occur in the regular course of events, they are not brought about by capricious and lawless agencies; they are a part of the entire cosmos, regulated on the principle of unity and uniformity: though to the dwellers in any time and place, from whose senses most of the cosmos is hidden, they may appear to be sudden and portentous dislocations of natural order.

So much is granted if we accept the first of the above issues. If we accept the second, we accept a purposeful and directed universe, carrying on its evolutionary processes from an inevitable past into an anticipated future with a definite aim; not left to the random control of inorganic forces like a motor-car which has lost its driver, but permeated throughout by mind and intention and foresight and will. Not mere energy, but constantly directed energy—the energy being controlled by something which is not energy, nor akin to energy, something which presumably is immanent in the universe and is akin to life and mind.

The alternative to these two beliefs is a universe of random chance and capricious disorder, not a cosmos or universe at all—a multiverse rather; consequently I take it that we all hold to one or other of these two beliefs. But do we and can we hold to both?

So far as I conceive my present mission, it is to urge that the two beliefs are not inconsistent with each other, and that we may and should contemplate and gradually feel our way toward accepting both.

(1) We must realize that the Whole is a single undeviating law-saturated cosmos;

(2) But we must also realize that the Whole consists not of matter and motion alone, nor yet of spirit and will alone, but of both and all; we must even yet further, and enormously, enlarge our conception of what the Whole contains.

Scientific men have preached the first of these desiderata, but have been liable to take a narrow view regarding the second. Keenly alive on law, and knowledge, and material fact, they have been occasionally blind to art, to emotion, to poetry, and to the higher mental and spiritual environment which inspires and glorifies the realm of knowledge.

The temptation of religious men has also lain in the direction of too narrow an exclusiveness, for they have been so occupied with their own conceptions of the fulness of things that they have failed to grasp what is meant by the first of the above requirements; they have allowed the emotional content to overpower the intellectual, and have too often ignored, disliked, and practically rejected an integral portion of the scheme—appearing to desire, what no one can really wish for, a world of uncertainty and caprice, where effects can be produced without adequate cause, and where the connection of antecedent and consequent can be arbitrarily dislocated.

The same vice has therefore dogged the steps of both classes of men. The acceptance of miracle, in the crude sense of arbitrary intervention and special providence, is appropriate to those who feel enmeshed in the grip of inorganic and mechanical law, without being able to reconcile it with the idea of constant guidance and intelligent control. And a denial of miracle, in every sense, that is of all providential guidance, and all controlling intelligence, may also be the result of the very same feeling, experienced by people who are conscious of just the same kind of inability—people who cannot recognize a directing intelligence in the midst of law and order, and hence regard the absence of dislocation and interference as a mark of the inorganic, the mechanical, the inexorable: wherefore the denial of miracle has often led to a sort of practical atheism and to an assertion of the valuelessness of prayer.

But to those who are able to combine the acceptance of both the above faiths, prayer is part of the orderly cosmos, and may be an efficient portion of the guiding and controlling will; somewhat as the desire of the inhabitants of a town for a civic improvement may be a part of the agency which ultimately brings it about, no matter whether the city be representatively or autocratically governed.

The two beliefs cannot be logically and effectively combined by those who think of themselves as something detached from and outside the cosmos, operating on it externally and seeking to modify its manifestations by vain petitions addressed to a system of ordered force. To such persons the above propositions must seem contradictory or mutually exclusive. But if we can grasp the idea that we ourselves are an intimate part of the whole scheme, that our wishes and desires are a part of the controlling and guiding will—then our mental action cannot but be efficient, if we exercise it in accordance with the highest and truest laws of our being.

V

HUMAN EXPERIENCE

Let us survey our position:

We find ourselves for a few score years incarnate intelligences on this planet; we have not always been here, and we shall not always be here: we are here, in fact, each of us, for but a very short period, but we can study the conditions of existence while here, and we perceive clearly that a certain amount of guidance and control is in our hands. For better for worse we can, and our legislators do, influence the destinies of the planet. The process is called "making history." We can all, even the humblest, to some extent influence the destinies of individuals with whom we come into contact. We have therefore a certain sense of power and responsibility.

It is not likely that we are the only, or the highest, intelligent agents in the whole wide universe, nor that we possess faculties and powers denied to all else; nor is it likely that our own activity will be always as limited as it is now. The Parable of the Talents is full of meaning, and it contains a meaning that is not often brought out.

It is absurd to deny the attributes of guidance and intelligence and personality and love to the Whole, seeing that we are part of the Whole, and are personally aware of what we mean by those words in ourselves. These attributes are existent, therefore, and cannot be denied; cannot be denied even to the Deity.

Is the planet subject to intelligent control? We know that it is: we ourselves can change the course of rivers for predestined ends, we can make highways, can unite oceans, can devise inventions, can make new compounds, can transmute species, can plan fresh variety of organic life; we can create works of art; we can embody new ideas and lofty emotions in forms of language and music, and can leave them as Platonic offspring (*vide* Symposium) to remote posterity. Our power is doubtless limited, but we can surely learn to do far more than we have yet so far in the infancy of humanity accomplished; more even than we have yet conjectured as within the range of possibility.

Our progress already has been considerable. It is but a moderate time since our greatest men were chipping flints and carving bones into the likeness of reindeer. More recently they became able to build cathedrals and make poems. Now we are momentarily diverted from immortal pursuits by vivid interest in that kind of competition which has replaced the competition of the sword, and by those extraordinary inequalities of possession and privilege which have resulted from the invention of an indestructible and transmissible form of riches, a form over which neither moth nor rust has any power. We raise an incense of smoke, and offer sacrifices of squalor and ugliness, in worship of this new idol. But it will pass; human life is not meant to continue as it is now in city slums; nor is the strenuous futility of mere accumulation likely to satisfy people when once they have been really educated; the world is beautiful, and may be far more widely happy than it has been yet. Those who have preached this hitherto have been heard with deaf ears, but some day we shall awake to a sense of our true planetary importance and shall recognize the higher possibilities of existence. Then shall we realize and practically believe what is involved in those words of poetic insight:

"The heaven, even the heavens are the Lord's: but the earth hath he given to the children of men."

There is a vast truth in this yet to be discovered; power and influence and responsibility lie before us, appalling in their magnitude, and as yet we are but children playing on the stage before the curtain is rolled up for the drama in which we are to take part.

But we are not left to our own devices: we of this living generation are not alone in the universe. What we call the individual is strengthened by elements emerging from the social whole out of which he is born. We are not things of yesterday, nor of to-morrow. We do not indeed remember our past, we are not aware of our future, but in common with everything else we must have had a past and must be going to have a future. Some day we may find ourselves able to realize both.

Meanwhile what has been our experience here? We have not been left solitary. Every newcomer to the planet, however helpless and strange he be, finds friends awaiting him, devoted and self-sacrificing friends, eager to care for and protect his infancy and to train him in the ways of this curious world. It is typical of what goes on throughout conscious existence; the guidance which we exert, and to which we are subject now, is but a phase of something running through the universe; and when the time comes for us to quit this sphere and enter some larger field of action, I doubt not that we shall find there also that kindness and help and patience and love, without which no existence would be tolerable or even at some stages possible.

Miracles lie all around us: only they are not miraculous. Special providences envelop us: only they are not special. Prayer is a means of communication as natural and as simple as is speech.

Realize that you are part of a great, orderly, and mutually helpful cosmos, that you are not stranded or isolated in a foreign universe, but that you are part of it and closely akin to it; and your sense of sympathy will be enlarged, your power of free communication will be opened, and the heartfelt aspiration and communion and petition that we call prayer will come as easily and as naturally as converse with those human friends and relations whose visible bodily presence gladdens and enriches your present life.

VI

SUMMARY

The atmosphere of religion should be recognized as enveloping and permeating everything; it should not be specially or exclusively sought as an emanation from signs and wonders. Strange and ultranormal things may happen, and are well worthy of study, but they are not to be regarded as especially holy. Some of them may represent either extension or survival of human faculty, while others may be an inevitable endowment or attribute of a sufficiently lofty character; but none of them can be accepted without investigation. Testimony concerning such things is to be treated in a sceptical and yet open-minded spirit; the results of theory and experiment are to be utilized, as in any other branch of natural knowledge; and indiscriminate dogmatic rejection is as inappropriate as wholesale uncritical acceptance.

The bearing on the hopes and fears of humanity of such unusual facts as can be verified may be considerable, but they bear no exceptional witness to guidance and control. Guidance and control, if admitted at all, must be regarded as constant and continuous; and it is just this uniform character that makes them so difficult to recognize. It is always difficult to perceive or apprehend anything which is perfectly regular and continuous.

Those fish, for instance, which are submerged in ocean-depths, beyond the reach of waves and tides, are probably utterly unconscious of the existence of water; and, however intelligent, they can have but little reason to believe in that medium, notwithstanding that their whole being, life, and motion, is dependent upon it from instant to instant. The motion of the earth, again, furious rush though it is—fifty times faster than a cannon ball—is quite inappreciable to our senses; it has to be inferred from celestial observations, and it was strenuously disbelieved by the agnostics of an earlier day.

Uniformity is always difficult to grasp; our senses are not made for it, and yet it is characteristic of everything that is most efficient; jerks and jolts are easy to appreciate, but they do not conduce to progress. Steady motion is what conveys us on our way, collisions are but a retarding influence. The seeker after miracle, in the exceptional and narrow or exclusive sense, is pining for a catastrophe; the investigator of miracle, in the continuous and broad or comprehensive sense, has the universe for a laboratory.

"RELIGION AND PHYSICAL SCIENCE"

BY THE

DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLAND

Of all the changes which have taken place in the attitude of thoughtful men in the course of the last thirty or forty years none are more striking than those affecting the relations between religion and physical science. The keen controversies which formerly raged between the two schools of thought, and the bitterness thereby engendered, have become things of the past, and the mutual distrust which certainly exercised a baneful influence upon both parties has been greatly diminished, if it has not altogether disappeared. To what is this great change due? Is it owing to lukewarmness, and to the indifference of either of the combatants to their own pursuits and doctrines? Is it because the faith of either in their own theories has been undermined? Has victory declared itself so palpably on one side that the other is vanquished, and silenced, if not convinced? Or does each disputant take a saner and more appreciative view of his own position and sphere, and that of his opponent, being content to perform his own work without burdening himself with criticism of the other?

These are very grave and vital questions for all those who are strongly impressed with the importance of either of these great branches of human thought and effort, and however little we may be able to appreciate in our own day their full significance there can be little doubt that on the answer to them must depend the legitimacy of our hopes for the advance and improvement of the highest interests of mankind.

It is this, among many other things, which invests with peculiar importance the able address delivered by the president of the British Association at a recent meeting at Belfast. The distinguished services which the protracted and indefatigable labors of Professor Dewar have rendered to science, and the advances which it has made under his guidance, together with his well-known tolerance of opinion and width of grasp, attach the utmost weight and authority to any views he may express. Consequently it is very noteworthy that he should on that occasion have called attention in a marked manner to what he fitly describes as the "epoch-making deliverance" of Professor Tyndall in the same city some thirty years ago, and should have dwelt with special emphasis on his declaration on behalf of men of science that "we claim, and we shall wrest, from theology the entire domain of cosmological theory." Professor Dewar adds that this "claim has been practically, though often unconsciously, conceded." In other words, if I understand the Professor rightly, the somewhat militant dictum of Tyndall has been justified by the defeat of the theologian, and his abandonment since the year 1874 of a field he has been compelled to admit he had no right to occupy. This must be a somewhat startling assertion for some persons who, while sincerely interested in the results of scientific research, and profoundly sensible of the value of the studies of those gifted men who devote themselves to it, are nevertheless firmly attached to the current theology of the day, and are absolutely unaware of having resigned an inch of its territory.

It is, therefore, justifiable, and, indeed, necessary, to examine this declaration of Tyndall's a little closely, and to ascertain exactly what it means before inquiring whether its prognostics have been actually fulfilled. But as it is always hazardous to criticise any single sentence of an utterance without giving its context it may be well to quote the whole passage.

"The impregnable position of science may be described in a few words. We claim, and we shall wrest, from theology the entire domain of cosmological theory. All schemes and systems which thus infringe upon the domain of science must, *in so far as they do this*, submit to its control, and relinquish all thought of controlling it. Acting otherwise proved disastrous in the past, and is simply fatuous to-day. Every system which would escape the fate of an organism too rigid to adjust itself to its environment, must be plastic to the extent that the growth of knowledge demands."[1]

Now let us revert to the sentence of the above which is quoted by Professor Dewar, and is indeed the text of that part of his address: "We claim, and we shall wrest, from theology the entire domain of cosmological theory."

"Theology" is the science which treats of the nature, attributes, and modes of working of the Deity; "cosmology" is the science which deals with the origin, qualities, and properties, active or passive, of the material world; a "domain" is either the lordship over a territory, or the territory under rule. And, put into less figurative and formal language, these words mean that the science which treats of the nature, attributes, and modes of the working of Deity has nothing to tell us of the origin, qualities, and properties of the material world, can throw no light upon them, and is, therefore, not worth listening to on the point.

Now one of three things must be true. Either there is no Deity, in which case there can be no science about Him, and it is impossible to wrest anything from that which has no existence; or there is a Deity, but we can know nothing about Him, in which case there can equally be no science of theology; or, thirdly, there is at any rate a Great First Cause, who has revealed Himself to some extent to man, and of whose attributes, etc., man can thus form some idea. If this last be the true state of the case (and we may gather from Tyndall's address that this was the direction in which his own convictions pointed), surely every scientist must regard the material universe as one of the most striking revelations of its supreme author which He has afforded.

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[1] See *Forty-fourth Report of the British Association* (1874), p. xcv.

And thus we are brought to this signification of Tyndall's dictum, viz., that the students of cosmology claim that the most striking revelation of Himself which God has given to man is no part of that science which deals with His nature and attributes. This seems hardly a scientific or logical position. Theology may or may not have grappled satisfactorily with the problems. She may need direction and limitation, but she can be no more dispossessed by physical science than the starry heavens can be shut to Galileo by the Index Expurgatorius.

An analogous, though not an identical, relation to that between theology and physical science may be traced between history and archæology. For many ages history held its own almost, if not entirely, unaided by the researches and discoveries of the archæologist. History so isolated not infrequently drew unwarranted conclusions, not so much on her theoretical and æsthetic side (for the philosophy of history and politics has advanced but slowly) as in her facts, and especially in their details. And she left, and, for the matter of that, still leaves, much unaccounted for and unexplained. Archæology, dealing with the material part, the dry bones, of the subject, has corrected some of her conclusions. But what would be thought of an attempt to wrest from history the whole domain of archæology for this reason? How great would have been the loss if Layard and Flinders Petrie, Sayce and Evans had turned Herodotus out of court! For many years the most suggestive pages of the Father of History have seemed as idle tales; and those too impatient to tolerate an apparent paradox, or to wait for a solution of a startling statement, dubbed him the father of lies. But wider knowledge has largely vindicated the Greek, and the process is still going on. It is, for instance, only quite recently that the excavations in Crete have verified the accuracy of the stories of Minos, the labyrinth, and the Minotaur.

And just as the day is dawning when not only is archæology corroborating history, but history is, in innumerable cases, interpreting and vivifying antiquarian discoveries in a very unexpected manner, so there are many persons who are quite willing to bide in patience for the time when theology will illuminate many a scientific problem, and when science shall throw an unlooked-for light on theology.

The truth is that there are two classes of minds, each of which finds it extremely difficult, not merely to sympathize with, but to conceive the attitude of the other. The one is slow to believe anything the truth of which has not been either proved experimentally or logically shown to be probable. The other experiences no difficulty in saying "credo quia impossibile," and indeed regards such an attitude in the finite postulated by the existence of the infinite. For both these modes of thought there can be for many people no common and simultaneous acceptance. But it does not necessarily follow that either should attack the other. In the Middle Ages, the theologian assaulted the scientist with great success, having the "bayonets" on his side. Thirty years ago the tables were turned, and the scientist's onslaught on the theologian is expressed by Tyndall in a tone as decided as that of Urban the Eighth. Each wished to "wrest the domain of cosmological theory" from the other, and neither had the smallest right to do anything of the sort!

Another great obstacle to a common understanding is a verbal one. All men's thoughts are better than their words. Every one knows what it is to have ideas passing through the mind which the language at the thinker's command is totally inadequate to express. In the case of an exact science, this difficulty is in some degree met by the coining of new words, a practice so prevalent in the present day as to have lately called forth a vigorous protest in some quarters. But theology is not an exact science, and its subject-matter is to a large extent incapable of precise definition, as the history of all sects and heresies abundantly shows. Words are commonly used in a vague and general sense, and this vagueness is intolerable to minds trained in the schools of experimental research.

The true eirenicon consists in the frank recognition of these facts, and of the right of either party to traverse the whole domain of human thought without an indictment of trespass, each retaining its own opinion of the ability of the other to discover and develop the resources of that domain, but without interference with its proceedings. If this were fully recognized, science would at any rate be the gainer by her liberty to attract an audience from among those who, being much affected by theological and ecclesiastical influences, are scared by a militant attitude on the part of the scientist.

There is perhaps no better example of the character and value of such a position than the bearing which it would have on the acceptance of the great doctrine of evolution. As a working hypothesis which affords from the purely material side of the question a probable explanation of a vast body of fact, and which furnishes an admirable basis for the coordination and classification of cosmical phenomena, it receives the adhesion of almost every one at all qualified to form an opinion. And this is all that science need, or indeed does, demand for her most brilliant generalizations. Let us hear Professor Dewar's finely expressed statement of her posture.

"It is only poverty of language," he says, "and the necessity of compendious expression, that oblige the man of science to resort to metaphor, and to speak of the laws of Nature. In reality, he does not pretend to formulate any laws for Nature, since to do so would be to assume a knowledge of the inscrutable cause from which alone such laws could emanate. When he speaks of a 'law of Nature' he simply indicates a sequence of events which, so far as his experience goes, is invariable, and which therefore enables him to predict, to a certain extent, what will happen in given circumstances. But however seemingly bold may be the speculation in which he permits himself to indulge, he does not claim for his best hypothesis more than a provisional validity. He does not forget that to-morrow may bring a new experience compelling him to recast the hypothesis of to-day. This plasticity of scientific thought, depending on reverent recognition of the vastness of the unknown, is oddly made a matter of reproach by the very people who harp upon the limitations of human knowledge."

But the theologian approaches the matter from another standpoint. He is accustomed to resolve problems according to what he considers to be their absolute and abstract truth or falsehood, and he asks, not whether "so far as experience goes" the theory of evolution holds good, but whether it is in fact the true explanation of the material world as we see it, and how far it is so. Is it not evident that science cannot, and does not profess to, give an answer? But two things are plain. That environment does modify the type of living organisms cannot be denied by any one. That all such organisms have been evolved from one primordial form cannot be affirmed with any certainty.

Between these two extremes lies an ocean of possibilities. Each man will adopt his position partly according to the character of his own mind, partly according to the value he attaches to abstract doctrines, partly according to his capacity for collecting evidence and for weighing it fairly. Why should he not hold it without insisting that his neighbor should assume it also? Why should not the man who cannot accept the Darwinian doctrine as the real explanation of the problems it claims to solve, entertain it as a working hypothesis? Why should the Darwinian wrest the domain of cosmological theory from him, when he himself can claim nothing more for his best hypothesis about the cosmos than provisional validity?

Professor Dewar asserts that science adopts a humble and a reverent attitude. He confesses on her behalf her "ignorance of the ultimate nature of matter, of the ultimate nature of energy, and still more of the origin and ultimate synthesis of the two." Nay, further, he regards the mystery of matter as inscrutable. One of the greatest theologians who ever existed asserted an equal humility for theology more than 1800 years ago, when he declared that he saw through a glass darkly, and knew only in part. Whether the theologian and the natural philosopher will ever see perfectly eye to eye until both stand face to face with

Him whose actings they alike study, and know even as they are known, may well be doubted. But every true advance achieved by either must necessarily tend to bring them to the same goal, however temporarily divergent the winding and intricate paths leading thereto may appear to be. Theology, no less than natural science (to quote after Professor Dewar the noble words of Lord Kelvin), is "bound by the everlasting law of honor to face fearlessly every problem that can fairly be presented to it," and to assert its right to range over every domain of theory with absolute freedom. It is not by elbowing out her sister that either will promote her own true interests, but by patient and tolerant occupation and development of a field amply sufficient for both to seek to advance side by side from one conquest to another till both shall join hands in the full enlightenment of the perfect day.

IV

THE SUCCESSES

FIVE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO CIVILIZATION"

BY

CHARLES W. ELIOT

PRESIDENT OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY

FROM the problems which menace the future, we turn for encouragement to the successes already achieved. As President Eliot himself expresses it, "Our country's future perils, whether visible or still unimagined, are to be met with courage and constancy founded firmly on these popular achievements of the past." How great these achievements have really been, he makes clear to us in the following address, which was first delivered before the Chautauqua educational conference and is here presented with the approval of President Eliot and by the courtesy of his publishers, the Century Company. The address is patriotic, as we all are patriotic, but it is wholly free from any extravagance of praise or pride. It uses nouns, not adjectives, states facts without attempting to color them. It is thoughtful, moderate, and conservative.

There was a time when America passed through an era of giant adjectives, of self-congratulation, self-consciousness, perhaps of boastfulness. Recently, however, as if in reaction against this excess, many of our citizens have swung to the other extreme. We have criticised our country, and decried ourselves; we have magnified every fault. Perhaps we have been more pessimistic of tongue than of heart; yet the fact remains that our country has been deliberately underrated by those who love it best. It is well

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[1] Copyright 1897 by the Century Co.

then that a man who has the confidence of us all, a man serene and aged, the dean of American education, for thirty-eight years the president of our largest university, should speak out before us all, soberly estimate our past, and tell us what he accepts, what posterity will undoubtedly accept, as to the worthiness of the work so far accomplished by our United States.

LOOKING back over forty centuries of history, we observe that many nations have made characteristic contributions to the progress of civilization, the beneficent effects of which have been permanent, although the races that made them may have lost their national form and organization, or their relative standing among the nations of the earth. Thus, the Hebrew race, during many centuries, made supreme contributions to religious thought; and the Greek, during the brief climax of the race, to speculative philosophy, architecture, sculpture, and the drama. The Roman people developed military colonization, aqueducts, roads and bridges, and a great body of public law, large parts of which still survive; and the Italians of the middle ages and the Renaissance developed ecclesiastical organization and the fine arts, as tributary to the splendor of the church and to municipal luxury. England, for several centuries, has contributed to the institutional development of representative government and public justice; the Dutch, in the sixteenth century, made a superb struggle for free thought and free government; France, in the eighteenth century, taught the doctrine of individual freedom and the theory of human rights; and Germany, at two periods within the nineteenth century, fifty years apart, proved the vital force of the sentiment of nationality. I ask you to consider with me what characteristic and durable contributions the American people have been making to the progress of civilization.

The first and principal contribution to which I shall ask your attention is the advance made in the United States, not in theory only, but in practice, toward the abandonment of war as the means of settling disputes between nations, the substitution of discussion and arbitration, and the avoidance of armaments. If the intermittent Indian fighting and the brief contest with the Barbary corsairs be disregarded, the United States passed through only four years and a quarter of international war in the one hundred and seven years following the adoption of the Constitution. Within the same period the United States have been a party to forty-seven arbitrations—being more than half of all that have taken place in the modern world. The questions settled by these arbitrations have been just such as have commonly caused wars, namely, questions of boundary, fisheries, damage caused by war or civil disturbances, and injuries to commerce. Some of them were of great magnitude, the four made under the treaty of Washington (May 8, 1871) being the most important that have ever taken place. Confident in their strength, and relying on their ability to adjust international differences, the United States have habitually maintained, by voluntary enlistment for short terms, a standing army and a fleet which, in proportion to the population, are insignificant.

The beneficent effects of this American contribution to civilization are of two sorts: in the first place, the direct evils of war and of preparations for war have been diminished; and secondly, the influence of the war spirit on the perennial conflict between the rights of the single personal unit and the powers of the multitude that constitute organized society—or, in other words, between individual freedom and collective authority—has been reduced to the lowest terms. War has been, and still is, the school of collectivism, the warrant of tyranny. Century after century, tribes, clans, and nations have sacrificed the liberty of the individual to the fundamental necessity of being strong for combined defence or attack in war. Individual freedom is crushed in war, for the nature of war is inevitably despotic. It says to the private person: "Obey without a question, even unto death; die in this ditch, without knowing why; walk into that deadly thicket; mount this embankment, behind which are men who will try to kill you, lest you should kill them; make part of an immense machine for blind destruction, cruelty, rapine, and killing." At this moment every young man in Continental Europe learns the lesson of absolute military obedience, and feels himself subject to this crushing power of militant society, against which no rights of the individual to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness avail anything. This pernicious influence, inherent in the social organization of all Continental Europe during many centuries, the American people have for generations escaped, and they show other nations how to escape it. I ask your attention to the favorable conditions under which this contribution of the United States to civilization has been made.

There has been a deal of fighting on the American continent during the past three centuries; but it has not been of the sort which most imperils liberty. The first European colonists who occupied portions of the coast of North America encountered in the Indians men of the Stone Age, who ultimately had to be resisted and quelled by force. The Indian races were at a stage of development thousands of years behind that of the Europeans. They could not be assimilated; for the most part they could not be taught or even reasoned with; with a few exceptions they had to be driven away by prolonged fighting, or subdued by force so that they would live peaceably with the whites. This warfare, however, always had in it for the whites a large element of self-defence—the homes and families of the settlers were to be defended against a stealthy and pitiless foe. Constant exposure to the attacks of savages was only one of the formidable dangers and difficulties which for a hundred years the early settlers had to meet, and which developed in them courage, hardiness, and persistence. The French and English wars on the North American continent, always more or less mixed with Indian warfare, were characterized by race hatred and religious animosity—two of the commonest causes of war in all ages; but they did not tend to fasten upon the English colonists any objectionable public authority, or to contract the limits of individual liberty. They furnished a school of martial qualities at small cost to liberty. In the War of Independence there was a distinct hope and purpose to enlarge individual liberty. It made possible a confederation of the colonies, and, ultimately, the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. It gave to the thirteen colonies a lesson in collectivism, but it was a needed lesson on the necessity of combining their forces to resist an oppressive external authority. The war of 1812 is properly called the Second War of Independence, for it was truly a fight for liberty and for the rights of neutrals, in resistance to the impressment of seamen and other oppressions growing out of European conflicts. The civil war of 1861–65 was waged, on the side of the North, primarily, to prevent the dismemberment of the country, and, secondarily and incidentally, to destroy the institution of slavery. On the Northern side it therefore called forth a generous element of popular ardor in defence of free institutions; and though it temporarily caused centralization of great powers in the government, it did as much to promote individual freedom as it did to strengthen public authority.

In all this series of fightings the main motives were self-defence, resistance to oppression, the enlargement of liberty, and the conservation of national acquisitions. The war with Mexico, it is true, was of a wholly different type. That was a war of conquest, and of conquest chiefly in the interest of African slavery. It was also an unjust attack made by a powerful people on a feeble one; but it lasted less than two years, and the number of men engaged in it was at no time large. Moreover, by the treaty which ended the war, the conquering nation agreed to pay the conquered eighteen million dollars in partial compensation for some of the territory wrested from it, instead of demanding a huge war-indemnity, as the European way is. Its results contradicted the anticipations both of those who advocated and of those who opposed it. It was one of the wrongs which prepared the way for the great rebellion; but its direct evils were of moderate extent, and it had no effect on the perennial conflict between individual liberty and public power.

In the mean time, partly as the results of Indian fighting and the Mexican war, but chiefly through purchases and arbitrations, the American people had acquired a territory so extensive, so defended by oceans, gulfs, and great lakes, and so intersected by those great natural highways, navigable rivers, that it would obviously be impossible for any enemy to overrun or subdue it. The civilized nations of Europe, western Asia, and northern Africa have always been liable to hostile incursions from without. Over and over again barbarous hordes have overthrown established civilizations; and at this moment there is not a nation of Europe which does not feel obliged to maintain monstrous armaments for defence against its neighbors. The American people have long been exempt from such terrors, and are now absolutely free from this necessity of keeping in readiness to meet heavy assaults. The absence of a great standing army and of a large fleet has been a main characteristic of the United States, in contrast with the other civilized nations; this has been a great inducement to immigration, and a prime cause of the country's rapid increase in wealth. The United States have no formidable neighbor, except Great Britain in Canada. In April, 1817, by a convention made between Great Britain and the United States, without much public discussion or observation, these two powerful nations agreed that each should keep on the Great Lakes only a few police vessels of insignificant size and armament. This agreement was made but four years after Perry's naval victory on Lake Erie, and only three years after the burning of Washington by a British force. It was one of the first acts of Monroe's first administration, and it would be difficult to find in all history a more judicious or effectual agreement between two powerful neighbors. For eighty years this beneficent convention has helped to keep the peace. The European way would have been to build competitive fleets, dockyards, and fortresses, all of which would have helped to bring on war during the periods of mutual exasperation which have occurred since 1817. Monroe's second administration was signalized, six years later, by the declaration that the United States would consider any attempt on the part of the Holy Alliance to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States. This announcement was designed to prevent the introduction on the American continent of the horrible European system—with its balance of power, its alliances offensive and defensive in opposing groups, and its perpetual armaments on an enormous scale. That a declaration expressly intended to promote peace and prevent armaments should now be perverted into an argument for arming and for a belligerent public policy is an extraordinary perversion of the true American doctrine.

The ordinary causes of war between nation and nation have been lacking in America for the last century and a quarter. How many wars in the world's history have been due to contending dynasties; how many of the most cruel and protracted wars have been due to religious strife; how many to race hatred! No one of these causes of war has been efficacious in America since the French were overcome in Canada by the English in 1759. Looking forward into the future, we find it impossible to imagine circumstances under which any of these common causes of war can take effect on the North American continent. Therefore, the ordinary motives for maintaining armaments in time of peace, and concentrating the powers of government in such a way as to interfere with individual liberty, have not been in play in the United States, as among the nations of Europe, and are not likely to be.

Such have been the favorable conditions under which America has made its best contribution to the progress of our race.

There are some people of a perverted sentimentality who occasionally lament the absence in our country of the ordinary inducements to war, on the ground that war develops certain noble qualities in some of the combatants, and gives opportunity for the practice of heroic virtues, such as courage, loyalty, and self-sacrifice. It is further said that prolonged peace makes nations effeminate, luxurious, and materialistic, and substitutes for the high ideals of the patriot soldier the low ideals of the farmer, manufacturer, tradesman, and pleasure-seeker. This view seems to me to err in two opposite ways. In the first place, it forgets that war, in spite of the fact that it develops some splendid virtues, is the most horrible occupation that human beings can possibly engage in. It is cruel, treacherous, and murderous. Defensive warfare, particularly on the part of a weak nation against powerful invaders or oppressors, excites a generous sympathy; but for every heroic defence there must be an attack by a preponderating force, and war, being the conflict of the two, must be judged by its moral effects, not on one party, but on both parties. Moreover, the weaker party may have the worse cause. The immediate ill effects of war are bad enough, but its after effects are generally worse, because indefinitely prolonged and indefinitely wasting and damaging. At this moment, thirty-one years after the end of our civil war, there are two great evils afflicting our country which took their rise in that war, namely, (1) the belief of a large proportion of our people in money without intrinsic value, or worth less than its face, and made current solely by act of Congress, and (2) the payment of immense annual sums in pensions. It is the paper-money delusion born of the civil war which generated and supports the silver-money delusion of to-day. As a consequence of the war, the nation has paid $2,000,000,000 in pensions within thirty-three years. So far as pensions are paid to disabled persons, they are a just and inevitable, but unproductive, expenditure; so far as they are paid to persons who are not disabled—men or women—they are in the main not only unproductive, but demoralizing; so far as they promote the marriage of young women to old men, as a pecuniary speculation, they create a grave social evil. It is impossible to compute or even imagine the losses and injuries already inflicted by the fiat-money delusion; and we know that some of the worst evils of the pension system will go on for a hundred years to come unless the laws about widows' pensions are changed for the better. It is a significant fact that in 1895, of the existing pensioners of the war of 1812 only twenty-one were surviving soldiers or sailors, while 3,826 were widows.

War gratifies, or used to gratify, the combative instinct of mankind, but it gratifies also the love of plunder, destruction, cruel discipline, and arbitrary power. It is doubtful whether fighting with modern appliances will continue to gratify the savage instinct of combat; for it is not likely that in the future two opposing lines of men can ever meet, or any line or column reach an enemy's intrenchments. The machine-gun can only be compared to the scythe, which cuts off every blade of grass within its sweep. It has made cavalry charges impossible, just as the modern ironclad has made impossible the manœuvres of one of Nelson's fleets. On land, the only mode of approach of one line to another must hereafter be by concealment, crawling, or surprise. Naval actions will henceforth be conflicts between opposing machines, guided, to be sure, by men; but it will be the best machine that wins, and not necessarily the most enduring men. War will become a contest between treasuries or warchests; for now that 10,000 men can fire away a million dollars' worth of ammunition in an hour, no poor nation can long resist a rich one, unless there be some extraordinary difference between the two in mental and moral strength.

The view that war is desirable omits also the consideration that modern social and industrial life affords ample opportunities for the courageous and loyal discharge of duty, apart from the barbarities of warfare. There are many serviceable occupations in civil life which call for all the courage and fidelity of the best soldier, and for more than his independent responsibility, because not pursued in masses or under the immediate command of superiors. Such occupations are those of the locomotive engineer, the electric lineman, the railroad brakeman, the city fireman, and the policeman. The occupation of the locomotive engineer requires constantly a high degree of skill, alertness, fidelity, and resolution, and at any moment may call for heroic self-forgetfulness. The occupation of a lineman requires all the courage and endurance of a soldier, whose lurking foe is mysterious and invisible. In the two years 1893 and 1894 there were 34,000 trainmen killed and wounded on the railroads of the United States, and 25,000 other railroad employés besides. I need not enlarge on the dangers of the fireman's occupation, or on the disciplined gallantry with which its risks are habitually incurred. The policeman in large cities needs every virtue of the best soldier, for in the discharge of many of his most important duties he is alone. Even the feminine occupation of the trained nurse illustrates every heroic quality which can possibly be exhibited in war; for she, simply in the way of duty, without the stimulus of excitement or companionship, runs risks from which many a soldier in hot blood would shrink. No one need be anxious about the lack of opportunities in civilized life for the display of heroic qualities. New industries demand new forms of fidelity and self-sacrificing devotion. Every generation develops some new kind of hero. Did it ever occur to you that the "scab" is a creditable type of nineteenth-century hero? In defence of his rights as an individual, he deliberately incurs the reprobation of many of his fellows, and runs the immediate risk of bodily injury or even of death. He also risks his livelihood for the future, and thereby the well-being of his family. He steadily asserts in action his right to work on such conditions as he sees fit to make, and, in so doing, he exhibits remarkable courage and renders a great service to his fellow-men. He is generally a quiet, unpretending, silent person, who values his personal freedom more than the society and approbation of his mates. Often he is impelled to work by family affection, but this fact does not diminish his heroism. There are file-closers behind the line of battle of the bravest regiment. Another modern personage who needs heroic endurance, and often exhibits it, is the public servant who steadily does his duty against the outcry of a party press bent on perverting his every word and act. Through the telegram, cheap postage, and the daily newspaper, the forces of hasty public opinion can now be concentrated and expressed with a rapidity and intensity unknown to preceding generations. In consequence, the independent thinker or actor, or the public servant, when his thoughts or acts run counter to prevailing popular or party opinions, encounters sudden and intense obloquy, which, to many temperaments, is very formidable. That habit of submitting to the opinion of the majority which democracy fosters renders the storm of detraction and calumny all the more difficult to endure—makes it, indeed, so intolerable to many citizens that they will conceal or modify their opinions rather than endure it. Yet the very breath of life for a democracy is free discussion, and the taking account, of all opinions honestly held and reasonably expressed. The unreality of the vilification of public men in the modern press is often revealed by the sudden change when an eminent public servant retires or dies. A man for whom no words of derision or condemnation were strong enough yesterday is recognized to-morrow as an honorable and serviceable person, and a credit to his country. Nevertheless, this habit of partisan ridicule and denunciation in the daily reading-matter of millions of people calls for a new kind of courage and toughness in public men, and calls for it, not in brief moments of excitement only, but steadily, year in and year out. Clearly, there is no need of bringing on wars in order to breed heroes. Civilized life affords plenty of opportunities for heroes, and for a better kind than war or any other savagery has ever produced. Moreover, none but lunatics would set a city on fire in order to give opportunities for heroism to firemen, or introduce the cholera or yellow fever to give physicians and nurses opportunity for practising disinterested devotion, or condemn thousands of people to extreme poverty in order that some well-to-do persons might practise a beautiful charity. It is equally crazy to advocate war on the ground that it is a school for heroes.

Another misleading argument for war needs brief notice. It is said that war is a school of national development—that a nation, when conducting a great war, puts forth prodigious exertions to raise money, supply munitions, enlist troops, and keep them in the field, and often gets a clearer conception and a better control of its own materials and moral forces while making these unusual exertions. The nation which means to live in peace necessarily foregoes, it is said, these valuable opportunities of abnormal activity. Naturally, such a nation's abnormal activities devoted to destruction would be diminished; but its normal and abnormal activities devoted to construction and improvement ought to increase.

One great reason for the rapid development of the United States since the adoption of the Constitution is the comparative exemption of the whole people from war, dread of war, and preparations for war. The energies of the people have been directed into other channels. The progress of applied science during the present century, and the new ideals concerning the well-being of human multitudes, have opened great fields for the useful application of national energy. This immense territory of ours, stretching from ocean to ocean, and for the most part but imperfectly developed and sparsely settled, affords a broad field for the beneficent application of the richest national forces during an indefinite period. There is no department of national activity in which we could not advantageously put forth much more force than we now expend; and there are great fields which we have never cultivated at all. As examples, I may mention the post-office, national sanitation, public works, and education. Although great improvements have been made during the past fifty years in the collection and delivery of mail matter, much still remains to be done both in city and country, and particularly in the country. In the mail facilities secured to our people we are far behind several European governments, whereas we ought to be far in advance of every European government except Switzerland, since the rapid interchange of ideas, and the promotion of family, friendly, and commercial intercourse are of more importance to a democracy than to any other form of political society. Our national government takes very little pains about the sanitation of the country, or its deliverance from injurious insects and parasites; yet these are matters of gravest interest, with which only the general government can deal, because action by separate States or cities is necessarily ineffectual. To fight pestilences needs quite as much energy, skill, and courage as to carry on war; indeed, the foes are more insidious and awful, and the means of resistance less obvious. On the average and the large scale, the professions which heal and prevent disease, and mitigate suffering, call for much more ability, constancy, and devotion than the professions which inflict wounds and death and all sorts of human misery. Our government has never touched the important subject of national roads, by which I mean not railroads, but common highways; yet here is a great subject for beneficent action through government, in which we need only go for our lessons to little republican Switzerland. Inundations and droughts are great enemies of the human race, against which government ought to create defences, because private enterprise cannot cope with such wide-spreading evils. Popular education is another great field in which public activity should be indefinitely enlarged, not so much through the action of the Federal government—though even there a much more effective supervision should be provided than now exists—but through the action of States, cities, and towns. We have hardly begun to apprehend the fundamental necessity and infinite value of public education, or to appreciate the immense advantages to be derived from additional expenditure for it. What prodigious possibilities of improvement are suggested by the single statement that the average annual expenditure for the schooling of a child in the United States is only about eighteen dollars! Here is a cause which requires from hundreds of thousands of men and women keen intelligence, hearty devotion to duty, and a steady uplifting and advancement of all its standards and ideals. The system of public instruction should embody for coming generations all the virtues of the mediæval church. It should stand for the brotherhood and unity of all classes and conditions; it should exalt the joys of the intellectual life above all material delights; and it should produce the best constituted and most wisely directed intellectual and moral host that the world has seen. In view of such unutilized opportunities as these for the beneficent application of great public forces, does it not seem monstrous that war should be advocated on the ground that it gives occasion for rallying and using the national energies?

The second eminent contribution which the United States have made to civilization is their thorough acceptance, in theory and practice, of the widest religious toleration. As a means of suppressing individual liberty, the collective authority of the Church, when elaborately organized in a hierarchy directed by one head and absolutely devoted in every rank of its service, comes next in proved efficiency to that concentration of powers in government which enables it to carry on war effectively. The Western Christian Church, organized under the Bishop of Rome, acquired, during the middle ages, a centralized authority which quite overrode both the temporal ruler and the rising spirit of nationality. For a time Christian Church and Christian State acted together, just as in Egypt, during many earlier centuries, the great powers of civil and religious rule had been united. The Crusades marked the climax of the power of the Church. Thereafter, Church and State were often in conflict; and during this prolonged conflict the seeds of liberty were planted, took root, and made some sturdy growth. We can see now, as we look back on the history of Europe, how fortunate it was that the colonization of North America by Europeans was deferred until after the period of the Reformation, and especially until after the Elizabethan period in England, the Luther period in Germany, and the splendid struggle of the Dutch for liberty in Holland. The founders of New England and New York were men who had imbibed the principles of resistance both to arbitrary civil power and to universal ecclesiastical authority. Hence it came about that within the territory now covered by the United States no single ecclesiastical organization ever obtained a wide and oppressive control, and that in different parts of this great region churches very unlike in doctrine and organization were almost simultaneously established. It has been an inevitable consequence of this condition of things that the Church, as a whole, in the United States has not been an effective opponent of any form of human rights. For generations it has been divided into numerous sects and denominations, no one of which has been able to claim more than a tenth of the population as its adherents; and the practices of these numerous denominations have been profoundly modified by political theories and practices, and by social customs natural to new communities formed under the prevailing conditions of free intercourse and rapid growth. The constitutional prohibition of religious tests as qualifications for office gave the United States the leadership among the nations in dissociating theological opinions and political rights. No one denomination or ecclesiastical organization in the United States has held great properties, or has had the means of conducting its ritual with costly pomp or its charitable works with imposing liberality. No splendid architectural exhibitions of Church power have interested or overawed the population. On the contrary, there has prevailed in general a great simplicity in public worship, until very recent years. Some splendors have been lately developed by religious bodies in the great cities; but these splendors and luxuries have been almost simultaneously exhibited by religious bodies of very different, not to say opposite, kinds. Thus, in New York city, the Jews, the Greek Church, the Catholics, and the Episcopalians have all erected, or undertaken to erect, magnificent edifices. But these recent demonstrations of wealth and zeal are so distributed among differing religious organizations that they cannot be imagined to indicate a coming centralization of ecclesiastical influence adverse to individual liberty.

In the United States, the great principle of religious toleration is better understood and more firmly established than in any other nation of the earth. It is not only embodied in legislation, but also completely recognized in the habits and customs of good society. Elsewhere it may be a long road from legal to social recognition of religious liberty, as the example of England shows. This recognition alone would mean, to any competent student of history, that the United States had made an unexampled contribution to the reconciliation of just governmental power with just freedom for the individual, inasmuch as the partial establishment of religious toleration has been the main work of civilization during the past four centuries. In view of this characteristic and infinitely beneficent contribution to human happiness and progress, how pitiable seem the temporary outbursts of bigotry and fanaticism which have occasionally marred the fair record of our country in regard to religious toleration! If any one imagines that this American contribution to civilization is no longer important—that the victory for toleration has been already won—let him recall the fact that the last years of the nineteenth century witnessed two horrible religious persecutions, one by a Christian nation, the other by a Moslem—one, of the Jews by Russia, and the other, of the Armenians by Turkey.

The third characteristic contribution which the United States have made to civilization has been the safe development of a manhood suffrage nearly universal. The experience of the United States has brought out several principles with regard to the suffrage which have not been clearly apprehended by some eminent political philosophers. In the first place, American experience has demonstrated the advantages of a gradual approach to universal suffrage, over a sudden leap. Universal suffrage is not the first and only means of attaining democratic government; rather, it is the ultimate goal of successful democracy. It is not a specific for the cure of all political ills; on the contrary, it may itself easily be the source of great political evils. The people of the United States feel its dangers to-day. When constituencies are large, it aggravates the well-known difficulties of party government; so that many of the ills which threaten democratic communities at this moment, whether in Europe or America, proceed from the breakdown of party government rather than from failures of universal suffrage. The methods of party government were elaborated where suffrage was limited and constituencies were small. Manhood suffrage has not worked perfectly well in the United States, or in any other nation where it has been adopted, and it is not likely very soon to work perfectly anywhere. It is like freedom of the will for the individual —the only atmosphere in which virtue can grow, but an atmosphere in which sin can also grow. Like freedom of the will, it needs to be surrounded with checks and safeguards, particularly in the childhood of the nation; but, like freedom of the will, it is the supreme good, the goal of perfected democracy. Secondly, like freedom of the will, universal suffrage has an educational effect, which has been mentioned by many writers, but has seldom been clearly apprehended or adequately described. This educational effect is produced in two ways: In the first place, the combination of individual freedom with social mobility, which a wide suffrage tends to produce, permits the capable to rise through all grades of society, even within a single generation; and this freedom to rise is intensely stimulating to personal ambition. Thus every capable American, from youth to age, is bent on bettering himself and his condition. Nothing can be more striking than the contrast between the mental condition of an average American belonging to the laborious classes, but conscious that he can rise to the top of the social scale, and that of a European mechanic, peasant, or tradesman, who knows that he cannot rise out of his class, and is content with his hereditary classification. The state of mind of the American prompts to constant struggle for self-improvement and the acquisition of all sorts of property and power. In the second place, it is a direct effect of a broad suffrage that the voters become periodically interested in the discussion of grave public problems, which carry their minds away from the routine of their daily labor and household experience out into larger fields. The instrumentalities of this prolonged education have been multiplied and improved enormously within the past fifty years. In no field of human endeavor have the fruits of the introduction of steam and electrical power been more striking than in the methods of reaching multitudes of people with instructive narratives, expositions, and arguments. The multiplication of newspapers, magazines, and books is only one of the immense developments in the means of reaching the people. The advocates of any public cause now have it in their power to provide hundreds of newspapers with the same copy, or the same plates, for simultaneous issue. The mails provide the means of circulating millions of leaflets and pamphlets. The interest in the minds of the people which prompts to the reading of these multiplied communications comes from the frequently recurring elections. The more difficult the intellectual problem presented in any given election, the more educative the effect of the discussion. Many modern industrial and financial problems are extremely difficult, even for highly educated men. As subjects of earnest thought and discussion on the farm, and in the work-shop, factory, rolling-mill, and mine, they supply a mental training for millions of adults, the like of which has never before been seen in the world.

In these discussions, it is not only the receptive masses that are benefited; the classes that supply the appeals to the masses are also benefited in a high degree. There is no better mental exercise for the most highly trained man than the effort to expound a difficult subject in so clear a way that the untrained man can understand it. In a republic in which the final appeal is to manhood suffrage, the educated minority of the people is constantly stimulated to exertion, by the instinct of self-preservation as well as by love of country. They see dangers in proposals made to universal suffrage, and they must exert themselves to ward off those dangers. The position of the educated and well-to-do classes is a thoroughly wholesome one in this respect: they cannot depend for the preservation of their advantages on land-owning, hereditary privilege, or any legislation not equally applicable to the poorest and humblest citizen. They must maintain their superiority by being superior. They cannot live in a too safe corner.

I touch here on a misconception which underlies much of the criticism of universal suffrage. It is commonly said that the rule of the majority must be the rule of the most ignorant and incapable, the multitude being necessarily uninstructed as to taxation, public finance, and foreign relations, and untrained to active thought on such difficult subjects. Now, universal suffrage is merely a convention as to where the last appeal shall lie for the decision of public questions; and it is the rule of the majority only in this sense. The educated classes are undoubtedly a minority; but it is not safe to assume that they monopolize the good sense of the community. On the contrary, it is very clear that native good judgment and good feeling are not proportional to education, and that among a multitude of men who have only an elementary education a large proportion will possess both good judgment and good feeling. Indeed, persons who can neither read nor write may possess a large share of both, as is constantly seen in regions where the opportunities for education in childhood have been scanty or inaccessible. It is not to be supposed that the cultivated classes, under a régime of universal suffrage, are not going to try to make their cultivation felt in the discussion and disposal of public questions. Any result under universal suffrage is a complex effect of the discussion of the public question in hand by the educated classes in the presence of the comparatively uneducated, when a majority of both classes taken together is ultimately to settle the question. In practice, both classes divide on almost every issue. But, in any case, if the educated classes cannot hold their own with the uneducated, by means of their superior physical, mental, and moral qualities, they are obviously unfit to lead society. With education should come better powers of argument and persuasion, a stricter sense of honor, and a greater general effectiveness. With these advantages, the educated classes must undoubtedly appeal to the less educated, and try to convert them to their way of thinking; but this is a process which is good for both sets of people. Indeed, it is the best possible process for the training of freemen, educated or uneducated, rich or poor.

It is often assumed that the educated classes become impotent in a democracy, because the representatives of those classes are not exclusively chosen to public office. This argument is a very fallacious one. It assumes that the public offices are the places of greatest influence; whereas, in the United States, at least, that is conspicuously not the case. In a democracy, it is important to discriminate influence from authority. Rulers and magistrates may or may not be persons of influence; but many persons of influence never become rulers, magistrates, or representatives in parliaments or legislatures. The complex industries of a modern state, and its innumerable corporation services, offer great fields for administrative talent which were entirely unknown to preceding generations; and these new activities attract many ambitious and capable men more strongly than the public service. These men are not on that account lost to their country or to society. The present generation has wholly escaped from the conditions of earlier centuries, when able men who were not great land-owners had but three outlets for their ambition—the army, the church, or the national civil service. The national service, whether in an empire, a limited monarchy, or a republic, is now only one of many fields which offer to able and patriotic men an honorable and successful career. Indeed, legislation and public administration necessarily have a very second-hand quality; and more and more legislators and administrators become dependent on the researches of scholars, men of science, and historians, and follow in the footsteps of inventors, economists, and political philosophers. Political leaders are very seldom leaders of thought; they are generally trying to induce masses of men to act on principles thought out long before. Their skill is in the selection of practicable approximations to the ideal; their arts are arts of exposition and persuasion; their honor comes from fidelity under trying circumstances to familiar principles of public duty. The real leaders of American thought in this century have been preachers, teachers, jurists, seers, and poets. While it is of the highest importance, under any form of government, that the public servants should be men of intelligence, education, and honor, it is no objection to any given form, that under it large numbers of educated and honorable citizens have no connection with the public service.

Well-to-do Europeans, when reasoning about the working of democracy, often assume that under any government the property-holders are synonymous with the intelligent and educated class. That is not the case in the American democracy. Any one who has been connected with a large American university can testify that democratic institutions produce plenty of rich people who are not educated and plenty of educated people who are not rich, just as mediæval society produced illiterate nobles and cultivated monks.

Persons who object to manhood suffrage as the last resort for the settlement of public questions are bound to show where, in all the world, a juster or more practicable regulation or convention has been arrived at. The objectors ought at least to indicate where the ultimate decision should, in their judgment, rest—as, for example, with the land-owners, or the property-holders, or the graduates of secondary schools, or the professional classes. He would be a bold political philosopher who, in these days, should propose that the ultimate tribunal should be constituted in any of these ways. All the experience of the civilized world fails to indicate a safe personage, a safe class, or a safe minority, with which to deposit this power of ultimate decision. On the contrary, the experience of civilization indicates that no select person or class can be trusted with that power, no matter what the principle of selection. The convention that the majority of males shall decide public questions has obviously great recommendations. It is apparently fairer than the rule of any minority, and it is sure to be supported by an adequate physical force. Moreover, its decisions are likely to enforce themselves. Even in matters of doubtful prognostication, the fact that a majority of the males do the prophesying tends to the fulfilment of the prophecy. At any rate, the adoption or partial adoption of universal male suffrage by several civilized nations is coincident with unexampled ameliorations in the condition of the least fortunate and most numerous classes of the population. To this general amelioration many causes have doubtless contributed; but it is reasonable to suppose that the acquisition of the power which comes with votes has had something to do with it.

Timid or conservative people often stand aghast at the possible directions of democratic desire, or at some of the predicted results of democratic rule; but meantime the actual experience of the American democracy proves: 1, that property has never been safer under any form of government; 2, that no people have ever welcomed so ardently new machinery, and new inventions generally; 3, that religious toleration was never carried so far, and never so universally accepted; 4, that nowhere have the power and disposition to read been so general; 5, that nowhere has governmental power been more adequate, or more freely exercised, to levy and collect taxes, to raise armies and to disband them, to maintain public order, and to pay off great public debts —national, State, and town; 6, that nowhere have property and well-being been so widely diffused; and 7, that no form of government ever inspired greater affection and loyalty, or prompted to greater personal sacrifices in supreme moments. In view of these solid facts, speculations as to what universal suffrage would have done in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or may do in the twentieth, seem futile indeed. The most civilized nations of the world have all either adopted this final appeal to manhood suffrage, or they are approaching that adoption by rapid stages. The United States, having no customs or traditions of an opposite sort to overcome, have led the nations in this direction, and have had the honor of devising, as a result of practical experience, the best safeguards for universal suffrage, safeguards which, in the main, are intended to prevent hasty public action, or action based on sudden discontents or temporary spasms of public feeling. These checks are intended to give time for discussion and deliberation, or, in other words, to secure the enlightenment of the voters before the vote. If, under new conditions, existing safeguards prove insufficient, the only wise course is to devise new safeguards.

The United States have made to civilization a fourth contribution of a very hopeful sort, to which public attention needs to be directed, lest temporary evils connected therewith should prevent the continuation of this beneficent action. The United States have furnished a demonstration that people belonging to a great variety of races or nations are, under favorable circumstances, fit for political freedom. It is the fashion to attribute to the enormous immigration of the last fifty years some of the failures of the American political system, and particularly the American failure in municipal government, and the introduction in a few States of the rule of the irresponsible party foremen known as "bosses." Impatient of these evils, and hastily accepting this improbable explanation of them, some people wish to depart from the American policy of welcoming immigrants.

In two respects the absorption of large numbers of immigrants from many nations into the American commonwealth has been of great service to mankind. In the first place, it has demonstrated that people who at home have been subject to every sort of aristocratic or despotic or military oppression become within less than a generation serviceable citizens of a republic; and, in the second place, the United States have thus educated to freedom many millions of men. Furthermore, the comparatively high degree of happiness and prosperity enjoyed by the people of the United States has been brought home to multitudes in Europe by friends and relatives who have emigrated to this country, and has commended free institutions to them in the best possible way. This is a legitimate propaganda vastly more effective than any annexation or conquest of unwilling people, or of people unprepared for liberty.

It is a great mistake to suppose that the process of assimilating foreigners began in the last century. The eighteenth century provided the colonies with a great mixture of peoples, although the English race predominated then, as now. When the Revolution broke out, there were already English, Irish, Scotch, Dutch, Germans, French, Portuguese, and Swedes in the colonies. The French were, to be sure, in small proportion, and were almost exclusively Huguenot refugees, but they were a valuable element in the population. The Germans were well diffused, having established themselves in New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Georgia. The Scotch were scattered through all the colonies. Pennsylvania, especially, was inhabited by an extraordinary mixture of nationalities and religions. Since steam-navigation on the Atlantic and railroad transportation on the North American continent became cheap and easy, the tide of immigration has greatly increased; but it is very doubtful if the amount of assimilation going on in the nineteenth century has been any larger, in proportion to the population and wealth of the country, than it was in the eighteenth. The main difference in the assimilation going on in the two centuries is this, that in the eighteenth century the newcomers were almost all Protestants, while in the nineteenth century a considerable proportion have been Catholics. One result, however, of the importation of large numbers of Catholics into the United States has been a profound modification of the Roman Catholic Church in regard to the manners and customs of both the clergy and the laity, the scope of the authority of the priest, and the attitude of the Catholic Church toward public education. This American modification of the Roman Church has reacted strongly on the Church in Europe.

Another great contribution to civilization made by the United States is the diffusion of material well-being among the population. No country in the world approaches the United States in this respect. It is seen in that diffused elementary education which implants for life a habit of reading, and in the habitual optimism which characterizes the common people. It is seen in the housing of the people and of their domestic animals, in the comparative costliness of their food, clothing, and household furniture, in their implements, vehicles, and means of transportation, and in the substitution, on a prodigious scale, of the work of machinery for the work of men's hands. This last item in American well-being is quite as striking in agriculture, mining, and fishing, as it is in manufactures. The social effects of the manufacture of power, and of the discovery of means of putting that power just where it is wanted, have been more striking in the United States than anywhere else. Manufactured and distributed power needs intelligence to direct it: the bicycle is a blind horse, and must be steered at every instant; somebody must show a steam-drill where to strike and how deep to go. So far as men and women can substitute for the direct expenditure of muscular strength the more intelligent effort of designing, tending, and guiding machines, they win promotion in the scale of being, and make their lives more interesting as well as more productive. It is in the invention of machinery for producing and distributing power, and at once economizing and elevating human labor, that American ingenuity has been most conspicuously manifested. The high price of labor in a sparsely settled country has had something to do with this striking result; but the genius of the people and of their government has had much more to do with it. As proof of the general proposition, it suffices merely to mention the telegraph and telephone, the sewing-machine, the cotton-gin, the mower, reaper, and threshing-machine, the dish-washing machine, the river steamboat, the sleeping-car, the boot and shoe machinery, and the watch machinery. The ultimate effects of these and kindred inventions are quite as much intellectual as physical, and they are developing and increasing with a portentous rapidity which sometimes suggests a doubt whether the bodily forces of men and women are adequate to resist the new mental strains brought upon them. However this may prove to be in the future, the clear result in the present is an unexampled diffusion of well-being in the United States.

These five contributions to civilization—peace-keeping, religious toleration, the development of manhood suffrage, the welcoming of new-comers, and the diffusion of well-being—I hold to have been eminently characteristic of our country, and so important that, in spite of the qualifications and deductions which every candid citizen would admit with regard to every one of them, they will ever be held in the grateful remembrance of mankind. They are reasonable grounds for a steady, glowing patriotism. They have had much to do, both as causes and as effects, with the material prosperity of the United States; but they are all five essentially moral contributions, being triumphs of reason, enterprise, courage, faith, and justice, over passion, selfishness, inertness, timidity, and distrust. Beneath each one of these developments there lies a strong ethical sentiment, a strenuous moral and social purpose. It is for such work that multitudinous democracies are fit.

In regard to all five of these contributions, the characteristic policy of our country has been from time to time threatened with reversal—is even now so threatened. It is for true patriots to insist on the maintenance of these historic purposes and policies of the people of the United States. Our country's future perils, whether already visible or still unimagined, are to be met with courage and constancy founded firmly on these popular achievements in the past.

V

THE BEGINNINGS

"THE MAN OF THE PAST"

BY

E. KAY ROBINSON

FROM this general outline of the organization of our world of to-day, its position, its plans and its problems, we turn now to look more closely at the details. First, we must go back to the earliest problem of all, we must look to our race's very beginning, to the origin of life itself, and of mankind. Our steps fall here on doubtful ground, amid vague mists. We attempt to penetrate through ages immeasurable, through years that perhaps approach the infinite. Science offers herself as our guide and guard; yet even Science is here wavering and uncertain, must soar through these dim regions on wings of the imagination, must answer us with inference and supposition, rather than with definite conclusions, positive and ascertainable facts, such as ordinarily she prefers to dwell among, and from which she gathers all her strength.

It were well also to premise that this backward glance involves no problem of religion. There is no modern churchman who would maintain that suddenly, in an instant of time, man was created out of good, brown dirt. The creative process from which the human body sprang, extended over centuries, over eons of time. The length, the giant reach of this slow process, does not, however, affect the fact of the creation. Science is quick and eager to insist on this. Nor does the long time lessen the wonder of the fact. To many minds, indeed, it does but increase the mystery, the "miracle" of unending patience, of far-sighted purpose, of a wisdom beyond our thought or measure.

But these words are beside the intention of the present address. The duty of religion is with the soul, not with the body; with the future, not with the past; with the purpose of creation, not the physical facts employed in its accomplishment. It is these physical facts which are here imagined and arrayed for us by Mr. E. Kay Robinson, the well-known English scientific writer.

About twenty years ago I was permitted to introduce to readers the man of the future, that mysterious being who will look back across the dim gulf of time upon us, his ancestors, with much of the same incredulous but not unkindly scorn with which we mentally caricature the poor 'Missing Link' in the chain of human genealogy. 'The man of the future,' I then said, 'will be a toothless, hairless, and stiff-limbed being, incapable of extended locomotion, with no divisions between the toes, and priding himself upon various other "developments" which would not at the present time be regarded as improvements.' Much has been written on the subject since then; but the general tendency of essayists is to confirm the view which I had somewhat abruptly expressed, and to agree that the man of the future will hold his place, in the foremost files of time to come, by brain power alone, discarding the animal characteristics of teeth and hair, agility and combativeness, and disdaining the retention of such useless peculiarities as independent toes, each liable to the drawback of corns and chilblains.

It was not easy, however, even in the enthusiasm of youth, surfeited with Darwinism, to feel altogether proud of so maimed a descendant; and as years pass retrospect becomes the more congenial habit of thought. Youth is the age of enthusiasm and curiosity as to the future; for youth has no past of its own, and therefore little sympathy with the past of the world at large. As the vista of years lengthens behind us, however, we fall to counting the milestones of our journey through life, and this draws our eyes to the more distant landscape, with its dim traces of the devious paths trodden by those before us.

Science has not yet thrown her search-lights to the uttermost horizon of that misty landscape, and mortal vision still has limits which prevent us from seeing what the ancestor of humanity was like before he became an entity. Even the outlines of his earliest being within our scientific ken are a trifle blurred and indistinct. We must therefore be content with the general assurance that the original man, the ancestor of the human race, was what would in modern language be loosely described as a microscopic dab of mud.

There are persons of considerable scientific attainments, still outside lunatic asylums, who cherish the hope of discovering the secret of the beginning of life by witnessing some process of spontaneous generation of microbes in bottled fluid; and other persons of equal or even greater scientific attainments have thought it worth while to conduct elaborate experiments to combat the views of the others. Both alike seem to forget that the microbe of the present day—however simple his organization may appear to the limited power of such microscopes as we already possess, or to the clumsy touch of our chemical analyses —stands, as man himself does, at the end of a long line of progressive development. His family is as ancient as ours; and, like us, he has partly created and partly accommodated himself to the conditions which now prevail upon this planet. He is as much at home as we are in this world of the twentieth century, and on the whole he has succeeded in making himself fairly comfortable. He is, too, the only rival whom we need fear as an enemy. Man will never extinguish the microbe, but the microbe may extinguish man. To expect him spontaneously to generate himself in a bottle of fluid is, then, no less insulting than would be the proposal to build a hermetically sealed town and after a lapse of a certain time expect it to be filled with men and women, or at least babies. If these men of science really desire to see as much of the beginning of life as is possible nowadays, let them take a basin of water, empty their solutions into it, and throw in the empty bottles and corks afterward. Then they will see the beginning of life with the naked eye on the surface of the water in the basin.

For what will they see? The empty bottles and the corks will, without assistance, either attach themselves to the sides of the basin or cluster together in the centre; while those bottles which can get rid of the air inside them will dive to the bottom. When

Newton saw the apple fall, he made a shrewd guess at a great truth; but he did not discover that what he saw was Life itself. He saw the attraction of the earth for the apple, and we call the principle 'gravitation': but if the apple had fallen, like our hypothetical empty bottles, into a basin of water, it would have bobbed up again to the surface, and ultimately have attached itself to the side, unless indeed there had been other objects in the basin, whose company it might have sought by preference. Attraction is, in fact, not only the universal law of life, but it is life itself. So far as those empty bottles and that apple possess individual life and power of action, they display it by forcing their way through the air or the water in order to attach themselves to the object that attracts them most. How nearly this process approaches in appearance sometimes to the highest development of deliberate choice, as we recognize that function in ourselves, may be witnessed by any one curious enough to float, say, a wooden match and a few grains of sawdust in some water. If the water could be kept absolutely motionless it is possible that the separate grains of sawdust and the match might be kept apart indefinitely, each pinned, as it were, to its own spot on the surface of the water by the attraction of the earth, although the water, being still more strongly attracted, would insist upon occupying the nearer place and so keep the wood floating aloft. But in ordinary circumstances the water would sooner or later be disturbed, moving the grains of sawdust hither and thither, until one by one they come into the sphere of attraction of each other or the match or the side of the vessel. It is when they are attracted to the match that the phenomenon is most interesting. There is almost the coyness of courtship in their circling approach, until they are quite close, and then it is by a positive leap that they throw themselves upon the attractive object and remain closely attached to it, insomuch that the water may be rudely disturbed without separating them. This not only looks like life—it is life: and we may see it also in the stone which, falling into a well, does exactly what you or I would do. It obeys the downward attraction of the earth, but at the same time recognizes that of the wall of the well by swerving toward and striking it before reaching the bottom.

Now let us return to our ancestor, the prehistoric dab of mud which retrospective vision dimly discerns seated on the surface of an as yet inchoate world. It would be more correct, perhaps, to say *in* the surface; for it is only with the eye of imagination that we can elevate him above his fellows, and promote him to the status of a distinguishable entity, breaking the sky-line of that distant horizon. We may take him up by the pound with the spade of fancy, and he will slide back into his parent chaos, mere slime. Yet even in the slime of the past there were gradations of rank among its particles. Let us lay down the spade and filter the ooze through the meshes of thought; much—most of it—slides through, intangible and imperceptible to the touch, but some remains. What? Particles of matter. And here we reach the first milestone of human history.

What constituted this prehistoric particle of matter, our penultimate parent, so far as our present family knowledge extends? We may be content with knowing, from our acquaintance with the general law of attraction, that a particle of homogeneous matter large enough to be retained in the meshes of a commonplace mind must be composed of minor atoms sticking together. We have seen how grains of sawdust stick together in the water; we can see how grains of water stick together in a drop at the end of our wet finger; it requires, therefore, no great effort to see how, in the ooze where the first scenes in the drama of human life were played, atoms stuck together and made particles. It does not matter how large or small atoms or particles may be—I use no word in a severely scientific or unintelligible-to-the-vulgar sense —we know that the law of attraction made those, which had attraction for each other and came sufficiently near to each other, stick together. How tightly they adhered does not matter either; the fact that they adhered is sufficient, because it means that they showed *life*, and with the commencement of life commenced their struggle for continued and improved existence, and their upward march toward the top-hatted and kid-gloved style now affected by their descendants.

Viewed across so vast a stretch of time, with its innumerable milestones graduating almost to invisible infinity, the progress our ancestors had so far made may not appear extensive. But the first step of the journey is the most important; they had made a start and in the right direction. They had individualized themselves among the surrounding slime, and had acquired a new status and new power. The fruit-vender who places the largest strawberries at the top of the basket might plead that he does so in obedience to a natural law: for, other things being equal, it is undeniably the rule in this world of stress and struggle for existence, that the biggest comes to the top. Sometimes other things are not equal, and the biggest sinks by sheer weight, which may be only another phrase for incapacity to rise. The truth of both axioms may be observed by the simple experiment of gently shaking a little mixed bird-seed in a wine-glass. The larger seeds will come to the surface; but the superior size of the stones with which the dishonest seed-merchant has eked out the weight of his wares avails them naught. They can be descried through the glass, sinking ignobly to the bottom, past even the smallest and most insignificant of the seeds. And herein we see repeated the first parting that our ancestors suffered—when one branch of the family by its inert weight had to sink down below and people the interior of the earth with stones and minerals, while the other remained above to cover the surface with life and beauty. From this momentous epoch in our history, when we became the 'upper classes,' we have nothing to do with the struggle for existence of our poor relations, the stones.

Since they parted company with us and came down in the world, they have gone through great trials, and have, like human unfortunates, suffered the extremes of heat and cold—now molten into igneous strata, and now cloven by the frost of glacial epochs. But they have also achieved great things: and there are beauties in gem and crystal, stalactite and ores of rainbow hue, in marbles and alabasters, which still move our minds with the sense of a beauty kindred to the loveliest products of the life—the higher life, as we are justified in regarding it—to which our branch of the family has attained; just as, in India, you may often find the loveliest women in the lowest castes.

We soon forgot our poor relations, however: for one step necessitates another, and the position of our ancestors, in the surface of the slough which the world of the past resembled, subjected them to the inevitable process of knocking against other things and each other whenever natural movements agitated their surrounding slime. In such conditions it was inevitable that they should, like pebbles upon a wave-washed beach, tend to assume a rounded or oval outline; and with the conservatism that is the marked characteristic of the animal and vegetable kingdom this early shape of our common ancestors is retained in the beginning of all life, as in the eggs of birds, reptiles, and insects, and the seeds of plants: while the fact that we and other mammals have left off the habit of laying eggs need not fill us with unseemly progressive pride. Comparative anatomy shows that we are still conservative to the backbone in our allegiance to types that were ours before we had backbones; for even we are oviform in our earliest beginnings. The first triumph, then, of our ancestors was to be able to maintain their position at the top of things, generally by their superior size and what we may call in a prophetic sense their agility, as opposed to the inert weight of their relatives who sank to make the mineral world; and the second was the accidental acquisition of an oval shape, which enabled them to survive the buffetings of their neighbors. But if they imagined that the struggle for existence was finally decided by those two achievements, the subsequent experiences of us, their descendants, show how vastly they were mistaken. In what way, then, did this struggle for existence next spur them on to self-improvement? It is obvious that those were most favorably circumstanced who possessed, in addition to relative size and regularity of outline, a special power of cohesion beyond the ordinary attraction of matter to matter. We see varying degrees of attraction around us every day of our lives: we feel them in the presence of victuals and drink, in the choice of occupations, and above all in the vicinity of the opposite sex. The various forms and degrees of special attraction may, therefore, be described as affinity; and our ancestors certainly belonged to that section of the upper classes of the upper past whose constituent parts possessed marked affinity for each other. A particle otherwise composed would have within it a force constantly tending to disruption, and in the long run this tendency to decomposition would prove a decisive disadvantage in the struggle for existence. And among the survivors new subtle distinctions were soon observable—just as among their successors of the present day there is always an *élite* of the *élite*—owing to the birth of the discriminating faculty. In proportion to the affinity of the elements composing these early beings would be their position in its substance. Those which were the more strongly attracted would be drawn to the centre; those less privileged would stand in a ring outside, getting as near the centre as they could; the unattractive detrimentals would be severely dropped. Thus each of our ancestors was, as one of their wise descendants has discovered of modern man, a microcosm in himself, with satellites in their orbits round his centre. And even as suitable atoms came within the radius of his attraction they took their proper place, and the larger he grew the more attractive he seemed and the ring of outsiders grew closer. Thus, although to the eye of fact our ancestor was still scarcely, if at all, distinguishable from the slime in which he continued to reside, he had made a great stride up the ladder of evolution. He had mastered the secret of assimilation and of growth. For we must note here the wide potential distinction between this form of development and the mere accretion by which minerals increase in bulk. The growth of our ancestors took place by means of absorption and selection of what we would now call food, which was separated into its constituent elements according to their attractiveness, and distributed to the various parts of the body. In other words, our ancestor digested and assimilated his food; and, at that stage, man could do no more. Stones have not learned to do it yet.

The faculty which next calls for notice, though all matter had possessed it from the first, is that of motion. Everything which was attracted to anything else moved toward it; but our ancestor belonged to that fortunate class of beings whose complex attractions were so evenly balanced that he was always drawn whither it was advantageous to be. He was neither too earthy nor too spiritual in his affinities: he was a man of the world, and as such kept himself always in evidence. As he attracted attractive particles to his inside, so was he drawn in the direction where attractive particles were thickest. Thus early was developed that faculty of mankind during social entertainments to cluster round the bars and supper-tables. Oh! man was getting on! And here it is to be observed that the attraction, we may call it the yearning, of our ancestor for his food proceeded directly from his inside; that is to say, the central part of him, which had the strongest attraction for the stuff he wanted, was the part which drew him toward it. We, his superior descendants, have a brain which polices our actions, and we do not reach after a sandwich with our stomachs. But we need not be proud. Our relatives, the amœba and the star-fish and others, do this thing still, and the habit is one to which we owe much. In default of organs of prehension, mastication, and so on, it was something for our ancestor to be able to reach out, as it were, with *something* for his dinner. Not that, in all probability, he greedily extruded his simple internal arrangements. It sufficed if their tendency was to gravitate toward that margin of his ovoid person near which the food was situated. The rest was simple, for the outer ring-rind (or skin we might call it nowadays) of semi-attractive atoms with which he had clothed himself had no such cohesion as to refuse admittance to a favored morsel. It was against our first parent's claim to very high rank, as rank goes in modern times, that he took in his food at any part of his person; but here, again, the amœba—what evolutionists would have done without the amœba I cannot say—comes to our rescue. The amœba does it, unblushingly, in the glare of this so-called twentieth century.

And here we come to the penultimate triumph of life; namely, the faculty of reproduction. Hitherto the life of the individual was indefinite. The influence of the sun was necessary to produce that equipoise of conflicting attractions—the earliest 'balance of power' known in mundane politics—which enabled our honest ancestor to hold his own among others, as may be seen from the diurnal rotation of our elementary functions. The influence of the moon had much to say in the matter also: witness the lunar periods in the life of many animals. And that we are of the earth, earthy, goes without saying: else we would not be glued to it by our feet all our lives. Those creatures survived (our ancestor among the number) who were able to accommodate themselves to the changing conditions created by these conflicting influences. We were like frontier tribes in Central Asia, displaying all kinds of unexpected forms of activity, according as one or another 'sphere of influence' overlapped us. And when I say 'we,' I do not mean that at this period of evolution there were lots of us. All the hopes of humanity were centred in one person, and with all the good-will in the world I cannot distinguish him, our ancestor, from the other dabs of mud around him. I would throw my arms around his neck if I could find him: but he had no neck, and did not appreciably differ from what, in our vulgar modern way, we should call 'sludge' or something like that.

And the first accident which happened to him, although it prepared the way for the publication of Darwin's 'Origin of Species,' would have appeared to his limited vision, if he had had any, in the light of a misfortune. I am inclined to believe that it was at the close of an unusually hot day in spring that he got left high and dry above the high-water mark of the period. Not *very* dry, because everything, including the air, was wet in those days, but still out of his element rather. And it is always this factor of novel, and apparently unsuitable, environment which has brought out the highest qualities of the human race. Driven by necessity he invented—*invenio*, 'I come into,' therefore 'I find out,' therefore 'I invent'—reproduction. Let us think what this means. Hitherto the life of a species, or a genus, or a kingdom, had been the life of the individual. It did not matter how cleverly our ancestor or any of the other persons who might have become the ancestors of beings totally different from ourselves adapted themselves to their surroundings: without reproduction, the world would have been filled only with the original individuals who were once microscopic dabs of mud. All that was needed for everlasting existence was the faculty of adaptation to the various forces of attraction. We see one instance in the successful adaptation of the air to the circumstances of life. The air was a creature, just like our first ancestor—more volatile and lively perhaps, and less severely handicapped in the struggle for existence. And it has made no progress. It goes on attracting suitable elements into itself when it can, and parting with them when it must; and it has grown to an immense size. It covers the whole earth: but, like the human beings of tropical climes, it has not yet found any incentive to further evolution because it has never been placed in sufficiently difficult circumstances. So far as we know, it is the same air that rose aloft when our ancestor grovelled in the slime ever so long ago. It has remained 'it,' while we have become 'he's' and 'she's.' The water is another creature who has been able to flow along in its old course without interruption, so far as we know: although the glacial epoch may have hit it hard, and the Flood have buoyed it up with foolish hopes of swallowing the whole wide world. It did not reckon with the insignificant creature who, whether in the Ark or by other means, weathered the era of water's dominion, and has emerged triumphant to build bridges and water-mills and ocean-going ships, and now talks of using the 'wasted' strength of water to do all his work for him, turn his machinery, light his house, and provide the force for driving his tricycle. Here we see on a world-wide scale the grand triumph of those who have struggled against difficulties, as in detail we see it also in the victory of Northern European races over the soft and luxurious inhabitants of the 'Sunny South' and tropics.

Well, our ancestor might have had the good, or bad, luck to find himself so adapted to surrounding circumstances that he continued to expand and grow, swallowing everything he had a mind to, until his slimy, shapeless bulk covered what we call continents and oceans, and became in size a worthy rival of the air and the water, and an example to the various minerals cramped down below in their restricted areas. But in that case he would not have been our ancestor, because it was only owing to the fact that he met with an accident in being cast up beyond the reach of ordinary tides that he was compelled to invent reproduction. He may not have seemed happy at first. The air scoffingly passed over his surface and dried his skin: but he took what he wanted, all the same, from the air as it passed. His more fluid portions displayed an unworthy inclination to sink into the ground, but he got something out of the ground too. And when the sun rose next morning, it shone upon something just a little different from anything which it had seen before. Shrivelled somewhat, and as deplorable as a stranded jelly-fish, our ancestor boldly met the gaze of the sun—for was not he the prospective father of Britons?—and he took what he wanted from the sunlight. So the day passed and the night, and other days and nights to follow, until another high tide came at the full moon and washed over our parent once more. And what happened then? During his long rest between high-water marks he had got stuck too tightly to the ground to leave it again. Some of him had indeed sunk into the crevices between particles of the soil—a habit which the roots of the vegetable kingdom have inherited and improved upon—and held him where he was. But the bulk of him strove to obey loyally the old impulse that used to draw him upward to the sunlight when he was what naturalists would call a free-swimming embryo of his present self. The attraction of food was strong upon him also, and the moon that drew up the tides strained him, too, toward her. Thus for the first time in his life he felt, as Britain felt when the American colonies claimed the right to independence, that he must part with a portion of himself. It stretched upward, and the bond that held them together grew thinner and weaker. His rind—may I call it 'skin'?—assumed an elongated shape, with an hour-glass constriction between the part which held to the earth and the part that would float through the water. At last, with a wrench almost like that of dissolution, it parted; and a fragment of him, small, globular, and free, as once he was himself, rose upward to the sunlight or to bask in the moon's rays. What was left of our ancestor settled down again, contentedly, for he had borne a son. Nor was that the only one. The changing seasons brought him new opportunities of growth, and at favorable periods he cast off in the same way other fragments of himself; and continued doing so to a very great age, until perhaps his great-great-great- and so on grandchildren who had risen in the world would have been ashamed to recognize the simple old fellow, with no organs and no specialized functions whatever, as their ancestor. We are not so proud.

We cannot be certain, of course, that this new power of reproduction was gained by a single individual only, or that evolution had taken place in no other directions. The earth was filled with rude variations of types, which were holding their own in the struggle for existence, because the favorable circumstances which gave each of them a start were being incessantly repeated with the changes of days and seasons. But our concern is with our ancestor and his progeny only. These might not have survived, and quite a different being to myself might now be speculating upon the origin of the world's inhabitants, but for the fact that our ancestor's children proved themselves to be true chips of the old block. He had invented reproduction: they responded with 'heredity.'

When the sun rose next day there may have been little or nothing in the appearance of these individuals to mark their immense potential difference from their comrades all around. There was no analytical chemist to examine them and demonstrate that they were composed of exactly the same elements in the same combination as their father; and there were no men of science to draw the conclusion that, when chance threw them into the same situation as that into which he had originally fallen, they would behave exactly as he did. Yet this is what our second ancestor could not help doing. He behaved as his father —the first father in the world—had done; that is to say, he parted with portions of himself and created new creatures in his own likeness. Thus was death vanquished. Hitherto the life of all the types in the world ended with the individual; and although similarity of surrounding circumstances induced uniformity, there was no heredity. Now there had come into the world a creature with the faculty of subdividing, *i.e.*, propagating, itself.

In the lowest orders of animal and plant life—the orders, that is to say, which have advanced least from our common starting-point—we still find this dual form of existence in the shape of a fixed parent with free-swimming young, destined in their turn to become fixed and give birth to free progeny.

At the first glance it might not be thought that much had been gained by this new development; but let us recapitulate. Our ancestor was still not very distinguishable from a dab of mud; but he had acquired the power of

(1) *Attracting or Drawing into his own Substance those Ele-*

ments which had for him the Strongest Affinity—or, as we should say nowadays, which he liked most. Other less potently attracted elements went to form his indurated integument or skin; and yet others, unattracted—or, as we say now, unattractive or innutritious—were rejected altogether. Thus in a rude way he performed the functions which we now carry on by means of specialized organs when we breathe, eat, or drink.

(2) *Moving Upward or Downward or Sideways when it suited him*—by which I do not mean that he exercised any independent volition, such as we think that we ourselves do, when he went hither or thither, but that he obeyed inherited impulses which tended to his advantage. If they had not he would not have inherited them, for they would have so handicapped his ancestors in the struggle for existence that they would not have survived to produce him. The only movements which were perpetuated, therefore, were such as the accidental experience of generations proved to be good for the race; and this remains still the highest aim of all our human actions.

(3) *Reproducing his Kind.*—And upon this accidental acquirement the permanence and improvement of every other gift depended. For by the time that our first ancestor, in the proper hereditary sense, produced, or rather detached, from himself his first oviform offspring, the world was full of what were then the highest types of creatures. That they were not high according to modern ideas may be realized from the fact that each individual had gone through the whole course of evolution up to date in his own person. I should not be writing this article if I had to begin by inventing language; then discovering the truths of science; then bringing out the inventions of printing, papermaking, and the manufacture of ink and machinery; then have to educate the public and induct into their minds the idea that printed matter was worth purchasing; then establish an editor, and finally bring him my article. I should not have got very far into this programme before death would cut short my career. No; many æons ago, in the first feeble sound uttered by one living creature and heard by another, was the germ and natural origin of this published volume. Therefore we must not despise those early contemporaries of our ancestor who inherited nothing

from *their* ancestor and had to do all their own origin of species for themselves. Besides, *de mortuis nil nisi bonum;* and most of them disappeared forever off the face of the earth as our family multiplied, thanks to the subtle advantage which its members possessed of letting bits of themselves start periodically upon life on their own account. As the other creatures broke up or became decomposed for one reason or another, this multiplying type gradually absorbed their elements—'ate them,' we should say now—and each fragment became in turn sufficiently obese to part with more fragments, and so on, until the world was filled with them.

But all this while insensible variations were being introduced into this hereditary type. Infinitely small departures by accident from the original were found to give new generations the slight determining advantage which decides the struggle for existence: and of these, two ultimately survived. One was a type of creature which attracted within itself such elements as were needed for the sustenance of life through infinitely small apertures or pores in its skin, and the other, the bolder type, which drew within it by the same force of attraction other entire creatures, subsequently separating the desired elements from those which were not required.

The first type became the parent of all vegetables, which draw their sustenance in microscopic solution from earth, water, air, or decomposed organisms; and from the second type originated the animal world, which captures its food in the shape of other organized beings, animal or vegetable, and assimilates the parts required for sustenance, rejecting the residuum. With the first type we have no concern here save to notice that it has proved to the advantage of this class to remain usually in a fixed position, in the shape of trees and seaweeds, which draw nourishment from their surroundings, being content with very modest arrangements for the mobility of their offspring, in the shape of spores or seeds.

The second type of creature—the ancestor of the animal kingdom—preferred the life of motion. Some indeed, as corals or sea anemones, retain the stationary habit, and many mollusks attach themselves to fixed spots: but the habit of living upon organic creatures, while it materially assisted development, necessitated in most cases free motion, either to fresh fields and new pastures or to happier hunting grounds when the old ones were exhausted. And the development of the higher classes of the animal kingdom depended entirely upon the habit of locomotion adopted. They all started from the common accidental device of excrescences protruding beyond the outline of the body, against which floating bodies lodged and were thence absorbed: but in one type the tendency was developed to produce these excrescences impartially on all sides of the body, thus producing ultimately radiate creatures like starfish and polypi, while another type had the advantage, as it has proved, of acquiring the habit of annexing its food 'end on,' so to speak. As ages passed innumerable variations of this type were doubtless produced, but it seems that, again, two only survived. One of these attained mobility and safety—for at a very early period those only began to survive who could protect themselves against the absorptive faculties of their neighbors—in a jointed and hardened integument: while the other type had the joints and the stiffening inside. From the former type have descended all such creatures as worms, woodlice, lobsters, and insects; and with these we have no further concern. Our ancestor belonged to the other type; for he was undoubtedly a person with his stiffening inside, else what should we be doing for backbones? He still lived in the shallows of the vast sea, propelling himself through the water by the waggling of his body; but as ages passed, one member of the family acquired the habit of scrambling over the mud by means of projections, which in succeeding generations were improved into rudimentary limbs, stiffened by lateral prolongations of the stiffening inside. That is why our legs and arms are jointed to our backbones. Perhaps the modern goggle-eyed mudfish, which wabbles and wallows in the slimy mangrove swamps of the East, most nearly reproduces in outline the first great advance made by our ancestors after they had acquired jointed backbones and rudimentary limbs; and though the snakes have dispensed with limbs altogether, and the fishes have modified them to fins, our branch of the family undoubtedly made the wiser choice in attaching less importance to the waggling of their hinder end as a means of progression than to the use of those lateral processes which have become our limbs. The wisdom of the choice may not have been obvious at first; but the blessings of evolution generally come in disguise. Indeed, to the philosopher of those days, had there been one, it might even have seemed that when at an earlier stage our parents neglected the vegetable habit of safely planting themselves upon a suitable spot, they made a serious mistake, and he would have pointed to the striking contrast between the luxuriance of vegetation compared with the struggling life of the crawling creatures at its roots. Even to-day, if it were merely a question of the difference between the mangrove tree and the mudfish which paddles about under its tangled branches, the advantage might not to a casual observer from another planet seem to be all on the side of the mudfish. But we who have also chosen locomotion, and to that end have adopted the system of backbone and limbs, know that, whatever pleasures plants may enjoy, they can know little of the joys of hunting, fighting, and love-making, the trinity of functions which constitute animal 'life.' Indeed, from the animal's point of view the majority of plants might just as well be dead, for all the pleasure which they can have, and yet the only difference between the earliest animal and the earliest plant, children of a common parent, was that they chose different methods of obtaining nutriment.

And at every subsequent parting of the branches of the genealogical tree of humanity we can see how by chance our ancestors always had forced upon them that which was the best for the future. When, for instance, the members of our branch of the family began to crawl about clumsily on dry land, dragging heavy tails after them, how clumsy and foolish they must have appeared in comparison with their cousins who retained aquatic habits and swiftly darted hither and thither through the water with a waggle of the body and sweep of the wide tail! Even when the burden of the tail grew less and the limbs became more prominent and powerful—a transformation which we may see repeated each spring in the development of the frog from the tadpole—how small the advantage would have appeared to a philosopher of the period! Indeed, comparing the types of frog and crocodile, it is more than likely that he would have given the preference to the saurian. But the highest evolution arises from the successful negotiation of the greatest obstacles; as we may see in the superiority of our hardy Northern races, who have always been compelled to labor in order to live, over the uncivilized inhabitants of luxuriant regions where the problem of livelihood presents no difficulties. So long as monkeys can live like monkeys they will remain monkeys; but the hard struggle for existence may teach them, too, as it has taught us, to acquire new powers in order to escape extinction, and then they will cease to be monkeys, though they will not be men. They parted company from us at the last corner in our difficult journey, and there are no short-cuts to recover lost ground in evolution. And we cannot help feeling sorry for the monkeys, because it really seems as if this particular turning was the only one of real importance since our common ancestor elected by accident to have his stiffening inside instead of outside. Between the eating, fighting, and love-making of the crocodile, the eagle, the lion, or the whale, and that of the monkey, there does not seem much difference; and what other joy in life has he which they have not? He has, in fact, gained nothing by belonging to our branch of the family when we discarded our tails as means of locomotion; retained our four limbs for the purpose of running on the ground instead of flapping two of them like birds; and learned to use our toes for the purpose of grasping. The originator of the monkey family may indeed have considered, if he thought about the matter at all, that our ancestor was much to be pitied when he began to abandon the use of his hind toes in this way, for the greater convenience of a flat foot in running or walking. And no doubt the abandonment was quite involuntary on our part. It may be that our ancestor was driven forth to find his living in a treeless land, where he acquired the habit of running hungrily after the prey on which he was forced to subsist, in place of fruit plucked without effort in the primeval forests. Perhaps it was in some such chase that—possibly in a fit of anger such as baulked monkeys fall into—he seized his first missile and flung it, with the happiest effect, at his escaping dinner. Hence the art of hunting and the use of weapons. And familiarity with the weapon in time suggested its use as a tool, the earliest application of the tool being doubtless analogous to carving-knife or hammer, to divide a slaughtered animal among the family or to smash through the hard shell of turtle or mollusk. Speech was first evolved by the necessities of combination to guard against enemies: for an animal which had learned to use lethal weapons, missiles, and tools ceased to be dependent upon either his personal agility or powerful teeth for the purposes of offence and defence. It was doubtless by combination that our ancestors excavated their cave fortress; and from the necessities of watch and ward, as well as the constant companionship within, arose the habit of speech, rising from mere signals to action, such as grunts of anger and cries of warning, to notes of encouragement, admonition, approval, and so on. Thence language would naturally develop in the direction of expressing domestic needs and wishes: then communal instructions and words of command, with expressions of assent, dissent, or criticism. Thus by degrees speech was built up, and by combined labor and the communication of ideas man was enabled so to protect and perhaps to fortify his cave dwelling that the species acquired its characteristic of slow development. The young hare, brought forth in a tuft of grass, can see and run as soon as born. The young rabbit, born in a safe burrow, is blind and helpless for days. So cave-dwelling man acquired the habit, which he still possesses, of slower development from birth than any other creature, because in addition to the natural safety of his dwelling he had learned the art of protecting it, by combination and distribution of work, against all enemies. The tool of utility he learned to use as an implement for the adornment of himself and his belongings. He scratched the outlines of the beasts he had slain upon the weapon that slew them; he decked himself and his mate in their spoils. His powerful canine teeth decreased, the useless hair upon his body disappeared, the multiplying problems of his many acquired habits developed his powers of thought; and when he strode forth from his cave and viewed the animal and vegetable world around him, he felt that he was their king. Looking deeper and deeper, year by year, into the mysteries of the world around him, he has learned the 'why' of many things: and the complement of the 'why' is always the 'because.' And if he follows in thought the trail of the 'because' as far back as his mind will carry him, he comes to a point whence he can dimly discern the outline of his first father, scarcely breaking the horizon of the slimy past, a microscopic dab of mud.

VI

THE ORIGIN OF LIFE

"ITS CHEMICAL CREATION BY SCIENCE"

BY

PROFESSOR JOHN BUTLER BURKE

OF CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY

If the imaging forth of man's origin and development be a marvel of the infinitely great, we approach now a marvel of the infinitely minute. Modern science seeks to create life itself, to understand it as a natural, perhaps a chemical, process, and to set in motion the physical conditions which produce it—produce it through conjunctions and harmonies of atoms, too delicate, too evanescent for sight or for full comprehension. It were well to emphasize this point, for it has been much misunderstood. No scientist pretends to understand life, or, in the broader sense, to create it. He merely imitates; he investigates the conditions from the midst of which life may arise, and seeks to reproduce these so that some day he may see an organism, a being, appear before him, sprung not from preceding life-forms but from inorganic matter.

Perhaps the thing is impossible. We have seen that in Mr. Robinson's address he could not forbear a sarcastic fling at its absurdity. Yet so patient has been the investigation, so fascinating are its aims and its ideas, that no man can afford to shut the question wholly aside when engaged in an effort to understand our day. At the present moment the foremost of the investigators of this subject is Mr. John Butler Burke, who here briefly explains what he and others have accomplished.

The article is in a sense an abridgement of the author's recent elaborate volume upon the same subject. He belongs to the *younger generation of English scientists, being not yet forty. His lectures and investigations have, however, already won him fame, and placed him high among intellectual leaders.*

His explanations here are of necessity technical, far more technical than anything else that will appear in this series, and any one not possessed of at least a fair amount of chemical knowledge might better pass over most of the central part of the address, looking only to the opening to see the basis of Mr. Burke's work, and then to the close to learn what the investigator believes as to the result.

THE Editor offers me the opportunity to express my views upon the subject of those researches which have recently so much attracted the attention not merely of the scientific world but even of the world at large. Whether these experiments have the right to command all the interest they have evoked is a question which I myself feel rather diffident to answer. But that they have so aroused the enthusiam of all sorts and conditions of men compels me now to give utterance to what I do and do not think can legitimately be inferred from the facts I have observed; I feel it all the more beholden in me to express my indebtedness for the exceptional appreciation with which my efforts for some time past have been met from friends, and from all quarters. I do not think these experiments prove "spontaneous generation," if by this term is to be understood the appearance of life from the absolutely lifeless. Such a phenomenon, if it has ever taken place, and if it is even taking place around us, cannot, I fear, be proved to the satisfaction of all parties, and certainly not to that of those who have already made up their minds not to accept it. There may be, as they will again and again affirm—no matter to how high a temperature we may get—some secret source of energy. No matter how far we may trace the first beginnings of life, whether it is to the minutest microscopic cells, or to the atom itself, they would still maintain that the problem was not solved, and that in the atom itself is to be found the principle and the source of vital energy, and if this could be carried further they would fall back upon the electron or even on the æther. In this respect they cannot, strictly speaking, it is true, be met by any contradiction. But their argument is of the nature of a metaphysical objection of the same kind as that which asserts the freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul. They admit of no answer, just as they admit of no proof, unless that proof be metaphysical, and unconvincing so far as its scientific aspect goes. I do not wish to be drawn into a quagmire if even in that quagmire I should discover what is true. The risk is too great, and our time is too short. There may be charms in groping in a bog, or in getting muddled, but for my part I prefer to keep out of it, at any rate so far as my investigations go.

By spontaneous generation I mean the development of what we have a right to think is living from that which we have hitherto had a right to think was not. The development of living organisms from inorganic matter would be without question quite a case in point. No doubt that inorganic substance may contain embedded in it some germ, or germs, hitherto unknown, and of a nature quite distinct from any we have yet had reason to regard as living; the substances employed may by their very nature, as it is here claimed—or, more accurately, suggested—have the principle of vital process, in an elementary form, as a part and parcel of their being. It is so with the dynamically unstable substances which of their own account manifest radio-activity. These dynamically unstable bodies have to some extent some of the properties of life—they disintegrate, they decay, in their manifestations of that activity, but although this is merely analogy, and we must remember, as Darwin has well said, "Analogy is a deceitful guide"; still, if that analogy has prescribed or suggested results which have since been verified, its utility should have a greater claim to our attention than to be passed over with indifference and ignored. The products of radio-active bodies manifest not merely instability and decay but growth, subdivision, reproduction, and adjustment of their internal functions to their surroundings, a circumstance which I think will be found to be equivalent to nutrition. Whether we are to regard these products, strictly speaking, as living things is the point which remains to be decided. We have to define their properties, and we have also to define life.

Now their properties are as simple as they are well known, but before they are recapitulated here it would be well to repeat in outline one or two of the particulars which have led me to take up the line of argument I have ventured to pursue.

By the action of radium upon bouillon, when sterilized so far as such experiments permit, microscopic bodies appear, already more than once described. In the first instance, they are not, as micro-organisms generally, or I should say always, are, more or less of the same size so long as they are of the same kind; ordinary bacilli, provided they are of the same type, are found to be also of the same dimensions. They do not show signs which indicate that they have one and all sprung in a process of continuous growth from ultra-microscopic forms. But this is one of the characteristic features of the products now produced by radium. There can be no question that they spring —that in each case they have sprung—from the invisible, and grown to such a magnitude as to be seen. We find no such indication with ordinary bacteria. If these have not the marks of manufactured articles, they afford at least the signs of not having sprung spontaneously into existence. They bear the stamp of an inheritance of many varying qualities from a long and probably varying line of ancestors, of probably countless generations, which have at last made them what they are. But the "radiobes" undergo many developments. After six or seven days, and at times even less, they develop nuclei; but later still they cease to grow, and then begin to segregate and multiply. These are some of the qualities which have led me to suppose that they are assimilative, and automatic, and not, strictly speaking, lifeless things.

Their growth is no indication of vitality, for crystals not merely grow, but grow to such dimensions that in this point no living microscopic organism has any chance to rival them; they, however, do stop growing at some stage or another, else we should have, as some one has insisted, diamonds as large as Mount Etna or the Himalayas. This, however, does not seem to be the point; when crystals reach their maximum dimensions, do they then throw off their superfluous particles and disintegrate themselves? In other words, do they show the *cyclic* process, pass into higher forms, and then decay, which is the test and the guarantee of life? There are critics who will criticise without in the least trying to understand. Some indeed are merely literary hacks who pose before the world as judges of everything and anything they can get the chance to talk about. The stoppage of growth at a particular size, and of reproduction by fission or subdivision, and then the total disintegration of the cell, or whatever we may choose to call it, after its steady regular growth up to that point, is not merely suggestive of vitality, but in a certain sense, as it seems, it is vitality itself. It is an indication of self-nutrition and a very clear as well as an assuring one. The subdivision or fission which accompanies the cessation of development in the mechanism of adding to its size, shows the stage when there is a balance between the accumulation of energy and its expenditure. The bodies obtained by M. Stephane Leduc in 1902, by the action of potassium ferrocyanide on gelatine, or by allowing metallic salts to crystallize in gelatine and other colloidal solutions, do not exhibit all these primary or elementary properties of living things; they do not, in fact, manifest more than a resemblance in appearance to the cells or unit-forms of life. Their properties are not sufficient to justify the inference that they are living things, nor even that they possess to any marked extent any of the qualities that are associated with organic matter as it manifests vitality. On the other hand, it has been suggested that the "radiobes" (as I have ventured to designate them), if they are crystals, subdivide by cleavage under the influence of internal strain, as, for instance, South African diamonds are found occasionally to do. It all depends upon the nature of the segregation whether it is like a fission or a cleavage. Photographs show this most distinctly as it occurs within fourteen days or so. The subdivision is clearly not of the nature of a cleavage. Neither is it, as has also been suggested, at all likely that these subdivisions resemble those obtained by Professor Bütschli of Heidelberg, by the action on soluble salts of such substances as olive oil, and the bodies obtained by emulsion of these bodies in water which behave in some ways, or by their subdivisions, much as if they were elementary forms of living things.

But here again it is upon the nature of the subdivisions that we must rest our assurance as to what these subdivisions mean. The subdivisions are quite different from anything we should expect mere surface tension to effect.

A close examination of the mode of segregation at once shows that the "cell," if so we may call it, becomes divided into segments, much in the same way as ordinary yeast cells are well known to do. A sharp corner, which is not unusual in the part so segregated, seems incompatible with the proposed theory of some overbalance in the force of surface tension over the internal forces which tend to keep the body intact. Many minute bodies subdivide, but they thus subdivide in different ways. And the manner in which they are found to do this is as important, if not far more so, than the mere fact that they do so actually divide. Thus it may again and again be urged that there are many microscopic particles which are known to pass through some of the performances which our "radiobes" also do; but we have no knowledge of any bodies which can do them all except those bodies which we know are living things. If a bacteriologist were told that the objects of his observations were not strictly living things because Bütschli had obtained bodies certainly quite lifeless which could perform many of the actions which his bacteria do—because Leduc had obtained other bodies which possess many other properties which his bacterial bodies have; that Le Bon, Schrön, Quincke, Lehmann, Ostwald, and a host of others had also observed minute so-called liquid and organic bodies, some of which are, accurately speaking, crystals—that therefore microbes must be crystals, he would reply, and very rightly so, that the argument was scarcely valid, and that here, at least, analogy was a deceitful guide. But the argument would not be worse than that of those who would assert that because certain things are not bacteria they therefore must be crystals. It has been suggested that the products of radium and bouillon are like the microscopic crystals described by those already mentioned, and also by

Schenck in his admirable little work which has recently been published.[1] But the bodies there described, some of which I have many times observed, I have never thought of classifying or identifying with the "plastide particles" in bouillon that I have styled "radiobes." The two are totally distinct. One type, the smaller one, behave like bubbles, or, more accurately, like oily drops, possessing no indication whatsoever of an internal structure other than that which we may associate with crystalline forms. The larger ones are much too large, and show no signs of disintegration, but give the beautiful characteristic figures of crystals under the polariscope. Even the comparatively small ones give, to some extent at least, some slight polariscope effects. But they are obviously, to anybody who has seen them, quite different from those which are brought about in the culture medium under the influence of radium. They do not stain—at least I have not found them to do so—as the radium bodies do, and they do not manifest any of the properties which have so attracted our attention with the latter. The two—at least so far as I can judge—are totally distinct—as distinct as coal is from potatoes.

It will be urged—in fact it has been urged—that these bodies, if living, must be the result of imperfect sterilizations, and that the experiments of Pasteur completely proved that when sterilizations are properly carried out life does not spring from lifeless matter. This sounds very simple, very clear, and very forcible. But has it really any bearing on the question as to whether radioactivity can afford the internal energy of vital processes? Pasteur's experiments were on sterilized media not acted upon by sources of activity such as those which now form the subject of discussion. They have nothing whatsoever to do with the question as to whether radio-activity can afford the energy in dynamically unstable groupings placed in suitable surroundings, and which might afford in more complex aggregations the *flux*, so to speak, which constitutes the principle of life. I argue now for possibilities, and I say without fear or hesitation, that, whatever may be the aspect we should take of this conception, the bearing of Pasteur's observations on this point is as remote as it is on the question whether there are living bodies in Venus or in Mars. It is a matter about which I feel, without misgiving, that Pasteur, Tyndall, and Huxley would have thought as strongly as myself that their efforts had no bearing whatsoever on the point at issue.

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[1] *Kristallinische Flüssigkeiten und Flüssige Kristalle.*

Having cleared our minds on the subject of these previous experiments of thirty years ago, we may turn our attention more particularly to these new experiments themselves.

In the course of my previous work on phosphorescence I was induced to try whether the molecular groupings which, it was supposed, were formed during phosphorescence, by exciting sources, could also be produced in other organic bodies, whether they become luminous or not so long as they are similarly acted upon.

The first attempt was to bring about the condensation or formation of a complex aggregate round a nucleus, itself the seat of electro-magnetic disturbances, as in radio-active particles, that might set up an aggregation of molecules, probably of an unstable kind, in its vicinity.

The most promising step to take appeared to be to introduce some radium salt into a tube containing glycerine and then suddenly to cool the liquid by immersion in liquid air.[1] The liquid would thus have every opportunity of condensing round the ions embedded in the glycerine from the radium, and perhaps also the aggregates contemplated would have a similar opportunity of being formed, by the intense electro-magnetic pulses set up, or possibly by some catalytic actions. Crystals of glycerine were thus produced, but it was found that the radium was not necessary, the low temperature being sufficient to enable them to form. On being removed from the cooling chamber and allowed to stand at the ordinary temperature of the room, they rapidly disappeared in about five minutes or so.

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[1] These experiments were made at the Cavendish Laboratory in October, 1904, and were exhibited to a host of people in Cambridge at the time. By a coincidence, M. R. Dubois, an eminent physiologist, shortly afterwards stated, in an inaugural address at Lyons last November, that he had observed the production of similar bodies, which he called *vacuolides*, by the action of radium on certain culture media. Up to the time of correcting the proofs of this article he has not, so far as I am aware, made any communication to any scientific journal on the subject. In abstracting my work for the *Revue des Idées*, July 15, 1905, he refers to his speech and proposes to change the name of his vacuolides to *eobes*. He admits they are the same as radiobes.

The experiment was also made with gelatine. Microscopic crystals were thus easily produced by immersion in liquid air, and the outward appearance of the colloid was greatly altered, as it became intensely opaque.

Bouillon, which was carefully sterilized under pressure at a temperature from 130° to 140° with radium for about thirty minutes at a time, was also tried. It was found in this case that after two days a culture was growing on the surface of the gelatine. Moreover, on repeating the experiment it was observed that the *culture* was still formed even when the tube was not frozen.

This was most remarkable, but the obvious explanation appeared to be that the cultures were contaminations and the result of imperfect sterilization. So the experiment was repeated with controls. The result was precisely the same as before, in the tube containing radium, while the control tube showed no sign whatever of contamination. The radium was mixed with the gelatine medium in most of the experiments; in some, however, it was contained in another and smaller tube close to the surface of the gelatine, or in a side tube. In all the experiments which may be regarded as reliable, actual contact seemed to be necessary, although at first it seemed as though the α-rays were sufficient. But in all such cases some of the radium actually got to the gelatine during the process of sterilization.

In the earlier experiments the salt used was the chloride. It was sprinkled on a narrow glass slide over which a thin layer of gum was spread. The cultures were obtained only when the edge of the glass slide came in contact with the gelatine.

On looking up the matter I found that it was a well-known fact that gum acted on gelatine in such a manner as to produce oily drops.[1] Controls with gum alone, however, proved that the two effects were entirely different, the gum globules being confined chiefly to the surface, disappearing altogether after some days, while the radium effect increased.

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[1] See Article "Gum," *Encyclopædia Britannica.* 9th Edition.

Thus it seemed quite clear from these control experiments that the gum was not the cause of the culture-like appearances, while subsequent experiments with pure radium salt proved this beyond doubt.

The next step was to get sub-cultures by inoculation in fresh media. The sub-cultures did not show the slightest signs of growth for nearly six weeks. They then, however, did manifest a tendency towards development, but only to a very small extent.

Thus it is at once evident that the original cultures were not bacteria.

The first experiments were repeated with radium bromide. About $2\frac{1}{2}$ milligrammes of the salt contained in a small glass tube, one end of which was drawn out to a fine point, were introduced into an ordinary test-tube containing bouillon. The test-tube was plugged with cotton-wool in the usual way with such experiments, and then sterilized at a temperature of 130° C. for about thirty minutes at a time. On cooling, as soon as the liquid had coagulated, the fine end of the inner tube containing the radium was broken by means of a wire hook in a side tube. The salt was thus allowed to drop on the surface of the gelatine. After twenty-four hours signs of growth were already visible. On opening the tube and examining the culture microscopically the same results were obtained as previously.

Their appearance is indeed most striking. It is curious, however, that with the bromide the cultures, although produced more rapidly, did not spread far into the interior of the gelatine, as did those due to the chloride.

It is noteworthy that the consistency with which they appear, and their form at each stage of development, are not the least striking feature of their many characteristics. At first their appearance is that of diplococci; yet it will be observed that they are not all of the same size, but vary considerably through a considerable range from 0.3μ[1] to mere specks, as seen in $\frac{1}{12}$

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[1] μ is the one-thousandth of a millimetre, or the twenty-five-thousandth of an inch.

inch power. There is an indication of growth and of their having originated from ultra-microscopic particles.

At first they looked like crystals of carbonate of lime, but these are so very much larger and are visible with much lower powers. The latter are insoluble, while the former are soluble in warm water, so that the two cannot be identified. They might have been soluble phosphates, but the considerations which follow indicate that they are highly complicated structures and more like organisms.

The polariscope does not give the figures and changes of color which are the characteristic features of a crystal. There is, however, a left-handed rotation imparted to the gelatine, and one which can easily be detected when the culture has penetrated some distance into the interior, the rotation amounting to several degrees in a centimetre thickness. Thus they appear to be more of the nature of colloided bodies, but like bacteria with an asymmetric structure.

The very minute quantity which could be experimented with rendered it extremely difficult to investigate their chemical composition; but the method of prolonged observation, like the astronomical method in matters over which we have no control, enables us to study their structure and behavior, and to decide the question as to whether they are crystalline or organized and living forms.

Upon this point, however, it is necessary that the use of the word "crystal" should stand for some definite thing. By a crystal I mean an aggregate of symmetrically arranged groups of molecules. Such aggregates are known to grow by piling up, as it were, one on to another. They grow by accretion, not by assimilation, from their environment. Sachs[1] regarded protoplasm as made up of minute crystals, but that seems perhaps to be using the word in a somewhat elastic sense, if protoplasm, a colloid substance, were to be included amongst crystalline bodies.

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[1] *Physiology of Plants*, p. 206. His view that protoplasm is an organized substance consisting of crystalline, doubly refracting molecules (Micellæ) is now generally accepted. In the moist state each of these (Micellæ) is surrounded with an envelope of water in consequence of its powerful attraction. In their dry state they are in mutual contact. This theory of the internal structure of organized bodies was founded by Naegeli.

If colloidal bodies are aggregates of minute crystals, they are, however, not symmetrically arranged crystals, and the aggregate is not isomorphous with the constituent crystals, but on the whole amorphous.

An organism has a structure, a nucleus, and an external boundary or cell-wall, and its vitality may be described as being a continuous process of adjustment between its internal and its external relations.

Now a clear examination of the bodies produced by the action of radium on culture media will enable us to decide under which of these two heads these bodies come.

The earlier stage does not reveal any structure, but later on the existence of a nucleus of a highly organized body is distinctly shown; whilst after a while the segregation effects of growth and development, which it would appear rule crystals out of court, become distinctly marked. In such large bodies a satellite or offspring is usually visible and is suggestive of reproduction.

This subdivision is the most striking thing about them, and a clear idea of its actual nature cannot fully be derived from the photographs. When the body exceeds 3μ there is a tendency for it to divide up, and each part to lead a separate existence.

The growth is from the minutest visible speck to two dots, then a dumb-bell shaped appearance, later more like frog's spawn, and so on through various stages until it reaches a shape largely different from its previous forms, when it divides and loses its individuality, and ultimately becomes resolved into minute crystals, possibly of uric acid. This is a development which no crystal has yet been known to make, and forces upon the mind the idea that they must be organisms; the fact, however, that they are soluble in water seems, on the other hand, to disprove the suggestion that they can be bacteria. But the stoppage of growth and the subdivision at a certain stage of development in such circumstances as these is a clear indication of the continuous adjustment of internal to external relations of the individual with its surroundings, and thus suggests vitality.

The continuity of structure, assimilation, and growth, and then subdivision, together with the nucleated structure as shown in a few of the best specimens, *suggests that they are entitled to be classed among living things, in the sense in which we use the words*, whether we call them bacteria or not.

As they do not possess all the properties of bacteria, they are not what are understood by this name, and are obviously altogether outside the beaten track of living things. This, however, will not prevent such bodies from coming under the realm of biology, and, in fact, they appear to possess many of the qualities and properties which enable them to be placed in the borderland between crystals and bacteria, organisms in the sense in which we have employed the word, and possibly the missing link between the animate and inanimate. May it not also be the germ which, after countless generations, under gradually changing forms and in suitable environments, has at length evolved into a bacillus at which we gaze and gaze with hopeless wonder and amazement, each time we view it in the microscope to-day?

In their properties they are so like bacteria and yet not of them, nor of crystals, from both of which they differ widely, that they may with advantage, as we have said, be called *Radiobes*, a name at once suggestive both of their nature and their origin.

Thus the gap, apparently insuperable, between the organic and the inorganic world seems, however roughly, to be bridged over by the presence of these radio-organic organisms which at least may give a clew as to the beginning and the end of life, "that vital putrefaction of the dust," to which Dr. Saleeby has recently drawn attention.

Rainey obtained many curious results with salts of lime, but some of his observations may have been due to microbes, as in those days sufficient attention was not paid to the process of sterilization, while crystals of lime would be insoluble in water.

Schenck's crystals, however, can be examined in the polariscope, and do not segregate and reproduce as the bodies we are dealing with invariably have been found to do.

May it not be that, among those unknown processes which, as Huxley expected, worked in the "remote prodigious vista of the past," where he could find no record of the commencement of life, the process now considered almost a universal one, of radio-activity, performed those reactions, that we now see taking place in gelatine cultures, slowly and yet spontaneously by virtue of even slightly radio-active bodies?

The earth itself, which is slightly radio-active, should act likewise, and the substances required are the ingredients for the formation of radio-organisms.

The only process taking place in matter which has since then revealed a hidden source of energy, not destroyed by heat, is radio-activity.

Whether the lowliest forms of life—so simple that the simplest amœba as we see it to-day would appear a highly complex form—whether such elementary types have arisen from inorganic matter by such processes as I have described, I know not. May it not be, however, and does it not seem probable, in the light of these experiments, that the recently discovered processes of instability and decay of inorganic matter, resulting from the unexpected source of energy which gives rise to them, are analogous in many ways to the very inappropriately called "vital force" or really vital energy of living mater? For this idea such physiologists as Johannes Müller so devoutly pleaded more than half a century ago. And may they not also be the source of life upon this planet?

Cannot this instability and decay of inorganic matter of atoms of highly complex structure, in suitable environments, be the seat of disturbances, of fermentations, and of metabolisms? The building up and breaking down through *catalytic* actions of great complex aggregates, not merely of *stable* crystalline forms, but of *unstable* dynamical aggregations, imparted by the unstable atom of a radio-active substance to the agglomerated mass?

The results of these investigations of which I have given an account, although not affording an answer to this question, by giving rise to organisms such as bacteria (for it must be borne in mind that these are the descendants of countless generations, under gradually varying conditions), still afford beyond doubt organic forms of matter, as appears from their structure and behavior, even if they are not crystals or bacteria of the types already known, and place also at our disposal a method of structural organic synthesis, of which the chemist, perhaps, has not hitherto made use with effect.

When working some time ago at the phosphorescent glow in gases, I was led from various considerations to infer that the luminosity was the result of great complex molecular agglomerations produced by the spark. The duration of the life-period, if I might so call it, of those molecular groups is greatly increased by letting them diffuse into another tube through which the spark had not previously been sent.[1]

The effect of glycerine and gelatine on phosphorescent liquids is also known to increase the duration of the luminosity, and this is probably due to diminution of the number of collisions. I thus endeavored to observe the effect upon the phosphorescent molecules by introducing glycerine or gelatine into a vacuum tube, immediately after sending a discharge of electricity through it, while the phosphorescent glow lasted.

If the glycerine or gelatine on being introduced is shaken inside the tube, some of the phosphorescent molecules would be caught by the liquid, which in turn should become phosphorescent. The cyanogen molecules, it was thought, would do this particularly on account of their persistent nature after the passage of the discharge. Bouillon,[2] which had been sterilized with the tube itself before being introduced, was also among the substances employed. The vapor, however, from these substances when in the liquid state was enough to prevent the phosphorescent molecules which could exist at low pressure from persisting, and thus the experiments for the time were dropped.

It seemed to me that the complex molecules of para-cyanogen, unstable, but at the same time persistent and yielding a vast store of energy in their disintegration, might act as nuclei which would in suitable media set up catalytic activity, and thus act as a means of synthesizing complex organic compounds, a method not hitherto employed. It was for this reason that bouillon, of the composition used in the experiments with radium, was employed, since it contained all the constituents of protoplasm, and it seemed at the time quite possible, not to say probable, that the physical properties of the cyanogen molecule, as well as its chemical properties, justified the very shrewd conception of Pflüger, that the molecule of cyanogen is a semi-living thing.

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[1] *Philosophical Magazine*, March, 1901.

[2] In this particular case it was the substance used for cultivating *photogenic micro-cocci.*

The fundamental difference between living proteid as it constitutes living substance, and dead proteid as it occurs in egg-albumen, is in the self-decomposition of the former and the stable constitution of the latter.

Verworn says: "The starting-point for further consideration is afforded by the fact that of the heterogeneous decomposition products of living proteid such as uric acid, creatin, and, moreover, the nuclein bases, guanin, xanthin, hypoxanthin, and adenin, a part contains cyanogen as a radical, and a part like urea, the most important of all the decomposition products of living proteid, can be produced artificially from cyanogen compounds by a rearrangement of the atoms." "This points strongly," he thinks, "to the probability that living proteid contains the radical cyanogen, and thus differs fundamentally from dead or food proteid." Thus, according to Pflüger, "in the formation of cell substance, *i.e.*, of living proteid out of food proteid, a change in the latter takes place, the atoms of nitrogen going into a cyanogen-like relation with the atoms of carbon, probably with the absorption of a considerable amount of heat." Cyanogen is a radical which contains a vast amount of energy, and, although not to be compared with that of radium compounds, its potential store is nevertheless very great, as appears from thermal investigations. Again, "the idea that it is the cyanogen especially that confers upon the living proteid molecule its characteristic properties is supported especially by many analogies that exist between living proteid and the compounds of cyanogen. Thus a product of the oxidation of cyanogen, cyanic acid, H.C.N.O., possesses great similarity to living proteid. Pflüger calls attention to the following interesting points of comparison: (1) Both bodies grow by polymerization by chemically combining similar molecules, like chains, into masses; the growth of living substance takes place thus, and in this way also the polymeric $H_nC_nN_nO_n$ comes from cyanic acid, H.C.N.O. (2) Further, both bodies in the presence of water are spontaneously decomposed into carbonic acid and ammonia. (3) Both afford urea by dissociation, *i.e.*, by intramolecular rearrangement, not by direct oxidation. (4) Finally, both are liquid and transparent at low temperatures and coagulate at higher ones; cyanic acid earlier, living proteid later." "Their similarity," says Pflüger, "is so great that I might term cyanic acid a half-living molecule."

Pflüger's analyses have not met, to say the least of it, with widespread recognition. Further experimental confirmation is doubtless necessary before they can be ranked as theory.

The dynamical nature of the cyanogen molecule, however, together with the large store of potential energy it contains, constitutes the resemblance between it and radium compounds, but it must be borne in mind that the internal energy thus manifested by the molecular disintegration is of an entirely different order of magnitude. Nevertheless, there is a sufficient resemblance between the two to utilize each for the purpose of the experiments we have in view. Then the molecule of either might act as a nucleus which should by catalysis, or some other means, set up dynamically unstable groups, which, though not living in the sense that they possessed the n qualities of living proteid, may, by possessing $(n-1)$ of those qualities, be regarded as a mode of life in the sense in which many philosophers have used the word. If cyanogen is a half-living thing, as Pflüger supposed for the reason we have given, it is only natural to try if it would form growths in culture media, and the use of bouillon in my experiments was merely the logical outcome of this conception.

It seems quite beyond hope that even if we had the materials and conditions for producing life in the laboratory we should be able to produce forms of life as developed as even the simplest amœba, for the one reason, if for no other, that these are the descendants of almost an indefinite series of ancestors. But it is not beyond hope to produce others, more elementary ones, artificially; and the micro-organisms—I think I am justified in calling them such—which form the subject of this article, although not bacteria, still may be looked upon as approximating to these more closely, and certainly regarded as higher in the scale of being than any forms of crystalline or colloid bodies hitherto observed.

VII

THE BIRTH OF CONSCIENCE

"THE MORALITY OF NATURE"

BY

PRINCE KROPOTKIN

IN our own day, the old distinction between scientist and philosopher bids fair to become extinct. Time was when the scientist confined himself to exact experiment and the discovery of the physical laws which underlay his results, while the philosopher took the universe for his province and speculated upon its meaning. Now, however, each invades the other's realm; the scientist theorizes on origin and cause; the philosopher adopts scientific methods. Somewhere in the borderland between the two, lies the following address. It attempts to discover the origin of society, the explanation of altruism, the reason why a man is insufficient for himself and desires the company of others, feels both the joy and suffering of others in addition to his own.

Here again it is obvious that we do but strive to push a little further from us the mystery of our being. Even were the search of science successful, so that she could set her finger on a point and date, and say, here began the social instinct in man, from this it has developed—even then the marvel would stand as it stands now, not in the method of development, but in the fact that this social instinct exists, that it has been created.

Nevertheless, it may be well to caution our readers that in this interweaving of science and philosophy, the scientist is apt to carry through his philosophic excursions the forms of expression, the positiveness of assertion, which belong properly to his experimental work. Hence when, in one of the few essays our series gives of necessity to science, the writer states a fact of the present *time, which he has seen or tried, we may accept him fully; but when from this fact he infers something that occurred æons ago, we must grow cautious. For each positive "is" it were wise to substitute the more modest "seems," for "proves" let us read "suggests," or at the most "makes probable." Scientists themselves would be the readiest to approve this caution. True science has no more deadly enemy than over-sureness. The possibility of lurking error, or of new and unknown causes working to confuse results, is ever in the seeker's mind.*

In the present address Darwinism, already introduced to the reader, presents its most recent thoughts, and presents them in the words of one of its most noted exponents. Prince Kropotkin is the most widely known of Russian scientists. He is also a leader in the discussion of social problems. To Americans his career may be less familiar than it is in Europe. Born of a vice-regal family in Russia, he was educated among the pages of the imperial court; but a more vigorous life attracted him, and he became an explorer and geographer amid the wilds of Siberia. Later he took part in the Russian revolutionary movement, and joined the International Working Men's Association (1872). He was imprisoned and escaped, to become an anarchistic leader throughout Europe. As such, he was expelled from Switzerland. Even in republican France he was held three years in prison; and it was not till 1886 that he settled to the more quiet existence of a littérateur *and scientist. In 1900 he published his "Memoirs of a Revolutionist," which has been translated into every leading language; and in 1902 he published his important treatise on "Mutual Aid in Evolution," to which he makes frequent reference below.*

I

THE work of Darwin was not limited to biology only.[1] Already in 1837, when he had just written a rough outline of his theory of the origin of species, he entered in his note-book this significant remark: 'My theory will lead to a new philosophy.'

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[1] In his *History of Modern Philosophy* the Danish professor, Harald Höffding, gives an admirable sketch of the philosophical importance of Darwin's work. *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, German translation by F. Bendixen (Leipsic, 1896), Vol. II., p. 487 *et seq.*

And so it did in reality. The application which he made of the idea of evolution to the whole of organic life marked a new era in philosophy; and it led him later on to write a sketch of the development of the moral sense, which opened a new page in ethics. In this sketch so much was done to throw a new light upon the true and efficient cause of the moral feelings, and place the whole of ethics on a scientific basis, that although Darwin's leading ideas may be considered as a further development of those of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, his work represents, nevertheless, a new departure, on the lines faintly indicated by Bacon. It secured, therefore, for its author a place by the side of the other founders of ethical schools, such as Hume, Hobbes, or Kant.

The leading ideas of Darwin's ethics may easily be summed up. In the very first sentences of his essay he states his object in quite definite terms. He begins with a praise of the sense of duty, which he characterizes in the well-known poetical words of Kant: 'Duty! Wondrous thought that workest neither by fond insinuation, flattery, nor by any threat, . . .' etc. And he undertakes to explain this sense of duty, or moral conscience, 'exclusively from the side of natural history'—an explanation, he adds, which no English writer had hitherto attempted to give.[1] That the moral sense should be acquired by each individual separately, during its lifetime, he naturally considers 'at least extremely improbable on the general theory of evolution'; and he derives this sense from the social feelings which are instinctive or innate in the lower animals, and probably in man as well. The origin and the very foundation of all moral feelings Darwin sees 'in the social instincts which lead the animal to take pleasure in the society of its fellows, to feel a certain amount of sympathy with them, and to perform various services for them'; sympathy being understood here in its proper sense—not as a feeling of commiseration or love, but as a 'fellow-feeling' or 'mutual sensibility'; the fact of being influenced by another's feelings.

This being Darwin's first proposition, his second is that as soon as the mental faculties of a species become highly developed as they are in man, the social instinct will necessarily lead, as every other unsatisfied instinct does, to a sense of dissatisfaction, or even misery, as often as the individual, reasoning about its past actions, sees that in some of them 'the enduring and always present social instinct had yielded to some other instinct, at the time stronger, but neither enduring nor leaving behind it a very vivid impression.' For Darwin the moral sense is thus not the mysterious gift of unknown origin which it was for Kant. 'Any animal whatever,' he says, 'endowed with well-marked social instincts, the parental and filial affections being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense, or conscience [Kant's "knowledge of duty"], as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well, or nearly as well, developed as in man.

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[1] *The Descent of Man*, chap. IV.

To these two fundamental propositions Darwin adds two secondary ones. After the power of language had been acquired, and the wishes of the community could be expressed, 'the common opinion how each member ought to act for the public good would naturally become, in a paramount degree, the guide of action.' However, the effect of public approbation and disapprobation depends entirely upon the development of mutual sympathy. It is because we feel in sympathy with others that we appreciate their opinions; and public opinion acts in a moral direction only where the social instinct is sufficiently strongly developed. This is evidently an important remark, because it refutes those theories of Mandeville and his more or less outspoken eighteenth-century followers, which represented morality as nothing but a set of *conventional* manners. Finally, Darwin mentions habit as a potent factor for framing our conduct. It strengthens the social instinct and mutual sympathy, as also obedience to the judgment of the community.

Having thus stated the substance of his views in four definite propositions, Darwin gives them some further developments. He examines, first, sociability in animals, their love of society, and the misery which every one of them feels if it is left alone; their continual intercourse; their mutual warnings, and the services they render each other in hunting and for self-defence. 'It is certain,' he says, 'that associated animals have a feeling of love for each other which is not felt by non-social adult animals.' They may not much sympathize with each other's pleasures, but cases of sympathy with each other's distress or danger are quite common, and Darwin quotes a few of the most striking instances. Some of them, such as Saintsbury's blind pelican or the blind rat, both of which were fed by their congeners, have become classical by this time, while several similar illustrations have been added since. 'Moreover, beside love and sympathy,' Darwin continues, 'animals exhibit other qualities connected with social instincts which in us would be called moral,' and he gives a few examples of moral self-restraint in dogs and elephants. Altogether, it is evident that every action in common—and with certain animals it is quite habitual—requires some restraint of the same sort. However, it must be said that Darwin did not treat the subject of sociability in animals and their incipient moral feelings with all the developments which it deserved, in view of the central position which it occupies in his theory of morality.

Considering next human morality, Darwin remarks that although man, such as he now exists, has but few special instincts, he nevertheless is a sociable being who must have retained from an extremely remote period some degree of instinctive love and sympathy for his fellows. These feelings act as an impulsive instinct, which is assisted by reason, experience, and the desire of approbation. 'Thus the social instincts, which must have been acquired by man in a very rude state, and probably even by his ape-like progenitors, still give the impulse for some of his best actions.' The remainder is the result of a steadily growing intelligence and collective education.

It is evident that these views are correct only if we are ready to recognize that the intellectual faculties of animals differ from those of man in degree, but not in their essence. But this is admitted now by most students of comparative psychology; and the attempts which have been made lately to establish 'a gulf' between the instincts and the intellectual faculties of man and those of animals have not attained their end.[1] However, it does not follow from this resemblance that the moral instincts developed in different species, and the less so in species belonging to two different classes of animals, should be identical. If we compare insects with mammals, we must never forget that the lines of their development have diverged at a very early period of animal evolution. The consequence was that a deep physiological differentiation between separate portions of the same species took place with the ants, the bees, the wasps, etc., corresponding to a permanent physiological division of labor between their females, their males, and their workers—a division of which there is no trace among mammals. Therefore it seems almost impossible to ask men to judge of the morality of the worker-bees when they kill the males in their hive; and this is why the illustration of Darwin to this effect met with so much hostile criticism. And yet the moral conceptions of man and the actions of insects have so much in common that the greatest ethical teachers of mankind did not hesitate to recommend certain features of the ants and the bees for imitation by man. Their devotion to the group is certainly not surpassed by ours; and, on the other hand—to say nothing of our race wars, or of the occasional exterminations of religious dissidents and political adversaries—the human code of morality has undergone such variations in the course of time as to pass from the exposure of children by savages in years of scarcity, and the 'wound-for-wound and life-for-life' principle of the Decalogue, to the profound respect of everything that lives preached by Bodisatta and the pardon of offences practised by the early Christians. We are thus bound to conclude that while the differences between the morality of the bee and that of man are due to a deep physiological divergence, the striking similarities between the two point, nevertheless, to a community of origin.

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[1] The incapacity of an ant, a dog, or a cat to make a *discovery*, or to hit upon the correct solution of a difficulty, is not proof of an essential difference between the intelligence of man and that of these animals, because the same want of inventiveness is continually met with in men as well. Like the ant in one of Lubbock's experiments, thousands of men who had not been already familiar with bridges would spend their forces in the effort of crossing a brook or a ravine, before they would try to bridge it. And, on the other hand, the collective intelligence of

The social instinct is thus, in Darwin's opinion, the common stock, out of which all morality originates; and he further

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an ant's nest or a beehive—one individual in the thousand hitting upon the correct solution, and the others imitating it—solves difficulties much greater than those upon which the individual ant, or bee, or cat has so ludicrously failed. The bees at the Paris Exhibition, and their devices to prevent being disturbed in their work, or any one of the well-known facts of inventiveness among the bees, the ants, the wolves hunting together, are instances in point.—K.

analyzes this instinct. Unfortunately, scientific animal psychology is still in its infancy, and therefore it is extremely difficult to disentangle the complex relations which exist between the social instinct, properly so-called, and the parental and filial instincts, as well as several other instincts and faculties, such as sympathy, reason, experience, and a tendency to imitation. Darwin felt this difficulty very much, and therefore he expressed himself extremely cautiously. The parental and filial instincts, he suggested, 'apparently lie at the base of the social instincts': and in another place he wrote: 'The feeling of pleasure from society is probably an extension of the parental or filial affections, since the social instinct seems to be developed by the young remaining for a long time with their parents.'

This caution was fully justified, because in other places he pointed out that the social instinct must be *a separate instinct in itself*, different from the others—an instinct which has been developed by natural selection *for its own sake*, as it was useful for the well-being and the preservation of the species. It is so fundamental that when it runs against another instinct, even one so strong as the attachment of the parents to their offspring, it often takes the upper hand. Birds, when the time has come for their autumn migration, will leave behind their tender young, not yet old enough for a prolonged flight, and follow their comrades.

To this striking illustration I may also add that the social instinct is strongly developed with many lower animals, such as the land-crabs, or the Molucca crab[1]; as also with certain fishes, with whom it hardly could be considered as an extension of the filial or parental feelings. In these cases it appears rather as an extension of the *brotherly* or *sisterly* relations, or feelings of *comradeship*, which probably develop each time that a considerable number of young animals, having been hatched at a given place and at a given moment, continue to live together—whether they are with their parents or not. It would seem, therefore, more correct to consider the social and the parental instincts as *two* closely connected instincts, of which the former is perhaps the earlier, and therefore the stronger, and which both go hand in hand in the evolution of the animal world. Both are favored

[1] See *Mutual Aid*, 1903, pp. 11 and 12.

by natural selection, which, as soon as they come into conflict, keeps the balance between the two, for the ultimate good of the species.[1]

The most important point in the ethical theory of Darwin is, of course, his explanation of the moral conscience of man and his sense of remorse and duty. This point has always been the stumbling-block of all ethical theories. Kant, as is known, utterly failed, in his otherwise so beautifully written work on morality, to establish why his 'categorical imperative' should be obeyed at all, unless such be the will of a supreme power. We may admit that Kant's 'moral law,' if we slightly alter its formula, while we maintain its spirit, is a *necessary* conclusion of the human reason. We certainly object to the metaphysical form which Kant gave it; but, after all, its substance is equity, justice. And, if we translate the metaphysical language of Kant into the concrete language of inductive science, we may find points of contact between his conception of the origin of the moral law and the naturalist's view concerning the development of the moral sense. But this is only one-half of the problem. Supposing, for the sake of argument, that 'pure reason,' free from all observation, all feeling, and all instinct, in virtue of its inherent properties, should necessarily come to formulate a law of justice similar to Kant's imperative, and granting that no reasoning being could ever come to any other conclusion, because such are the inherent properties of *reason*—granting all this, and fully recognizing at the same time the elevating character of Kant's moral philosophy, the great question of all ethics remains, nevertheless, in full: 'Why should man obey the moral law, or principle, formulated by his reason?' Or, at least, 'Whence that feeling of obligation which men are experiencing?'

Several critics of Kant's ethical philosophy have already pointed out that it left this great fundamental question unsolved.

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[1] In an excellent analysis of the social feeling (*Animal Behaviour*, 1900, pp. 231–232) Professor Lloyd Morgan says: 'And this question Prince Kropotkin, in common with Darwin and Espinas, would probably answer without hesitation that the primæval germ of the social community lay in the prolonged coherence of the group of parents and offspring.' I should only add the words: '*or of the offspring without the parents*,' because this addition would better agree with the above facts, while it also more correctly renders the idea of Darwin.—K.

But they might have added also that Kant himself had recognized his incapacity of solving it. After having thought intensely upon this subject, and written about it for four years, he acknowledged in his *Philosophical Theory of Religion* (Part I., 'Of the Radical Evil of Human Nature,' published in 1792) that he was unable to find the origin of the moral law. In fact, he gave up the whole problem by recognizing 'the incomprehensibility of this capacity, a capacity which proclaims a divine origin'—this very incomprehensibility having to rouse man's spirit to enthusiasm and to strengthen it for any sacrifices which respect to his duty may impose upon him.[1]

Intuitive philosophy having thus acknowledged its incapacity to solve the problem, let us see how Darwin solved it from the point of view of the naturalist. Here is, he said, a man who has yielded to a strong sense of self-preservation, and has not risked his life to save that of a fellow-creature; or, he has stolen food from hunger. In both cases he has obeyed a quite natural instinct, and the question is, Why should he feel miserable at all? Why should he think that he ought to have obeyed some other instinct, and acted differently? Because, Darwin replies, in human nature 'the more enduring social instincts conquer the less persistent instincts.' Moral conscience has always a retrospective character; it speaks in us when we think of our past actions; and it is the result of a struggle, during which the less persistent, the less permanent *individual* instinct yields before the more permanently present and the more enduring *social* instinct. With those animals which always live in society 'the social instincts are ever present and persistent.' Such animals are always ready to join in the defence of the group and to aid each other in different ways. They feel miserable if they are separated from the others. And it is the same with man. 'A man who possessed no trace of such instincts would be a monster.' On the other hand, the desire which leads a man to satisfy his hunger or his anger, or to escape danger, or to appropriate somebody's possessions, is in its nature temporary. Its satisfaction is always weaker than the desire itself. And when we think of it in the past, we cannot recall it as vividly as it was before its satisfaction. Consequently, if a man, with a view of satisfying such a desire, has acted so as to traverse his social instinct, and afterward reflects upon his action—which we continually do—he will be driven 'to make a comparison between the impressions of past hunger, vengeance satisfied, or danger shunned at other men's cost, with the almost ever-present instinct of sympathy, and with his early knowledge of what others consider as praiseworthy or blamable.' And once he has made this comparison he will feel 'as if he had been baulked in following a present instinct or habit, and this with all animals causes *dissatisfaction*, or even *misery*.'

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[1] Hartleben's edition of Kant's works, Vol. VI., pp. 143, 144.

And then Darwin shows how the primary promptings of such a conscience, which always 'looks backward, and serves as a guide for the future,' may take the aspect of shame, regret, repentance, or even violent remorse, if the feeling be supported by reflection about the judgment of those with whom man feels in sympathy. Later on, habit will necessarily increase the power of this conscience upon man's actions, while at the same time it will tend to harmonize more and more the desires and passions of the individual with his social sympathies and instincts.[1] Altogether, the great difficulty for ethical philosophy is to explain the first germs of the 'ought'—the appearance of the first whisper of the voice which pronounces that word. If that much has been explained, the accumulated experience of the community and its collective teachings will explain the rest.

We have thus, for the first time, an explanation of the sense of duty on a natural basis. True that it runs counter to the ideas that are current now about animal and human nature; but it is correct. Nearly all ethical writers have hitherto started with the unproved postulate that the strongest of all the instincts of man, and the more so of animals, is the *self-preservation instinct*, which, owing to a certain looseness of their terminology, they have identified, in man, with self-assertion, or egoism properly speaking. This instinct, which they conceived as including, on the one side, such primary impulses as self-defence, self-preservation, and the very act of satisfying hunger, and, on the other side, such derivative feelings as the longing for domination, greed, hatred, the desire of revenge, and so on—this compound and heterogeneous aggregate of instincts and feelings they represented as an all-pervading and all-powerful force, which finds no contradiction in animal and human nature, excepting in a certain feeling of benevolence or mercy. The consequence of such a view was that, *once human nature was recognized as such*, there obviously remained nothing but to lay a special stress upon the softening influence of those moral teachers who appealed to mercy, borrowing the spirit of their teachings and the impressiveness of their words from a world that lies outside nature—outside and above the world which is accessible to our senses. And if one refused to accept this view, the only alternate issue was to attribute, as Hobbes and his followers did, a special importance to the coercive action of the State, inspired by genial law-givers—which meant, of course, merely to shift the extra-natural inspiration from the religious preacher to the law-maker.

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[1] In a foot-note Darwin, with his usual deep insight, makes, however, one exception. 'Enmity, or hatred,' he remarks, 'seems also to be a highly persistent feeling, perhaps more so than any other that can be named. . . . This feeling would thus seem to be innate, and is certainly a most persistent one. It seems to be the complement and converse of the true social instinct' (foot-note 27). This feeling, so deeply seated in animal nature, evidently explains the bitter wars that are fought between different tribes or groups in several animal species and among men. It explains also the existence of two different codes of morality retained till now among civilized nations. But this important and yet neglected subject can better be treated in connection with the development of the idea of justice.—K.

Beginning with the Middle Ages, the founders of ethical schools, for the most part ignorant of nature, to the study of which they preferred metaphysics, had represented the self-assertive instincts of the individual as the very condition of its physical existence. To obey their promptings was considered as *the* law of nature, the neglect of which would lead to a sure defeat and to the ultimate disappearance of the species. Therefore, to combat these egotistic promptings was possible only if man called to his aid the supernatural forces. The triumph of moral principles was thus represented as *a triumph of man over nature*, which he may hope to achieve only with an aid from without, coming as a reward for his humility. They told us, for instance, that there is no greater *virtue*, no greater triumph of the spiritual over the natural, than self-sacrifice for the welfare of our fellow-men. But the fact is that self-sacrifice in the interest of an ants' nest, for the safety of a group of birds, or the security of a drove of cattle, a herd of antelopes, or a band of monkeys, is *a zoölogical fact of every-day occurrence in Nature*—a fact for which hundreds upon hundreds of animal species require nothing else but natural sympathy with their fellow-creatures, the sensation of full vital energy, and a constant habit of mutual aid. Darwin, who *knew* nature, had the courage boldly to assert that of the two instincts—the social and the individual—it is the former which is the stronger, the more persistent, and the more permanently present. And he was right. The instinct of mutual aid pervades the animal world, because natural selection works for maintaining and further developing it, and pitilessly destroys those species which lose it. In the great struggle for life which every animal species carries on against the hostile agencies of climate, surroundings, and natural enemies, big and small, those species which most consistently carry out the principle of mutual support have the best chance to survive, while the others die out. And the same great principle is confirmed by the history of mankind.

It is most remarkable that in representing the social instinct under this aspect we return, in fact, to what Bacon, the great founder of inductive science, had perceived. In his programme of the work to be done by the next generations with the aid of the inductive method, in *The Great Instauration*, he wrote:

"All things are endued with an appetite for two kinds of good—the one as a thing is a whole in itself, the other as it is a part of some greater whole; and *this latter is more worthy and more powerful than the other, as it tends to the conservation of a more ample form*. The first may be called individual, or self-good, and the latter, good of communion. . . . And thus it generally happens that the conservation of the more general form regulates the appetites." [1]

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[1] *On the Dignity and Advancement of Learning*, Book VII. chap. i. We certainly find Bacon's *arguments* in favor of this idea insufficient; but he was only establishing the outlines of a science, which had to be worked out by his followers. In another place he returns to the same idea. He speaks of 'two appetites [instincts] of the creatures,' (1) that of self-preservation and defence, and (2) that of multiplying and propagating, and he adds, 'The latter, which is active, seems *stronger* and more worthy than the former, which is passive.'—K.

It may be asked, of course, whether such a conception agrees with the theory of natural selection, according to which struggle for life, within the species, was considered a necessary condition for the appearance of new species, and for evolution altogether? Having already touched elsewhere upon this question, I will not enter here into its discussion, and will only add the following remark. Immediately after the appearance of Darwin's work on the origin of species we were all inclined to believe that an acute struggle for the means of existence between the members of the same species was necessary for accentuating the variations, and for the development of new species. But the deeper we go into the study of the facts of nature, and realize the *direct* influence of the surroundings for producing *variation in a definite direction*, as also the influence of isolation upon portions of the species separated from the main body in consequence of their migrations, we are prepared to understand 'struggle for life' in a much wider and deeper sense. We see more and more *the group of animals*, acting as a whole, carrying on the struggle against adverse conditions, or against some such an enemy as a kindred species, by means of mutual support within the group, and thus acquiring habits which reduce the struggle, while they lead at the same time to a higher development of intelligence among those who took to mutual support. The above objection falls through in proportion as we advance in our knowledge of the struggle for life.

Nature has thus to be recognized as *the first ethical teacher of man*. The social instinct, innate in men as well as it is in all the sociable animals, is the origin of all ethical conceptions and all the subsequent ethical development.

II

Primitive man lived in close intimacy with animals. With some of them he probably shared the shelters under the rocks, occasionally the caverns, and very often food. Not more than a hundred years ago the natives of Siberia and America astonished our naturalists by their thorough knowledge of the habits of the most retiring beasts and birds; but primitive man stood in still closer relations to the animals, and knew them still better. The wholesale extermination of life by means of forest and prairie fires, poisoned arrows, and the like, had not yet begun; and from the bewildering abundance of animal life which was found by the white settlers when they first took possession of the American continent we may judge of the density of the animal population during the early Post-glacial period. Palæolithic and neolithic man lived closely surrounded by his dumb brothers—just as the shipwrecked crew of Behring lived amidst the multitudes of polar foxes, which were prowling in the midst of their encampments and gnawing at night at the very furs upon which the men were sleeping. Our primitive ancestors lived *with* the animals, in the midst of them. And as soon as they began to bring some order into their observations of nature, and to transmit them to posterity, the animals and their life supplied them with the chief materials for their unwritten encyclopædia of knowledge, as well as for their wisdom, which they expressed in proverbs and sayings. Animal psychology was the first psychology which man was aware of—it is still a favorite subject of talk at the campfires; and animal life, closely interwoven with that of man, was the subject of the very first rudiments of art, inspiring the first engravers and sculptors, and entering into the composition of the most ancient epical traditions and cosmogonic myths.

The first thing which our children learn in natural history is something about the beasts of prey—the lions and the tigers. But the first thing which primitive savages must have learned about nature was that it represents a vast agglomeration of animal clans and tribes: the ape tribe, so nearly related to man, the ever-prowling wolf tribe, the knowing, chattering bird tribe, the ever-busy insect tribe, and so on. For them the animals were an extension of their own kin—only so much wiser than themselves. And the first vague generalization which men must have made about nature—so vague as to hardly differ from a mere impression—was that the living being and his clan or tribe are inseparable. *We* can separate them—*they* could not; and it seems even doubtful whether they could *think* of life otherwise than within a clan or a tribe.

Such an impression of nature was unavoidable. Among his nearest congeners—the monkeys and the apes—man saw hundreds of species living in large societies, united together within each group by the closest bonds. He saw how they supported each other during their foraging expeditions, how they combined against their common enemies, and rendered each other all sorts of small services, such as the picking of thorns from each other's fur, the nestling together in cold weather, and so on. Of course they often quarrelled, but there was more noise in these quarrels than serious harm, and at times, in case of danger, they displayed the most striking mutual attachment, to say nothing of the strong devotion of the mothers to their young ones, which they have in common with all the animals. Sociability was thus the rule with the monkey tribe; and if there are now two species of big apes, the gorilla and the orang-outang, which are not sociable, and keep in small families only, the very limited sizes of the areas they inhabit are a proof of their being now decaying species—decaying, perhaps, on account of the merciless war which men have waged against them in consequence of the very resemblance between the two species.[1]

Primitive man saw, next, that even among the carnivorous beasts, which live by killing other animals, there is one general and invariable rule: *They never kill each other.* Some of them are very sociable—such are all the dog tribe: the jackals, the dholes or kholzun dogs, the hyenas. Some others prefer to live in small families; but even among these last the more intelligent ones—the lions and the leopards—occasionally join together for hunting, like the dog tribe. And as to those few which lead—nowadays, at least—a quite solitary life in small families, so that even the females with their cubs will often keep separate from the

[1] Several African travellers speak of that enmity and signal its causes.

males, the same general rule of nature prevails among them: they do not kill each other. Even now, when the myriads of ruminants which formerly peopled the prairies have been exterminated, and the tigers live mainly on man's herds, and are compelled, therefore, to keep close to the villages, every one to its own domain—even now the natives of India will tell us that somehow the tigers manage to keep to their separate domains without fighting bloody internecine wars for securing them. Besides, it appears extremely probable that even those few animals which now lead a solitary existence—such as the tigers, the smaller species of the cat tribe (nearly all nocturnal), the bears, the genets, most weasels, the marten tribe, the hedgehog, and a few others—were not always solitary creatures. For some of them we have positive evidence that they remained sociable so long as they escaped extermination by man, and we have reason to believe that nearly all of them were in the same conditions in times past.[1] But even if there always existed a few unsociable species, the fact is that man has always considered them an exception.

The lesson of nature was, thus, that even the strongest beasts are bound to combine. And that man who had witnessed once in his life an attack of wild dogs, or dholes, upon the biggest beasts of prey, certainly realized, once and forever, the irresistible force of the tribal unions, and the confidence and courage with which they inspire every individual. Man made divinities of these dogs, and worshipped them, trying by all sorts of magic to acquire their courage.

In the prairies and the woods our earliest ancestors saw myriads of animals, all living in clans and tribes. Countless herds of red-deer, fallow deer, reindeer, gazelles and antelopes, thousands of droves of buffaloes and legions of wild horses, wild donkeys, quaggas, zebras, and so on, were moving over the boundless plains, peacefully grazing side by side. Even the dreary plateaus had their herds of llamas and wild camels. And when man approached these animals, he soon realized how closely connected all these beings were in their respective droves or herds. Even when they seemed fully absorbed in grazing, and apparently took no notice of the others, they closely watched each other's movements, always ready to join in some common action. Man saw that all the deer tribe, whether they graze or merely gambol, always keep sentries, which never release their watchfulness and never are late to signal the approach of a beast of prey; he knew how, in case of sudden attack, the males and the females would encircle their young ones and face the enemy, exposing their lives for the safety of the feeble ones; and how, even with such timid creatures as the antelopes, or the fallow deer, the old males would often sacrifice themselves in order to cover the retreat of the herd. Man knew all that, which we ignore or easily forget, and he repeated it in his tales, embellishing the acts of courage and self-sacrifice with his primitive poetry, or mimicking them in his religious tribal dances. Still less could he ignore the great migrations of animals, because be followed them—just as the Chukchi follows still the herds of the wild reindeer, when the clouds of mosquitoes drive them from one place of the Chukchi peninsula to another, or as the Lapp follows the herds of his half-domesticated reindeer in their wanderings, over which he has no control. And if we, with all our book-learning, feel unable to understand how animals scattered over a wide territory can warn each other so as to bring their thousands to a given spot before they begin their march north, south, or west, our ancestors, who considered the animals as beings so much wiser than themselves, saw no difficulty in explaining that intercourse. For them all animals—beasts, birds, and fishes alike—were in continual communication, warning each other by means of hardly perceptible signs or sounds, informing one another about all sorts of events, and thus constituting one vast community, which had its own habits and rules of propriety and good behavior. Even to-day deep traces of that conception of nature survive in the folklore of all nations.

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[1] See *Mutual Aid*, chaps. I. and II., and Appendix.

From the populous, animated, and gay villages of the marmots, the prairie dogs, the jerboas, the hamsters, and so on, and from the colonies of that silent sage, the beaver, with which the Post-glacial rivers were thickly studded, primitive man, who himself had begun as a nomad forest-dweller, could learn the advantages of settled life, permanent dwellings, and labor in common. Even now we can see how the nomad cattle-breeders of Mongolia, whose improvidence is phenomenal, learn from the striped marmot (*Tamias striatus*) the advantages of agriculture and foresight when they plunder quite regularly every autumn the underground galleries of this rodent, and seize its provisions of eatable bulbs. The granaries of many smaller rodents, full of all sorts of eatable seeds, must have given man the first suggestion as to the culture of cereals. In fact, the sacred books of the East contain many an allusion to the foresight and laboriousness of the animals, which are set up as an example to man.

The birds, in their turn—almost every one of their species—gave our ancestors a lesson of the most intimate sociability, of the joys of social life, and its enormous advantages. It certainly did not escape the attention of man that, even among the birds of prey, many species of falcons are extremely sociable, and that even some eagles combine for hunting; while the flocks of kites will sometimes chase the strongest eagle and get hold of its spoil. And they saw, of course, many a time, how the smallest birds, if they are numerous enough, overcome their first terror at the sight of a hawk, and chase it, immensely enjoying this kind of sport.

The nesting associations of aquatic birds, and their unanimity in defending their young broods and eggs, were well known to man. He knew that as soon as he approached the shore of a lake where thousands of birds belonging to different species were nesting, his appearance would be signalled at once; how, the moment he would set his foot upon their grounds, hundreds of birds would circle and fly round him, skim over his face, bewilder him by the flapping of their wings, deafen him by their cries, and often compel him to retreat. Man knew this only too well, for his very existence in the early summer depended upon his capacity to resist such a combined attack of the winged tribe. And then the joy of life in the autumn societies of the bird-youngsters was certainly familiar to people who themselves lived in the woods and by the side of the forest brooks. Who knows if the very idea of wide tribal unions, or, at least, of those great tribal hunts (*abà* with the Mongols, *kadà* with the Tunguses), which are real *fêtes*, lasting a couple of months every autumn, was not suggested by such autumn gatherings of the birds, in which so many widely different species join together, spending a few hours every day in providing their food, and then chattering and fluttering about the remainder of the time?

Man knew also, of course, the gay play of animals, the sports in which several species delight, the concerts and dances of some others; the flights which certain species perform in the evenings, sometimes with a wonderful art and elaboration; the noisy meetings which are held by the swallows and other migrating birds, for years in succession, on the same spot, before they start on their long journeys south. And how often man must have stood in bewilderment as he saw the immense migrating columns of birds passing over his head for many hours in succession. The 'brute savage' knew and meditated on all these beauties of nature, which we have forgotten in our towns, and which we do not even find in our 'natural history' books, compiled for teaching anything but life; while the narratives of the great explorers —the Humboldts, the Audubons, the Azaras, the Brehms—of which every page was a picture of the real life of nature, are mouldering in our libraries.

In those times the wide world of the running waters and lakes was not a sealed book for man. He was familiar with its inhabitants as well. Even now many semi-savage natives of Africa and Polynesia profess a deep reverence for the crocodile. They consider him a near relative to man—a sort of ancestor. They even avoid naming him in their conversations, and if they must mention him they will say 'the old grandfather,' or use some other word expressing kinship and veneration. The crocodile, they maintain, acts exactly as they themselves do. He will never finally swallow his prey without having invited his relatives and friends to share the food; and if one of his tribe has been killed by man, otherwise than in due and just blood revenge, he will take vengeance upon any one of the murderer's kin. Therefore, if a negro has been eaten by a crocodile, his tribe will take the greatest care to discover the real culprit, and when he has been discovered and killed, they will carefully examine his intestines, in order to make sure that there has been no mistake; but if no proof of the beast's guilt is forthcoming, they will make all sorts of expiatory amends to the crocodile tribe, in order to appease the relatives of the innocently slaughtered individual, and continue to search for the real culprit. Otherwise the kinsfolk of the former would take revenge. The same belief exists among the Red Indians concerning the rattlesnake and the wolf, and its bearing upon the subsequent development of the idea of justice is self-evident.

The fishes, their shoals, and the ways they play in the transparent waters, exploring them by their scouts before they move in a given direction, must have deeply impressed man from a remote antiquity. Traces of this impression are found in folklore in many parts of the globe. Thus, for instance, Dekanawideh, the legendary law-giver of the Five Nations of the Red Indians, who is supposed to have given them the class organization, is represented as having retired first to meditate in contact with nature. He 'reached the side of a smooth, clear, running stream, transparent and full of fishes. He sat down, reclining on the sloping bank, gazing intent into the waters, watching the fishes playing about in complete harmony. . . .' Thereupon he conceived the scheme of dividing his people into gentes and classes, or totems.[1]

Altogether, for the primitive savage, animals are mysterious, problematic beings, possessed of a wide knowledge of the things of nature. They know much more than they are ready to tell us. In some way or another, by the aid of senses much more refined than ours, and by telling to each other all that they notice in their rambles and flights, they know everything, for miles round. And if man has been 'just' toward them, they will warn him of a coming danger, as they warn each other; but they will take no heed of him if he has not been straightforward in his actions. Snakes and birds (the owl is a leader of the snakes), mammals and insects, lizards and fishes—all understand each other, and continually communicate their observations to one another. They all belong to one brotherhood, into which they may, in some cases, admit man.

Inside this vast brotherhood there are, of course, the still closer brotherhoods of beings 'of one blood.' The monkeys, the bears, the wolves, the elephants and the rhinoceroses, most ruminants, the hares and most of the rodents, the crocodiles, and so on, perfectly know their own kin, and they will not tolerate any one of their relatives to be slaughtered by man without taking, in one way or another, honest revenge. This conception must have had an extremely remote origin. It must have grown at a time when man had not yet become omnivorous (which I am inclined to think, must have happened during the Glacial period) and had not yet begun to hunt animals for food. However, the same conception has been retained down to the present time. Even now, when a savage is hunting, he is bound to respect certain rules of propriety toward the animals, and he must perform certain expiatory ceremonies after his hunt. Most of these ceremonies are rigorously enacted, even nowadays in the savage clans, especially as regards those species which are considered the allies of man.

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[1] J. Brant-Sero, 'Dekanawideh,' in *Man*, 1901, p. 166. In other legends the wise man of the tride learns wisdom from the beaver, or the squirrel, or some bird.

It is well known that two men belonging to two different clans or tribes can become brothers by mixing the blood of the two, obtained from small incisions made for that purpose. To enter into such a union was quite habitual in olden times, and we learn from the folklore of all nations, and especially the sagas, how religiously such a brotherhood was observed. But it was also quite habitual for man to enter into brotherhood with some animal. The tales continually mention it. An animal asks a hunter to spare it, and if the hunter accedes to the demand the two become brothers. And then the monkey, the bear, the doe, the bird, the crocodile, or the bee—any one of the sociable animals—will take all possible care of the man-brother in the critical circumstances of his life, sending his or her animal brothers of different tribes to warn him or help him out of a difficulty. And if the warning comes too late, or is misunderstood, and he loses his life, they will all try to bring him back to life, and if they fail they will take the due revenge, just as if the man had been one of their own kin.

When I journeyed in Siberia I was often struck, without understanding it, with the care which my Tungus or Mongol guide would take not to uselessly kill any animal. The fact is that *every life* is respected by a savage, or rather it was before he came in contact with Europeans. If he kills an animal, it is for food or for clothing; but he does not destroy life, as the whites do, for the mere excitement of the slaughter. True, the Red Indians have done that with the buffaloes; but it was only after they had been for a long time in contact with the whites, and had got from them the rifle and the quick-firing revolver. Of course, there are rascals among the animals—the hyena, for instance, or the shrew-mouse, or the man-eating tiger; but these do not count: they are outlaws. As to the great animal world as a whole, savage children are taught to respect it and to see in it an extension of their own kin.

The idea of 'justice,' conceived at its origin as revenge, is thus connected with observations made on animals. But it appears extremely probable that the idea of reward for 'just' and 'unjust' treatment must also have originated, with primitive mankind, from the idea that animals take revenge if they have not been properly treated by man, and repay kindness with kindness. This idea is so deeply rooted in the minds of the savages all over the world that it may be considered as one of the most primitive conceptions of mankind. Extended from a few animals to all of them, it soon embodied the whole of nature—the trees and the forests, the rivers and the seas, the rocks and the mountains, which are all living. Gradually it grew to be a conception of the great whole, bound together by certain links of mutual support, which watches all the actions of the living beings and, owing to that solidarity in the universe, undertakes the revenge of wrong deeds. It became the conception of the Eumenides and the Moirai of the Greeks, the Parcæ of the Romans, and especially the Karma of the Hindoos. The Greek legend of the cranes of Ibikus, which links together man and birds, and countless Eastern legends, are poetical embodiments of the same conception.

This is what primitive man saw in nature and learned from it. With our scholastic education, which has systematically ignored nature and has tried to explain its most common facts by metaphysical subtleties, we began to forget that lesson. But for our Stone-Age ancestors sociability and mutual aid within the tribe must have been a fact so general in nature, so habitual, and so common that they certainly could not imagine life under another aspect. The conception of an isolated being is a later product of civilization—an abstraction, which it took ages to develop in the human race. To a primitive man isolated life seems so strange, so much out of the usual course of nature, that when he sees a tiger, a badger, a shrew-mouse, or a kingfisher leading a solitary existence, or when he notices a tree that stands alone, far from the forest, he creates a legend to explain this strange occurrence. He makes no legends to explain life in societies, but he has one for every case of solitude. The hermit, if he is not a sage or a wizard, is in most cases an outcast of animal society. He has done something so contrary to the ordinary run of life that they have thrown him out. Very often he is a sorcerer, who has the command of all sorts of dangerous powers, and has something to do with the pestilential corpses which sow disease in the world. This is why he prowls at night, prosecuting his wicked designs under the cover of darkness. All other beings in nature are sociable, and human thought runs in this channel. Sociable life—that is, *we*, not *I*—is, in the eyes of primitive man, the normal form of life. *It is life itself.* Therefore 'We' must have been the normal form of thinking for primitive man: a 'category' of his understanding, as Kant might have said. And not even 'We,' which is still too personal, because it represents a multiplication of the '*I*'s,' but rather such expressions as 'the men of the beaver tribe,' 'the kangaroo men,' or 'the turtles.' This was the primitive form of thinking, which nature impressed upon the mind of man.

Here, in that identification, or, we might even say, in this absorption of the 'I' by the tribe, lies the root of all ethical thought. The self-asserting 'individual' came much later on. Even now, with the lower savages, the 'individual' hardly exists at all. It is the tribe, with its hard-and-fast rules, superstitions, taboos, habits, and interests, which is always present in the mind of the child of nature. And in that constant, ever-present identification of the unit with the whole lies the substratum of all ethics, the germ out of which all the subsequent conceptions of justice, and the still higher conceptions of morality, grew up in the course of evolution.

VIII

THE SOUL IN BEASTS

"THE GROWTH OF MODERN IDEAS ON ANIMALS"

BY

COUNTESS CESARESCO

IF we accept, or even partly accept, the views of Prince Kropotkin as to the development of men from animals, and as to the nature and extent of our moral debt to the lower orders of life, then indeed the question of the possibility of a soul in the beast becomes of deepest interest. So also does the obverse of the same idea, our treatment of, our duty toward our "brethren of the wild." How many of us have felt urged to lament with Burns:

> *"I'm truly sorry man's dominion,*
> *Has broken nature's social union,*
> *An' justifies that ill opinion,*
> *Which makes thee startle*
> *At me, thy poor, earth-born companion,*
> *An' fellow-mortal."*

It is this side of the question, the humane side, that seems ever uppermost in the mind of the Countess E. Martinengo Cesaresco. She is known throughout the English and Italian races, indeed throughout the world, as a "friend of the creature." She has been active in his service and has written in his favor many times. In the following article, however, she keeps in mind the historic and also the scientific side of her subject, and presents us a summation of the most recent (1907) *thought upon the relation of man and beast.*

THE last age of antiquity was an age of yeast. Ideas were in fermentation; religious questions came to be regarded as "interesting"—just as they are now. The spirit of inquiry took the place of placid acceptance on the one hand, and placid indifference on the other. It was natural that there should be a rebound from the effort of Augustus to re-order religion on an Imperial, conventional, and unemotional basis. Then, too, Rome, which had never been really Italian except in the sublime previsions of Virgil, grew every day more cosmopolitan: the denizens of the discovered world found their way thither on business, for pleasure, as slaves—the influence of these last not being the least important factor, though its extent and character are not easy to define. Everything tended to foment a religious unrest which took the form of one of those "returns to the East" that are ever destined to recur: the spiritual sense of the Western world became Orientalized. The worship of Isis and Serapis and much more of Mithra proved to be more exciting than the worship of the Greek and Roman gods which represented Nature and law, while the new cults proposed to raise the veil on what transcends natural perception. No doubt the atmosphere of the East itself favored their rapid development; the traveller in North Africa must be struck by the extraordinary frequency with which the symbols of Mithraism recur in the sculpture and mosaics of that once great Roman dependency. Evidently the birthland of St. Augustine bred in the matter-of-fact Roman colonist the same nostalgia for the Unknowable which even now a lonely night under the stars of the Sahara awakes in the dullest European soul. Personal immortality as a paramount doctrine; a further life more real than this one; ritual purification, redemption by sacrifice, mystical union with deity—these were among the un-Roman and even anti-Roman conceptions which lay behind the new, strange propaganda, and prepared the way for the diffusion of Christianity. With the Italian peasants who clung to the unmixed older faith no progress was made till persecution could be called in as an auxiliary.

In such a time it was a psychological certainty that among the other Eastern ideas which were coming to the fore would be those ideas about animals which are roughly classed under the head of Pythagoreanism. The apostles of Christ in their journeys east or west might have met a singular individual who was carrying on an apostolate of his own, the one clear and un-yielding point of which was the abolition of animal sacrifices. This was Apollonius of Tyana, our knowledge of whom is derived from the biography, in part perhaps fanciful, written by Philostratus in the third century to please the Empress Julia Domna, who was interested in occult matters. Apollonius worked wonders as well attested as those, for instance, of the Russian Father John, but he seems to have considered his power the naturally produced result of an austere life and abstinence from flesh and wine, which is a thoroughly Buddhist or Jaina theory. He was a Theosophist who refrained from attacking the outward forms and observances of established religion when they did not seem to him either to be cruel or else incongruous to the degree of preventing a reverential spirit. He did not entirely understand that this degree is movable, any more than do those persons who want to substitute Gregorian chants for opera airs in rural Italian churches. He did not mind the Greek statues which appealed to the imagination by suggestions of beauty, but he blamed the Egyptians for representing deity as a dog or an ibis; if they disliked images of stone, why not have a temple where there were no images of any kind, where all was left to the inner vision of the worshipper? In which question, almost accidentally, Apollonius throws out a hint of the highest form of spiritual worship.

The keenly intellectual thinkers whom we call the Fathers of the Church saw that the majority of the ideas then agitating men's minds might find a quietus in Christian dogma, which suited them a great deal better than the vague and often grotesque shape they had worn hitherto. But there was a residuum of which they felt an instinctive fear, and peculiar notions about animals had the ill-luck of being placed at the head of these. It could not have been a fortunate coincidence that two of the most prominent men who held them in the early centuries were declared foes of the new faith—Celsus and Porphyry.

When the Church triumphed, the treatise written by Celsus would have been no doubt entirely destroyed like other works of the same sort, had not Origen made a great number of quotations from it for the purpose of confutation. Celsus was no *borné* disputant after the fashion of the Octavius of Minucius, but a man of almost encyclopædic learning; if he was a less fair critic than he held himself to be, it was less from want of information than from want of that sympathy which is needful for true comprehension. The inner feeling of such a man toward the Christian Sectaries was not nearly so much that of a Torquemada in regard to heretics as that of an old-fashioned Tory upholder of throne and altar toward dissent fifty years ago. It was a feeling of social aloofness.

Yet Celsus wished to be fair, and he had studied religions to enough purpose not to condemn as delusion or untruth everything that a superficial adversary would have rejected at once; for instance, he was ready to allow that the appearances of Christ to His disciples after the Crucifixion might be explained as psychical phenomena. Possibly he believed that truth, not falsehood, was the ultimate basis of all religions, as was the belief of Apollonius before him. In some respects Celsus was more unprejudiced than Apollonius; this can be observed in his remarks on Egyptian zoömorphism; it causes surprise, he says, when you go inside one of the splendid Egyptian temples to find for divinity a cat, a monkey, or a crocodile, but to the initiated they are symbols which under an allegorical veil turn people to honor imperishable ideas, not perishable animals as the vulgar suppose.

It may have been his recondite researches which led Celsus to take up the question of the intelligence of animals and the conclusions to be drawn from it. He only touches lightly on the subject of their origin; he seems to lean toward the theory that the soul, life, mind, only is made by God, the corruptible and passing body being a natural growth or perhaps the handiwork of inferior spirits. He denied that reason belonged to man alone, and still more strongly that God created the universe for man rather than for the other animals. Only absurd pride, he says, can engender such a thought. He knew very well that this, far from being a new idea, was the normal view of the ancient world from Aristotle to Cicero; the distinguished men who disagreed with it had never won more than a small minority over to their opinion. Celsus takes Euripides to task for saying:

> "The sun and moon are made to serve mankind."

Why mankind? he asks; why not ants and flies? Night serves them also for rest, and day for seeing and working. If it be said that we are the king of animals because we hunt and catch them or because we eat them, why not say that we are made for them because they hunt and catch us? Indeed, they are better provided than we, for while we need arms and nets to take them and the help of several men and dogs, Nature furnishes them with the arms they require, and we are, as it were, made dependent on them. You want to make out that God gave you the power to take and kill wild animals, but at the time when there were no towns or civilization or society or arms or nets, animals probably caught and devoured men while men never caught animals. In this way, it looks more as if God subjected man to animals than *vice versa*. If men seem different from animals because they build cities, make laws, obey magistrates and rulers, you ought to note that this amounts to nothing at all, since ants and bees do just the same. Bees have their "kings"; some command, others obey; they make war, win battles, take prisoners the vanquished; they have their towns and quarters; their work is regulated by fixed periods; they punish the lazy and cowardly—at least, they expel the drones. As to ants, they practise the science of social economy just as well as we do; they have granaries which they fill with provisions for the winter; they help their comrades if they see them bending under the weight of a burden; they carry their dead to places which become family tombs; they address each other when they meet: whence it follows that they never lose their way. We must conclude, therefore, that they have complete reasoning powers and common notions of certain general truths, and that they have a language and know how to express fortuitous events. If some one, then, looked down from the height of heaven on to the earth, what difference would he see between our actions and those of ants and bees? If man is proud of knowing magical secrets, serpents and eagles know a great deal more, for they use many preservatives against poisons and diseases, and are acquainted with the virtues of certain stones with which they cure the ailments of their young ones, while if men find out such a cure they think they have hit on the greatest wonder in the world. Finally, if man imagine that he is superior to animals because he possesses the notion of God, let him know that it is the same with many of them; what is there more divine, in fact, than to foresee and to foretell the future? Now for that purpose men have recourse to animals, especially to birds, and all our soothsayers do is to understand the indications given by these. If, therefore, birds and other prophetic animals show us by signs the future as it is revealed to them by God, it proves that they have closer relations with the deity than we; that they are wiser and more loved by God. Very enlightened men have thought that they understood the language of certain animals, and in proof of this they have been known to predict that birds would do something or go somewhere, and this was observed to come true. No one keeps an oath more religiously or is more faithful to God than the elephant, which shows that he knows Him.

Hence, concludes Celsus, the universe has *not* been made for man any more than for the eagle or the dolphin. Everything was created not in the interest of something else, but to contribute to the harmony of the whole in order that the world might be absolutely perfect. God takes care of the universe; it is that which His providence never forsakes, that which never falls into disorder. God no more gets angry with men than with rats or monkeys: everything keeps its appointed place.

In this passage Celsus rises to a higher level than in any other of the excerpts preserved for us by Origen. The tone of irony which usually characterizes him disappears in this dignified affirmation of supreme wisdom justified of itself, not by the little standards of men—or ants. It must be recognized as a lofty conception, commanding the respect of those who differ from it, and reconciling all apparent difficulties and contradictions forced upon us by the contemplation of man and Nature. But it brings no water from the cool spring to souls dying of thirst; it expounds in the clearest way and even in the noblest way the very thought which drove men into the Christian fold far more surely than the learned apologies of controversialists like Origen: the thought of the crushing unimportance of the individual.

The least attentive reader must be struck by the real knowledge of natural history shown by Celsus; his ants are nearly as conscientiously observed as Lord Avebury's. Yet a certain suspicion of conscious exaggeration detracts from the seriousness of his arguments; he strikes one as more sincere in disbelieving than in believing. A modern writer has remarked that Celsus in the second half of the second century forestalled Darwin in the second half of the nineteenth by denying human ascendancy and contending that man may be a little lower than the brute. But it scarcely seems certain whether he was convinced by his own reasoning or was not rather replying by paradoxes to what he considered the still greater paradoxes of Christian theology.

The shadow of no such doubt falls on the pages of the neoplatonists Plotinus and Porphyry. To them the destiny of animals was not an academic problem, but an obsession. The questions which Heine's young man asked of the waves—"What signifies man? Whence does he come? Whither does he go?"—were asked by them with passionate earnestness in their application to all sentient things. Plotinus reasoned, with great force, that intelligent beast-souls must be like the soul of man, since in itself the essence of the soul could not be different. Porphyry (born at Tyre, A.D. 233), accepting this postulate that animals possess an intelligent soul like ours, went on to declare that it was therefore unlawful to kill or feed on them under any circumstances. If justice is due to rational beings, how is it possible to evade the conclusion that we are also bound to act justly toward the races below us? He who loves all animated nature will not single out one tribe of innocent beings for hatred; if he loves the whole he will love every part, and, above all, that part which is most closely allied to ourselves. Porphyry was quite ready to admit that animals in their own way made use of words, and he mentions Melampus and Apollonius as among the philosophers who understood their language.

Neoplatonism penetrated into the early church, but divested of its views on animal destiny; even the Catholic neoplatonist Boethius, though he was sensitively fond of animals (witness his lines about caged birds), yet took the extreme view of the hard and fast line of separation, as may be seen by his poem on the "downward head," which he interpreted to indicate the earth-bound nature of all flesh save man. Birds, by the by, and even fishes, not to speak of camelopards, can hardly be said to have a "downward head." Meanwhile, the other manner of feeling, if not of thinking, reasserted its power, as it always will, for it belongs to the primal things. Excluded from the broad road, it came in by the narrow way—the way that leads to heaven. In the wake of the Christian Guru came a whole troop of charming beasts, little less saintly and miraculous than their holy protectors, and thus preachers of the religion of love were spared the reproach of showing an all-unloving face toward creatures that could return love for love as well as most and better than many of the human kind. The saint saved the situation, and the Church wisely let him alone to discourse to his brother fishes or his sister turtle-doves, without inquiring about the strict orthodoxy of the proceeding.[1]

Unhappily the more direct inheritors of neoplatonist dreams were not let alone. A trend of tendency toward Pythagoreanism runs through their different developments from Philo to the Gnostics, from the Gnostics, through the Paulicians, to the Albigenses. It passes out of our sight when these were suppressed in the thirteenth century by the most sanguinary persecution that the world has seen; but before long it was to reappear in one shape or another, and we may be sure that the thread was never wholly lost.

At an early date, in the heart of official Catholicism, an inconsistency appeared which is less easily explained than homilies composed for fishes or hymns for birds; namely, the strange business of animal prosecutions. Without inquiring exactly what an animal is, it is easy to bestow upon it either blessings or curses. The beautiful rite of the blessing of the beasts, which is still performed once a year in many places, involves no doctrinal crux. In Corsica the priest goes up to the high mountain *plateaux* where the animals pasture in the summer, and after saying mass in presence of all the four-footed family, he solemnly blesses them and exhorts them to prosper and multiply. It is a delightful scene, but it does not affect the conception of the moral status of animals, nor would that conception be affected by a right-down malediction or order to quit. What, however, can be thought of a regular trial of inconvenient or offending animals, in which great care is taken to keep up the appearance of fair-play to the defendants? Our first impression is that it must be an elaborate comedy; but a study of the facts makes it impossible to accept this theory.

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[1] It is the common impression in Rome that the present occupant of the Chair of St. Peter is nearer to the Saints than to the doctors; it does not cause surprise, therefore, though it must cause a great deal of pleasure, to find him recently bestowing his blessing "on all protectors of animals throughout the world."—C.

The earliest allusions to such trials that seem to exist belong to the ninth century, which does not prove that they were the first of the kind. One trial took place in 824 A.D. The Council of Worms decided in 868 that if a man has been killed by bees they ought to suffer death, "but," added the judgment, "it will be permissible to eat their honey." A relic of the same order of ideas lingers in the habit some people have of shooting a horse which has caused a fatal accident, often the direct consequence of bad riding or bad driving. The earlier beast trials of which we have knowledge were conducted by laymen, the later by ecclesiastics, which suggests their origin in a folk-practice. A good, characteristic instance began on September 5th, 1370. The young son of a Burgundian swineherd had been killed by three sows which seemed to have feared an attack on one of their young ones. All members of the herd were arrested as accomplices, which was a serious matter to their owners, the inmates of a neighboring convent, as the animals, if convicted, would be burnt and their ashes buried. The prior pointed out that three sows alone were guilty; surely the rest of the pigs ought to be acquitted. Justice did not move quickly in those times; it was on the 12th September, 1379, that the Duke of Burgundy delivered judgment; only the three guilty sows and one young pig (what had *it* done?) were to be executed; the others were set at liberty, "notwithstanding that they had seen the death of the boy without defending him." Were the original ones all alive after nine years? If so, would so long a respite have been granted them had no legal proceedings been instituted?

An important trial took place in Savoy in the year 1587. The accused was a certain fly. Two suitable advocates were assigned to the insects, who argued on their behalf that these creatures were created before man, and had been blessed by God who gave them the right to feed on grass, and for all these and other good reasons the flies were in their right when they occupied the vineyards of the Commune; they simply availed themselves of a legitimate privilege conforming to divine and natural law. The plaintiffs' advocate retorted that the Bible and common sense showed animals to be created for the utility of man; hence they could not have the right to cause him loss, to which the counsel for the insects replied that man had the right to command animals, no doubt, but not to persecute, excommunicate, and interdict them when they were merely conforming to natural law, "which is eternal and immutable like the divine."

The judges were so deeply impressed by this pleading that, to cut the case short, which seemed to be going against him the Mayor of St. Julien hastened to propose a compromise; he offered a piece of land where the flies might find a safe retreat and live out their days in peace and plenty. The offer was accepted. On June 29th, 1587, the citizens of St. Julien were bidden to the market square by ringing the church bells, and after a short discussion they ratified the agreement, which handed over a large piece of land to the exclusive use of the insects. Hope was expressed that they would be entirely satisfied with the bargain. A right of way across the land was, indeed, reserved to the public, but no harm whatever was to be done to the flies on their own territory. It was stated in the formal contract that the reservation was ceded to the insects in perpetuity.

All was going well, when it transpired that, in the mean time, the flies' advocates had paid a visit to that much-vaunted piece of land, and when they returned they raised the strongest objection to it on the score that it was arid, sterile, and produced nothing. The mayor's counsel disputed this; the land, he said, produced no end of nice small trees and bushes, the very things for the nutrition of insects. The judges intervened by ordering a survey to find out the real truth, which survey cost three florins. There, alas, the story ends, for the winding up of the affair is not to be found in the archives of St. Julien.

Records of 144 such trials have come to light. Of the two I have described, it will be remarked that one belongs, as it were, to criminal and the other to civil law. The last class is the most curious. No doubt the trial of flies or locusts was resorted to when other means of getting rid of them had failed; it was hoped, somehow, that the elaborate appearance of fair play would bring about a result not to be obtained by violence. We can hardly resist the inference that they involved some sort of recognition or intuition of animals' rights and even of animal intelligence.

Afterward, during the cruel witch mania, not a few cleverly trained animals were put to death on suspicion of diabolical possession, like Bankes' horse, "*Morocco*," whose pretty tricks were mentioned by Shakespeare. It is lucky for the Prussian "Hans" that he lives in a more enlightened age.

In the dawn of modern literature animals played a large, though artificial, part, which must not be quite ignored on account of its artificiality, because in the Bestiaries, as in the Æsopic and Oriental fables from which they were mainly derived, there was an inextricable tangle of observations of the real creature and arbitrary ascription to him of human qualities and adventures. At last they became a mere method for attacking political or ecclesiastical abuses, but their great popularity was as much due to their outer as to their inner sense. There is not any doubt that at the same time floods of Eastern fairy-tales were migrating to Europe, and in these the most highly appreciated hero was always the friendly beast. In a romance of the thirteenth century called *Guillaume de Palerme*, all previous marvels of this kind were outdone by the story of a Sicilian prince who was befriended by a were-wolf!

It is not generally remembered that the Indian or Buddhist view of animals must have been pretty well known in Europe at least as early as the fourteenth century. The account of the monastery "where many strange beasts of divers kinds do live upon a hill," which Fra Odoric, of Pordenone, dictated in 1330, is a description, both accurate and charming, of a Buddhist animal refuge, and in the version given of it in Mandeville's "Travels," if not in the original, it must have been read by nearly every one who could read, for no book ever had so vast a diffusion as the "Travels" of the elusive Knight of St. Albans.

With the Italian renaissance came the full modern *æsthetic* enjoyment of animals—the admiration of their beauty and perfection, which had been appreciated, of course, long before, but not quite in the same spirit. The all-round gifted Leo Battista Alberti in the fifteenth century took the same critical delight in the points of a fine animal that a modern expert would take. He was a splendid rider, but his interest was not confined to horses; his love for his dog is shown by his having pronounced a funeral oration over him.

We feel that with such men humanity toward animals was a part of good manners. "We owe justice to men," said the intensely civilized Montaigne, "and grace and benignity to other creatures that are capable of it; there is a natural commerce and mutual obligation between them and us." Sir Arthur Helps, speaking of this, called it "using courtesy to animals," and, when one comes to think of it, is not such "courtesy" the particular mark and sign of a man of good breeding in all ages?

The Renaissance brought with it something deeper than a wonderful quickening of the æsthetic sense in all directions; it also brought that spiritual quickening which is the co-efficient of every really upward movement of the human mind. It was to be foreseen that animals would have their portion of attention in the ponderings of the god-intoxicated musers on life and things who have been called the sceptics of the Renaissance. For the proof that they did receive it we have only to turn to the pages of Giordano Bruno: "Every part of creation has its share in being and cognition." "There is a difference, not in quality, but in quantity, between the soul of man, the animal, and the plant." "Among horses, elephants, and dogs there are single individuals which appear to have almost the understanding of men." "With what understanding the ant gnaws her grain of wheat lest it should sprout in her underground habitations!"

Bruno's prophetic guess, that instinct is inherited habit, might have saved Descartes (who was much indebted to the Nolan) from giving his name an unenviable immortality in connection with the theory which is nearly all that the ignorant know now of Cartesian philosophy. This was the theory that animals are *automata*, a sophism that may be said to have swept Europe, though it was not long before it provoked a reaction. Descartes got this idea from the very place where is was likely to originate, from Spain. A certain Gomez Pereira advanced it before Descartes made it his own, which even led to a charge of plagiarism. "Because a clock marks time and a bee makes honey, we are to consider the clock and the bee to be machines. Because they do one thing better than man and no other thing so well as man, we are to conclude that they have no mind, but that Nature acts within them, holding their organs at her disposal." "Nor are we to think, as the ancients do, that animals speak, though we do not know their language, for, if that were so, they, having several organs related to ours, might as easily communicate with us as with each other."

About this, Huxley showed that an almost imperceptible imperfection of the vocal chord may prevent articulated sounds. Moreover, the click of the bushman, which is almost his only language, is exceedingly like the sounds made by monkeys.

Language, as defined by an eminent Italian man of science, Professor Broca, is the faculty of making things known or expressing them by signs or sounds. Much the same definition was given by Mivart, and if there be a better one, we have still to wait for it. Human language is evolved; at one time man had it not. The babe in the cradle is without it; the deaf mute, in his untaught state, is without it; *ergo*, the babe and the deaf mute cannot feel. Poor babes and poor deaf mutes, should the scientific Loyolas of the future adopt this view!

I do not know if any one has remarked that rural and primitive folk can never bring themselves to believe of any foreign tongue that it is real human language like their own. To them it seems a jargon of meaningless and uncouth sounds.

Chanet, a follower of Descartes, said that he would believe that beasts thought when a beast told him so. By what cries of pain, by what looks of love, have not beasts told men that they thought! Man himself does not think in words in moments of profound emotion, whether of grief or joy. *He cries out* or he *acts*. Thought in its absolutely elementary form is *action*. The mother thinks in the kiss she gives her child. Perhaps God thinks in constellations. I asked a man who had saved many lives by jumping into the sea, "What did you think of at the moment of doing it?" He replied, "You do not think, or you might not do it."

The whole trend of philosophic speculation worthy of the name lies toward unity, but the Cartesian theory would arbitrarily divide even man's physical and sensational nature from that of the other animals. To remedy this, Descartes admitted that man was just as much an automatic machine as other creatures. By what right then does he complain when he happens to have a toothache? Because, says Descartes triumphantly, man has an immortal soul! The child thinks in his mother's womb, but the dog, which after scenting two roads takes the third without demur, sure that his master must have gone that way, this dog is acting "by springs," and neither thinks nor feels at all.

The misuse of the ill-treated word "Nature" cannot hide the fact that the beginning, middle, and end of Descartes' argument rests on a perpetually recurrent miracle. Descartes confessed as much when he said that God *could* make animals as machines, so why should it be impossible that he *had* made them as machines? Voltaire's clear reason revolted at this logic; he declared it to be absurd to imagine that God had given animals organs of feeling in order that they might *not* feel. He would have endorsed Professor Romanes' saying that "the theory of animal automatism which is usually attributed to Descartes can never be accepted by common sense."

On the other hand, while Descartes was being persecuted by the Church for opinions which he did *not* hold, this particular opinion of his was seized upon by Catholic divines as a vindication of creation. Pascal so regarded it. The miraculous element in it did not disturb him. Malebranche said that though opposed by reason it was approved by faith.

Descartes said that the idea that animals think and feel is a relic of childhood. The idea that they do *not* think and feel might be more truly called a relic of that darkest side of perverse childhood, the existence of which we are all fain to forget. Whoever has seen a little child throwing stones at a toad on the highway—and sad because his hands are too small to take up the bigger stones to throw—will understand what I mean. I do not wish to allude more than slightly to a point which is of too much importance to pass over in silence. Descartes was a vivisector; so were the pious people at Port Royal, who embraced his teaching with enthusiasm and liked to hear the howls of the dogs they vivisected. M. Émile Ferrière in his work "L'âme est la fonction du cerveau," sees in the "soul" of beasts exactly the same nature as in the "soul" of man; the difference, he maintains, is one of degree; thought generally inferior, it is sometimes superior to "souls" of certain human groups. Here is a candid materialist who deserves respect. But there is a school of physiologists nowadays which carries on an unflagging campaign in favor of belief in unconscious animal machines which work by springs, while denying that there is a God to wind up the springs, and in conscious human machines, while denying that there is a soul, independent of matter, which might account for the difference. "The wish is father to the thought." *Non ragionam di lor ma guarda e passa.*

The strongest of all reasons for dismissing the machine theory of animals is their variety of idiosyncrasy. It is said that to the shepherd no two sheep look alike; it is certain that no two animals of any kind have the same characters. Some are selfish, some are unselfish, some are gentle, some irretrievably ill-tempered both to each other and to man. Some animals do not show much regret at the loss of their offspring; with others it is manifestly the reverse. Édouard Quinet described how on one occasion, when visiting the lions' cage in the Jardin des Plantes, he observed the lion gently place his large paw on the forehead of the lioness, and so they remained, grave and still, all the time he was there. He asked Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, who was with him, what it meant. "Their lion cub," was the answer, "died this morning." "Pity, benevolence, sympathy, could be read on those rugged faces." That these qualities are often absent in sentient beings, what man can doubt? but they are not to be found in the best machine-made animals in all Nuremberg!

One of the first upholders of the idea of legislative protection of animals was Jeremy Bentham, who asked why the law should refuse its protection to any sensitive being? Most people forget the degree of opposition which was encountered by the earlier combatants of cruel practices and pastimes in England. Cobbett made a furious attack on a clergyman who, to his honor, was agitating for the suppression of bull-baiting, "the poor man's sport," as Cobbett called it. That it demoralized the poor man as well as tormented the bull never entered into the head of the inimitable wielder of English prose, pure and undefiled, who took it under his (happily) ineffectual protection. Societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals had, in their day, to undergo almost as much criticism and ridicule in England as they now meet with in some parts of the Continent. Even the establishment of the Dogs' Home in London raised a storm of disapproval, as may be seen by any one who turns over the files of the *Times* for October, 1860. If the friends of humanity persevere, the change of sentiment which has become an accomplished fact in England, will in the end triumph elsewhere.

Unfortunately, humane sentiment, and especially humane practice, do not progress on a level line. As long ago as 1782 an English writer named Soame Jenyns protested against the wickedness of shooting a bear on an inaccessible island of ice, or an eagle on the mountain's top. "We are unable to give life and therefore ought not to take it away from the meanest insect without sufficient reason." What would he say if he came back to earth to find whole species of beautiful winged creatures being destroyed to afford a more or less barbarous ornament for women's heads?

The "discovery" of Indian literature brought prominently forward in the West the Indian ideas of animals of which the old travellers had given the earliest news. The effect of familiarity with those ideas may be traced in many writers, but nowhere to such an extent as in the works of Schopenhauer, for whom, as for many more obscure students, they formed the most attractive and interesting part of Oriental lore. Schopenhauer cannot speak about animals without using a tone of passionate vehemence which was, without doubt, genuine. He felt the intense enjoyment in observing them which the lonely soul has ever felt, whether it belonged to saint or sinner. All his pessimism disappears when he leaves the haunts of man for the retreats of beasts. What a pleasure it is, he says, to watch a wild animal going about undisturbed! It shows us our own nature in a simpler and more sincere form. "There is only one mendacious being in the world, and that is man. Every other is true and sincere." It strikes me that total sincerity did not shine on the face of a dog which I once saw trotting innocently away, after burying a rabbit he had caught in a ploughed field, near a tree in the hedge—the only tree there was—which would make it easy for him to identify the spot. But about that I will say no more. The German "Friend of the Creature" was indignant at "the unpardonable forgetfulness in which the lower animals have hitherto been left by the moralists of Europe." The duty of protecting them, neglected by religion, falls to the police. Mankind are the devils of the earth, and animals the souls they torment.

Full of these sentiments, Schopenhauer was prepared to welcome unconditionally the Indian conception of the Wheel of Being and to close his eyes to its defects. Strauss, too, hailed it as a doctrine which "unites the whole of Nature in one sacred and mysterious bond"—a bond in which, he goes on to say, a breach has been made by the Judaism and Dualism of Christianity. He might have observed that the Church derived her notions on the subject rather from Aristotle than from Semitic sources.

Schopenhauer came to the conclusion that the ill-treatment of animals arose directly from the denial to them of immortality, while it was ascribed to men. There is and there is not truth in this. When all is said, the humane man always was and always will be human; "the merciful man regardeth the life of his beast." And since people reason to fit their acts rather than act to fit their reasoning, he will even find a motive for his humanity where others find an excuse for the lack of it. Humphry Primatt wrote in 1776: "Cruelty to a brute is an injury irreparable because there is no future life to be a compensation for present afflictions."

Mr. Lecky, in his "History of European Morals," tells of a cardinal who let himself be bitten by gnats because "*we* have heaven, but these poor creatures only present enjoyment!" Could Jaina do more?

Strauss thought that the rising tide of popular sentiment about animals was the direct result of the abandonment by science of the spiritualistic isolation of man from Nature. I suspect that those who have worked hardest for animals in the last half century cared little about the origin of species, while it is certain that some professed evolutionists have been their worst foes. The fact remains, however, that by every rule of logic the theory of evolution *ought* to produce the effect which Strauss thought that it had produced. The discovery which gives its name to the nineteenth century revolutionizes the whole philosophic conception of the place of animals in the Universe.

Lamarck, whom Cuvier so cruelly attacked, was the first to discern the principle of evolution. At one time he held the Chair of Zoölogy at the University of Paris; but the opposition which his ideas met with crushed him in body, though not in soul, and he died blind and in want in 1829, only consoled by the care of an admirable daughter. His last words are said to have been that it is easier to discover a truth than to convince others of it.

An Italian named Carlo Lessona was one of the first to be convinced. He wrote a work containing the phrase, "the intelligence of animals"—which work, by the rule then in force, had to be presented to the ecclesiastical Censor at Turin to receive his permit before publication. The canon who examined the book fell upon the words above mentioned, and remarked, "This expression, 'intelligence of animals,' will never do!" "But," said Lessona, "it is commonly used in natural history books." "Oh!" replied the canon, "natural history has much need of revision."

The great and cautious Darwin said that the senses, intuitions, emotions, and faculties, such as love, memory, attention, curiosity, imitation, reason, of which man boasts, may be found in an incipient or even sometimes in a well-developed condition, in the lower animals. "Man, with all his noble qualities, his God-like intellect, still bears in his bodily frame the indelible stamp of his lowly origin. Our brethren fly in the air, haunt the bushes, and swim in the sea." Darwin agreed with Agassiz in recognizing in the dog something very like the human conscience.

Dr. Arnold said that the whole subject of the brute creation was such a painful mystery that he dared not approach it. Michelet called animal life a "sombre mystery," and shuddered at the "daily murder," hoping that in another globe "these base and cruel fatalities may be spared to us." It is strange to find how many men of very different types have wandered without a guide in these dark alleys of speculation. A few of them arrived at, or thought they had arrived at, a solution. Lord Chesterfield wrote that "animals preying on each other is a law of Nature which we did not make and which we cannot undo, for 'if I do not eat chickens my cat will eat mice.'" But the appeal to Nature will not satisfy every one; our whole human conscience is a protest against Nature, while our moral actions are an attempt to effect a compromise. Paley pointed out that the law was not good, since we could live without animal food, and wild beasts could not. He offered another justification, the permission of Scripture. This was satisfactory to him, but he must have been aware that it waives the question without answering it.

Some humane people have taken refuge in the *automata* argument, which is like taking a sleeping-draught to cure a broken leg. Others, again, look for justice to animals in the one and only hope that man possesses of justice to himself—in compensation after death for unmerited suffering in this life. Leibnitz said that Eternal Justice *ought* to compensate animals for their misfortunes on earth. It is curious to find that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries seven or eight small works, written in Latin in support of this thesis, were published in Germany and Sweden. Probably in all the world a number, unsuspectedly large, of sensitive minds has endorsed the belief expressed so well in the lines which Southey wrote on coming home to find that a favorite old dog had been "destroyed" during his absence:

. . . . Mine is no narrow creed;
And He who gave thee being did not frame
The mystery of life to be the sport
Of merciless man! There is another world
For all that live and move—a better one!
Where the proud bipeds, who would fain confine
Infinite Goodness to the little bounds
Of their own charity, may envy thee!

The holders of this "no narrow creed" start with all the advantages from the mere point of view of dialectics. They can boast that they have placed the immortality of the soul on a scientific basis. For truly, it is more reasonable to suppose that the soul is natural than supernatural, a word invented to clothe our ignorance; and, if natural, why not universal?

They have the right to say, moreover, that they and they alone have "justified the ways of God." They alone have admitted all creation that groaneth and travaileth to the ultimate guerdon of the "Love that moves the sun and other stars."

IX

THE FAILURE OF EVOLUTION

"HUMAN SELECTION AND MARRIAGE"

BY

ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE

ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE, LL.D., D.C.L., F.R.S., stands to-day as the father of modern science, the dean of living scholars. An aged man of eighty-four, he is still vigorous and full of thought, still writing for a world which is little likely ever to forget his remarkable entry into fame. It was he who, at the same time as Darwin, worked out the theory of the survival of the fittest. From his far-off exploring station in the Malayan archipelago, Mr. Wallace sent home to Darwin an essay which covered the very ground upon which its recipient was at work. Darwin made public both his own work and Wallace's, and thus the two men shone forth as twin stars of the great new doctrine. It was around Darwin that the attack and defence of evolution centred, and doubtless he proved himself the greater scientist of the two; so that the fame of the dead discoverer has justly outshone the fame of the one still living. Yet science knows few names to equal that of Wallace.

His article here treats the startling question of the failure of his famous doctrine to apply to modern conditions of society, and, in consequence, the possible retrogression of human life and the survival of the unfit. The danger is a real one; it has drawn wide attention of late. Modern pity and charity protect the feeble; modern war and competition destroy the strong. Mr. Wallace finds the remedy in the wisdom of women, in the marriage customs of the future. Whether he is right in this or no, he makes star-

tlingly evident the fact that the old brute law of survival has ceased to operate upon mankind.

In one of my latest conversations with Darwin he expressed himself very gloomily on the future of humanity, on the ground that in our modern civilization natural selection had no play, and the fittest did not survive. Those who succeed in the race for wealth are by no means the best or the most intelligent, and it is notorious that our population is more largely renewed in each generation from the lower than from the middle and upper classes. As a recent American writer well puts it, "We behold the melancholy spectacle of the renewal of the great mass of society from the lowest classes, the highest classes to a great extent either not marrying or not having children. The floating population is always the scum, and yet the stream of life is largely renewed from this source. Such a state of affairs, sufficiently dangerous in any society, is simply suicidal in the democratic civilization of our day."[1]

That the check to progress here indicated is a real one few will deny, and the problem is evidently felt to be one of vital importance, since it has attracted the attention of some of our most thoughtful writers, and has quite recently furnished the theme for a perfect flood of articles in our best periodicals. I propose here to consider very briefly the various suggestions made by these writers, and afterward shall endeavor to show that, when the course of social evolution shall have led to a more rational organization of society, the problem will receive its final solution by the action of physiological and social agencies, and in perfect harmony with the highest interests of humanity.

ARE THE RESULTS OF TRAINING HEREDITARY?

Before discussing the question itself it will be well to consider whether there are in fact any other agencies than some form of selection to be relied on. It has been generally accepted hitherto that such beneficial influences as education, hygiene, and social refinement had a cumulative action, and would of themselves lead to a steady improvement of all civilized races. This view rested on the belief that whatever improvement was effected in individuals was transmitted to their progeny, and that it would be thus possible to effect a continuous advance in physical, moral, and intellectual qualities without any selection of the better or elimination of the inferior types. But of late years grave doubts have been thrown on this view, owing chiefly to the researches of Galton and Weismann as to the fundamental causes to which heredity is due. The balance of opinion among physiologists now seems to be against the heredity of any qualities acquired by the individual after birth, in which case the question we are discussing will be much simplified, since we shall be limited to some form of selection as the only possible means of improving the race.

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[1] Hiram M. Stanley in the *Arena*.

In order to make the difference between the two theories clear to those who may not have followed the recent discussions on the subject, an illustration may be useful. Let us suppose two persons, each striving to produce two distinct types of horse —the cart-horse and the racer—from the wild prairie horses of America, and that one of them believes in the influence of food and training, the other in selection. Each has a lot of a hundred horses to begin with, as nearly as possible alike in quality. The one who trusts to selection at once divides his horses into two lots, the one stronger and heavier, the other lighter and more active, and, breeding from these, continually selects, for the parents of the succeeding generation, those which most nearly approach the two types required. In this way it is perfectly certain that in a comparatively short period—thirty or forty years perhaps—he would be able to produce two very distinct forms, the one a very fair racehorse, the other an equally good specimen of a cart-horse; and he could do this without subjecting the two strains to any difference of food or training, since it *is* by selection alone that our various breeds of domestic animals have in most cases been produced.

On the other hand, the person who undertook to produce similar results by food and training alone, without allowing selection to have any part in the process, would have to act in a very different manner. He should first divide his horses into two lots as nearly as possible identical in all points, and thereafter subject the one lot to daily exercise in drawing loads at a slow pace, the other lot to equally constant exercise in running, and he might also supply them with different kinds of food if he thought it calculated to aid in producing the required effect. In each successive generation he must make no selection of the swiftest or the strongest, but must either keep the whole progeny of each lot, or carefully choose an average sample of each to be again subjected to the same discipline. It is quite certain that the very different kinds of exercise would have some effect on the individuals so trained, enlarging and strengthening a different set of muscles in each, and if this effect were transmitted to the offspring then there ought to be in this case also a steady advance toward the racer and the cart-horse type. Such an experiment, however, has never been tried, and we cannot therefore say positively what would be the result; but those who accept the theory of the non-heredity of acquired characters would predict with confidence that after thirty or forty generations of training without selection, the last two lots of colts would have made little or no advance toward the two types required, but would be practically indistinguishable.

It is exceedingly difficult to find any actual cases to illustrate this point, since either natural or artificial selection has almost always been present. The apparent effects of disuse in causing the diminution of certain organs, such as the reduced wings of some birds in oceanic islands and the very small or aborted eyes of some of the animals inhabiting extensive caverns, can be as well explained by the withdrawal of the cumulative agency of natural selection and by economy of growth, as by the direct effects of disuse. The following facts, however, seem to show that special skill derived from practice, when continued for several generations, is not inherited, and does not therefore tend to increase. The wonderful skill of most of the North American Indians in following a trail by indications quite imperceptible to the ordinary European has been dwelt upon by many writers, but it is now admitted that the white trappers equal and often excel them, though these trappers have in almost every case acquired their skill in a comparatively short period, without any of the inherited experience supposed to belong to the Indian.

Again, for many generations a considerable proportion of the male population of Switzerland has practised rifle-shooting as a national sport, yet in international contests they show no marked superiority over our riflemen, who are, in a large proportion, the sons of men who never handled a gun. Another case is afforded by the upper classes of this country who for many generations have been educated at the universities, and have had their classical and mathematical abilities developed to the fullest extent by rivalry for honors. Yet now, that for some years these institutions have been opened to dissenters whose parents usually for many generations have had no such training, it is found that these dissenters carry off their full share or even more than their share of honors. We thus see that the theory of the non-heredity of acquired characters, whether physical or mental, is supported by a considerable number of facts, while few if any are directly opposed to it. We therefore propose to neglect the influence of education and habit as possible factors in the improvement of our race, and to confine our argument entirely to the possibility of improvement by some form of selection.[1]

PROPOSALS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE RACE

Among the modern writers who have dealt with this question the opinions of Mr. Galton are entitled to be first considered, because he has studied the whole subject of human faculty in the most thorough manner, and has perhaps thrown more light upon it than any other writer. The method of selection by which he has suggested that our race may be improved is to be brought into action by means of a system of marks for family merit, both as to health, intellect, and morals, those individuals who stand high in these respects being encouraged to marry early by state endowments sufficient to enable the young couples to make a start in life. Of all the proposals that have been made tending to the systematic improvement of our race, this is one of the least objectionable, but it is also I fear among the least effective. Its tendency would undoubtedly be to increase the number and to raise the standard of our highest and best men, but it would at the same time leave the bulk of the population unaffected, and would but slightly diminish the rate at which the lower types tend to supplant or to take the place of the higher. What we want is, not a higher standard of perfection in the few, but a higher average, and this can best be produced by the elimination of the lowest of all and a free intermingling of the rest.

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[1] Those who desire more information on this subject should read Weismann's *Essays on Heredity.*

Something of this kind is proposed by Mr. Hiram M. Stanley in his article on "Our Civilization and the Marriage Problem," already referred to. This writer believes that civilizations perish because, as wealth and art increase, corruption creeps in, and the new generations fail in the work of progress because the renewal of individuals is left chiefly to the unfit. The two great factors which secure perfection in each animal race—sexual selection by which the fit are born, and natural selection by which the fittest survive—both fail in the case of mankind, among whom are hosts of individuals which in any other class of beings would never have been born, or, if born, would never survive. He argues that, unless some effective measures are soon adopted and strictly enforced, our case will be irremediable; and, since natural selection fails so largely, recourse must be had to artificial selection. "The drunkard, the criminal, the diseased, the morally weak should never come into society. Not reform, but prevention, should be the cry." The method by which this is proposed to be done is hinted at in the following passages: "In the true golden age, which lies not behind but before us, the privilege of parentage will be esteemed an honor for the comparatively few, and no child will be born who is not only sound in body and mind, but also above the average as to natural ability and moral force"; and again, "The most important matter in society, the inherent quality of the members which compose it, should be regulated by trained specialists."

Of this proposal and all of the same character we may say that nothing can possibly be more objectionable, even if we admit that they might be effectual in securing the object aimed at. But even this is more than doubtful; and it is quite certain that any such interference with personal freedom in matters so deeply affecting individual happiness will never be adopted by the majority of any nation, or if adopted would never be submitted to by the minority without a life-and-death struggle.

Another popular writer of the greatest ability and originality, who has recently given us his solution of the problem, is Mr. Grant Allen. His suggestion is in some respects the very reverse of the last, yet it is, if possible, even more objectionable. Instead of any interference with personal freedom he proposes the entire abolition of legal restrictions as to marriage, which is to be a free contract, to last only so long as either party desires. This alone, however, would have no effect on race-improvement, except probably a prejudicial one. The essential part of his method is that girls should be taught, both by direct education and by the influence of public opinion, that the duty of all healthy and intellectual women is to be mothers of as many and as perfect children as possible. For this purpose they are recommended to choose as temporary husbands the finest, healthiest, and most intellectual men, thus insuring a variety of combinations of parental qualities which would lead to the production of offspring of the highest possible character and to the continual advancement of the race.[1]

I think I have fairly summarized the essence of Mr. Grant Allen's proposal, which, though enforced with all his literary skill and piquancy of illustration, can, in my opinion, only be fitly described by the term already applied to it by one of his reviewers, "detestable." It purports to be advanced in the interests of the children and of the race; but it would necessarily impair that family life and parental affection which are the prime essentials to the well-being of children; while, though it need not necessarily produce, it would certainly favor, the increase of pure sensualism, the most degrading and most fatal of all the qualities that tend to the deterioration of races and the downfall of nations. One of the modern American advocates of greater liberty of divorce, in the interest of marriage itself, thus admirably summarizes the essential characteristics and purport of true marriage: "In a true relation, the chief object is the loving companionship of man and woman, their capacity for mutual help and happiness, and for the development of all that is noblest in each other. The second object is the building up a home and family, a place of rest, peace, security, in which child-life can bud and blossom like flowers in the sunshine."[1] For such rest, peace, and security, permanence is essential. This permanence need not be attained by rigid law, but by the influence of public opinion, and, more surely still, by those deep-seated feelings and emotions which, under favorable conditions, render the marriage tie stronger and its influence more beneficial the longer it endures. To me it appears that no system of the relations of men and women could be more fatal to the happiness of individuals, the well-being of children, or the advancement of the race, than that proposed by Mr. Grant Allen.

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[1] See *The Girl of the Future* in *The Universal Review.*

OBJECTIONS TO ALL THE PRECEDING PROPOSALS

Before proceeding further with the main question it is necessary to point out that, besides the special objections to each of the proposals here noticed, there is a general and fundamental objection. They all attempt to deal at once, and by direct legislative enactment, with the most important and most vital of all human relations, regardless of the fact that our present phase of social development is not only extremely imperfect, but vicious and rotten at the core. How can it be possible to determine and settle the relations of women to men which shall be best alike for individuals and for the race, in a society in which a very large proportion of women are obliged to work long hours daily for the barest subsistence, while another large proportion are forced into more or less uncongenial marriages as the only means of securing some amount of personal independence or physical well-being? Let any one consider, on the one hand, the lives of the wealthy as portrayed in the society papers and, on the other hand, the terrible condition of millions of workers—men, women, and children—and the still more awful condition of those who seek work of any kind in vain, and, seeing their children slowly dying of starvation, are driven in utter helplessness and despair to murder and suicide. Can any thoughtful person admit for a moment that, in a society so constituted that these overwhelming contrasts of luxury and privation are looked upon as necessities, and are treated by the Legislature as matters with which it has practically nothing to do, there is the smallest probability that we can deal successfully with such tremendous social problems as those which involve the marriage tie and the family relation as a means of promoting the physical and moral advancement of the race? What a mockery to still further whiten the sepulchre of modern society, in which is hidden "all manner of corruption," with schemes for the moral and physical advancement of the race!

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[1] Elizabeth Cady Stanton, in the *Arena*.

SOCIAL ADVANCE WILL RESULT IN IMPROVEMENT OF CHARACTER

It is my firm conviction, for reasons which I shall state presently, that, when we have cleansed the Augean stable of our existing social organization, and have made such arrangements that *all* shall contribute their share of either physical or mental labor, and that all workers shall reap the *full* and equal reward of their work, the future of the race will be ensured by those laws of human development that have led to the slow but continuous advance in the higher qualities of human nature. When men and women are alike free to follow their best impulses; when idleness and vicious or useless luxury on the one hand, oppressive labor and starvation on the other, are alike unknown; when all receive the best and most thorough education that the state of civilization and knowledge at the time will admit; when the standard of public opinion is set by the wisest and the best, and that standard is systematically inculcated on the young—then we shall find that a system of selection will come spontaneously into action which will steadily tend to eliminate the lower and more degraded types of man, and thus continuously raise the average standard of the race. I therefore strongly protest against any attempt to deal with this great question by legal enactments in our present state of unfitness and ignorance, or by endeavoring to modify public opinion as to the beneficial character of monogamy and permanence in marriage. That the existing popular opinion is the true one is well and briefly shown by Miss Chapman in *Lippincott's Magazine;* and as her statement of the case expresses my own views, and will, I think, be approved by most thinkers on the subject, I here give it:

"1. *Nature* plainly indicates permanent marriage as the true human relation. The young of the human pair need parental care and supervision for a great number of years.

"2. *Instinct* is strongly on the side of indissoluble marriage. In proportion as men leave brutedom behind and enter into the fulness of their human heritage, they will cease to tolerate the idea of two or more living partners.

"3. *History* shows conclusively that where divorce has been easy, licentiousness, disorder, and often complete anarchy have prevailed. The history of civilization is the history of advance in monogamy, of the fidelity of one man to one woman, and one woman to one man.

"4. *Science* tells the same tale. Physiology and Hygiene point to temperance, not riot. Sociology shows how man, in spite of himself, is ever striving, through lower forms, upward, to the monogamic relation.

"5. *Experience* demonstrates to every one of us, individually, the superiority of the indissoluble marriage. We know that, speaking broadly, marriages turn out well or ill in proportion as husband and wife are—let me not say loving—but loyal, sinking differences and even grievances for the sake of children and for the sake of example."

We have now to consider what would be the probable effect of a condition of social advancement, the essential characteristics of which have been already hinted at, on the two great problems—the increase of population, and the continuous improvement of the race by some form of selection which we have reason to believe is the only method available. In order to make this clear, however, and in order that we may fully realize the forces that would come into play in a just and rational state of society, such as may certainly be realized in the not distant future, it will be necessary to have a clear conception of its main characteristics. For this purpose, and without committing myself in any way to an approval of all the details of his scheme, I shall make use of Mr. Bellamy's clear and forcible picture of the society of the future, as he supposes it may exist in America in little more than a century hence.[1]

The essential principle on which society is supposed to be founded is that of a great family. As in a well-regulated modern family the elders, those who have experience of the labors, the duties, and the responsibilities of life, determine the general mode of living and working, with the fullest consideration for the convenience and real well-being of the younger members, and with a recognition of their essential independence. As in a family, the same comforts and enjoyments are secured to all, and the very idea of making any difference in this respect, to those who from mental or physical disability are unable to do so much as others, never occurs to any one, since it is opposed to the essential principles on which a true society of human brotherhood is held to rest. As regards education all have the same advantages, and all receive the fullest and best training, both intellectual and physical; every one is encouraged to follow out those studies or pursuits for which they are best fitted, or for which they exhibit the strongest inclination. This education, the complete and thorough training for a life of usefulness and enjoyment, continues in both sexes till the age of twenty-one (or thereabouts), when all alike, men and women, take their place in the lower ranks of the industrial army in which they serve for three years. During the latter years of their education, and during the succeeding three years of industrial service, every opportunity is given them to see and understand every kind of work that is carried on by the community, so that at the end of the term of probation they can choose what department of the public service they prefer to enter. As every one—men, women, and children alike—receive the same amount of public credit—their equal share of the products of the labor of the community, the attractiveness of various pursuits is equalized by differences in the hours of labor, in holidays, or in special privileges attached to the more disagreeable kinds of necessary work, and these are so modified from time to time that the volunteers for every occupation are always about equal to its requirements. The only other essential feature that it is necessary to notice for our present purpose is the system of grades, by which good conduct, perseverance, and intelligence in every department of industry and occupation are fully recognized, and lead to appointments as foremen, superintendents, or general managers, and ultimately to the highest offices of the state. Every one of these grades and appointments is made public; and as they constitute the only honors and the only differences of rank, with corresponding insignia and privileges, in an otherwise equal body of citizens, they are highly esteemed, and serve as ample inducements to industry and zeal in the public service.

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[1] *Looking Backward.* See specially, chapters vii, ix, xii, and xxv.

At first sight it may appear that in any state of society whose essential features were at all like those here briefly outlined, all the usual restraints to early marriage as they now exist would be removed, and that a rate of increase of the population unexampled in any previous era would be the result, leading in a few generations to a difficulty in obtaining subsistence, which Malthus has shown to be the inevitable result of the normal rate of increase of mankind when all the positive as well as the preventive checks are removed. As the positive checks—which may be briefly summarized as war, pestilence, and famine—are supposed to be non-existent, what, it may be asked, are the preventive checks which are suggested as being capable of reducing the rate of increase within manageable limits? This very reasonable question I will now endeavor to answer.

NATURAL CHECKS TO RAPID INCREASE

The first and most important of the checks upon a too rapid increase of population will be the comparatively late average period of marriage, which will be the natural result of the very conditions of society, and will besides be inculcated during the period of education, and still further enforced by public opinion. As the period of systematic education is supposed to extend to the age of twenty-one, up to which time both the mental and physical powers will be trained and exercised to their fullest capacity, the idea of marriage during this period will rarely be entertained. During the last year of education, however, the subject of marriage will be dwelt upon, in its bearing on individual happiness and on social well-being, in relation to the welfare of the next generation and to the continuous development of the race. The most careful and deliberate choice of partners for life will be inculcated as the highest social duty; while the young women will be so trained as to look with scorn and loathing on all men who in any way wilfully fail in their duty to society—on idlers and malingerers, on drunkards and liars, on the selfish, the cruel, or the vicious. They will be taught that the happiness of their whole lives will depend on the care and deliberation with which they choose their husbands, and they will be urged to accept no suitor till he has proved himself to be worthy of respect by the place he holds and the character he bears among his fellow-laborers in the public service.

Under social conditions which render every woman absolutely independent, so far as the necessaries and comforts of existence are concerned, surrounded by the charms of family life and the pleasures of society, which will be far greater than anything we now realize when *all* will possess the refinements derived from the best possible education, and all will be relieved from sordid cares and the struggle for mere existence, is it not in the highest degree probable that marriage will rarely take place till the woman has had three or four years' experience of the world after leaving college—that is, till the age of 25, while it will very frequently be delayed till 30 or upward? Now Mr. Galton has shown, from the best statistics available, that if we compare women married at 20 with those married at 29, the proportionate fertility is about as 8 to 5. But this difference, large as it is, only represents a portion of the effect on the rate of increase of population caused by a delay in the average period of marriage. For when the age of marriage is delayed the time between successive generations is correspondingly lengthened; while a still further effect is produced by the fact that the greater the average age of marriage the fewer generations are alive at the same time, and it is the combined effect of these three factors that determines the actual rate of increase of the population.[1]

But there is yet another factor tending to check the increase of population that would come into play in a society such as we have been considering. In a remarkable essay on the *Theory of Population*, Herbert Spencer has shown, by an elaborate discussion of the phenomena presented by the whole animal kingdom, that the maintenance of the individual and the propagation of the race vary inversely, those species and groups which have the shortest and most uncertain lives producing the greatest number of offspring; in other words, individuation and reproduction are antagonistic. But individuation depends almost entirely on the development and specialization of the nervous system, through which, not only are the several activities and co-ordinations of the various organs carried on, but all advance in instinct, emotion, and intellect is rendered possible. The actual rate of increase in man has been determined by the necessities of the savage state, in which, as in most animal species, it has usually been only just sufficient to maintain a limited average population. But with civilization the average duration of life increases and the possible increase of population under favorable conditions becomes very great, because fertility is greater than is needed under the new conditions. The advance in civilization as regards the preservation of life has in recent times become so rapid, and the increased development of the nervous system has been limited to so small a portion of the whole population, that no general diminution in fertility has yet occurred. That the facts do, however, accord with the theory is indicated by the common observation that highly intellectual parents do not as a rule have large families, while the most rapid increase occurs in those classes which are engaged in the simpler kinds of manual labor. But in a state of society in which all will have their higher faculties fully cultivated and fully exercised throughout life, a slight general diminution of fertility would at once arise, and this diminution added to that caused by the later average period of marriage would at once bring the rate of increase of population within manageable limits. The same general principle enables us to look forward to that distant future when the world will be fully peopled, in perfect confidence that an equilibrium between the birth and death rates will then be brought about by a combination of physical and social agencies, and the bugbear of over-population become finally extinct.[1]

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[1] See *Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development*, p. 321; and *Hereditary Genius*, p. 353.

HOW NATURAL SELECTION WILL IMPROVE THE RACE

There now only remains for consideration the means by which, in such a society, a continuous improvement of the race could be brought about, on the assumption that for this purpose education is powerless as a direct agency, since its effects are not hereditary, and that some form of selection is an absolute necessity. This improvement I believe will certainly be effected through the agency of female choice in marriage. Let us, therefore, consider how this would probably act.

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[1] See *A Theory of Population deduced from the General Law of Animal Fertility.*

It will be generally admitted that, although many women now remain unmarried from necessity rather than from choice, there are always a considerable number who feel no strong inclination to marriage, and who accept husbands to secure a subsistence or a home of their own rather than from personal affection or sexual emotion. In a society in which women were all pecuniarily independent, were all fully occupied with public duties and intellectual or social enjoyments, and had nothing to gain by marriage as regards material well-being, we may be sure that the number of the unmarried from choice would largely increase. It would probably come to be considered a degradation for any woman to marry a man she could not both love and esteem, and this feeling would supply ample reasons for either abstaining from marriage altogether or delaying it till a worthy and sympathetic husband was encountered. In man, on the other hand, the passion of love is more general, and usually stronger; and as in such a society as is here postulated there would be no way of gratifying this passion but by marriage, almost every woman would receive offers, and thus a powerful selective agency would rest with the female sex. Under the system of education and of public opinion here suggested there can be no doubt how this selection would be exercised. The idle and the selfish would be almost universally rejected. The diseased or the weak in intellect would also usually remain unmarried; while those who exhibited any tendency to insanity or to hereditary disease, or who possessed any congenital deformity would in hardly any case find partners, because it would be considered an offence against society to be the means of perpetuating such diseases or imperfections.

We must also take into account a special factor hitherto, I believe, unnoticed in this connection, that would in all probability intensify the selection thus exercised. It is well known that females are largely in excess of males in our existing population, and this fact, if it were a necessary and permanent one, would tend to weaken the selective agency of women, as it undoubtedly does now. But there is good reason to believe that it will not be a permanent feature of our population. The births indicate a natural tendency in the opposite direction, since they always give a larger proportion of males than females, varying from 3½ to 4 per cent. But boys now die so much more rapidly than girls that when we include all under the age of five the numbers are nearly equal. For the next five years the mortality is nearly the same in both sexes; then that of females preponderates up to 30 years of age, then up to 60 that of men is the larger, while for the rest of life female mortality is again greatest. The general result is that at the ages of most frequent marriage—from 20 to 35—females are between 8 and 9 per cent. in excess of males. But during the ages from 5 to 35 we find a wonderful excess of male deaths from two preventible causes—"accident" and "violence." For a recent year the deaths from these causes in England and Wales was as follows:—

Males (5 to 35 years)	4,158
Females (5 to 35 years)	1,100

Here we have an excess of male over female deaths in one year of 3,058, all between the ages of 5 and 35, a very large portion of which is no doubt due to the greater risks run by men and boys in various industrial occupations, in sport, and in war. In a state of society in which the bulk of the population were engaged in industrial work, and were all social equals, it is quite certain that almost all these deaths would be prevented, thus bringing the male population more nearly to an equality with the female. But there are also many unhealthy employments in which men are exclusively or more largely engaged, such as the grinders of Sheffield, and many others; and many more men have their lives shortened by labor in unventilated workshops, to say nothing of the loss of life at sea and in war. When the lives of all its citizens are accounted of equal value to the community, no one will be allowed to suffer from such preventible causes as these; and this will still further reduce the mortality of men as compared with that of women. On the whole, then, it seems highly probable that in the society of the future the superior numbers of males at birth will be maintained throughout life, or, at all events, during what may be termed the marriageable period. This will greatly increase the influence of women in the improvement of the race. Being a minority they will be more sought after, and will have a real choice in marriage, which is rarely the case now. This actual minority being further increased by those who, from the various causes already referred to, abstain from marriage, will cause considerable numbers of men to remain permanently unmarried, and as these will consist very largely, if not almost wholly, of those who are the least perfectly developed either mentally or physically, the constant advance of the race in every good quality will be insured.

This method of improvement, by elimination of the worst, has many advantages over that of securing the early marriages of the best. In the first place it is the direct instead of the indirect way, for it is more important and more beneficial to society to improve the average of its members by getting rid of the lowest types than by raising the highest a little higher. Exceptionally great and good men are always produced in sufficient numbers, and have always been so produced in every phase of civilization. We do not need more of these so much as we need less of the weak and the bad. This weeding-out system has been the method of natural selection, by which the animal and vegetable worlds have been improved and developed. The survival of the fittest is really the extinction of the unfit. In nature this occurs perpetually on an enormous scale, because, owing to the rapid increase of most organisms, the unfit which are yearly destroyed form a large proportion of those that are born. Under our hitherto imperfect civilization this wholesome process has been checked as regards mankind; but the check has been the result of the development of the higher attributes of our nature. Humanity—the essentially *human* emotion—has caused us to save the lives of the weak and suffering, of the maimed or imperfect in mind or body. This has to some extent been antagonistic to physical and even intellectual race-improvement; but it has improved us morally by the continuous development of the characteristic and crowning grace of our human as distinguished from our animal nature.

In the society of the future this defect will be remedied, not by any diminution of our humanity, but by encouraging the activity of a still higher human characteristic—admiration of all that is beautiful and kindly and self-sacrificing, repugnance to all that is selfish, base, or cruel. When we allow ourselves to be guided by reason, justice, and public spirit in our dealings with our fellow-men, and determine to abolish poverty by recognizing the equal rights of all the citizens of our common land to an equal share of the wealth which all combine to produce—when we have thus solved the lesser problem of a rational social organization adapted to secure the equal well-being of all, then we may safely leave the far greater and deeper problem of the improvement of the race to the cultivated minds and pure instincts of the men, and especially of the Women of the Future.

X

THE LATEST KNOWLEDGE

"SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION AND PROGRESS"

BY

IRA REMSEN

PRESIDENT OF JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

HAVING traced the thoughts of science as they apply to man, as they enable us to understand the progress and perhaps the origin of our race, we are ready now to turn to the latest achievements of the investigators, to question what they are doing for us to-day, and what they hope and promise to do for us to-morrow. The recent developments of science have been, as we all know, marvellous. Has it "reached its term"? Or does it see opening before it a future even more brilliant than its past? To guide us in this question, we need, not the vague enthusiasm of the dreamer, but the practical analysis and calm judgment of the expert. Let us therefore seek for information from one among the foremost of our American authorities.

The following address was delivered by President Remsen before the American Association for the Advancement of Science, of which distinguished body he was made president in 1903. Dr. Remsen has been professor of chemistry at Johns Hopkins University for over thirty years, and since 1902 has been president of that celebrated institution. It is however not so much to his high official position as to his valuable research work that Dr. Remsen owes his noteworthy place among the leaders of modern science.

THE LATEST KNOWLEDGE

At the weekly services of many of our churches it is customary to begin with the reading of a verse or two from the Scriptures for the purpose, I suppose, of putting the congregations in the proper state of mind for the exercises which are to follow. It seems to me that we may profit by this example, and accordingly I ask your attention to Article 1 of the Constitution of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, which reads thus: "The objects of the association are, by periodical and migratory meetings, to promote intercourse between those who are cultivating science in different parts of America, to give stronger and more general impulse and more systematic direction to scientific research, and to procure for the labors of scientific men increased facilities and a wider usefulness."

The first object mentioned, you will observe, is "to promote intercourse between those who are cultivating science in different parts of America"; the second is "to give a stronger and more general impulse and more systematic direction to scientific research"; and the third is "to procure for the labors of scientific men increased facilities and a wider usefulness." Those who are familiar with the history of the association are well aware that it has served its purposes admirably, and I am inclined to think that those who have been in the habit of attending its meetings will agree that the object which appeals to them most strongly is the promotion of intercourse between those who are cultivating science. Given this intercourse and the other objects will be reached as a necessary consequence, for the intercourse stimulates thought, and thought leads to work, and work leads to wider usefulness.

While in 1848, when the association was organized and the constitution was adopted, there was a fair number of good scientific investigators in this country, it is certain that in the half-century that has passed since then the number of investigators has increased very largely, and naturally the amount of scientific work done at present is very much greater than it was at that time. So great has been the increase in scientific activity during recent years, that we are apt to think that by comparison scientific research is a new acquisition. In fact there appears to be an impression abroad that in the world at large scientific research is a relatively new thing, for which we of this generation and our immediate predecessors are largely responsible. Only a superficial knowledge of the history of science is necessary, however, to show that the sciences have been developed slowly, and that their beginnings are to be looked for in the very earliest times. Everything seems to point to the conclusion that men have been always engaged in efforts to learn more and more in regard to the world in which they find themselves. Sometimes they have been guided by one motive and sometimes by another, but the one great underlying motive has been the desire to get a clearer and clearer understanding of the universe. But besides this there has been the desire to find means of increasing the comfort and happiness of the human race.

A reference to the history of chemistry will serve to show how these motives have operated side by side. One of the first great incentives for working with chemical things was the thought that it was possible to convert base metals like lead and copper into the so-called noble metals, silver and gold. Probably no idea has ever operated as strongly as this upon the minds of men to lead them to undertake chemical experiments. It held control of intellectual men for centuries, and it was not until about a hundred years ago that it lost its hold. It is very doubtful if the purely scientific question, whether one form of matter can be transformed into another, would have had the power to control the activities of investigators for so long a time; and it is idle to speculate upon this subject. It should, however, be borne in mind that many of those who were engaged in this work were actuated by a desire to put money in their purses—a desire that is by no means to be condemned without reserve, and I mention it not for the purpose of condemning it, but to show that a motive that we sometimes think of as peculiarly modern is among the oldest known to man.

While the alchemists were at work upon their problems, another class of chemists were engaged upon problems of an entirely different nature. The fact that substances obtained from various natural sources and others made in the laboratory produce effects of various kinds when taken into the system, led to the thought that these substances might be useful in the treatment of disease. Then, further, it was thought that disease itself is a chemical phenomenon. These thoughts, as is evident, furnish strong motives for the investigation of chemical substances, and the science of chemistry owes much to the work of those who were guided by these motives.

And so in each period as a new thought has served as the guide we find that men have been actuated by different motives, and often one and the same worker has been under the influence of mixed motives. Only in a few cases does it appear that the highest motives alone operate. We must take men as we find them, and we may be thankful that on the whole there are so many who are impelled by one motive or another, or by a mixture of motives to take up the work of investigating the world in which we live. Great progress is being made in consequence and almost daily we are called upon to wonder at some new and marvellous result of scientific investigation. It is quite impossible to make predictions of value in regard to what is likely to be revealed to us by continued work, but it is safe to believe that in our efforts to discover the secrets of the universe, only a beginning has been made. No matter in what direction we may look we are aware of great unexplored territories, and even in those regions in which the greatest advances have been made it is evident that the knowledge gained is almost insignificant as compared with that which remains to be learned. But this line of thought may lead to a condition bordering on hopelessness and despondency, and surely we should avoid this condition, for there is much greater cause for rejoicing than for despair. Our successors will see more, and see more clearly than we do, just as we see more and see more clearly than our predecessors. It is our duty to keep the work going without being too anxious to weigh the results on an absolute scale. It must be remembered that the absolute scale is not a very sensitive instrument, and that it requires the results of generations to affect it markedly.

On an occasion of this kind it seems fair to ask the question, What does the world gain by scientific investigation? This question has often been asked and often answered, but each answer differs in some respects from the others, and each may be suggestive and worth giving. The question is a profound one, and no answer that can be given would be satisfactory. In general it may be said that the results of scientific investigation fall under three heads—the material, the intellectual, and the ethical.

The material results are the most obvious and they naturally receive the most attention. The material wants of man are the first to receive consideration. They can not be neglected. He must have food and clothing, the means of combating disease, the means of transportation, the means of producing heat, and a great variety of things that contribute to his bodily comfort and gratify his æsthetic desires. It is not my purpose to attempt to deal with all of these and to show how science is helping to work out the problems suggested. I shall have to content myself by pointing out a few of the more important problems, the solution of which depends upon the prosecution of scientific research.

First, the food problem. Whatever views one may hold in regard to that which has come to be called "race suicide," it appears that the population of the world is increasing rapidly. The desirable places have been occupied. In some parts of the earth there is such a surplus of population that famines occur from time to time, and in other parts epidemics and floods relieve the embarrassment. We may fairly look forward to the time when the whole earth will be overpopulated, unless the production of food becomes more scientific than it now is. Here is the field for the work of the agricultural chemist, who is showing us how to increase the yield from a given area, and, in case of poor and worn-out soils, how to preserve and increase their fertility. It appears that the methods of cultivating the soil are still comparatively crude, and more and more thorough investigation of the processes involved in the growth of plants is called for. Much has been learned since Liebig founded the science of agricultural chemistry. It was he who pointed out some of the ways by which it is possible to increase the fertility of a soil. Since the results of his investigations were given to the world, the use of artificial fertilizers has become more and more general.

But it is one thing to know that artificial fertilizers are useful, and it is quite another thing to get them. At first bone dust and guano were chiefly used. Then as these became dearer, phosphates, and potassium salts from the mineral kingdom came into use.

At the Fifth International Congress for Applied Chemistry, held at Berlin, Germany, in 1903, Dr. Adolph Frank, of Charlottenburg, gave an extremely interesting address on the subject of the use of the nitrogen of the atmosphere for agriculture and the industries, which bears upon the problem that we are dealing with. Plants must have nitrogen. At present this is obtained from the great beds of saltpetre found on the west coast of South America—the so-called Chili saltpetre—and also from the ammonia abtained as a by-product in the distillation of coal, especially in the manufacture of coke. The use of Chili saltpetre for agricultural purposes began about 1860. In 1900 the quantity exported was 1,453,000 tons, and its value was about $60,000,000. In the same year the world's production of ammonium sulphate was about 500,000 tons, of a value of somewhat more than $20,000,000. Of these enormous quantities about three-quarters finds application in agriculture. The use of these substances, especially of saltpetre, is increasing rapidly. At present it seems that the successful cultivation of the soil is dependent upon the use of nitrates, and the supply of nitrates is limited. Unless something is done we may look forward to the time when the earth, for lack of proper fertilizers, will not be able to produce as much as it now does, and meanwhile the demand for food is increasing. According to the most reliable estimations, indeed, the saltpetre beds will be exhausted in thirty or forty years. Is there a way out? Dr. Frank shows that there is. In the air there is nitrogen for all. The plants can make only a limited use of this directly. For the most part it must be in some form of chemical combination, as, for example, a nitrate of ammonia. The conversion of atmospheric nitrogen into nitric acid would solve the problem, and this is now carried out. But Dr. Frank shows that there is another, perhaps more economical, way of getting the nitrogen into a form suitable for plant food. Calcium carbide can now be made without difficulty, and is made in enormous quantities by the action of a powerful electric current upon a mixture of coal and lime. This substance has the power of absorbing nitrogen from the air, and the product thus formed appears to be capable of giving up its nitrogen to plants, or, in other words, to be a good fertilizer. It is true that this subject requires further investigation, but the results thus far obtained are full of promise. If the outcome should be what we have reason to hope, we may regard the approaching exhaustion of the saltpetre beds with equanimity. But, even without this to pin our faith to, we have the preparation of nitric acid from the nitrogen and oxygen of the air to fall back upon.

While speaking of the food problem, a few words in regard to the artificial preparation of foodstuffs. I am sorry to say that there is not much of promise to report upon in this connection. In spite of the brilliant achievements of chemists in the field of synthesis, it remains true that thus far they have not been able to make, except in very small quantities, substances that are useful as foods, and there is absolutely no prospect of this result being reached within a reasonable time. A few years ago Berthelot told us of a dream he had had. This has to do with the results that, according to Berthelot, are to be brought about by the advance of chemistry. The results of investigations already accomplished indicate that, in the future, methods will perhaps be devised for the artificial preparation of food from the water and carbonic acid so abundantly supplied by nature. Agriculture will then become unnecessary, and the landscape will not be disfigured by crops growing in geometrical figures. Water will be obtained from holes three or four miles deep in the earth, and this water will be above the boiling temperature, so that it can be used as a source of energy. It will be obtained in liquid form after it has undergone a process of natural distillation, which will free it from all impurities, including, of course, disease germs. The foods prepared by artificial methods will also be free from microbes, and there will be, consequently, less disease than at present. Further, the necessity for killing animals for food will no longer exist, and mankind will become gentler and more amenable to higher influences. There is, no doubt, much that is fascinating in this line of thought, but whether it is worth following, depends upon the fundamental assumption. Is it at all probable that chemists will ever be able to devise methods for the artificial preparation of foodstuffs? I can only say that to me it does not appear probable in the light of the results thus far obtained. I do not mean to question the probability of the ultimate synthesis of some of those substances that are of value as foods. This has been already accomplished on a small scale, but for the most part the synthetical processes employed have involved the use of substances which themselves are the products of natural processes. Thus, the fats can be made, but the substances from which they are made are generally obtained from nature and are not themselves synthetical products. Emil Fischer has, to be sure, made very small quantities of sugars of different kinds, but the task of building up a sugar from the raw material furnished by nature—that is to say, from carbonic acid and water—presents such difficulties that it may be said to be practically impossible.

When it comes to starch, and the proteids which are the other chief constituents of foodstuffs, the difficulties are still greater. There is not a suggestion of the possibility of making starch artificially, and the same is true of the proteids. In this connection it is, however, interesting to note that Emil Fischer, after his remarkable successes in the sugar group and the uric-acid group, is now advancing upon the proteids. I have heard it said that at the beginning of his career he made out a programme for his lifework. This included the solution of three great problems. These are the determination of the constitution of uric acid, of the sugars, and of the proteids. Two of these problems have been solved. May he be equally successful with the third! Even if we should be able to make a proteid, and show what it is, the problem of the artificial preparation of foodstuffs will not be solved. Indeed, it will hardly be affected.

Although science is not likely, within periods that we may venture to think of, to do away with the necessity of cultivating the soil, it is likely to teach us how to get more out of the soil than we now do, and thus put us in a position to provide for the generations that are to follow us. And this carries with it the thought that, unless scientific investigation is kept up, these coming generations will be unprovided for.

Another way by which the food supply of the world can be increased is by relieving tracts of land that are now used for other purposes than the cultivation of foodstuffs. The most interesting example of this kind is that presented by the cultivation of indigo. There is a large demand for this substance, which is plainly founded upon æsthetic desires of a somewhat rudimentary kind. Whatever the cause may be, the demand exists, and immense tracts of land have been and are still, devoted to the cultivation of the indigo plant. Within the past few years scientific investigation has shown that indigo can be made in the factory from substances, the production of which does not for the most part involve the cultivation of the soil. In 1900, according to the report of Dr. Brunck, managing director of the Badische Anilin- und Soda-Fabrik, the quantity of indigo produced annually in the factory would, if grown from plants, "require the cultivation of an area of more than a quarter of a million acres of land (390 square miles) in the home of the indigo plant (India)." Dr. Brunck adds: "The first impression which this fact may be likely to produce is that the manufacture of indigo will cause a terrible calamity to arise in that country; but, perhaps not. If one recalls to mind that India is periodically afflicted with famine, one ought not, without further consideration, to cast aside the hope that it might be good fortune for that country if the immense areas now devoted to a crop which is subject to many vicissitudes and to violent market changes, were at last to be given over to the raising of breadstuffs and other food products." "For myself," says Dr. Brunck, "I no not assume to be an impartial adviser in this matter, but, nevertheless, I venture to express my convictions that the government of India will be rendering a very great service if it should support and aid the progress, which will in any case be irresistible, of this impending change in the cultivation of that country, and would support and direct its methodical and rational execution."

The connection between scientific investigation and health is so frequently the subject of discussion that I need not dwell upon it here. The discovery that many diseases are due primarily to the action of microscopic organisms that find their way into the body and produce the changes that reveal themselves in definite symptoms, is a direct consequence of the study of the phenomenon of alcoholic fermentation by Pasteur. Everything that throws light upon the nature of the actions of these microscopic organisms is of value in dealing with the great problem of combating disease. It has been established in a number of cases that they cause the formation of products that act as poisons and that the diseases are due to the action of these poisons. So also, as is well known, investigation has shown that antidotes to some of these poisons can be produced, and that by means of these antidotes the diseases can be controlled. But more important than this, is the discovery of the way in which diseases are transmitted. With this knowledge it is possible to prevent the diseases. The great fact that the death rate is decreasing stands out prominently and proclaims to humanity the importance of scientific investigation. It is, however, to be noted in this connection that the decrease in the death rate compensates to some extent for the decrease in the birth rate, and that, if an increase in population is a thing to be desired, the investigations in the field of sanitary science are contributing to this result.

The development of the human race is dependent not alone upon a supply of food, but upon a supply of energy in available forms. Heat and mechanical energy are absolutely essential to man. The chief source of the energy that comes into play is fuel. We are primarily dependent upon the coal supply for the continuation of the activities of man. Without this, unless something is to take its place, man is doomed. Statistics in regard to the coal supply and the rate at which it is being used have so frequently been presented by those who have special knowledge of this subject, that I need not trouble you with them now. The only object in referring to it is to show that, unless by means of scientific investigation man is taught new methods of rendering the world's store of energy available for the production of heat and of motion, the age of the human race is measured by the extent of the supply of coal and other forms of fuel. By other forms of fuel I mean, of course, wood and oil. Plainly, as the demand for land for the production of foodstuffs increases, the amount available for the production of wood must decrease, so that wood need not be taken into account for the future. In regard to oil, our knowledge is not sufficient to enable us to make predictions of any value. If one of the theories now held in regard to the source of petroleum should prove to be correct, the world would find much consolation in it. According to this theory petroleum is not likely to be exhausted, for it is constantly being formed by the action of water upon carbides that in all probability exist in practically unlimited quantity in the interior of the earth. If this be true, then the problem of supplying energy may be reduced to one of transportation of oil. But given a supply of oil and, of course, the problem of transportation is solved.

What are the other sources of practical energy? The most important is the fall of water. This is being utilized more and more year by year, since the methods of producing electric currents by means of the dynamo have been worked out. There is plainly much to be learned before the energy made available in the immediate neighborhood of the waterfall can be transported long distances economically, but advances are being made in this line, and already factories that have hitherto been dependent upon coal are making use of the energy derived from waterfalls. The more rapidly these advances take place the less will be the demand for coal, and if there were enough waterfalls conveniently situated, there would be no difficulty in furnishing all the energy needed by man for heat or for motion.

It is a fortunate thing that, as the population of the earth increases, man's tastes become more complex. If only the simplest tastes prevailed, only the simplest occupations would be called for. But let us not lose time in idle speculations as to the way this primitive condition of things would affect man's progress. As a matter of fact his tastes are becoming more complex. Things that are not dreamed of in one generation become the necessities of the next generation. Many of these things are the direct results of scientific investigation. No end of examples will suggest themselves. Let me content myself by reference to one that has of late been the subject of much discussion. The development of the artificial dye-stuff industries is extremely instructive in many ways. The development has been the direct result of the scientific investigation of things that seemed to have little, if anything, to do with this world. Many thousands of workmen are now employed, and many millions of dollars are invested, in the manufacture of dye-stuffs that were unknown a few years ago. Here plainly the fundamental fact is the æsthetic desire of man for colors. A colorless world would be unbearable to him. Nature accustoms him to color in a great variety of combinations, and it becomes a necessity to him. And his desires increase as they are gratified. There seems to be no end to development in this line. At all events, the data at our disposal justify the conclusion that there will be a demand for every dye that combines the qualities of beauty and durability. Thousands of scientifically trained men are engaged to work in the effort to deliver new dyes to meet the increasing demands. New industries are springing up, and many find employment in them. As a rule, the increased demand for labor caused by the establishment of these industries is not offset by the closing up of other industries. Certainly it is true that scientific investigation has created large demands for labor that could hardly find employment without these demands.

The welfare of a nation depends to a large extent upon the success of its industries. In his address as president of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Sir Norman Lockyer quotes Mr. Chamberlain thus: "I do not think it is necessary for me to say anything as to the urgency and necessity of scientific training. . . . It is not too much to say that the existence of this country as the great commercial nation depends upon it. . . . It depends very much upon what we are doing now, at the beginning of the twentieth century, whether at its end we shall continue to maintain our supremacy or even equality with our great commercial and manufacturing rivals." In another part of his address, Sir Norman Lockyer says: "Further, I am told that the sum of £24,000,000 is less than half the amount by which Germany is yearly enriched by having improved upon our chemical industries, owing to our lack of scientific training. Many other industries have been attacked in the same way since, but taking this one instance alone, if we had spent this money fifty years ago, when the Prince Consort first called attention to our backwardness, the nation would now be much richer than it is, and would have much less to fear from competition."

But enough on the purely material side. Let us turn to the intellectual results of scientific investigation. This part of our subject might be summed up in a few words. It is so obvious that the intellectual condition of mankind is a direct result of scientific investigation, that one hesitates to make the statement. The mind of man cannot carry him much in advance of his knowledge of the facts. Intellectual gains can be made only by discoveries, and discoveries can be made only by investigation. One generation differs from another in the way it looks at the world. A generation that thinks the earth is the centre of the universe differs intellectually from one that has learned the true position of the earth in the solar system, and the general relations of the solar system to other similar systems that make up the universe. A generation that sees in every species of animal and plant evidence of a special creative act differs from one that has recognized the general truth of the conception of evolution. And so in every department of knowledge, the great generalizations that have been reached through the persistent efforts of scientific investigators are the intellectual gains that have resulted. These great generalizations measure the intellectual wealth of mankind. They are the foundations of all profitable thought. While the generalizations of science belong to the world, not all the world takes advantage of its opportunities. Nation differs from nation intellectually, as individual differs from individual. It is not, however, the possession of knowledge that makes the efficient individual and the efficient nation. It is well known that an individual may be very learned and at the same time very inefficient. The question is, what use does he make of his knowledge? When we speak of intellectual results of scientific investigation, we mean not only accumulated knowledge, but the way in which this knowledge is invested. A man who simply accumulates money, and does not see to it that this money is carefully invested, is a miser, and no large results can come from his efforts. While, then, the intellectual state of a nation is measured partly by the extent to which it has taken possession of the generalizations that belong to the world, it is also measured by the extent to which the methods by which knowledge is accumulated have been brought into requisition and have become a part of the equipment of the people of that nation. The intellectual progress of a nation depends upon the adoption of scientific methods in dealing with intellectual problems. The scientific method is applicable to all kinds of intellectual problems. We need it in every department of activity. I have sometimes wondered what the result would be if the scientific method could be employed in all the manifold problems connected with the management of a government. Questions of tariff, of finance, of international relations would be dealt with much more satisfactorily than at present if the spirit of the scientific method were breathed into those who are called upon to deal with these questions. It is plain, I think, that the higher the intellectual state of a nation the better will it deal with all the problems that present themselves. As the intellectual state is a direct result of scientific investigation, it is clear that the nation that adopts the scientific method will in the end outrank both intellectually and industrially the nation that does not.

What are the ethical results of scientific investigation? No one can tell. There is one thought that in this connection I should like to impress upon you. The fundamental characteristic of the scientific method is honesty. In dealing with any question science asks no favors. The sole object is to learn the truth, and to be guided by the truth. Absolute accuracy, absolute fidelity, absolute honesty are the prime conditions of scientific progress. I believe that the constant use of the scientific method must in the end leave its impress upon him who uses it. The results will not be satisfactory in all cases, but the tendency will be in the right direction. A life spent in accordance with scientific teachings would be of a high order. It would practically conform to the teachings of the highest types of religion. The motives would be different, but so far as conduct is concerned the results would be practically identical. I need not enlarge upon this subject. Unfortunately, abstract truth and knowledge of facts and of the conclusions to be drawn from them do not at present furnish a sufficient basis for right living in the case of the great majority of mankind, and science cannot now, and I do not believe it ever can, take the place of religion in some form. When the feeling that the two are antagonistic wears away, as it is wearing away, it will no doubt be seen that one supplements the other, in so far as they have to do with the conduct of man.

What are we doing in this country to encourage scientific investigation? Not until about a quarter of a century ago can it be said that it met with any encouragement. Since then there has been a great change. Up to that time research was sporadic. Soon after, it became almost epidemic. The direct cause of the change was the establishing of courses in our universities for the training of investigators somewhat upon the lines followed in the German universities. In these courses the carrying out of an investigation plays an important part. This is, in fact, the culmination of the course. At first there were not many following these courses, but it was not long before there was a demand for the products. Those who could present evidence that they had followed such courses were generally given the preference. This was especially true in the case of appointments in the colleges, some colleges even going so far as to decline to appoint any one who had not taken the degree of doctor of philosophy, which is the badge of the course that involves investigation. As the demand for those who had received this training increased, the number of those seeking it increased at least in the same proportion. New universities were established and old ones caught the spirit of the new movement, until from one end of the country to the other centres of scientific activity are now found, and the amount of research work that is done is enormous compared with what was done twenty-five or thirty years ago. Many of those who get a taste of the work of investigation become fascinated by it and are anxious to devote their lives to it. At present, with the facilities for such work available, it seems probable that most of those who have a strong desire and the necessary industry and ability to follow it find their opportunity somewhere. There is little danger of our losing a genius or even one with fair talent. The world is on the lookout for them. The demand for those who can do good research work is greater than the supply. To be sure the material rewards are not as a rule so great as those that are likely to be won by the ablest members of some other professions and occupations, and as long as this condition of affairs continues to exist there will not be so many men of the highest intellectual order engaged in this work as we should like to see. On the other hand, when we consider the great progress that has been made during the last twenty-five years or so, we have every reason to take a cheerful view of the future. If as much progress should be made in the next quarter century, we shall, to say the least, be able to compete with the foremost nations of the world in scientific investigation. In my opinion this progress is largely dependent upon the development of our universities. Without the opportunities for training in the methods of scientific investigation there will be but few investigators. It is necessary to have a large number in order that the principle of selection may operate. In this line of work, as in others, many are called, but few are chosen.

Another fact that is working advantageously to increase the amount of scientific research done in this country is the support given by the government in its different scientific bureaus. The Geological Survey, the Department of Agriculture, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the National Bureau of Standards, and other departments are carrying on a large amount of excellent scientific work, and thus helping most efficiently to spread the scientific spirit throughout the land.

Finally, two exceedingly interesting experiments in the way of encouraging scientific investigation are now attracting the attention of the world. I mean, of course, the Carnegie Institution, with its endowment of $10,000,000, and the Rockefeller Institute, devoted to investigations in the field of medicine, which will no doubt be adequately endowed. It is too early to express an opinion in regard to the influence of these great foundations upon the progress of scientific investigation. As both will make possible the carrying out of many investigations that would otherwise probably not be carried out, the chances of receiving valuable results will be increased. The danger is that those who are responsible for the management of the funds will be disappointed that the results are not at once of a striking character, and that they will be tempted to change the method of applying the money before those who are using it have had a fair chance. But we who are on the outside know little of the plans of those who are inside. All signs indicate that they are making an earnest effort to solve an exceedingly difficult problem, and all who have the opportunity should do everything in their power to aid them.

XI

OUR COUNTRY

"THE MAKING OF THE NATION"

BY

WOODROW WILSON

PRESIDENT OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

WE have traced humanity back to its vague sources, we have invoked the aid of the chief leaders of present-day science to tell us not only what they are achieving now, but what they believe as to the development of the primal instincts of the race. We have endeavored to look upon ourselves as science looks upon us, calmly, analytically, comprehensively. Let us escape for a moment from this unemotional atmosphere, let us turn from consideration of the race, the animal, as a mass, and begin the more direct and human study of the individual. And first, for man in general we will substitute American man. Through what special process has he, the woodsman, the pioneer, the colonizer of three centuries ago, become the intellectual, wide-reaching, business-like worker of to-day? What changing influences have worked upon his mind and body, upon his surroundings and his government? What, in short, has built up "our country"?

To guide us here we seek the aid of our foremost contemporary historian, Woodrow Wilson, President of Princeton since 1902, and author of the noteworthy "History of the American People." The following article was originally published in the Atlantic Monthly, *and is here reprinted by permission of the editors and with the approval of President Wilson. The broad patriotism of the author saves from all sectional spirit an analysis which might easily have become partisan. There is weakness in our government, of the occasional evil results of* *which we have all been painfully aware. Dr. Wilson's keen thought points out its source.*

The making of our own nation seems to have taken place under our very eyes, so recent and so familiar is the story. The great process was worked out in the plain and open day of the modern world, statesmen and historians standing by to superintend, criticise, make record of what was done. The stirring narrative runs quickly into the day in which we live; we can say that our grandfathers builded the government which now holds so large a place in the world; the story seems of yesterday, and yet seems entire, as if the making of the republic had hastened to complete itself within a single hundred years. We are elated to see so great a thing done upon so great a scale, and to feel ourselves in so intimate a way actors in the moving scene.

Yet we should deceive ourselves were we to suppose the work done, the nation made. We have been told by a certain group of our historians that a nation was made when the federal Constitution was adopted; that the strong sentences of the law sufficed to transform us from a league of States into a people single and inseparable. Some tell us, however, that it was not till the war of 1812 that we grew fully conscious of a single purpose and destiny, and began to form policies as if for a nation. Others see the process complete only when the civil war struck slavery away, and gave North and South a common way of life that should make common ideals and common endeavors at last possible. Then, when all have had their say, there comes a great movement like the one which we call Populism, to remind us how the country still lies apart in sections: some at one stage of development, some at another; some with one hope and purpose for America, some with another. And we ask ourselves, Is the history of our making as a nation indeed over, or do we still wait upon the forces that shall at last unite us? Are we even now, in fact, a nation?

Clearly, it is not a question of sentiment, but a question of fact. If it be true that the country, taken as a whole, is at one and the same time in several stages of development—not a great commercial and manufacturing nation, with here and there its broad pastures and the quiet farms from which it draws its food; not a vast agricultural community, with here and there its ports of shipment and its necessary marts of exchange; nor yet a country of mines, merely, pouring their products forth into the markets of the world, to take thence whatever it may need for its comfort and convenience in living—we still wait for its economic and spiritual union. It is many things at once. Sections big enough for kingdoms live by agriculture, and farm the wide stretches of a new land by the aid of money borrowed from other sections which seem almost like another nation, with their teeming cities, dark with the smoke of factories, quick with the movements of trade, as sensitive to the variations of exchange on London as to the variations in the crops raised by their distant fellow-countrymen on the plains within the continent. Upon other great spaces of the vast continent, communities, millions strong, live the distinctive life of the miner, have all their fortune bound up and centred in a single group of industries, feel in their utmost concentration the power of economic forces elsewhere dispersed, and chafe under the unequal yoke that unites them with communities so unlike themselves as those which lend and trade and manufacture, and those which follow the plough and reap the grain that is to feed the world.

Such contrasts are nothing new in our history, and our system of government is admirably adapted to relieve the strain and soften the antagonism they might entail. All our national history through our country has lain apart in sections, each marking a stage of settlement, a stage of wealth, a stage of development, as population has advanced, as if by successive journeyings and encampments, from east to west; and always new regions have been suffered to become new States, form their own life under their own law, plan their own economy, adjust their own domestic relations, and legalize their own methods of business. States have, indeed, often been whimsically enough formed. We have left the matter of boundaries to surveyors rather than to statesmen, and have by no means managed to construct economic units in the making of States. We have joined mining communities with agricultural, the mountain with the plain, the ranch with the farm, and have left the making of uniform rules to the sagacity and practical habit of neighbors ill at ease with one another. But on the whole, the scheme, though a bit haphazard, has worked itself out with singularly little friction and no disaster, and the strains of the great structure we have erected have been greatly eased and dissipated.

Elastic as the system is, however, it stiffens at every point of national policy. The federal government can make but one rule, and that a rule for the whole country, in each act of its legislation. Its very constitution withholds it from discrimination as between State and State, section and section; and yet its chief powers touch just those subjects of economic interest in which the several sections of the country feel themselves most unlike. Currency questions do not affect them equally or in the same way. Some need an elastic currency to serve their uses; others can fill their coffers more readily with a currency that is inelastic. Some can build up manufactures under a tariff law; others cannot, and must submit to pay more without earning more. Some have one interest in a principle of interstate commerce; others, another. It would be difficult to find even a question of foreign policy which would touch all parts of the country alike. A foreign fleet would mean much more to the merchants of Boston and New York than to the merchants of Illinois and the farmers of the Dakotas.

The conviction is becoming painfully distinct among us, moreover, that these contrasts of conditions and differences of interest between the several sections of the country are now more marked and emphasized than they ever were before. The country has been transformed within a generation, not by any creations in a new kind, but by stupendous changes in degree. Every interest has increased its scale and its individual significance. The "East" is transformed by the vast accumulations of wealth made since the civil war—transformed from a simple to a complex civilization, more like the

Old World than like the New. The "West" has so magnified its characteristics by sheer growth, every economic interest which its life represents has become so gigantic in its proportions, that it seems to Eastern men, and to its own people also, more than ever a region apart. It is true that the "West" is not, as a matter of fact, a region at all, but, in Professor Turner's admirable phrase, a stage of development, nowhere set apart and isolated, but spread abroad through all the far interior of the continent. But it is now a stage of development with a difference, as Professor Turner has shown,[1] which makes it practically a new thing in our history. The "West" was once a series of States and settlements beyond which lay free lands not yet occupied, into which the restless and all who could not thrive by mere steady industry, all who had come too late and all who had stayed too long, could pass on, and, it might be, better their fortunes. Now it lies without outlet. The free lands are gone. New communities must make their life sufficient without this easy escape—must study economy, find their fortunes in what lies at hand, intensify effort, increase capital, build up a future out of details. It is as if they were caught in a fixed order of life and forced into a new competition, and both their self-consciousness and their keenness to observe every point of self-interest are enlarged beyond former example.

That there are currents of national life, both strong and definite, running in full tide through all the continent from sea to sea, no observant person can fail to perceive—currents which have long been gathering force, and which cannot now be withstood. There need be no fear in any sane man's mind that we shall ever again see our national government threatened with overthrow by any power which our own growth has bred. The temporary danger is that, not being of a common mind, because not living under common conditions, the several sections of the country, which a various economic development has for the time being set apart and contrasted, may struggle for supremacy in the control of the government, and that we may learn by some sad experience that there is not even yet any common standard, either of opinion or of policy, underlying our national life. The country is of one mind in its allegiance to the government and in its attachment to the national idea; but it is not yet of one mind in respect of that fundamental question, What policies will best serve us in giving strength and development to our life? Not the least noteworthy of the incidents that preceded and foretokened the civil war was, if I may so call it, the sectionalization of the national idea. Southern merchants bestirred themselves to get conventions together for the discussion, not of the issues of polities, but of the economic interests of the country. Their thought and hope were of the nation. They spoke no word of antagonism against any section or interest. Yet it was plain in every resolution they uttered that for them the nation was one thing and centred in the South, while for the rest of the country the nation was another thing and lay in the North and Northwest. They were arguing the needs of the nation from the needs of their own section. The same thing had happened in the days of the embargo and the war of 1812. The Hartford Convention thought of New England when it spoke of the country. So must it ever be when section differs from section in the very basis and method of its life. The nation is to-day one thing in Kansas, and quite another in Massachusetts.

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[1] See *American Historical Review*, Vol. I., p. 71.

There is no longer any danger of a civil war. There was war between the South and the rest of the nation because their differences were removable in no other way. There was no prospect that slavery, the root of these differences, would ever disappear in the mere process of growth. It was to be apprehended, on the contrary, that the very processes of growth would inevitably lead to the extension of slavery and the perpetuation of radical social and economic contrasts and antagonisms between State and State, between region and region. A heroic remedy was the only remedy. Slavery being removed, the South is now joined with the "West," joined with it in a stage of development, as a region chiefly agricultural, without diversified industries, without a multifarious trade, without those subtle extended nerves which come with all-around economic development, and which make men keenly sensible of the interests that link the world together, as it were into a single community. But these are lines of difference which will be effaced by mere growth, which time will calmly ignore. They make no boundaries for armies to cross. Tide-water Virginia was thus separated once from her own population within the Alleghany valleys—held two jealous sections within her own limits. Massachusetts once knew the sharp divergences of interest and design which separated the coast settlements upon the Bay from the restless pioneers who had taken up the free lands of her own western counties. North Carolina was once a comfortable and indifferent "East" to the uneasy "West" that was to become Tennessee. Virginia once seemed old and effete to Kentucky. The "great West" once lay upon the Ohio, but has since disappeared there, overlaid by the changes which have carried the conditions of the "East" to the Great Lakes and beyond. There has never yet been a time in our history when we were without an "East" and a "West," but the novel day when we shall be without them is now in sight. As the country grows it will inevitably grow homogeneous. Population will not henceforth spread, but compact; for there is no new land between the seas where the "West" can find another lodgment. The conditions which prevail in the ever-widening "East" will sooner or later cover the continent, and we shall at last be one people. The process will not be a short one. It will doubtless run through many generations and involve many a critical question of statesmanship. But it cannot be stayed, and its working out will bring the nation to its final character and rôle in the world.

In the mean time, shall we not constantly recall our reassuring past, reminding one another again and again, as our memories fail us, of the significant incidents of the long journey we have already come, in order that we may be cheered and guided upon the road we have yet to choose and follow? It is only by thus attempting, and attempting again and again, some sufficient analysis of our past experiences, that we can form any adequate image of our life as a nation, or acquire any intelligent purpose to guide us amidst the rushing movement of affairs. It is no doubt in part by reviewing our lives that we shape and determine them. The future will not, indeed, be like the past; of that we may rest assured. It cannot be like it in detail; it cannot even resemble it in the large. It is one thing to fill a fertile continent with a vigorous people and take possession of its treasures; it is quite another to complete the work of occupation and civilization in detail. Big plans, thought out only in the rough, will suffice for the one, but not for the other. A provident leadership, a patient tolerance of temporary but unavoidable evils, a just temper of compromise and accommodation, a hopeful industry in the face of small returns, mutual understandings, and a cordial spirit of coöperation are needed for the slow, intensive task, which were not demanded amidst the free advances of an unhampered people from settlement to settlement. And yet the past has made the present, and will make the future. It has made us a nation, despite a variety of life that threatened to keep us at odds among ourselves. It has shown us the processes by which differences have been obliterated and antagonisms softened. It has taught us how to become strong, and will teach us, if we heed its moral, how to become wise, also, and single-minded.

The colonies which formed the Union were brought together, let us first remind ourselves, not merely because they were neighbors and kinsmen, but because they were forced to see that they had common interests which they could serve in no other way. "There is nothing which binds one country or one State to another but interest," said Washington. "Without this cement the Western inhabitants can have no predilection for us." Without that cement the colonies could have had no predilection for one another. But it is one thing to have common interests, and quite another to perceive them and to act upon them. The colonies were first thrust together by the pressure of external danger. They needed one another, as well as aid from over-sea, as any fool could perceive, if they were going to keep their frontiers against the Indians, and their outlets upon the Western waters from the French. The French and Indian war over, that pressure was relieved, and they might have fallen again apart, indifferent to any common aim, unconscious of any common interest, had not the government that was their common master set itself to make them wince under common wrongs. Then it was that they saw how like they were in polity and life and interest in the great field of politics, studied their common liberty, and became aware of their common ambitions. It was then that they became aware, too, that their common ambitions could be realized only by union; not single-handed, but united against a common enemy. Had they been let alone, it would have taken many a long generation of slowly increased acquaintance with one another to apprise them of their kinship in life and interests and institutions; but England drove them into immediate sympathy and combination, unwittingly founding a nation by suggestion.

The war for freedom over, the new-fledged States entered at once upon a very practical course of education which thrust its lessons upon them without regard to taste or predilection. The Articles of Confederation had been formulated and proposed to the States for their acceptance in 1777, as a legalization of the arrangements that had grown up under the informal guidance of the Continental Congress, in order that law might confirm and strengthen practice, and because an actual continental war commanded a continental organization. But the war was virtually over by the time all the reluctant States had accepted the Articles; and the new government had hardly been put into formal operation before it became evident that only the war had made such an arrangement workable. Not compacts, but the compulsions of a common danger, had drawn the States into an irregular cooperation, and it was even harder to obtain obedience to the definite Articles than it had been to get the requisitions of the unchartered Congress heeded while the war lasted. Peace had rendered the makeshift common government uninteresting, and had given each State leave to withdraw from common undertakings, and to think once more, as of old, only of itself. Their own affairs again isolated and restored to their former separate importance, the States could no longer spare their chief men for what was considered the minor work of the general Congress. The best men had been gradually withdrawn from Congress before the war ended, and now there seemed less reason than ever why they should be sent to talk at Philadelphia, when they were needed for the actual work of administration at home. Politics fell back into their old localization, and every public man found his chief tasks at home. There were still, as a matter of fact, common needs and dangers scarcely less imperative and menacing than those which had drawn the colonies together against the mother country; but they were needs and perils of peace, and ordinary men did not see them; only the most thoughtful and observant were conscious of them: extraordinary events were required to lift them to the general view.

Happily, there were thoughtful and observant men who were already the chief figures of the country—men whose leadership the people had long since come to look for and accept—and it was through them that the States were brought to a new common consciousness, and at last to a real union. It was not possible for the several States to live self-sufficient and apart, as they had done when they were colonies. They had then had a common government, little as they liked to submit to it, and their foreign affairs had been taken care of. They were now to learn how ill they could dispense with a common providence. Instead of France, they now had England for neighbor in Canada and on the Western waters, where they had themselves but the other day fought so hard to set her power up. She was their rival and enemy, too, on the seas; refused to come to any treaty terms with them in regard to commerce; and laughed to see them unable to concert any policy against her because they had no common political authority among themselves. She had promised, in the treaty of peace, to withdraw her garrisons from the Western posts which lay within the territory belonging to the Confederation; but Congress had promised that British creditors should be paid what was due them, only to find that the States would make no laws to fulfil the promise, and were determined to leave their Federal representatives without power to make them; and England kept her troops where they were. Spain had taken France's place upon the farther bank of the Mississippi and at the great river's mouth. Grave questions of foreign policy pressed on every side, as of old, and no State could settle them unaided and for herself alone.

Here was a group of commonwealths which would have lived separately and for themselves, and could not; which had thought to make shift with merely a "league of friendship" between them and a Congress for consultation, and found that it was impossible. There were common debts to pay, but there was no common system of taxation by which to meet them, nor any authority to devise and enforce such a system. There were common enemies and rivals to deal with, but no one was authorized to carry out a common policy against them. There was a common domain to settle and administer, but no one knew how a Congress without the power to command was to manage so great a property. The Ordinance of 1787 was indeed bravely framed, after a method of real statesmanship; but there was no warrant for it to be found in the Articles, and no one could say how Congress would execute a law it had had no authority to enact. It was not merely the hopeless confusion and sinister signs of anarchy which abounded in their own affairs—a rebellion of debtors in Massachusetts, tariff wars among the States that lay upon New York Bay and on the Sound, North Carolina's doubtful supremacy among her settlers in the Tennessee country, Virginia's questionable authority in Kentucky—that brought the States at last to attempt a better union and set up a real government for the whole country. It was the inevitable continental outlook of affairs as well; if nothing more, the sheer necessity to grow and touch their neighbors at close quarters.

Washington had been among the first to see the necessity of living, not by a local, but by a continental policy. Of course he had a direct pecuniary interest in the development of the Western lands—had himself preëmpted many a broad acre lying upon the far Ohio, as well as upon the nearer western slopes of the mountains—and it is open to any one who likes the sinister suggestion to say that his ardor for the occupancy of the Western country was that of the land speculator, not that of the statesman. Everybody knows that it was a conference between delegates from Maryland and Virginia about Washington's favorite scheme of joining the upper waters of the Potomac with the upper waters of the streams which made their way to the Mississippi—a conference held at his suggestion and at his house—that led to the convening of that larger conference at Annapolis, which called for the appointment of the body that met at Philadelphia and framed the Constitution under which he was to become the first President of the United States. It is open to any one who chooses to recall how keen old Governor Dinwiddie had been, when he came to Virginia, to watch these same Western waters in the interests of the first Ohio Company, in which he had bought stock; how promptly he called the attention of the ministers in England to the aggressions of the French in that quarter, sent Washington out as his agent to warn the intruders off, and pushed the business from stage to stage, till the French and Indian war was ablaze, and nations were in deadly conflict on both sides of the sea. It ought to be nothing new and nothing strange, to those who have read the history of the English race the world over, to learn that conquests have a thousand times sprung out of the initiative of men who have first followed private interests into new lands like speculators, and then planned their occupation and government like statesmen. Dinwiddie was no statesman, but Washington was; and the circumstance which it is worth while to note about him is, not that he went prospecting upon the Ohio when the French war was over, but that he saw more than fertile lands there—saw the "seat of a rising empire," and, first among the men of his day, perceived by what means its settlers could be bound to the older communities in the East alike in interest and in polity. Here were the first "West" and the first "East," and Washington's thought mediating between them.

The formation of the Union brought a real government into existence, and that government set about its work with an energy, a dignity, a thoroughness of plan, which made the whole country aware of it from the outset, and aware, consequently, of the national scheme of political life it had been devised to promote. Hamilton saw to it that the new government should have a definite party and body of interests at its back. It had been fostered in the making by the commercial classes at the ports and along the routes of commerce, and opposed in the rural districts which lay away from the centres of population. Those who knew the forces that played from State to State, and made America a partner in the life of the world, had earnestly wanted a government that should preside and choose in the making of the nation; but those who saw only the daily round of the countryside had been indifferent or hostile, consulting their pride and their prejudices. Hamilton sought a policy which should serve the men who had set the government up, and found it in the funding of the debt, both national and domestic, the assumption of the Revolutionary obligations of the States, and the establishment of a national bank. This was what the friends of the new plan had wanted, the rehabilitation of credit, and the government set out with a programme meant to commend it to men with money and vested interests.

It was just such a government that the men of an opposite interest and temperament had dreaded, and Washington was not out of office before the issue began to be clearly drawn between those who wanted a strong government, with a great establishment, a system of finance which should dominate the markets, an authority in the field of law which should restrain the States and make the Union, through its courts, the sole and final judge of its own powers, and those who dreaded nothing else so much, wished a government which should hold the country together with as little thought as possible of its own aggrandizement, went all the way with Jefferson in his jealousy of the commercial interest, accepted his ideal of a dispersed power put into commission among the States —even among the local units within the States—and looked to see liberty discredited amidst a display of federal power.

When the first party had had their day in the setting up of the government and the inauguration of a policy which should make it authoritative, the party of Jefferson came in to purify it. They began by attacking the federal courts, which had angered every man of their faith by a steady maintenance and elaboration of the federal power; they ended by using that power just as their opponents had used it. In the first place, it was necessary to buy Louisiana, and with it the control of the Mississippi, notwithstanding Mr. Jefferson's solemn conviction that such an act was utterly without constitutional warrant; in the second place, they had to enforce an arbitrary embargo in order to try their hand at reprisal upon foreign rivals in trade; in the end, they had to recharter the national bank, create a national debt and a sinking fund, impose an excise upon whiskey, lay direct taxes, devise a protective tariff, use coercion upon those who would not aid them in a great war—play the rôle of masters and tax-gatherers as the Federalists had played it—on a greater scale, even, and with equal gusto. Everybody knows the familiar story: it has new significance from day to day only as it illustrates the invariable process of nation-making which has gone on from generation to generation, from the first until now.

Opposition to the exercise and expansion of the federal power only made it the more inevitable by making it the more deliberate. The passionate protests, the plain speech, the sinister forecasts, of such men as John Randolph aided the process by making it self-conscious. What Randolph meant as an accusation, those who chose the policy of the government presently accepted as a prophecy. It was true, as he said, that a nation was in the making, and a government under which the privileges of the States would count for less than the compulsions of the common interest. Few had seen it so at first; the men who were old when the government was born refused to see it so to the last; but the young men and those who came fresh upon the stage from decade to decade presently found the scarecrow look like a thing they might love. Their ideal took form with the reiterated suggestion; thev began to hope for what they had been bidden to dread. No party could long use the federal authority without coming to feel it national—without forming some ideal of the common interest, and of the use of power by which it should be fostered.

When they adopted the tariff of 1816, the Jeffersonians themselves formulated a policy which should endow the federal government with a greater economic power than even Hamilton had planned when he sought to win the support of the merchants and the lenders of money; and when they bought something like a third of the continent beyond the Mississippi, they made it certain the nation should grow upon a continental scale which no provincial notions about state powers and a common government kept within strait bounds could possibly survive. Here were the two forces which were to dominate us till the present day, and make the present issues of our politics: an open "West" into which a frontier population was to be thrust from generation to generation, and a protective tariff which should build up special interests the while in the "East," and make the contrast ever sharper and sharper between section and section. What the "West" is doing now is simply to note more deliberately than ever before, and with a keener distaste, this striking contrast between her own development and that of the "East." That was a true instinct of statesmanship which led Henry Clay to couple a policy of internal improvements with a policy of protection. Internal improvements meant in that day great roads leading into the West, and every means taken to open the country to use and settlement. While a protective tariff was building up special industries in the East, public works should make an outlet into new lands for all who were not getting the benefit of the system. The plan worked admirably for many a day, and was justly called "American," so well did it match the circumstances of a set of communities, half old, half new: the old waiting to be developed, the new setting the easy scale of living. The other side of the policy was left for us. There is no longer any outlet for those who are not the beneficiaries of the protective system, and nothing but the contrasts it has created remains to mark its triumphs.

Internal improvements no longer relieve the strain; they have become merely a means of largess.

The history of the United States has been one continuous story of rapid, stupendous growth, and all its great questions have been questions of growth. It was proposed in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 that a limit should be set to the number of new members to be admitted to the House of Representatives from States formed beyond the Alleghanies; and the suggestion was conceived with a true instinct of prophecy. The old States were not only to be shaken out of their self-centred life, but were even to see their very government changed over their heads by the rise of States in the Western country. John Randolph voted against the admission of Ohio into the Union, because he held that no new partner should be admitted to the federal arrangement except by unanimous consent. It was the very next year that Louisiana was purchased, and a million square miles were added to the territory out of which new States were to be made. Had the original States been able to live to themselves, keeping their own people, elaborating their own life, without a common property to manage, unvexed by a vacant continent, national questions might have been kept within modest limits. They might even have made shift to digest Tennessee, Kentucky, Mississippi, Alabama, and the great commonwealths carved out of the Northwest Territory, for which the Congress of the Confederation had already made provision. But the Louisiana purchase opened the continent to the planting of States, and took the processes of nationalization out of the hands of the original "partners." Questions of politics were henceforth to be questions of growth.

For a while the question of slavery dominated all the rest. The Northwest Territory was closed to slavery by the Ordinance of 1787. Tennessee, Kentucky, Mississippi, Alabama, took slavery almost without question from the States from which they were sprung. But Missouri gave the whole country view of the matter which must be settled in the making of every State founded beyond the Mississippi. The slavery struggle, which seems to us who are near it to occupy so great a space in the field of our affairs, was, of course, a struggle for and against the extension of slavery, not for or against its existence in the States where it had taken root from of old—a question of growth, not of law. It will some day be seen to have been, for all it was so stupendous, a mere episode of development. Its result was to remove a ground of economic and social difference as between section and section which threatened to become permanent, standing forever in the way of a homogeneous life. The passionate struggle to prevent its extension inevitably led to its total abolition; and the way was clear for the South, as well as the "West," to become like its neighbor sections in every element of its life.

It had also a further, almost incalculable effect in its stimulation of a national sentiment. It created throughout the North and Northwest a passion of devotion to the Union which really gave the Union a new character. The nation was fused into a single body in the fervent heat of the time. At the beginning of the war the South had seemed like a section pitted against a section; at its close it seemed a territory conquered by a neighbor nation. That nation is now, take it roughly, that "East" which we contrast with the "West" of our day. The economic conditions once centred at New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Pittsburg, and the other commercial and industrial cities of the coast States are now to be found, hardly less clearly marked, in Chicago, in Minneapolis, in Detroit, through all the great States that lie upon the Lakes, in all the old "Northwest." The South has fallen into a new economic classification. In respect of its stage of development it belongs with the "West," though in sentiment, in traditional ways of life, in many a point of practice and detail, it keeps its old individuality, and though it has in its peculiar labor problem a hinderance to progress at once unique and ominous.

It is to this point we have come in the making of the nation. The old sort of growth is at an end—the growth by mere expansion. We have now to look more closely to internal conditions, and study the means by which a various people is to be bound together in a single interest. Many differences will pass away of themselves. "East" and "West" will come together by a slow approach, as capital accumulates where now it is only borrowed, as industrial development makes its way westward in a new variety, as life gets its final elaboration and detail throughout all the great spaces of the continent, until all the scattered parts of the nation are drawn into real community of interest. Even the race problem of the South will no doubt work itself out in the slowness of time, as blacks and whites pass from generation to generation, gaining with each removal from the memories of the war a surer self-possession, an easier view of the division of labor and of social function to be arranged between them. Time is the only legislator in such a matter. But not everything can be left to drift and slow accommodation. The nation which has grown to the proportions almost of the continent within the century, lies under our eyes, unfinished, unharmonized, waiting still to have its parts adjusted, lacking its last lesson in the ways of peace and concert. It required statesmanship of no mean sort to bring us to our present growth and lusty strength. It will require leadership of a much higher order to teach us the triumphs of coöperation, the self-possession and calm choices of maturity.

Much may be brought about by a mere knowledge of the situation. It is not simply the existence of facts that governs us, but consciousness and comprehension of the facts. The whole process of statesmanship consists in bringing facts to light, and shaping law to suit, or, if need be, mould them. It is part of our present danger that men of the "East" listen only to their own public men, men of the "West" only to theirs. We speak of the "West" as out of sympathy with the "East": it would be instructive once and again to reverse the terms, and admit that the "East" neither understands nor sympathizes with the "West"—and thorough nationalization depends upon mutual understandings and sympathies. There is an unpleasant significance in the fact that the "East" has made no serious attempt to understand the desire for the free coinage of silver in the "West" and the South. If it were once really probed and comprehended, we should know that it is necessary to reform our currency at once, and we should know in what way it is necessary to reform it; we should know that a new protective tariff only marks with a new emphasis the contrast in economic interest between the "East" and the "West," and that nothing but currency reform can touch the cause of the present discontents.

Ignorance and indifference as between section and section no man need wonder at who knows the habitual courses of history; and no one who comprehends the essential soundness of our people's life can mistrust the future of the nation. He may confidently expect a safe nationalization of interest and policy in the end, whatever folly of experiment and fitful change he may fear in the mean while. He can only wonder that we should continue to leave ourselves so utterly without adequate means of formulating a national policy. Certainly Providence has presided over our affairs with a strange indulgence, if it is true that Providence helps only those who first seek to help themselves. The making of a nation has never been a thing deliberately planned and consummated by the counsel and authority of leaders, but the daily conduct and policy of a nation which has won its place must be so planned. So far we have had the hopefulness, the readiness, and the hardihood of youth in these matters, and have never become fully conscious of the position into which our peculiar frame of government has brought us. We have waited a whole century to observe that we have made no provision for authoritative national leadership in matters of policy. The President does not always speak with authority, because he is not always a man picked out and tested by any processes in which the people have been participants, and has nothing often but his office to render him influential. Even when the country does know and trust him, he can carry his views no further than to recommend them to the attention of Congress in a written message which the Houses would deem themselves subservient to give too much heed to. Within the Houses there is no man, except the Vice-President, to whose choice the whole country gives heed; and he is chosen, not to be a Senator, but only to wait upon the disability of the President, and preside meanwhile over a body of which he is not a member. The House of Representatives has in these latter days made its Speaker its political leader as well as its parliamentary moderator; but the country is, of course, never consulted about that beforehand, and his leadership is not the open leadership of discussion, but the undebatable leadership of the parliamentary autocrat.

This singular leaderless structure of our government never stood fully revealed until the present generation, and even now awaits general recognition. Peculiar circumstances and the practical political habit and sagacity of our people for long concealed it. The framers of the Constitution no doubt expected the President and his advisers to exercise a real leadership in affairs, and for more than a generation after the setting up of the government their expectation was fulfilled. Washington was accepted as leader no less by Congress than by the people. Hamilton, from the Treasury, really gave the government both its policy and its administrative structure. If John Adams had less authority than Washington, it was because the party he represented was losing its hold upon the country. Jefferson was the most consummate party chief, the most unchecked master of legislative policy, we have had in America, and his dynasty was continued in Madison and Monroe. But Madison's terms saw Clay and Calhoun come to the front in the House, and many another man of the new generation, ready to guide and coach the President rather than to be absolutely controlled by him. Monroe was not of the calibre of his predecessors, and no party could rally about so stiff a man, so cool a partisan, as John Quincy Adams. And so the old political function of the presidency came to an end, and it was left for Jackson to give it a new one—instead of a leadership of counsel, a leadership and discipline by rewards and punishments. Then the slavery issue began to dominate politics, and a long season of concentrated passion brought individual men of force into power in Congress—natural leaders of men like Clay, trained and eloquent advocates like Webster, keen debaters with a logic whose thrusts were as sharp as those of cold steel like Calhoun. The war made the Executive of necessity the nation's leader again, with the great Lincoln at its head, who seemed to embody, with a touch of genius, the very character of the race itself. Then reconstruction came—under whose leadership who could say?—and we were left to wonder what, henceforth, in the days of ordinary peace and industry, we were to make of a government which could in humdrum times yield us no leadership at all. The tasks which confront us now are not like those which centred in the war, in which passion made men run together to a common work. Heaven forbid that we should admit any element of passion into the delicate matters in which national policy must mediate between the differing economic interests of sections which a wise moderation will assuredly unite in the ways of harmony and peace! We shall need, not the mere compromises of Clay, but a constructive leadership of which Clay hardly showed himself capable.

There are few things more disconcerting to the thought, in any effort to forecast the future of our affairs, than the fact that we must continue to take our executive policy from presidents given us by nominating conventions, and our legislation from conference committees of the House and Senate. Evidently it is a purely providential form of government. We should never have had Lincoln for President had not the Republican convention of 1860 sat in Chicago, and felt the weight of the galleries in its work—and one does not like to think what might have happened had Mr. Seward been nominated. We might have had Mr. Bryan for President, because of the impression which may be made upon an excited assembly by a good voice and a few ringing sentences flung forth just after a cold man who gave unpalatable counsel had sat down. The country knew absolutely nothing about Mr. Bryan before his nomination, and it would not have known anything about him afterward had he not chosen to make speeches. It was not Mr. McKinley, but Mr. Reed, who was the real leader of the Republican party. It has become a commonplace among us that conventions prefer dark horses—prefer those who are not tested leaders with well-known records, to those who are. It has become a commonplace among all nations which have tried popular institutions, that the actions of such bodies as our nominating conventions are subject to the play of passion and of chance. They meet to do a single thing—for the platform is really left to a committee—and upon that one thing all intrigue centres. Who that has witnessed them will ever forget the intense night scenes, the feverish recesses, of our nominating conventions, when there is a running to and fro of agents from delegation to delegation, and every candidate has his busy headquarters—can ever forget the shouting and almost frenzied masses on the floor of the hall when the convention is in session, swept this way and that by every wind of sudden feeling, impatient of debate, incapable of deliberation? When a convention's brief work is over, its own members can scarcely remember the plan and order of it. They go home unmarked, and sink into the general body of those who have nothing to do with the conduct of government. They cannot be held responsible if their candidate fails in his attempt to carry on the Executive.

It has not often happened that candidates for the presidency have been chosen from outside the ranks of those who have seen service in national politics. Congress is apt to be peculiarly sensitive to the exercise of executive authority by men who have not at some time been members of the one House or the other, and so learned to sympathize with members' views as to the relations that ought to exist between the President and the federal legislature. No doubt a good deal of the dislike which the Houses early conceived for Mr. Cleveland was due to the feeling that he was an "outsider," a man without congressional sympathies and points of view—a sort of irregular and amateur at the delicate game of national politics as played at Washington; most of the men whom he chose as advisers were of the same kind, without Washington credentials. Mr. McKinley, though of the congressional circle himself, repeated the experiment in respect of his cabinet in the appointment of such men as Mr. Gage and Mr. Bliss and Mr. Gary. Members resent such appointments; they seem to drive the two branches of the government further apart than ever, and yet they grow more common from administration to administration.

These appointments make coöperation between Congress and the Executive more difficult, not because the men thus appointed lack respect for the Houses or seek to gain any advantage over them, but because they do not know how to deal with them—through what persons and by what courtesies of approach. To the uninitiated Congress is simply a mass of individuals. It has no responsible leaders known to the system of government, and the leaders recognized by its rules are one set of individuals for one sort of legislation, another for another. The Secretaries cannot address or approach either House as a whole; in dealing with committees they are dealing only with groups of individuals; neither party has its leader—there are only influential men here and there who know how to manage its caucuses and take advantage of parliamentary openings on the floor. There is a master in the House, as every member very well knows, and even the easy-going public are beginning to observe. The Speaker appoints the committees; the committees practically frame all legislation; the Speaker, accordingly, gives or withholds legislative power and opportunity, and members are granted influence or deprived of it much as he pleases. He of course administers the rules, and the rules are framed to prevent debate and individual initiative. He can refuse recognition for the introduction of measures he disapproves of as party chief; he may make way for those he desires to see passed. He is chairman of the Committee on Rules, by which the House submits to be governed (for fear of helplessness and chaos) in the arrangement of its business and the apportionment of its time. In brief, he is not only its moderator, but its master. New members protest and write to the newspapers; but old members submit—and indeed the Speaker's power is inevitable. You must have leaders in a numerous body—leaders with authority; and you cannot give authority in the House except through the rules. The man who administers the rules must be master, and you must put this mastery into the hands of your best party leader. The legislature being separated from the executive branch of the government, the only rewards and punishments by which you can secure party discipline are those within the gift of the rules—the committee appointments and preferences: you cannot administer these by election; party government would break down in the midst of personal exchanges of electoral favors. Here again you must trust the Speaker to organize and choose, and your only party leader is your moderator.

He does not lead by debate; he explains, he proposes nothing to the country; you learn his will in his rulings.

It is with such machinery that we are to face the future, find a wise and moderate policy, bring the nation to a common, a cordial understanding, a real unity of life. The President can lead only as he can command the ear of both Congress and the country—only as any other individual might who could secure a like general hearing and acquiescence. Policy must come always from the deliberations of the House committees, the debates, both secret and open, of the Senate, the compromises of committee conference between the Houses; no one man, no group of men, leading; no man, no group of men, responsible for the outcome. Unquestionably we believe in a guardian destiny! No other race could have accomplished so much with such a system; no other race would have dared risk such an experiment. We shall work out a remedy, for work it out we must. We must find or make, somewhere in our system, a group of men to lead us, who represent the nation in the origin and responsibility of their power; who shall draw the Executive, which makes choice of foreign policy and upon whose ability and good faith the honorable execution of the laws depends, into cordial coöperation with the legislature, which, under whatever form of government, must sanction law and policy. Only under a national leadership, by a national selection of leaders, and by a method of constructive choice rather than of compromise and barter, can a various nation be peacefully led. Once more is our problem of nation-making the problem of a form of government. Shall we show the sagacity, the open-mindedness, the moderation, in our task of modification, that were shown under Washington and Madison and Sherman and Franklin and Wilson, in the task of construction?

"PATRIOTISM AND POLITICS"

BY

HIS EMINENCE CARDINAL GIBBONS

CHIEF PRELATE OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN AMERICA

PRESIDENT WILSON has shown us the steps by which our country has become the mighty and happy land it is. Let us look now to the spirit which has made it great, to the patriotism which has guided and inspired its advance. Let us, moreover, consider this patriotism in no idle mood of joy, or pride, or self-gratulation. Rather must we study thoughtfully the means by which love of country has been roused in the past. We must seek the root of the emotions from which so fair a flower blooms; we must examine the meaning of this inspiring power which we have all seen in action, this undeniable spiritual force. We must aim to find why God implanted it in the heart of man. If in this search we become convinced of patriotism's high worth, we must then question what dangers threaten it, what means shall be taken to preserve it and to stimulate it to yet greater strength of inspiration in the coming years.

For this search, less simple than perchance it seems, let us accept the guidance of that distinguished prelate who stands at the head of the Roman Catholic Church in America. However widely many of us may differ from Cardinal Gibbons in matters of religious faith, yet his pure, strong, simple life has won him the respect of all. His steady influence in "Americanizing" the Catholic Church marks him as a friend of liberty. And his ever-widening fame guarantees that any written word of his will be filled full with a broad knowledge, a high wisdom, and a practical common-sense.

"PATRIOTISM AND POLITICS"

I HAVE no apology to make for offering some reflections on the political outlook of the nation; for my rights as a citizen were not abdicated or abridged on becoming a Christian prelate, and the sacred character which I profess, far from lessening, rather increases, my obligations to my country.

In answer to those who affirm that a churchman is not qualified to discuss politics, by reason of his sacred calling, which removes him from the political arena, I would say that this statement may be true in the sense that a clergyman as such should not be a heated partisan of any political party; but it is not true in the sense that he is unfitted by his sacred profession for discussing political principles. His very seclusion from popular agitation gives him a vantage-ground over those that are in the whirlpool of party strife, just as they, who have never witnessed Shakespeare's plays performed on the stage, are better qualified to judge of the genius of the author and the literary merit of his productions than they who witness the plays amid the environment of stage scenery.

It is needless to say that I write not merely as a churchman, but as a citizen; not in a partisan, but in a patriotic, spirit; not in advocacy of any particular party, but in vindication of pure government. There is a moral side to most political questions; and my purpose here is to consider the ethical aspect of politics, and the principles of justice by which they should be regulated.

Every man in the Commonwealth leads a dual life—a private life under the shadow of the home, and a public life under the ægis of the State. As a father, a husband, or a son, he owes certain duties to the family; as a citizen, he owes certain obligations to his country. These civic virtues are all comprised under the generic name, patriotism.

Patriotism means love of country. Its root is the Latin word *patria*, a word not domesticated in English. The French have it in *patrie;* the Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic races have it literally translated in Fatherland. "Fatherland," says Cicero, "is the common parent of us all: *Patria est communis omnium nostrum parens*."[1] It is the parental home extended, the family reaching out to the city, the province, the country. Hence, with us Fatherland and Country have come to be synonymous. Country in this sense comprises two elements, the soil itself, and the men who live thereon. We love the soil in which our fathers sleep—*terra patrum*, *terra patria*, the land in which we were born. We love the men who as fellow-dwellers share that land with us. When, not long ago, Dom Pedro, the exiled Emperor of Brazil, died in Paris, he was laid to his last sleep on Brazilian soil, which he had carried away with him for that very purpose. Let a citizen from Maine meet a citizen from California on the shores of the Bosphorus or on the banks of the Tiber, they will, at once, forget that at home they dwelt three thousand miles apart. State lines are obliterated, party differences are laid aside, religious animosities, if such had existed, are extinguished. They warmly clasp hands, they remember only that they are fellow-American citizens, children of the same mother, fellow-dwellers in the same land over which floats the star-spangled banner.

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[1] See Cicero's *De Finibus,* III., p. 19.

Patriotism implies not only love of soil and of fellow-citizens, but also, and principally, attachment to the laws, institutions, and government of one's country; filial admiration of the heroes, statesmen, and men of genius, who have contributed to its renown by the valor of their arms, the wisdom of their counsel, or their literary fame. It includes, also, an ardent zeal for the maintenance of those sacred principles that secure to the citizen freedom of conscience, and an earnest determination to consecrate his life, if necessary, *pro aris et focis* (in defence of altar and fireside), of God and Fatherland. Patriotism is a universal sentiment of the race:

> "Breathes there the man with soul so dead
> Who never to himself hath said,
> 'This is my own, my native land!'"

A certain philosophical school has taught that love of country has its origin in physical comfort. *Ibi patria ubi bene.* But is it not true that one's country becomes dear in proportion to the sufferings endured for it? Have not the sacrifices of our wars developed the patriotism of the American? In fact, it is the most suffering and persecuted races that are endowed with the deepest patriotism. We may even go so far as to say that the rougher the soil, the harsher the climate, the greater the material privations of a land, the more intense is the love of its inhabitants for it. Witness the Irish peasant. And are not the Swiss in their narrow valleys and on their steep mountain-sides, the Scotch on their rugged Highlands the classic models of patriotism? Nay, the Eskimo, amid the perpetual snows that hide from his eyes every green spot of earth, loves his home nor dreams of a fairer.

Patriotism is not a sentiment born of material and physical well-being; it is a sentiment that the poverty of country and the discomforts of climate do not diminish, that the inflictions of conquest and despotism do not augment. The truth is, it is a rational instinct placed by the Creator in the breast of man. When God made man a social being, He gave him a sentiment that urges him to sacrifice himself for his family and his country, which is, as it were, his larger family. "Dear are ancestors, dear are children, dear are relatives and friends; all these loves are contained in love of country."[1]

The Roman was singularly devoted to his country. *Civis Romanus sum* (I am a citizen of Rome) was his proudest boast. He justly gloried in being a citizen of a republic conspicuous for its centuries of endurance, for the valor of its soldiers, for the wisdom of its statesmen and the genius of its writers. One of its greatest poets has sung: "It is sweet and honorable to die for one's country."[2] So execrable was the crime of treason regarded, that the traitor not only suffered extreme penalties in this life, but he is consigned after death by Virgil to the most gloomy regions of Tartarus.[3]

Love of country shows itself in the citizen by the observance of law and the good use of political rights; and in those that, for the time being, govern, by justice and disinterestedness in their administration. Ministers of religion manifest their patriotism, not only as citizens, but also as spiritual teachers and leaders of the people, by inculcating the religious, moral, and civic virtues, and by prayer to the throne of God for the welfare of the land. "I desire, therefore," wrote St. Paul to his disciple Timothy, "first of all that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for all men; for kings and for all that are in high station, that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all piety and chastity; for this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour."[1]

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[1] Cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiares, sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est. (Cicero, De Off., I., 17.)

[2] Dulce et decorum pro patria mori. (Horace, B. III., Ode II.)

[3] See Virgil's *Æneid*, Book VI.

The Catholic Church in our country is not unmindful of this duty. A prayer composed by Archbishop Carroll to beg Heaven's blessing on the land and its rulers, a masterpiece of liturgical literature, is recited every Sunday at the solemn service in some parts of the United States, and notably in the Cathedral at Baltimore, in which the custom has never ceased since it was introduced by Baltimore's first Archbishop over one hundred years ago.

To the soldier, patriotism has inspired the most heroic deeds of courage and self-sacrifice. The victories of Debora, Judith, and Gedeon, achieved for God and country, are recorded with praise in Sacred Scripture.

The stand of Leonidas in the pass of Thermopylæ with his three hundred Spartans against the million Persians of Xerxes; the boldness of his answer to the Oriental monarch's summons to lay down arms, "Let him come and take them"; the recklessness of his reply to the threat that so numerous were his foes that the very heavens would be darkened by their arrows, "'Tis well. We shall fight in the shade"; the fierce battle; the fall of almost all the Grecian heroes; the total defeat of the Persian host—are commonplaces of history, are themes of the schoolroom. That day ranks among the great days of the world. Had Xerxes triumphed, Europe had become Asiatic, and the trend of history had been changed.

The three calls of Cincinnatus to the Dictatorship from the solitude and cultivation of his Sabine farm, his three triumphs over the enemies of the Republic, kindled not in his breast the fire of political ambition. When the foe was repelled and his country needed him no longer, he laid down the sword of command for the plough, left "the pomp and circumstance" of the camp for the quiet of his rural homestead, like him whose grave hallows the hillside of Mount Vernon—two notable instances of patriotism, making men great in peace no less than in war. Need I recall to my readers Regulus, Horatius Cocles, Brutus, the first consul, whose heroic and patriotic deeds have been the exultant theme of the classic authors of Rome?

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[1] See Timothy, II., 1-3.

Patriotism finds outward and, so to say, material expression, in respect for the flag that symbolizes the country, and for the chief magistrate who represents it. Perhaps it is only when an American travels abroad that he fully realizes how deep-rooted is his love for his native country. The sentiment of patriotism, which may be dormant at home, is aroused and quickened in foreign lands. The sight of an American flag flying from the mast of a ship in mid-ocean or in some foreign port awakes unwonted emotion and enthusiasm.

The interest which an American feels in a presidential election, or in any other important domestic event, is intensified when he is abroad. When I was travelling through the Tyrol, in 1880, I had a natural desire to find out who had been nominated for the Presidency; but in that country news travels slowly. On reaching Innspruck, I learned that Mr. Garfield was the nominee. I got my information from an American student buried in the cloisters of a seminary, to whom the outside world was apparently dead. I never discovered, and I dare say his professors never knew, how he obtained his information. But the news was correct.

Americans are in the habit of visiting Rome every year in large numbers. The greater part of them on their arrival instinctively repair to the American College. Perhaps, the name of the college attracts them; perhaps, also, the consciousness that they will hear their mother-tongue. And when they enter its portals, where they are always sure to find a warm welcome from the genial rector, their eyes are gladdened by the familiar features of the "Father of his Country."

Love of country, as I have described it, which is fundamentally an ethical sentiment, and which was such in all nations, even before Christian Revelation was given to the world, and which is such to-day among nations that have not heard the Christian message, is elevated, ennobled, and perfected by the religion of Christ. Patriotism in non-Christian times and races has inspired heroism even unto death. We do not pretend that Christian patriotism can do more. But we do say that Christianity has given to patriotism, and to the sacrifices it demands, nobler motives and higher ideals.

If the virtue of patriotism was held in such esteem by pagan Greece and Rome, guided only by the light of reason, how much more should it be cherished by Christians, instructed as they are by the voice of Revelation! The Founder of the Christian religion has ennobled and sanctified loyalty to country by the influence of His example and the force of His teaching.

When St. Peter was asked by the tax-collector whether his Master should pay the tribute money or not, he replied in the affirmative, and the penniless Master wrought a miracle to secure the payment of the money, though He was exempt from the obligation by reason of His poverty and his divine origin; for if the sons of kings are free from taxation, as Christ Himself remarked on that occasion, the Son of the King of kings had certainly a higher claim to exemption.

The Herodians questioned Jesus whether or not it was lawful to pay tribute to Cæsar. By this question they sought to ensnare Him in His words. If He admitted the obligation, He would have aroused the indignation of the Jews, who deemed it unlawful to pay tribute to a Gentile and idolatrous ruler. If, on the other hand, He denied the obligation, He would have incurred the vengeance of Rome. He made this memorable reply, which silenced His adversaries: "Render to Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and to God the things which are God's."

The Apostles echo the voice of their Master. "Let every soul be subject to higher powers; for there is no power but from God. Therefore, he who resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they who resist, purchase for themselves damnation. Render, therefore, to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor."[1] "Be ye subject to every authority for God's sake, whether to the king as excelling, or to governors as sent by him for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of those who do well."[1] This short sentence, "There is no authority but from God," has contributed more effectually to the stability of nations and to the peace and order of society than standing armies and all the volumes ever written on the principles of government. It ennobles obedience to constituted authority by representing it, not as an act of servility to man, but of homage to God. It sheds a halo around rulers and magistrates by holding them up to us as the representatives of God. It invests all legitimate laws with a divine sanction by an appeal to our conscience.

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[1] Romans, XIII.

If the Apostles and the primitive Christians had so much reverence for the civil magistrates in whose election they certainly had no voice; and if they were so conscientious in observing the laws of the Roman Empire, which often inflicted on them odious pains and disabilities, how much more respect should the American citizen entertain for the civil rulers in whose election he actively participates! With what alacrity should he fulfil the laws which are framed solely for his peace and protection and for the welfare of the Commonwealth!

The deification of the State in pagan times rested on a principle contrary to reason, and exacted sacrifices destructive of the moral worth of the citizen. The State absorbed the individual. It was held to be the proprietor and master of the citizen, who was only an instrument in its hand, to be used, cast aside, or broken at will. Christianity knows how to conciliate patriotism with the exigencies of man's personal dignity. Social perfection, or civilization, is in that form of government that secures to its members the greater facility for pursuing and attaining their end in life. That is the Christian notion of the State, and the American also, as laid down in the Declaration of Independence. It is stated therein that government is for the citizen, to secure to him his inalienable rights—that is to say, rights that are his and are inalienable by virtue of the supreme end marked out for him by the Creator.

Again, unlike pagan civilization, which despised the for-

Peter, II.

eigner as a barbarian and a foe, Christian and American civilization sees its ideal in that universal charity revealed to the world by Christ, who came to teach the brotherhood of all men in the Fatherhood of the One God. Patriotism and cosmopolitism are not incompatible in the Christian. They find a model in the religious order, in the Catholicity and unity of the Church. And even in the political order, the United States offers a miniature picture of the brotherly federation of nations —forty-five sovereign States, sovereign and independent as to their internal existence, yet presenting to the rest of the world a national unity in the federal government.

And, indeed, when we reflect on the happiness and manifold temporal blessings which our political institutions have already conferred, and are destined in the future to confer, on millions of people, we are not surprised that the American citizen is proud of his country, her history, and the record of her statesmen.

Therefore, next to God, our country should hold the strongest place in our affections. Impressed, as we ought to be, with a profound sense of the blessings which our system of government continues to bestow on us, we shall have a corresponding dread lest these blessings should be withdrawn from us. It is a sacred duty for every American to do all in his power to perpetuate our civil institutions and to avert the dangers that threaten them.

The system of government which obtains in the United States is tersely described in the well-known sentence, "A government of the people, by the people, for the people"; which may be paraphrased thus: Ours is a government in which the people are ruled by the representatives of their own choice, and for the benefit of the people themselves.

Our rulers are called the servants of the people, since they are appointed to fulfil the people's wishes; and the people are called the sovereign people, because it is by their sovereign voice that their rulers are elected.

The method by which the supreme will of the people is registered is the ballot-box. This is the oracle that proclaims their choice. This is the balance in which the merits of the candidates are weighed. The heavier scale determines at once the decision of the majority and the selection of the candidate.

And what spectacle is more sublime than the sight of ten millions of citizens determining, not by the bullet, but by the ballot, the ruler that is to preside over the nation's destinies

> "A weapon that comes down as still
>   As snowflakes fall upon the sod;
> But executes a freeman's will,
>   As lightning does the will of God:
> And from its force nor doors nor locks
> Can shield you: 'tis the ballot-box."

But the greatest blessings are liable to be perverted. Our Republic, while retaining its form and name, may degenerate into most odious tyranny; and the irresponsible despotism of the multitude is more galling, because more difficult to be shaken off, than that of the autocrat.

History is philosophy teaching by example. A brief review of the Roman Republic and the causes of its downfall will teach us a useful lesson. The Republic prospered so long as the citizens practised simplicity of life, and the civil magistrates administered even-handed justice. Avarice and ambition proved its ruin.[1] The avarice of the poor was gratified by the bribery of the rich; and the ambition of the rich was fed by the votes of the poor.

In the latter days of the Republic bribery and corruption were shamefully practised. Marius was elected to the consulship by the purchase of votes and by collusion with the most notorious demagogues. Pompey and Crassus secured the consulship by intimidation, though neither of them was legally qualified for that office. The philosophy of Epicuris, introduced during the last years of the Republic, hastened the moral and mental corruption of Rome. The loss of the political autonomy of Greece, which preceded that of Rome, may be traced to the same cause. To the early Romans the oath was sacred, and perjury a detestable crime. We find in a letter of

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[1] Primo pecuniæ, deinde imperii cupido crevit; ea quasi materies omnium malorum fuere. (Sallust.) Catalin. C. X.

Cicero to Atticus a curious incident that shows how far the politicians of his day had departed from former standards.

"Memmius," he writes, "has just made known to the Senate an agreement between himself and an associate candidate for the consulship on the one hand, and the two consuls of the current year on the other." It appears that the two consuls agreed to favor the candidacy of the aspirants on the following terms: The two aspirants bound themselves to forfeit to the consuls four hundred thousand sesterces if they failed to produce in favor of the consuls three augurs who were to swear that in their sight and hearing the Plebs (though such was not the fact) had voted the law *Curiate*, a law that invested the consuls with full military powers; and also if they failed to produce two ex-consuls who were to swear that in their presence the Senate had passed and signed a certain decree regulating the provinces of each consul, though such was not the fact.[1] What a crowding of dishonesty in this one transaction! Can the worst kind of American politics furnish the match of this slate gotten up regardless of truth and oath?

Cato failed to be elected consul, although eminently worthy of that dignity, because he disdained to purchase the office by bribes. Cæsar had so far debauched the populace with flattery and bribes, and the soldiers with pensions, that his election to the office of chief pontiff and consul was easily obtained.

During the Empire, elections were usually a mere formality. Bribery was open and unblushing. Toward the end of the second century the Empire was publicly sold at auction to the highest bidder. Didius Julianus, a rich senator, obtained the prize by the payment of $620 to each soldier of the Prætorian guard. But he was executed after a precarious and inglorious reign of sixty-six days.

The history of the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire should be a salutary warning to us. Our Christian civilization gives us no immunity from political corruption and disaster. The oft-repeated cry of election frauds should not be treated with indifference; though, in many instances, no doubt, it is the empty charge of defeated partisans against successful rivals, or the heated language of a party press.

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[1] Book IV., Letter XVIII

But after all reasonable allowances are made, enough remains of a substantial character to be ominous. In every possible way, by tickets insidiously printed, by "colonizing," "repeating," and "personation," frauds are attempted, and too often successfully, on the ballot. I am informed by a trustworthy gentleman that, in certain localities, the adherents of one party, while proof against bribes from their political opponents, will exact compensation before giving their votes even to their own party candidates. The evil would be great enough if it were restricted to examples of this kind, but it becomes much more serious when large bodies of men are debauched by the bribes or intimidated by the threats of wealthy corporations.

But when the very fountains of legislation are polluted by lobbying and other corrupt means; when the hand of bribery is extended, and not always in vain, to our municipal, state, and national legislators; when our law-makers become the pliant tools of some selfish and greedy capitalists, instead of subserving the interests of the people—then, indeed, patriotic citizens have reason to be alarmed about the future of our country. The man who would poison the wells and springs of the land is justly regarded as a human monster, as an enemy of society, and no punishment could be too severe for him. Is he not as great a criminal who would poison and pollute the ballot-box, the unfailing fount and well-spring of our civil freedom and of our national life?

The Ark of the Covenant was held in the highest veneration by the children of Israel. It was the oracle from which God communicated His will to the people. Two cherubim with outstretched wings were placed over it as sacred guardians. Oza was suddenly struck dead for profanely touching it. May we not, without irreverence, compare the ballot-box to the ancient Ark? Is it not for us the oracle of God, because it is the oracle of the people? God commands us to obey our rulers. It is through the ballot-box that our rulers are proclaimed to us; therefore, its voice should be accepted as the voice of God. Let justice and truth, like twin cherubs, guard this sacred instrument. Let him who lays profane hands upon it be made to feel that he is guilty of a grievous offence against the stability of government, the peace of society, and the majesty of God.

Our Saviour, filled with righteous indignation, seizes a scourge and casts out of the Temple those that bought and sold in it, and overturns the tables of the money-changers, saying: "My house is a house of prayer, but you have made it a den of thieves." The polling booth is a temple, in which the angel of justice holds the scales with an even hand. The political money-changer pollutes the temple by his iniquitous bargains. The money-changer in Jerusalem's Temple trafficked in doves; the electioneering money-changer traffics in human beings.

Let the minister of justice arise, and, clothed with the panoply of authority, let him drive those impious men from the temple. Let the buyers and sellers of votes be declared infamous; for they are trading in our American birthright. Let them be cast forth from the pale of American citizenship and be treated as outlaws.

I do not think the punishment too severe when we consider the enormity and far-reaching consequences of their crime. I hold that the man who undermines our elective system is only less criminal than the traitor who fights against his country with a foreign invader. The one compasses his end by fraud, the other by force.

The privilege of voting is not an inherent or inalienable right. It is a solemn and sacred trust, to be used in strict accordance with the intentions of the authority from which it emanates.

When a citizen exercises his honest judgment in casting his vote for the most acceptable candidate, he is making a legitimate use of the prerogatives confided to him. But when he sells or barters his vote, when he disposes of it to the highest bidder, like a merchantable commodity, he is clearly violating his trust and degrading his citizenship.

The enormity of the offence will be readily perceived by pushing it to its logical consequences:

First. Once the purchase of votes is tolerated or condoned or connived at, the obvious result is that the right of suffrage becomes a solemn farce. The sovereignty is no longer vested in the people, but in corrupt politicians or in wealthy corporations; money instead of merit becomes the test of success; the election is determined, not by the personal fitness and integrity of the candidate, but by the length of his own or his patron's purse; and the aspirant for office owes his victory, not to the votes of his constituents, but to the grace of some political boss.

Second. The better class of citizens will lose heart and absent themselves from the polls, knowing that it is useless to engage in a contest which is already decided by irresponsible managers.

Third. Disappointment, vexation, and righteous indignation will burn in the breasts of upright citizens. These sentiments will be followed by apathy and despair of carrying out successfully a popular form of government. The enemies of the Republic will then take advantage of the existing scandals to decry our system and laud absolute monarchies. The last stage in the drama is political stagnation or revolution.

But, happily, the American people are not prone to despondency or to political stagnation, or to revolution outside of the lines of legitimate reform. They are cheerful and hopeful, because they are conscious of their strength; and well they may be, when they reflect on the century of ordeals through which they have triumphantly passed. They are vigilant, because they are liberty-loving, and they know that "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty." They are an enlightened and practical people; therefore are they quick to detect and prompt to resist the first inroads of corruption. They know well how to apply the antidote to the political distemper of the hour. They have the elasticity of mind and heart to rise to the occasion. They will never suffer the stately temple of the Constitution to be overthrown, but will hasten to strengthen the foundation where it is undermined, to repair every breach, and to readjust every stone of the glorious edifice.

In conclusion, I shall presume to suggest, with all deference, a brief outline of what appear to me the most efficient means to preserve purity of elections and to perpetuate our political independence.

Many partial remedies may be named. The main purpose of these remedies is to foster and preserve what may be called a Public Conscience. In the individual man, conscience is that inner light which directs him in the knowledge and choice of good and evil, that practical judgment which pronounces, over every one of his acts, that it is right or wrong, moral or immoral. Now, this light and judgment which directs man in the ordinary personal affairs of life, must be his guide also in the affairs of his political life; for he is answerable to God for his political, as well as his personal, life.

The individual conscience is an enlightenment and a guide; and it is itself illumined and directed by the great maxims of natural law and the conclusions which the mind is constantly deducing from those maxims. Now, is there not a set of maxims and opinions that fulfil the office of guides to the masses in their political life?

The means which I propose are:

First. The enactment of strict and wholesome laws for preventing bribery and the corruption of the ballot-box, accompanied with condign punishment against the violators of the law. Let such protection and privacy be thrown around the polling booth that the humblest citizen may be able to record his vote without fear of pressure or of interference from those that might influence him. Such a remedy has already been attempted, with more or less success, in some States by the introduction of new systems of voting.

Second. A pure, enlightened, and independent judiciary to interpret and enforce the laws.

Third. A vigilant and fearless press that will reflect and create a healthy public opinion. Such a press, guided by the laws of justice and the spirit of American institutions, is the organ and the reflection of national thought, the outer bulwark of the rights and liberties of the citizen against the usurpations of authority and the injustice of parties, the speediest and most direct castigator of vice and dishonesty. It is a duty of the citizens of a free country not only to encourage the press, but to coöperate with it; and it is a misfortune for any land when its leading men neglect to instruct their country and act on public opinion through this powerful instrument for good.

Fourth. The incorporation into our school system of familiar lessons embodying a history of our country, a brief sketch of her heroes, statesmen, and patriots, whose civic virtues the rising generation will thus be taught to emulate. The duties and rights of citizens, along with reverence for our political institutions, should likewise be inculcated, as Dr. Andrews, President of the University of Nebraska, recommended some years ago. There is danger that the country whose history is not known and cherished will become to the masses only an abstraction, or, at best, that it will be in touch with them only on its less lovable side, the taxes and burdens it imposes. Men lost in an unnatural isolation, strangers to the past life of their nation, living on a soil to which they hold only by the passing interests of the present, as atoms without cohesion, are not able to realize and bring home to themselves the claims of a country that not only *is*, but that was before them, and that will be, as history alone can teach, long after them.

Fifth. A more hearty celebration of our national holidays.

The Hebrew people, as we learn from Sacred Scripture, were commanded to commemorate by an annual observance their liberation from the bondage of Pharaoh and their entrance into the Promised Land. In nearly all civilized countries there are certain days set apart to recall some great events in their national history, and to pay honor to the memory of the heroes who figured in them. The United States has already established three national holidays. The first is consecrated to the birth of the "Father of his Country"; the second, to the birth of the nation; and the third is observed as a day of Thanksgiving to God for His manifold blessings to the nation. On those days, when the usual occupations of life are suspended, every citizen has leisure to study and admire the political institutions of his country, and to thank God for the benedictions that He has poured out on us as a people. In contemplating these blessings, we may well repeat with the Royal Prophet: "He hath not done in like manner to every nation, and His judgments He hath not made manifest to them."

If holidays are useful to those that are to the manor born, they are still more imperatively demanded for the foreign population, which is constantly flowing into our country, and which consists of persons who are strangers to our civil institutions. The annually recurring holidays will create and develop in their minds a knowledge of our history and admiration for our system of government. It will help, also, to mould our people into unity of political faith. By the young, especially, are holidays welcomed with keen delight; and as there is a natural, though unconscious, association in the mind between the civic festivity and the cause that gave it birth, their attachment to the day will extend to the patriotic event or to the men whose anniversary is celebrated.

Sixth. The maintenance of party lines is an indispensable means for preserving political purity. One party watches the other, takes note of its shortcomings, its blunders and defects; and it has at its disposal the means for rebuking any abuse of power on the part of the dominant side, by appealing to the country at the tribunal of the ballot-box. The healthiest periods of the Roman Republic were periods of fierce political strife. The citizens of Athens were not allowed to remain neutral. They were compelled to take sides on all questions of great public interest. Not only was every citizen obliged to vote, but the successful candidate was bound to accept the office to which he was called, and to subordinate his taste for private life to the public interests.

England owes much of her greatness and liberty to the active and aggressive vigilance of opposing political camps. Political parties are the outcome of political freedom. Parties are not to be confounded with factions. The former contend for a principle, the latter struggle for a master.

To jurists and statesmen these considerations may seem trite, elementary, and commonplace. But, like all elementary principles, they are of vital import. They should be kept prominently in view before the people, and not obscured in a maze of wordy technicalities. They are landmarks to guide men in the path of public duty, and they would vastly contribute to the good order and stability of the Commonwealth if they were indelibly stamped on the heart and memory of every American citizen.

XIII

AMBITION

"THE CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS"

BY

DR. MAX NORDAU

MAX SIMON NORDAU stands to-day among the leading philosophers and literary men of the world. He is of Hebrew origin, was born in Budapesth, and educated there as a physician. Persecutions directed at his race and faith drove him from Hungary, and for over a quarter century he has resided in Paris, the centre which has drawn to itself so many noted literary men. Dr. Nordau early became known as a novelist and playwright, and in 1893 *his celebrated work "Degeneration" drew upon him the attention of the entire world. Medical men were as interested as philosophers by this grim, though probably exaggerated, pointing out of the symptoms of degeneracy in modern life. Since then works of more or less similar character, such as "The Drones Must Die," have kept the author prominently before the public.*

The present discourse by Dr. Nordau displays the same keenness of analysis, the same monumental honesty, and the same irrefutable logic as his longer works. To turn from Nordau contemptuously as a mere pessimist is childish folly. Rather we should look to him in admiration as what he is, the stern physician who does not hesitate to search the illnesses of society. With his keen scalpel he lays bare each evil, not from a mere morbid curiosity as to the progress of disease, but in anxiety to understand and cure. It is for us to aid him in his efforts, or at least to heed his warning of the danger, and, for ourselves, beware.

AMBITION

I

The reader in these latter days is accustomed to the sight of diagrams which show him in what an extraordinary measure everything has developed in the last quarter or half century: the output of coal and iron; baldness; the population of countries and towns; the wealth of individuals and communities; the range of guns and the consumption of soap; the length of railways and the salaries of tenors; the circulation of newspapers, the average length of life, and the number of divorces. There is something, however, on which we never obtain statistics, although it has developed to a greater extent than any other, and that is ambition.

It has become a commonplace that the great impulse to all human effort is hunger and love. This statement is true only regarding a certain phase of civilization. The daily bread and the woman are the aim of the toil and struggle of man so long as he has not raised himself much over the level of animality. On a higher degree of development a third stimulus comes into play, in many men the strongest of all—Ambition. People desire to shine, to become famous; they desire to be admired, envied, imitated. Everybody strives to rise above the others, to overtake all competitors in the race of life, to win the first prize. Formerly the feudal organization of society created hard-and-fast limits to the cravings of the individual. The low-born, the poor man, could not hope to lift himself much above the level on which the accident of his birth had placed him. His boldest dreams never carried him beyond the extreme limits of his caste. The democratic transformation of the peoples has changed this. The emancipation of the individual is in some countries complete and in others nearly so. Birth and extraction are no longer obstacles. Energy and talent, but of course smartness and unscrupulousness also, are keys to every door. Forces now have full play, free from the fetters of prejudice. "Quo non ascendam," cries in Dionysian intoxication every youngster who enters the arena of life, to take up the struggle for existence.

Nowhere is ambition so general and so boundless as in

America. This is natural, for nowhere is the individual so highly differentiated as in America, nowhere is he so full of inborn energy, so rich in initiative, resource, optimism, and self-confidence; nowhere is he so little tethered by pedantry, and nowhere are people so willing to recognize the value of a brilliant personality, however this may find expression.

To this it must be added, that in America the instances in which men have risen from the most humble beginnings to the most fabulous destinies, are more numerous and striking than anywhere else. A Lincoln who develops from a woodcutter into a President; a Mr. Schwab who at twenty years earned a dollar a day and at thirty-five has a salary of a million; a Mr. Carnegie who as a youth did not know where to find a shilling to buy primers, and as a man in mature life does not know how to get rid reasonably and usefully of his three hundred million dollars, must suggest to every woodcutter, every "buttons," every factory apprentice with the scantiest elementary schooling, the idea that it only depends on himself to tread in the footsteps of a Lincoln, a Mr. Schwab, or a Mr. Carnegie, and to reach the goal that these celebrities have attained.

The Horatian *Aurea mediocritas* has nowhere so few partisans as in America. "Everybody ahead" is the national motto. I suppress intentionally the second half of the smart sentence. The universal ideal of the American people seems to be success. The dream of success feeds the fancy of the child, hypnotizes the youth, gives the man temerity, tenacity, and perseverance, and only begins to become a matter of indifference under the sobering influence of advanced age.

Success, however, is but one of those vague words which mean nothing definite, but which, like "freedom" or "progress," are mere recipients filled by everybody with a different content. A well-known exercise in experimental psychology consists in asking a number of persons to indicate what images emerge in their consciousness when an abstract term is suddenly pronounced in their presence. In this manner we succeed in distinguishing the concrete elements out of which an abstract notion is composed.

If one were to ask a number of Americans what they imagine by success, one would evidently receive very different answers. Many would reply: Success means money. To be successful is synonymous with owning a palace, a yacht, a private Pullman car, with eating off gold plate, having the most expensive box in the Opera House, buying one's wife the largest diamonds in the market and one's daughter an English duke, or astonishing the world by the price of one's pictures, the number of one's pairs of trousers, and the amount of one's stakes at poker.

This is, of course, the coarsest view of wealth. It does not go beyond the most brutal selfishness and the mental horizon of an illiterate publican. Men of higher intellectual and moral attainment who hunt after wealth dream of making a nobler use of their gold. They desire to found universities and libraries, create museums, put up public monuments, assist talent, reward genius, to be the providence of the poor and the sick, and spread faith. In the one case as in the other, one is greedy for money on account of the power it incarnates, the power to satisfy low appetites or nobler aspirations, provoking whims or philanthropic sympathies, to gall one's fellow-men, or to be of use to them.

For others, success means the esteem of their fellow-countrymen. They do not desire to present them with money, they desire to give them the work of their brains. They see themselves as popular orators, as admired administrators, politicians, legislators. They dream of enthusiastic receptions by cheering crowds, of electoral victories, and of holding offices from mayor of their native place to President of the United States.

Yet another category understand success in one shape only, as fame. To be known to the whole world—to find that one's name is a household word with all people of education—what "consummation devoutly to be wish'd!" a goal which seems higher and more comprehensive than that of the millionaire or the public man. For with fame, so at least those believe who strive for it, goes also pecuniary reward, and the respect and admiration of one's fellow-men.

II

To weigh the moral and material value of these various forms of success, one against the other, is clearly not easy.

There exists no common measure for them. Their proportional estimation depends upon the conception of the world and life, the temperament, the coarser or finer soul-fibre of the person estimating them. It is emphatically a case for the application of the classic fable of the stork and the fox who invite each other to a meal. The fox can naturally do nothing with the long narrow pitcher of the stork, while the latter is equally helpless with the broad shallow dish of the fox. It all depends on whether one has a muzzle or a long bill.

It will probably be most difficult to come to an agreement regarding the value of the ideal of those for whom success takes the form of a mountain of gold, because not many people have the moral courage to deal with the problem sincerely; in their hearts they probably all value wealth, but it is considered low-minded and vulgar to admit this, while it seems noble and superior to make a show of despising money.

Now to despise money is very foolish, as it means to despise force, and force is the essence of the universe. Money in itself is nothing and means nothing. It is a mere symbol. It is a conventional representation of the whole of civilization. It virtually includes everything that up to this hour man has created with his many-sided mental and bodily efforts; what he has wrested from Nature in a struggle of giants of thousands of years, and has brought to a form suitable for human needs. Whoever boasts that he despises money, boasts that he despises the pictures of Leonardo and Velasquez, the statues of Michael Angelo, Carpeaux and Paul Dubois, the view on the north Italian lakes, the gulf of Naples and the giants of the Alps, the voice of De Reszke and Patti, the violin playing of Joachim and Sarasate, the wisdom of Mr. Herbert Spencer, the science of Lord Kelvin, and the inventiveness of Edison. For all these one can procure with money. That money can also be expended in vulgar fashion is not the fault of the money, but of those who spend it in a vulgar fashion.

At bottom one cannot blame the young man who, when he starts out on the race of life, makes as his goal the milliards of a Carnegie or a Rockefeller. He can think out for himself a good or a bad, a wise or a foolish, a useful or a harmful employ of them, and according to his choice will his ambition be attractive or repulsive.

It is true that a father, a tutor, a friend of even moderate wisdom only, will never advise the young man to make the conquest of milliards the task of his life. The prospects of passing the winning-post as victor are extremely unfavorable, the probabilities that in the struggle for excessive wealth he will lose his health, his peace of mind, his better self, perhaps his very life, are very great. The possession of the milliard may be a happiness; the earning of the milliard is certainly a work which peremptorily excludes every idea of happiness. The road to the milliard leads through all the circles of Dante's *Inferno*. Supposing the goal to be the paradise, the traveller arrives there in a condition which leaves him but little capacity for enjoying its bliss. The milliardaire who lives on a daily pint of milk of the value of six cents, and who in vain exhausts all the resources of human invention in striving to obtain a few hours of sleep, has become a common type in modern fiction, and I believe the portrait is true to life.

Providence has happily arranged that trees do not reach the heavens. Great wealth can only be gained from man. It is never the prize of solitary contemplation or secluded work at the desk in the cosey study. One must go to seek it in the market place, among the crowd. One must handle, outdo, overcome, or crush innumerable people. One must be more clever, have more will power, or be more artful than other men. This presupposes qualities which are not possessed by one man in a million. The young apprentice millionaire, when he is not a fool, soon sees that he is not cut in the material from which milliardaires are made. He calculates that on the whole there is no business which pays so little as the chase after the milliard, he abandons the race in time, before he breaks down, and devotes his energies to aims which are closer at hand, and reaches, not the fabulous milliards, but probably an honest competence.

The ambition to conquer a prominent situation in public life can be better encouraged. It is from its nature more moral than that for the mere possession of money. It is by definition social. The efforts it necessitates are compatible with health and happiness. It is true that here also we have the broad road and the narrow path. One can, in order to gain popularity, appeal to the bad instincts of the crowd as well as to the good. One may be the cad, parasite, and corrupter of the people, or its stern educator, warner, and critic. One can arrive at the Capitol through Tammany Hall or by heroism on Cuban battlefields. Whoever is not an incurable pessimist will at least admit the possibility that honesty, firmness of character, sound common sense, public spirit, sympathy with one's fellow-man, a little geniality, and a little gift of the gab, will sufficiently designate the possessor of these qualities, which are not over rare, even in their happy assemblage, to the esteem and confidence of his neighbors to assure him a reasonable, if perhaps not phenomenal, success in public life. The greater the number of citizens who have this kind of ambition, the better for the community; for their fruitful emulation, when it is controlled by a well-developed public sense of morality, strengthens the national solidarity, and recruits constantly precious forces for the work of the commonweal. In the struggle for success of this order, disappointment is not probable, for if the competitors are many, so also are the prizes. Cæsar preferred to be the first in the village rather than the second in Rome. Now to be first in Rome is difficult enough, but the alternative leaves Cæsar the choice of 50,000 situations.

The thirst for fame seems to be the most ideal ambition. It is the most foolish of all. In no case is the appearance so different from the reality as in the case of celebrity. To him who does not possess it, it seems the sum total of all that is splendid. He who, according to the general opinion of his contemporaries, possesses it, sees that it contains much more bitterness than satisfaction, and that it is not worth either a night's sleep or a day's effort.

To nothing can the "vanity of vanities" of the preacher be so well applied as to celebrity. Dante devoted to it the *Terzina:*—

"Non è 'l mondan rumor altro ch'un fiato
Del vento ch' or vien quinci ed or vien quindi,
E cambia nome perche cambia lato."

"World-renown is nothing but a break of wind, which blows sometimes from here, sometimes from there, and takes another name because it comes from another direction."

All that Falstaff said of honor, which replaces no lost limb and brings no dead to life, holds good of fame. What real use, what tangible advantage does it bring the celebrated man? His name is familiar to the world, but often enough the people who know it have no precise idea of the reason why they know it, and of the signification of the name.

Sir Richard Wallace presented the Parisians with some hundreds of public fountains. They are, as is meet, known as "Wallace Fountains," and have rendered his name a familiar sound to the man in Parisian streets. A reporter once overheard the following dialogue between two Paris workmen: "Old Wallace is dead!" "What old Wallace?" "You know quite well what Wallace, the man who made his fortune in fountains."

Fualdès is another name celebrated throughout France. It is that of a man who was cruelly murdered in the beginning of the nineteenth century. This tragic occurrence gave rise to a ballad which still lives in the mouth of the people. Let any one ask the average Frenchman if he knows Fualdès. Out of a hundred thus asked, ninety-nine will answer, "Fualdès? Certainly! the famous murderer!"

The visiting lady of a Sunday-school asked the children, "Do you know what a poet is?" "Yes," answered a dozen voices. "Give me a name." "Shakespeare." "Very good; now do you know what Shakespeare wrote?" General silence, finally broken by a clear voice, "The Bible, mum."

What does the celebrated man personally experience from his fame? He receives daily a bushel of letters, asking him for autographs, the minority of them with stamps for reply, many insufficiently prepaid, some not prepaid at all. Unknown persons honor him with confidential requests for assistance. Interviewers force their way in on him when he is obliged to work or when he would like to rest, bother him with indiscreet questions, and put idiotic replies in his mouth. Everybody claims the right to take up his time with undesired visits or egotistical letters, and he makes himself active, deadly foes, when he does not answer their letters or receive the visits.

Authors send him more books than he could get through in ten lifetimes entirely devoted to reading, and expect from him an exhaustive judgment, with his reasons for forming it. If he puts off the bore with a few non-compromising phrases, without opening the work, he is soon found out, and denounced as a hypocrite and a liar. If he frankly declares that he has no time for books which do not lie within his speciality, then he gets the name of being an ill-mannered boor and narrow-minded pedant. Every imbecile thinks it his duty to give his opinion about him, and many of these imbeciles put their opinion in print. People who also desired to become famous, but who, strange to say, have not become so, revenge themselves on him by spreading libellous anecdotes about him, and these anecdotes naturally find a greater number of people to repeat them and believe them, according to his degree of celebrity. If it gives him pleasure that the newspapers should occupy themselves with him, his enjoyment will be marred by his observing that the murderer of the day is given more space than the poet of the century. Czolgosz was, I believe, more spoken of in the Press in fourteen days than Tolstoi in a decade.

The flattering conviction that his fame reaches to the confines of the globe is supposed to indemnify the celebrated man for all these personal inconveniences. But to what humiliations he exposes himself if he tries personally to test his degree of fame! People have always believed that the best-known name of the nineteenth century was that of Napoleon I. One day, however, Prince Napoleon, "Plon Plon," came meditatively to his palace and said to the guests awaiting him, among whom were Sainte-Beuve and Renan, that he had just had a conversation under the arcades of the Palais Royal with a woman born and brought up in Paris who had never heard the name of Napoleon and had no notion of who he was.

III

It is exactly for this imaginary value, for fame, which neither offers the individual the tangible satisfactions of excessive wealth nor the community the advantage of the ambitious struggle for civic honors, that the most passionate greed exists.

This is easy to understand. The law of the least resistance explains the phenomenon.

The young man on the threshold of active life, who desires to become famous, naturally strikes upon the idea to try it by writing a book. He will become an author and win laurels with his pen. This requires the minimum of working capital and allows him to cling longest to subjective illusions.

Should the ambitious young man try for fame in a public career, he will soon be convinced that success cannot be attained by him if he has not the necessary qualities. He will fail at the polls; people will refuse to listen to his public speeches; he will return empty-handed from the hunt for office. That will, if he is at all capable of forming a judgment, open his eyes, and he will cease an effort which he is forced to see has no prospect of success.

Should he desire to become a milliardaire, every-day life will rapidly make it clear to him whether or not he has anything to hope for in this field. He will know at any minute the exact amount of his cash box. He will know what he is worth. Figures speak loudly and clearly, and they will tell him if his efforts are bearing fruit or not. We meet, it is true, people down at heel and out at elbow who are always on the track of phantom-like millions, but these poor fools are the laughing-stocks of their acquaintances. Men, too, are not too scarce who have actually climbed to the summit of the gold mountain, but have been hurled headlong down, to lie at the foot with broken limbs. These keep to the end of their lives the hope of once more reaching the top, and the memory of their short moment of glory makes them incapable of a sober comprehension of their position. They belong to the most lamentable victims of the battle of life.

The man, on the contrary, who hopes to win fame with the pen can for a very long time, perhaps forever, waste his strength and his time without being forced to the admission that he has failed to find the proper way. In order to create an immortal masterpiece, all that is required is some paper, ink, and a pen. This represents a starting capital of say ten cents. So much even the poor street arab can find. It is true that to the writing material something must be added—Genius. But this the ambitious youth believes he possesses. He therefore sits down and writes. The work will probably turn out to his satisfaction; for the less talent a man has, the more mild is his judgment of his efforts. Who is to open his eyes to the worthlessness of his work? His friends, if he finds them ready to listen to, or read, his elucubrations, will say to him, "That is trash." He will at once reply, "Pearls before swine." He will find no publisher. This only will depress him, but will not open his eyes, as he will mentally enumerate all the anecdotes of masterworks which were refused with contempt by a dozen publishers, until the thirteenth printed it reluctantly, thereby acquiring fame and fortune.

Let us assume the book is not so very bad, only mediocre; it is printed and comes on the market. The critics silence it to death—"Naturally, the conspiracy of silence!" The critic gives it a notice and says frankly that it would have been better left unwritten, without any loss to anybody and with distinct advantage to the author and publisher—"The critics are asses." The public refuses to buy the book—"They are fools; they are not ripe for my art or my wisdom." Thus can an author go for a whole lifetime, from failure to failure, without comprehending that the cause lies in himself. His self-consciousness resists every attack like an adamantine rock. He is clothed in armor, impenetrable to reality, by his illusions. He will die in the conviction that he was an unrecognized genius, and that posterity will accord to him the justice that was refused to him by the blindness of his contemporaries.

The number of these unhappy people is counted in the world by the hundreds of thousands. Their useless life work represents a waste of energy of the worst kind. Had they no ambition, they would probably be of economic and moral value for themselves and the community. Had they not this passion for fame, they would probably in every walk of life meet with that moderate success which spells happiness. Whoever should find a means to convince this army of deluded dreamers that in the struggle in which they have engaged victory is a rare exception, and when it is really achieved has only an imaginary value, would be one of the greatest benefactors of mankind.

IV

Literary ambition has one side to which I would like to draw special attention. It not only requires but the smallest capital, it seems also to impose the smallest measure of discipline. Any other work seems more jealous and tyrannical than literary work. I have already said that for a masterpiece of literature a sheet of paper, a pen, and some ink suffices. This paper one can write upon at any time and in any place, in the garret or on the bench in the public promenade, by day or by night. The temptation is great to regard literary occupation as something that one can carry on as a by-occupation, in the pauses of work, in the night hours, on Sundays and holidays. How many young people get the idea of trying literature because the attempt costs nothing. It is so inviting to gamble for fame without the game requiring any stake. Every other occupation in which one hopes to achieve success demands peremptorily the whole man. One must devote body and soul to it, give up to every minute of one's time and every thought of one's brain. Did it ever occur to any one to found a great Trust in his leisure moments, or to stand, by way of an amateur sport, for a post as senator or governor? Everybody knows he can do nothing else when he does this, and if he is not rich and does not soon achieve success, he will speedily enough abandon an occupation which brings nothing in and hinders him earning his living by more remunerative work.

Literature, on the contrary, seems suitable for a by-occupation; it seems an excellent plan for the utilization of time-offals. It brings the apprentice, the beginner, no return, but it also costs him nothing. It generously permits the poor man, who has nothing but his time, his ambitions, and his hopes, to earn the indispensable by some prosaic work, and to content himself with such spare time as he can find after the paid labor. It is a tempting thought for an impecunious but energetic youth that want of means is not a hindrance to the achieving of literary fame. He proudly proclaims, "I work by day to earn my bread, and by night to win fame."

The formula is, however, a delusion. The sooner he gives it up, the better it will be for him who has selected it as his rule of life. The most ordinary common sense should teach everybody that it is quite hopeless with half one's strength and during the hours of fatigue after a long day's work to try to win prizes in a career that is open to every one, which for that reason is the most crowded, and where the competition is the keenest and most pitiless that can be imagined. In a horse-race a difference of half a pound may be decisive for the victory. A sleepless night would deprive a Derby favorite of all chance. In every sporting competition the greatest care is taken that the competitors are in the very best form and not handicapped by any fatigue, any preoccupation, any indisposition. But the same young man who would never dream of competing for a championship in some athletic sport after a day's work for his daily bread, because he knows that it would be ridiculous to measure himself against a trained, fresh, professional competitor, if he is not himself in equally good condition, will not hesitate under the same predisposition to take up the struggle for a literary prize.

A lady of society once asked Newton how he had made his famous discovery of the law of gravitation. Sir Isaac answered, "By constantly thinking of it, madam." That is, together with inborn talent, the secret of each intellectual achievement. The inspiration comes, perhaps, suddenly, though this is in no way proved, for it is likely, even probable, that the possible sudden irruption of an idea of genius into consciousness was preceded by a may-be long preparatory work below the threshold of consciousness, on which the usual occupation of the mind may have exercised great influence. But inspiration is not everything. In a literary work the working out is quite as important, and the elaboration, in order to be perfect, demands all the concentration of which one is capable, all attention, all freshness of brain; in short, according to Sir Isaac Newton's formula, "constant thinking of it."

It is imaginable that a man who by day earns his bread by any kind of work may devote, with good results, a portion of his nights to acquiring education. Even this double activity of course is harmful to health, but if it does not last too long and is not too recklessly overdone, it need not necessarily destroy it. The memory retains what it can. If a man is too fatigued by his day's work or too preoccupied, he will not profit by night study. One must linger longer over a page of a book; it requires months to learn things which one with a fresh, well-concentrated, well-rested brain would acquire in weeks or days. The goal will be later and more painfully reached, but it can be reached, and, once one possesses the knowledge, no one can perceive that it was acquired in hours which should have been devoted to sleep.

There are enough examples of successful men who work for their daily bread by day and study by night. George Smith, born in 1840, was an engraver who earned 48s. a week. He had to engrave the plates for Sir Henry Rawlinson's great work on Assyriology. This work interested him. He had the daring idea of studying the Assyrian language and cuneiform writing. He did this in the night and in his leisure moments with superhuman application, and with the result that after two years' work, at the age of twenty-six, he was appointed to a position in the Assyrian Department of the British Museum, and soon after became world-famous as the discoverer and decipherer of the cuneiform version of the biblical story of the Flood.

He died of the plague at Aleppo, when only thirty-six years old.

Another and not less characteristic case is that of Michael Faraday. This great scientist, who lived from 1791 to 1867, was at twenty-two years old a poor ignorant bookbinder, who earned perhaps 30s. a week. He had a consuming thirst for knowledge and no means of stilling it. He greedily devoured the books given him to bind, acquired bit by bit some elements of knowledge, and obtained, by means of it, admission to a physical laboratory, where his genius could freely develop itself.

Similar, only reversed, is the case of the celebrated Professor of Clinical Medicine in the Paris Faculty, J. Jaccoud. In addition to his gift for medicine he had a pretty talent for the violin. He obtained a place in an orchestra, played half the night in the theatres and at balls, earned in this fashion perhaps 200 francs a month, and was able to study medicine by day.

It is, however, one thing to learn, something different to create. The memory still continues to serve after a long, trying day's work; the creative force of the imagination cannot then possibly be at its height. With a tired brain one learns more slowly, but one learns; one creates not slower, but weaker, worse, or not at all. It does not alter the quality of knowledge that one acquired it under peculiar difficulties; the quality of a literary work is incurably deteriorated by being conceived and carried out by an exhausted brain. I have been able to give examples of scientists who worked by day for bread and by night for knowledge, and it would be easy to add to these other similar cases. I know, however, no single example where a man after the daily work for bread has produced in the night hours a work which achieved fame.

This affirmation needs being qualified on one point only. Short lyrical poems could, under such circumstances, as a matter of exception, be successfully composed, because in this case the inspiration is everything, and the elaboration demands less material work than a novel, a drama, or a great essay. The few men who, by amateur work in the night after their professional work by day, have acquired fame in literature are all lyric poets. I may name the New York Ghetto-poet Morris Rosenfeld, who by day worried himself as tailor in a sweating-shop for a pittance, and at night composed songs in Jewish jargon of deep emotion, which endeared him to all who understand this jargon. Johanna Ambrosius, a simple East Prussian peasant woman, looked after her household, did her duty as wife and mother of a numerous family, and made use of her rare hours of leisure to write poems. Her verses had on their publication great success. It is true that this is to be ascribed more to a sentimental interest in the fate of the poetess than to the value of the poems themselves.

Other examples which one might cite prove nothing. Hans Sachs was a famous poet without ceasing to be a shoemaker. But then, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, a handicraft had, according to the German saying, "a golden bottom," and Hans Sachs was sufficiently well-to-do to have as much time to spare for writing poetry as he desired. John Bunyan first began to write when he had laid aside the tinker's tools and lived by his preaching. *The Pilgrim's Progress* is the work of a man who, while he was writing his book, thought of nothing else. Robert Burns had, as a farmer, spare time in the winter months, apart from the fact that a lyrical genius can compose a short song while he is driving the plough. The barber Jasmin (1798–1864), the well-known Provençal poet, really handled the razor, scissors, and comb less than the pen, and it was shrewd *coquetterie* on his part that he still kept his barber's shop when, in fact, he was nothing else but a professional writer.

It is not the night work of itself that is incompatible with good literary work. Schiller, when he was in full swing, wrote the whole night through in spite of the great harm it did his health, and Lord Byron preferred to compose at night in company with a bottle of brandy. But these men had no different day occupation to distract them. They had no other idea in their heads, day and night, but their work.

Only by means of this complete concentration is success possible. Good literary work suffers no other occupation beside it. Whoever is so poor that he must earn his bread by subaltern labor will seek in vain to pursue fame in the night hours. He will not achieve celebrity, but will certainly endanger his health and shorten his life.

In every other field overwork only harms the worker. In the field of literature it harms the work. In ancient time it was already a reproach when a critic remarked that a book smelt of the oil of the midnight lamp. When to the smell of that oil is added that of the sweat of a heterogeneous day-worker, the book will be completely unpalatable.

XIV

OUR PAST

"THE LESSON OF THE PAST"

BY

MAURICE MAETERLINCK

THE materialist, as represented by Nordau, looks to the material, and life seems shallow. The idealist sees in it a deeper meaning and a greater worth. Maurice Maeterlinck, the well-known Belgian writer, has been called a mystic, and the word has led some over-busy folk to dismiss him from mind as an idle dreamer; yet he is held by many critics to be the most valuable of living philosophers. It has been said of him that he bids fair to increase "the world's permanent stock of wisdom." There have been few men in any one century for whom this high claim could be made.

Let us then approach with Maeterlinck the heights of meditation. Here is no scientific measuring of material things, but an attempt to grasp the meaning of things immeasurable, to readjust our ways of thinking and our entire plane of thought. What is said here is true. It is more than true, it is divinely inspiring, encouraging, and resurrecting. It is such a word as the prophets gave to man. To dismiss it with an idle, scurried reading, such as one gives the latest novel, is a folly that reacts upon the reader. To meditate and ponder well upon its thought may mean a revolution in a gloomy life, a reformation in a wasted one.

I

OUR past stretches behind us in long perspective. It slumbers on the far horizon like a deserted city shrouded in mist. A few peaks mark its boundary, and soar predominant into the air; a few important acts stand out, like towers, some with the light still upon them, others half ruined and slowly decaying beneath the weight of oblivion. The trees are bare, the walls crumble, and shadow slowly steals over all. Everything seems to be dead there, and rigid, save only when memory, slowly decomposing, lights it for an instant with an illusory gleam. But apart from this animation, derived only from our expiring recollections, all would appear to be definitely motionless, immutable forever; divided from present and future by a river that shall not again be crossed.

In reality it is alive; and, for many of us, endowed with a profounder, more ardent life than either present or future. In reality this dead city is often the hotbed of our existence: and in accordance with the spirit in which men return to it shall some find all their wealth there, and others lose what they have.

II

Our conception of the past has much in common with our conception of love and happiness, destiny, justice, and most of the vague but therefore not less potent spiritual organisms that stand for the mighty forces we obey. Our ideas have been handed down to us ready-made by our predecessors; and even when our second cousciousness wakes, and, proud in its conviction that henceforth nothing shall be accepted blindly, proceeds most carefully to investigate these ideas, it will squander its time questioning those that loudly protest their right to be heard, and pay no heed to the others close by, that as yet, perhaps, have said nothing. Nor have we, as a rule, far to go to discover these others. They are in us and of us: they wait for us to address them. They are not idle, notwithstanding their silence. Amid the noise and babble of the crowd, they are tranquilly directing a portion of our real life; and as they are nearer the truth than their self-satisfied sisters, they will often be far more simple, and far more beautiful too.

III

Among the most stubborn of these ready-made ideas are those that preside over our conception of the past, and render it a force as imposing and rigid as destiny; a force that indeed becomes destiny working backward, with its hand outstretched to the destiny that burrows ahead, to which it transmits the last link of our chains. The one thrusts us back, the other urges us forward, with a like irresistible violence. But the violence of the past is perhaps more terrible, and more alarming. One may disbelieve in destiny. It is a god whose onslaught many have never experienced. But no one would dream of denying the oppressiveness of the past. Sooner or later its effect must inevitably be felt. Those even who refuse to admit the intangible, will credit the past, which their finger can touch, with all the mystery, the influence, the sovereign intervention whereof they have stripped the powers that they have dethroned; thus rendering it the almost unique and therefore more dreadful god of their depopulated Olympus.

IV

The force of the past is indeed one of the heaviest that weigh upon men and incline them to sadness. And yet there is none more docile, more eager to follow the direction we could so readily give, did we but know how best to avail ourselves of this docility. In reality, if we think of it, the past belongs to us quite as much as the present, and is far more malleable than the future. Like the present, and to a much greater extent than the future, its exsistence is all in our thoughts and our hand controls it; nor is this only true of our material past, wherein there are ruins that we perhaps can restore; it is true also of the regions that are closed to our tardy desire for atonement, it is true above all of our moral past, and of what we consider to be most irreparable there.

V

"The past is past," we say, and it is false: the past is always present. "We have to bear the burden of our past," we sigh; and it is false; the past bears our burden. "Nothing can wipe out the past"; and it is false: the least effort of will sends present and future travelling over the past, to efface whatever we bid them efface. "The indestructible, irreparable, immutable past!" And that is no truer than the rest. In those who speak thus it is the present that is immutable, and knows not how to repair. "My past is wicked, it is sorrowful, empty," we say again: "As I look back I can see no moment of beauty, of happiness, or love: I see nothing but wretched ruins. . . ." And that is false; for you see precisely what you yourself place there at the moment your eyes rest upon it.

VI

Our past depends entirely upon our present, and is constantly changing with it. Our past is contained in our memory, and this memory of ours, that feeds on our heart and brain, and is incessantly swayed by them, is the most variable being in the world, the least independent, the most impressionable. Our chief concern with the past, that which truly remains and forms part of us, is not what we have done or the adventures that we have met with, but the moral reactions bygone events are producing within us at this very moment, the inward being that they have helped to form; and these reactions, whence there arises our sovereign, intimate being, are wholly governed by the manner in which we regard past events, and vary as the moral substance varies that they encounter within us. But with every step in advance that our feelings or intellect takes will come a change in this moral substance, and then, on the instant, the most immutable facts, that seemed to be graven forever on the stone and bronze of the past, will assume an entirely different aspect, will return to life and leap into movement, bringing us vaster and more courageous counsels, dragging memory aloft with them in their ascent; and what was once a mass of ruin, mouldering in the darkness, becomes a populous city whereon the sun shines again.

VII

We have an arbitrary fashion of establishing a certain number of events behind us. We relegate them to the horizon of our memory, and having set them there we tell ourselves that they form part of a world in which the united efforts of all mankind could not wipe away a tear or cause a flower to raise its head. And yet, while admitting that these events have passed beyond our control, we still, with the most curious inconsistency, believe that they have full control over us. Whereas the truth is that they can only act upon us to the extent in which we have renounced our right to act upon them. The past asserts itself only in those whose moral growth has ceased; then, and not till then, does it truly become redoubtable. From that moment we have indeed the irreparable behind us and the weight of what we have done lies heavy upon our shoulders. But so long as the life of our mind and character flows uninterruptedly on, so long will the past remain in suspense above us; and, as the glance may be that we send toward it, will it, complaisant as the clouds Hamlet showed to Polonius, adopt the shape of the hope or fear, the peace or disquiet, that we are perfecting within us.

VIII

No sooner has our moral activity weakened than accomplished events rush forward and assail us; and woe to him who opens the door and permits them to take possession of his hearth! Each one will vie with the other in overwhelming him with the gifts best calculated to shatter his courage. It matters not whether our past has been happy and noble, or lugubrious and criminal, the danger shall be no less if we permit it to enter, not as an invited guest, but like a parasite settling upon us. The result will be either sterile regret or impotent remorse, and remorse and regrets of this kind are equally disastrous. In order to draw from the past what is precious within it—and most of our wealth is there—we must go to it at the hour when we are strongest, most conscious of mastery; enter its domain and make choice there of what we require, discarding the rest, and commanding it never to cross our threshold without our order. Like all things that only can live at the cost of our spiritual strength, it will soon learn to obey. At first, perhaps, it will endeavor to resist. It will have recourse to artifice and prayer. It will try to tempt us, to cajole. It will drag forward frustrated hopes and joys that are gone forever, broken affections, well-merited reproaches, expiring hatred and love that is dead, squandered faith and perished beauty; it will thrust before us all that once had been the marvellous essence of our ardor for life; it will point to the beckoning sorrows, decaying happiness, that now haunt the ruin. But we shall pass by without turning our head; our hand shall scatter the crowd of memories, even as the sage Ulysses, in the Cimmerian night, with his sword prevented the shades—even that of his mother, whom it was not his mission to question—from approaching the black blood that would for an instant have given them life and speech. We shall go straight to the joy, the regret or remorse, whose counsel we need; or to the act of injustice it behooves us scrupulously to examine, in order either to make reparation, if such still be possible, or that the sight of the wrong we did, whose victims have ceased to be, is required to give us the indispensable force that shall lift us above the injustice it still lies in us to commit.

IX

Yes, even though our past contain crimes that now are beyond the reach of our best endeavors, even then, if we consider the circumstances of time and place and the vast plane of each human existence, these crimes fade out of our life the moment we feel that no temptation, no power on earth, could ever induce us to commit the like again. The world has not forgiven—there is but little that the external sphere will forget or forgive—and their material effects will continue, for the laws of cause and effect are different from those which govern our consciousness. At the tribunal of our personal justice, however—the only tribunal which has decisive action on our inaccessible life, as it is the only one whose decrees we cannot evade, whose concrete judgments stir us to our very marrow—the evil action that we regard from a loftier plane than that at which it was committed, becomes an action that no longer exists for us save in so far as it may serve in the future to render our fall more difficult; nor has it the right to lift its head again except at the moment when we incline once more toward the abyss it guards.

Bitter, surely, must be the grief of him in whose past there are acts of injustice whereof every avenue now is closed, who is no longer able to seek out his victims and raise them and comfort them. To have abused one's strength in order to despoil some feeble creature who has definitely succumbed beneath the blow, to have callously thrust suffering upon a loving heart, or merely misunderstood and passed by a touching affection that offered itself—these things must of necessity weigh heavily upon our life, and induce a sorrow within us that shall not readily be forgotten. But it depends on the actual point our consciousness has attained whether our entire moral destiny shall be depressed or lifted beneath this burden. Our actions rarely die; and many unjust deeds of ours will therefore inevitably return to life some day to claim their due and start legitimate reprisals. They will find our external life without defence; but before they can reach the inward being at the centre of that life they must first listen to the judgment we have already passed on ourselves; and in accordance with the nature of that judgment will the attitude be of these mysterious envoys, who have come from the depths where cause and effect are established in eternal equilibrium. If it has indeed been from the heights of our newly acquired consciousness that we have questioned ourselves, and condemned, they will not be menacing justiciaries whom we shall suddenly see surging in from all sides, but benevolent visitors, friends we have almost expected; and they will draw near us in silence. They know in advance that the man before them is no longer the guilty creature they sought; and instead of coming to us charged with ideas of hatred, revolt, and despair, with punishments that degrade and kill, they will flood our heart with thought and contrition that ennoble, purify, and console.

X

The manner in which we are able to recall what we have done or suffered is far more important than our actual sufferings or deeds. This is one of the many features—all governed by the amount of confidence and zeal we possess—that distinguish the man who is happy and strong from him who weeps and will not be comforted. No past, viewed by itself, can seem happy; and the privileged of fate, who reflect on what remains of the happy years that have flown, have perhaps more reason for sorrow than the unfortunate ones who brood over the dregs of a life of wretchedness. Whatever was one day, and now is no longer, makes for sadness; above all, whatever was very happy and very beautiful. The object of our regrets—whether these revolve around what has been or what might have been—is therefore more or less the same for all men, and their sorrow should be the same. It is not, however; in one case it will reign uninterruptedly, whereas in another it will only appear at very long intervals. It must therefore depend on things other than accomplished facts. It depends on the manner in which men will act on these facts. The conquerors in this world—those who waste no time setting up an imaginary irreparable and immutable athwart their horizon, those who seem to be born afresh every morning in the world that forever awakes anew to the future—these know instinctively that what appears to exist no longer is still existing intact, that what appeared to be ended is only completing itself. They know that the years time has taken from them are still in travail; under their new master, obeying the old. They know that their past is forever in movement; that the yesterday which was despondent, decrepit, and criminal, will return full of joyousness, innocence, youth in the track of to-morrow. They know that their image is not yet stamped on the days that are gone: that a decisive deed, or thought, will suffice to break down the whole edifice; that however remote or vast the shadow may be that stretches behind them, they have only to put forth a gesture of gladness or hope for the shadow at once to copy this gesture, and, flashing it back to the remotest, tiniest ruins of early childhood even, to extract unexpected treasure from all this wreckage. They know that they have retrospective action on all bygone deeds; and that the dead themselves will annul their verdicts in order to judge afresh a past that to-day has transfigured and endowed with new life.

They are fortunate who find this instinct in the folds of their cradle. But may the others not imitate it who have it not; and is not human wisdom charged to teach us how we may acouire the salutary instincts that nature has withheld?

XI

Let us not lull ourselves to sleep in our past: and if we find that it tends to spread like a vault over our life, instead of incessantly changing beneath our eye: if the present grow into the habit of visiting it, not like a good workman repairing thither to execute the labors imposed upon him by the commands of to-day, but as a too passive, too credulous pilgrim content idly to contemplate beautiful, motionless ruins—then, the more glorious, the happier, that our past may have been, with all the more suspicion should it be regarded by us.

Nor should we yield to the instinct that bids us accord it profound respect, if this respect induce the fear in us that we may disturb its nice equilibrium. Better the ordinary past, content with its befitting place in the shadow, than the sumptuous past which claims to govern what has travelled out of its reach. Better a mediocre, but living, present, which acts as though it were alone in the world, than a present which proudly expires in the chains of a marvellous long ago. A single step that we take at this hour toward an uncertain goal is far more important to us than the thousand leagues we covered in our march toward a dazzling triumph in the days that were. Our past had no other mission than to lift us to the moment at which we are, and there equip us with the needful experience and weapons, the needful thought and gladness. If, at this precise moment, it take from us and divert to itself one particle of our energy, then, however glorious it may have been, it still was useless, and had better never have been. If we allow it to arrest a gesture that we were about to make, then is our death beginning; and the edifices of the future will suddenly take the semblance of tombs.

More dangerous still than the past of happiness and glory is the one inhabited by overpowering and too dearly cherished phantoms. Many an existence perishes in the coils of a fond recollection. And yet, were the dead to return to this earth, they would say, I fancy, with the wisdom that must be theirs who have seen what the ephemeral light still hides from us: "Dry your eyes. There comes to us no comfort from your tears; exhausting you, they exhaust us also. Detach yourself from us, banish us from your thoughts, until such time as you can think of us without strewing tears on the life we still live in you. We endure only in your recollection; but you err in believing that your regrets alone can touch us. It is the things you do that prove to us we are not forgotten and rejoice our manes: and this without your knowing it, without any necessity that you should turn toward us. Each time that our pale image saddens your ardor, we feel ourselves die anew, and it is a more perceptible, irrevocable death than was our other; bending too often over our tombs, you rob us of the life, the courage and love, that you imagine you restore.

"It is in you that we are: it is in all your life that our life resides; and as you become greater, even while forgetting us, so do we become greater too, and our shades draw the deep breath of prisoners whose prison door is flung open.

"If there be anything new we have learned in the world where we are, it is, first of all, that the good we did to you when we were, like yourselves, on the earth, does not balance the evil wrought by a memory which saps the force and the confidence of life."

XII

Above all, let us envy the past of no man. Our own past was created by ourselves, and for ourselves alone. No other could have suited us, no other could have taught us the truth that it alone can teach, or given the strength that it alone can give. And whether it be good or bad, sombre or radiant, it still remains a collection of unique masterpieces the value of which is known to none but ourselves; and no foreign masterpiece could equal the action we have accomplished, the kiss we received, the thing of beauty that moved us so deeply, the suffering we underwent, the anguish that held us enchained, the love that wreathed us in smiles or in tears. Our past is ourselves, what we are and shall be; and upon this unknown sphere there moves no creature, from the happiest down to the most unfortunate, who could foretell how great a loss would be his could he substitute the trace of another for the trace which he himself must leave in life. Our past is our secret promulgated by the voice of years: it is the most mysterious image of our being, over which Time keeps watch. The image is not dead: a mere nothing degrades or adorns it: it can still grow bright or sombre, can still smile or weep, express love or hatred; and yet it remains recognizable forever in the midst of the myriad images that surround it. It stands for what we once were, as our aspirations and hopes stand for what we shall be; and the two faces blend that they may teach us what we are.

Let us not envy the facts of the past, but rather the spiritual garment that the recollection of days long gone will weave around the sage. And though this garment be woven of joy or of sorrow, though it be drawn from the dearth of events or from their abundance, it shall still be equally precious; and those who may see it shining over a life shall not be able to tell whether its quickening jewels and stars were found amid the grudging cinders of a cabin or upon the steps of a palace.

No past can be empty or squalid, no events can be wretched; the wretchedness lies in our manner of welcoming them. And if it were true that nothing had happened to you, that would be the most astounding adventure that any man ever had met with; and no less remarkable would be the light it would shed upon you. In reality the facts, the opportunities and possibilities, the passions, that await and invite the majority of men, are all more or less the same. Some may be more dazzling than others; their attendant circumstances may differ, but they differ far less than the inward reactions that follow; and the insignificant, incomplete event that falls on a fertile heart and brain will readily attain the moral proportions and grandeur of an analogous incident which, on another plane, will convulse a whole people.

He who should see, spread out before him, the past lives of a multitude of men, could not easily decide which past he himself would wish to have lived, were he not able at the same time to witness the moral results of these dissimilar and unsymmetrical facts. He might not impossibly make a fatal blunder: he might choose an existence overflowing with incomparable happiness and victory, that sparkle like wonderful jewels; while his glance might travel indifferently over a life that appeared to be empty, whereas it was truly steeped to the brim in serene emotions and lofty, redeeming thoughts, whereby, though the eye saw nothing, that life was yet rendered happy among all. For we are well aware that what destiny has given and what destiny holds in reserve can be revolutionized as utterly by thought as by great victory or great defeat. Thought is silent: it disturbs not a pebble on the illusory road we see; but at the crossway of the more actual road that our secret life follows will it tranquilly erect an indestructible pyramid; and thereupon, suddenly, every event, to the very phenomena of Earth and Heaven, will assume a new direction.

In Siegfried's life it is not the moment when he forges the prodigious sword that he is most important, or when he kills the dragon and compels the gods from his path, or even the dazzling second when he encounters love on the flaming mountain; but indeed the brief instant wrested from eternal decrees, the little childish gesture when one of his hands, red with the blood of his mysterious victim, having chanced to draw near his lips, his eyes and ears are suddenly opened: he understands the hidden language of all that surrounds him, detects the treachery of the dwarf who represents the powers of evil, and learns in a flash to do that which had to be done.

XV

ART

"THE WHAT AND THE HOW IN ART"[1]

BY

WILLIAM DEAN HOWELLS

IF art might be dismissed as a mere means of amusement, a source of relaxation to be the sport of leisure hours, it would have no place in our discussion here. But art, as the great artists have understood it, as the world is beginning to understand it, is not a pleasant playing with colors or with sounds or words; it is an effort to give the highest, truest expression to whatever is pure and fair within us. Looked at in this light, art becomes assuredly one of the important aspects of life. The one all-important aspect, it has seemed to some geniuses, a Beethoven, or a Michelangelo! And though most of us may refuse to go so far in our artistic devotion, yet it is evident that in seeking to understand modern life we must pause for a moment to examine into the meaning of art, its aims and hopes, and its relationship to life in general. It is this study which is here essayed by Mr. Howells, William Dean Howells, who has been aptly termed the dean of American letters, whose novels and whose critical works have won him the respect and admiration of all readers. The following essay, previously published by Messrs. Harper & Brothers in their volume "Literature and Life," is here reproduced by consent of the publishers and with the special permission of Mr. Howells. It is accompanied by an address from M. de Maulde, the well-known French critic, in which he discusses the use of art in daily and especially in feminine life, the aims and means of art and woman being made clear as a Frenchman sees them.

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ART

One of the things always enforcing itself upon the consciousness of the artist in any sort is the fact that those whom artists work for rarely care for their work artistically. They care for it morally, personally, partially. I suspect that criticism itself has rather a muddled preference for the what over the how, and that it is always haunted by a philistine question of the material when it should, æsthetically speaking, be concerned solely with the form.

I

The other night at the theatre I was witness of a curious and amusing illustration of my point. They were playing a most soul-filling melodrama, of the sort which gives you assurance from the very first that there will be no trouble in the end, but everything will come out just as it should, no matter what obstacles oppose themselves in the course of the action. An overruling Providence, long accustomed to the exigencies of the stage, could not fail to intervene at the critical moment in behalf of innocence and virtue, and the spectator never had the least occasion for anxiety. Not unnaturally there was a black-hearted villain in the piece; so very black-hearted that he seemed not to have a single good impulse from first to last. Yet he was, in the keeping of the stage Providence, as harmless as a blank cartridge, in spite of his deadly aims. He accomplished no more mischief, in fact, than if all his intents had been of the best; except for the satisfaction afforded by the edifying spectacle of his defeat and shame, he need not have been in the play at all; and one might almost have felt sorry for him, he was so continually baffled. But this was not enough for the audience, or for that part of it which filled the gallery to the roof. Perhaps he was such an uncommonly black-hearted villain, so very, very cold-blooded in his wickedness that the justice unsparingly dealt out to him by the dramatist could not suffice. At any rate, the gallery took such a vivid interest in his punishment that it had out the actor who impersonated the wretch between all the acts, and hissed him throughout his deliberate passage across the stage before the curtain. The hisses were not at all for the actor, but altogether for the character. The performance was fairly good, quite as good as the performance of any virtuous part in the piece, and easily up to the level of other villanous performances (I never find much nature in them, perhaps because there is not much nature in villany itself; that is, villany pure and simple); but the mere conception of the wickedness this bad man had attempted was too much for an audience of the average popular goodness. It was only after he had taken poison, and fallen dead before their eyes, that the spectators forbore to visit him with a lively proof of their abhorrence; apparently they did not care to "give him a realizing sense that there was a punishment after death," as the man in Lincoln's story did with the dead dog.

II

The whole affair was very amusing at first, but it has since put me upon thinking (I like to be put upon thinking; the eighteenth-century essayists were) that the attitude of the audience towards this deplorable reprobate is really the attitude of most readers of books, lookers at pictures and statues, listeners to music, and so on through the whole list of the arts. It is absolutely different from the artist's attitude, from the connoisseur's attitude; it is quite irreconcilable with their attitude, and yet I wonder if in the end it is not what the artist works for. Art is not produced for artists, or even for connoisseurs; it is produced for the general, who can never view it otherwise than morally, personally, partially, from their associations and preconceptions.

Whether the effect with the general is what the artist works for or not, he does not succeed without it. Their brute liking or misliking is the final test; it is universal suffrage that elects, after all. Only, in some cases of this sort, the polls do not close at four o'clock on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November, but remain open forever, and the voting goes on. Still, even the first day's canvass is important, or at least significant. It will not do for the artist to electioneer, but if he is beaten he ought to ponder the causes of his defeat, and question how he has failed to touch the chord of universal interest. He is in the world to make beauty and truth evident to his fellow-men, who are as a rule incredibly stupid and ignorant of both, but whose judgment he must nevertheless not despise. If he can make something that they will cheer, or something that they will hiss, he may not have done any great thing, but if he has made something that they will neither cheer nor hiss, he may well have his misgivings, no matter how well, how finely, how truly he has done the thing.

This is very humiliating, but a tacit snub to one's artist-pride such as one gets from public silence is not a bad thing for one. Not long ago I was talking about pictures with a painter, a very great painter, to my thinking; one whose pieces give me the same feeling I have from reading poetry; and I was excusing myself to him with respect to art, and perhaps putting on a little more modesty than I felt. I said that I could enjoy pictures only on the literary side, and could get no answer from my soul to those excellences of handling and execution which seemed chiefly to interest painters. He replied that it was a confession of weakness in a painter if he appealed merely or mainly to technical knowledge in the spectator; that he narrowed his field and dwarfed his work by it; and that if he painted for painters merely, or for the connoisseurs of painting, he was denying his office, which was to say something clear and appreciable to all sorts of men in the terms of art. He even insisted that a picture ought to tell a story.

The difficulty in humbling one's self to this view of art is in the ease with which one may please the general by art which is no art. Neither the play nor the playing that I saw at the theatre when the actor was hissed for the wickedness of the villain he was personating was at all fine; and yet I perceived, on reflection, that they had achieved a supreme effect. If I may be so confidential, I will say that I should be very sorry to have written that piece; yet I should be very proud if, on the level I chose and with the quality I cared for, I could invent a villain that the populace would have out and hiss for his surpassing wickedness. In other words, I think it a thousand pities whenever an artist gets so far away from the general, so far within himself or a little circle of amateurs, that his highest and best work awakens no response in the multitude. I am afraid this is rather the danger of the arts among us, and how to escape it is not so very plain. It makes one sick and sorry often to see how cheaply the applause of the common people is won. It is not an infallible test of merit, but if it is wanting to any performance, we may be pretty sure it is not the greatest performance.

III

The paradox lies in wait here, as in most other human affairs, to confound us, and we try to baffle it, in this way and in that. We talk, for instance, of poetry for poets, and we fondly imagine that this is different from talking of cookery for cooks. Poetry is not made for poets; they have enough poetry of their own, but it is made for people who are not poets. If it does not please these, it may still be poetry, but it is poetry which has failed of its truest office. It is none the less its truest office because some very wretched verse seems often to do it.

The logic of such a fact is not that the poet should try to achieve this truest office of his art by means of doggerel, but that he should study how and where and why the beauty and the truth he has made manifest are wanting in universal interest, in human appeal. Leaving the drama out of the question, and the theatre, which seems now to be seeking only the favor of the dull rich, I believe that there never was a time or a race more open to the impressions of beauty and of truth than ours. The artist who feels their divine charm, and longs to impart it, has now and here a chance to impart it more widely than ever artist had in the world before. Of course, the means of reaching the widest range of humanity are the simple and the elementary, but there is no telling when the complex and the recondite may not universally please. The art is to make them plain to every one, for every one has them in him. Lowell used to say that Shakespeare was subtle, but in letters a foot high.

The painter, sculptor, or author who pleases the polite only has a success to be proud of as far as it goes, and to be ashamed of that it goes no further. He need not shrink from giving pleasure to the vulgar because bad art pleases them. It is part of his reason for being that he should please them, too; and if he does not it is a proof that he is wanting in force, however much he abounds in fineness. Who would not wish his picture to draw a crowd about it? Who would not wish his novel to sell five hundred thousand copies, for reasons besides the sordid love of gain which I am told governs novelists? One should not really wish it any the less because chromos and historical romances are popular.

Sometime, I believe, the artist and his public will draw nearer together in a mutual understanding, though perhaps not in our present conditions. I put that understanding off till the good time when life shall be more than living, more even than the question of getting a living; but in the mean time I think that the artist might very well study the springs of feeling in others; and if I were a dramatist I think I should quite humbly go to that play where they hiss the villain for his villany, and inquire how his wickedness had been made so appreciable, so vital, so personal. Not being a dramatist, I still cannot indulge the greatest contempt of that play and its public.

ART IN DAILY LIFE

BY

R. DE MAULDE

Many people think that life cannot be filled better than by whirl and excitement. Tell me frankly, does this lend charm to life? Life is what it is; why should we kill ourselves in painting its stucco? It would often be doing us a service were some one to show us the ridiculous side of a crowd of obligations and ambitions in which we consume ourselves, vainly. To do this thing or that because "everybody does it," to know everybody, to take the present time by the forelock, to think everybody's thoughts, to see what every one sees, to eat the fashionable kickshaws and suffer from the fashionable complaint, to reel under the prodigious exertion of doing nothing—truly a fine object in life, this: the life of a circus horse or a squirrel. The world will regard us with admiration maybe; but the physician before whom we presently collapse after our surfeit will treat us as degenerates.

He will tell us to quit Paris and fly to the sea or the mountains. Stuff! 'tis not the air of Paris that is unwholesome; what is unwholesome is its moral atmosphere. Still, I do find it a little hard to understand how a Parisian, constantly beset by risks so various, can reach manhood limb-whole, unmaimed. To be alive—that is the marvel.

And many persons, amid these futile activities, pass life by after all without touching it. Who they were is never known; you see only their gestures. In sooth, there must be many serious people among the clowns at the fair, judging by the number of clowns and fribbles among serious people.

Not a few of the grave men I happen to meet, lawyers, bankers, men of business, are not really men at all; they are merely lawyers, bankers, men of business. Is this happiness!

Mr. Rockefeller, the petroleum king, has fallen into a melancholy. Like Charles V., he desires to abdicate; but this dream is still to him a fresh source of trouble and sorrow, for he seeks a mortal of fit mould and temper to wield the sceptre in his stead, and, though he scours two hemispheres, this mortal is nowhere discoverable.

Will it astonish you, Madam, if I avouch that this rage of unrest has set its mark upon some of your sex? Would not you yourself think it a slight on your reputation if you were even suspected of being a stay-at-home? Conversation—writing,—what outworn, antiquated things! You fling out your words, your notes, in the style of a tradesman's list or a telegram; you are seen in the paddock or the polo-field, on charitable committees, in presidential chairs; since man is master, you think you are winning a place among the engulfing sex by adopting mannish modes wholesale.

The most charming of women will cut, at least, but a poor figure as a man; and I cannot, in truth, see what there is in the spectacle of the masculine hurly-burly to attract women who might well live in quietness. To be endlessly getting and spending, to turn all things to laughter and take nothing seriously, to be altogether insensible—oh, a fine philosophy! With all his wealth and titles and decorations, many a man comes to crawling on all-fours, and even finds exceeding comfort in his proneness, like the good soul who, being changed into a swine by the enchantress Circe, refused point-blank to resume his former features. But all our restless strivings represent in reality nothing but a varnish of egotism, wherefore we cannot desire a woman to take pleasure in them. Moreover, she would have to force her nature to attain an egotism so perfect. Such egotism is very rare among you, ladies; and often, after the loss of those you love has driven you within your last entrenchments, it happens that Death comes, rather than Forgetfulness.

Shall we at least find joy in the happiness of doing nothing?

I recognize that, for some women, there is a measure of practical wisdom in remaining idle. Unaccustomed to anything that can be called work, constrained often to periods of enforced idleness, they prefer to avoid all serious undertakings, last their activity prove mere bungling.

This attitude of mind is familiar also to many men, if they have an income however small, or merely the hope of espousing one. They tell themselves that work brings worry, breeds jealousy and envy: ignorance has its art—the art of shining inexpensively; and all you have to do for the decoration you covet is to unveil a statue in honor of some philosopher conneviently deceased. Meanwhile, it is so pleasant a sensation, so conducive to the peace and order of your country, to smoke your cigar without one thought, one desire, one aspiration!

So pleasant! But stay, my dear sir, let me deal fairly with you: you are always doing something, even though it be only smoking, hunting, reading the newspaper, emitting your political views, riding, eating, digesting. Only, these occupations are useless to your neighbors. It is very lucky, you will admit, that all men do not profess the same principles of ideal parasitism, for then who would give you to eat?

If we could but hug the assurance that wretchedness belongs of right to the poor, and glory to the rich, we might beseech the poor to batten on the odors exhaled from your kitchens. But no; uselessness seeks to foist itself as a mark of distinction; and vanity, often more ravenous than hunger, excites violent social strictures, especially among workmen of some intelligence, and sufficiently well off already to have an inkling of what luxury means.

Unhappily, our progress in material things serves only to develop this sense of luxury, by establishing on all sides contacts purely material. Money, and money alone, classifies the passengers on the railway; we all become mere parcels, some in wadding, others not. We are estimated by the weight of our money, though that is commonly a cause of moral feebleness, or at least of torpor. Will social happiness, any more than personal happiness, be found in this glorification of material indolence and the aristocracy of pleasure? It seems not, judging by the jealousy that devours our whole society, from top to bottom. There is endless talk of solidarity, fraternity; that is the court dress of the present day, as were formerly wigs and knee-breeches. But never was egotism so intolerant; never, consequently, was the tedium of life so grievous.

Men mightily deceive themselves by indulging all their life long the dream of an easy time—retirement from business, quiet days of fishing, and so on; seeking a path to this happiness by way of a life of inelastic limitations. Our life is either whirl or stagnation. To the women who do nothing, as well as to all these mechanical gentlemen, to those who are enamoured of the world, and to persons flourishing and waxing fat, may I present the woman of my dreams? She has formed the habit of living so actively on the joys and sorrows of others, she has sustained, encouraged, helped others so often, shared so many fears and hopes, seen so much of birth and death, lived so full of life, that beneath her blanching hair her heart finds it impossible to retire from the service. It grows and grows. Her activity, always fruitful, brings forth ever more and more. A clear proof that there must be a special secret.

II

Art has for its aim perfection, the augmentation of our sensibility to physical objects. Contact with the True and the Useful being often void of charm, whether because the Beautiful passes "out of range," as hunters say, or because the ugly presses upon us somewhat too closely, art consists in creating for one's self a nest, a little sanctuary, an environment that one can love, and in presenting to us by their softer sides the things with which contact is inevitable.

Therefore a woman's art consists in drawing from the most modest occupations a ray of beauty and of love; and the surest means of discovering such in those is to put it there.

A gross error of our time is an æsthetic error. The belief is current that there are things which are necessarily artistic, which make you an artist from head to heel as soon as you touch them, and other things which can never be artistic. People rush to the first, and eschew the others. They fancy themselves to be artists by the mere fact of their handling a chisel or a brush instead of a plough; a governess, be she ever such a goose, thinks herself a superior person. In reality there are some things to which art is applied, and other things to which it is not applied. The art of life consists in living steadily, without perturbations, in doing honestly that for which we were born, and in doing it with love.

I cannot forget, for example, the singular impression produced upon me, in a corner of the old hospital of Bruges, where Memlinc worked, by a group of Beguines scraping carrots, and murmuring their prayers the while. I was leaving the place with a band of tourists, my eyes filled with beauty, my heart haunted by the exquisite visions of Memlinc; these placid women, not one of whom raised her head at so commonplace an event as a stranger passing, wholly absorbed, as they were, in blending the love of God with the fulfilment of His laws, well reflected the sentiment of the painter, the living ray of grace. I seemed to see around them a glamour of art.

Take a woman who, from an entirely different point of view, showed the same instinct for finding loveliness in common things—the celebrated Madame Roland.

"The drying of her grapes and plums, the garnering of her nuts and apples, the due preparation of her dried pears, her broods of hens, her litters of rabbits, her frothing lye, the mending of her linen, the ranging of her napery in its lofty presses—all these were objects of her personal, unstinted, unremitting care, and gave her pleasure. She was present at the village merrymakings and took her place among the dancers on the green. The country people from miles around sought her aid for sick friends whom the doctors had given up. She ranged the fields on foot and horseback to collect simples, to enrich her herbarium, to complete her collections, and would pause in delight before tufts of violets bordering the hedgerows bursting with the first buds of spring, or before the ruddy vine-clusters tremulous in the autumn breeze; for her, everything in meadow and wood had voices, everything a smile."[1]

When a woman has armed herself with this special force of beauty, she has done much. It only remains for her to nourish and propagate it; her life is a permanent work of art; around her an atmosphere is naturally created in which all things solicit and give play to our noblest sentiments. Ah! this art is no chimera, no vain or useless thing; it is the very nursery of life. Even in a cottage it smiles upon the wayfarer, offering flowers to his view, teaching him the graciousness and the necessity of joy. M. Guyau defines the artist as "he who, simple even in his profound accomplishment, preserves in the gaze of the world a certain freshness of heart, and (so to say) a perpetual novelty of sensation." That is the impression that a woman should produce around her, and no tremendous exertion is needed, since the first rule is frankness and simplicity. Luxury tends to be hurtful. It is useless to go far afield, to ferret out recondite styles, to complicate, to love the affected, the rare, the eccentric, the languid. Let the house be a living and well-ordered place, where the accessory does not take precedence of the essential, where every object has its own place and its specific character. Breathe into all things a sentiment of unity, and also, as far as possible, of spaciousness and comfort.

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[1] O. Gréard.

In the country, respect the ancient dwelling, even though a little dilapidated—the old walls, the old furniture, the old avenue, the old church. Try to feel in presence of a living personality. A house is a book in stone, and, if you will, you may give to everything a soul, even to stones. Allow your own life freely to enter and pervade this ancient home. Irregularities in structure, recent additions, are all cries of existence. Something of your own soul thus cleaves to all these walls. Is it not true that the architect of a building, the painter of a fresco, the carver of an arabesque, have left upon their work some fragments of their souls? Their thoughts hover about the walls. The voice of a singer causes the composer's soul to live again in us; the painter, the sculptor, speak to us, serve us as mentors. I also, in these pages, shall leave some fragments of my soul, with the hope that in the shadow of my thought some one perchance may pray and love.

III

Rich or poor, do not crowd your walls; set on them merely a living and friendly note, something that is a final revelation of yourself, an element of life—a pretty water-color, a fine engraving. Is not this a thousand times better than a vulgar glitter, or even than tapestries? It is you, your thought, that you must stamp on these walls! Thereby you extend and fortify your personal action. What recks it me whether I find this or that object in your drawing-room? Am I stepping into a photographer's studio, or into a museum? It is you that I want to see. And, to tell the truth, I do not think it very delightful to see above your head your own portrait, the portraits of your husband and children. The end of portraiture is to replace the absent; besides, the painter or engraver strikes me too forcibly as interposing between you and me, and as indicating almost brutally how I am to understand you. What would happen, I wonder, if I should admire the imitation more than the original?

I would rather divine you, come to know you, in my own fashion, as the secret unity among your belongings grows upon me. If the visitor on entering perceives no discordant element; if his eye, wandering presently towards the chimney-piece or some other salient point, rests on a beautiful head enhaloed, as it were, with Christian sentiment and ideals, or on a beautiful Greek statue, calm, dignified, in no wise labored or strained, natural in pose and expression; at once he is at ease, his confidence is already won.

Presently his glance will range afield; he will perceive some fine early Italian master, adorable in its artlessness, crowded with ardent ideas, and fragrant with noble aspirations; or if you are touched with the unrest of life, if needs you must plumb the mysterious and the unknown, you will have made room for some Vincian vision; or maybe for the clever and superficial gayeties of the French school, or the admirable warmth and freedom of some of our landscape painters.

Many people indulge a taste for small canvases, because these will hang anywhere, go with anything, form part of the furniture, and suggest no manner of problem—cowsheds to wit, scoured miraculously clean, interiors all spick and span, kettles athrob, alive; or watery meadow-lands, with gray trees and gray water, and clouds fretted, or far stretched-out, or close-packed, or flocculent. These do not tire the brain, they offend no one, except that, from the house-decorator's point of view, they are often of too superior a workmanship.

Rembrandt is the divinity of shade, the antipodes of the Italian expansiveness. In an impenetrable cloud he dints a spot of gold, which proves to be a drunkard, a beggar, a melancholy wight, a rotund Boniface, a needy soul, or a Jew from Amsterdam or Batignolles; or possibly himself.

There are also the Gargantuesque old Flemish masters, with their phenomenal processions, their banquets open to the world, bubbling over with gayety and life.

It seems to me that in matters of art one should say *Raca!*

to nothing; every æsthetic impression has some use. And I really do not see the utility of a dispute like that which has been wrangled over for ages, about the relative importance of form and substance. Certainly there are features that are accidental, and others that are essential; you will choose according to your taste. The arts of design have no title to govern your soul; it is your part to govern and make use of them. Do you prefer to invoke an image, or a thought? Do you wish to surround yourself with the brutalities of so-called Truth, or with suggestions, forms which efface themselves in the interests of impressions or ideas? Do you love beauty of form, exact outlines, well-defined contours, or a broad effect, a surface whose lines are lost in the ambient shade? These are questions for yourself to answer. Good tools are those which suit you best. It is not the mission of painter or sculptor to reproduce a scene with mathematical precision; a photographer would do this better; the artist's part is to be of service to you, to furnish you with the elements of the art of life. Indeed, it is the distinguishing mark of the artist that he singles out and segregates, in a crowd, in a landscape, the one choice object; upon this he fastens, he is alive to all its manifold nuances, and the charm is so great that around this object he sees nought but gloom.

The æsthetic object does you the delightful service of supplementing your own visions, and of compassing you about with ideas. You do not inquire what it is, but what it expresses; the cleverest of still-life pictures, like those to be seen in Italian houses, would give you but a very superficial pleasure. You need support, not illusions; this marble, as no one knows better than yourself, is marble; but it speaks to you.

Only, the message of art needs to be properly directed. To catch its accents, or to make them heard, one must impart to it something of one's own. How wonderfully the meaning of things, even their most precise intellectual meaning, varies for us, day by day, through distraction or a change of mood! If our mind wanders when we read a book, the loveliest thoughts glide over us as though over marble. A lady who had been stirred to enthusiasm by a somewhat mediocre book wrote asking me to recommend another which would produce the same effect. I told her first to fill herself with the same enthusiasm, and then to take down from her shelves any book she pleased. One day, subdued to our mechanism, we pass on like blind men; the next, if our hearts are moved and our spirits satisfied, we feel suggestion to the full, and go so far as to see, in a phrase or a picture, ideas which the author never dreamed of putting there.

Let us not, then, be anxious to crowd our rooms with beautiful things; far better to display things few in number, but high in worth, adapted to their surroundings, and performing in some sort the office of the conductor of an orchestra.

To enforce this reflection, it is enough to mention the irritating effect produced by certain museums. The genus "collection"—that is the rock to shun! All these hapless canvases, torn from their luminous, hallowed, intimate, unique places, are there exhibited high and dry in philosophic desolation, rootless, forlorn. At ten o'clock you have to don the freshness of spirit necessary to enjoy them, and doff it on the stroke of four or five, according to the season. Instead of entering a gallery with heart at rest, and seeing in the sanctuary the objects of worship, you pull it to pieces, compare it with the canons, and puzzle out a needless meaning. Some good souls criticise the subject, others its treatment and technique; and the keepers stroll about or doze in a corner. What a crime to despoil streets and palaces and churches, the very tombs, for the sake of ranging such labels in a row! This is art as officialdom knows it.

In a room of great simplicity, a single work, adapted to its surroundings, and excellently interpreting a woman's tastes, renders us a wholly different service. This is no corpse to anatomize. You contemplate a thing that is loved, and a radiance floods the place; you forget, if only for a moment, the offences of life. And I maintain that the poorest woman in the world, if she has confidence in beauty, will always be able thus to fill her home with light; she can always place in it some flowers or a photograph.

IV

You may furnish your rooms in a higher sort by adorning your chairs with beings who speak and act. In referring to these familiar beings as furniture I mean no harm, but simply imply that they are no friends of yours, but merely accessories, persons who sink their own ideas and tastes, Madam, to assist your art with theirs.

In this category, musicians probably hold the first place. Indeed, music plays a much higher rôle in æstheticism than the manual arts, a rôle scarcely inferior to that of the intellectual arts. Like the latter, it has (so to say) no substance, appealing solely to the feelings; whether we will or no, it rarely fails to take possession of us, though merely by tangled sensations; it catches us as in a web, and does with us what it will; it moves us, lulls us to sleep, stimulates us. It derives its effects from the relations of tone, whether with neighboring tones on the scale, or with the singer and the listener. A small thing in itself, it is yet of capital importance; all life, all motion even, produces sound, from the wind and the sea upwards; and recourse has ever been had to sound for the purpose of touching men.

Beggars and the blind have always sung, as they do to this day; song has ever been employed to console the afflicted, to hearten soldiers on the march, even to soothe physical pain.

With very good reason, then, do women regard music as their own peculiar sphere. Thus, at the epoch of the Renaissance, in the heyday of their influence, they adopted musical attributes in their portraits; these were, so to speak, their sceptres.

Does it beseem a woman to aim higher, and to seek to create around her a real atmosphere of philosophy, history, science, poetry—in short, an intellectual atmosphere? Yes, and no. If she is so reliant on her own wit and ascendancy as to make all the personages she gathers but garniture for her soul or faithful radiators of her glory, mere apostles of her influence, yes. But no, if she has any fear of being absorbed by her surroundings and reduced to the level of a landlady.

It is often said that salons are things of the past, and the fact is lamented; in truth there are no salons now, and there never will be again, because, what with the ambitions and pretensions of men, the necessities of their careers, the obligations of the struggle for life, the present age knows little of the delight of allowing itself to be embodied or summed up in a woman. A drawing-room very soon becomes a sort of exchange for literary or sporting affairs, or the like. This does not imply that, for their own purposes, women should neglect intellectual resources; but it will certainly be recognized that real courage is needed if they are to rise superior to tittle-tattle, talk of stocks or the stable, the stuff they read, the things they hear. Happy are the societies where one can still enjoy life, and think! Happy the man who, like Monsieur Jourdain, makes prose without knowing it!

Yet, without holding a salon, women may still exercise in intellectual matters a guiding influence truly indispensable. Instead of allowing themselves to fall a prey to puffery, claptrap, or scandal, why should they not, on the contrary, treat as personal enemies the men who only use their undoubted talents to sport with them, to flaunt everywhere their nudities, to show off the slaves of their pleasure?—why smile upon scribblers, geniuses of Montmartre and the Latin Quarter? It is self-constituted slavery to bow incessantly at the feet of fashion. Always the fashion! A play is bad. Don't go to see it, and tell people so. A poem is a medley of unintelligible catchwords, a rigmarole of sonorous nothings; have the courage to say that it defies comprehension and that your mind loves lucidity! We all need our courage: this is yours. Nobody wants you to shoulder a rifle; you are asked to read or not to read, to see or not to see. If need be, effect a grand spring-cleaning! You alone can destroy the literature of the music-hall and the casino, the trashy novelettes, that ravage the meanest hamlets worse than alcohol. Is this courage beyond your strength? Do you fancy yourself compelled, because it is a free country, to fuddle yourself on the vile rinsings retailed a few steps away from your dwelling? Why then do you nourish your spirit on things that no one would dare to retail in the open air? Nobody would suggest that you should pass your life in preaching; a light or even a fatuous remark is not likely to offend. But for pity's sake insist that people wash their hands before entering your doors. Many a great personage whom you invite to dinner and make much of would be wearing a livery and displaying his calves in your entrance-hall if he had remained an honest man. Dare to face and to praise things that are true and serious. Diffuse their fragrance around you. You are responsible for the books that lie about on your table.

What a power you would have at command if you acted resolutely in the interests of beauty! The whole world would lay down its arms at your feet. The sentiment of the Beautiful is so strong! "To fathom the dreams of poets is the true philosophy," said a philosopher. "The mind of the savant stops at phenomena; the soul of the poet essays a higher flight, his inward vision pierces to the heart of reality. If the final knowledge is that which attains, not the surface, but the foundations of being, the poet's method is the true one."

Wherefore, surround yourself at any rate with men who have the taste for rendering life musical; in your conversations encourage clear, clean, warm images, refinements of sentiment rather than tricks of style; spread abroad an air of gayety, polish, and, above all, reverence. Your door is not that of a church, but neither is it that of a market.

Some women have too much belief in men of distinction, or so reputed; they imagine them upon a higher plane than they really are, and, especially, more difficult to reach. The majority of them, foolish or eminent, obscure or famous, reck little of grand sentiments, and are satisfied with a modicum of illusion or suggestion; they are led by means quite infantile, provided they are carried out of themselves.

Have you *sometimes* pondered our extraordinary facility for self-detachment, whenever we perform an act of imagination —if we are reading a novel, for instance? We delight in being duped; we want to see and hear everything, we fancy ourselves present at scenes where the novelist himself declares no one was present. Thus, as has been said by a very witty writer, we identify ourselves so thoroughly with the adventures of Pierre Loti that on the day when the Academy received into its bosom M. Julien Viaud, naval officer, the whole assembly, though so fastidiously select, thought they were really beholding M. Loti.

The art of the novelist consists in riveting us to what he depicts. M. Loti, for instance, to whom I have just referred, has admirably painted the sea, but he has not sought to exalt it to a level with us; he has lent to it neither ideas nor will, sadness nor ecstasies; but he has marvellously felt and caused us to feel the solemnity of its multitudinous and changeless life, its invincible weight, its aimless perturbation, and it is in this way that he has so powerfully impressed us.

Well, your art is similar. You need not trouble about your merits or ours, but solely about the effect you can produce on us who love to be duped. Acknowledge this as a guiding principle; for it is easier to regulate illusions than realities.

Finally, we must clearly envisage the precise duty of women, which is to develop their natural gifts, and boldly to adopt the virtues in which men are lacking.

They are the instrument of life, one might almost say the magic cauldron of life. They set all its elements in fermentation. To transform and to impart is their whole concern. Scarcely have they opened their eyes upon the world but they must needs have a doll to cherish, and tend, and fondle. And they continue thus cherishing, tending, fondling, unless life warps their nature. "Their machinery," as Rousseau said, "is admirable for assuaging or exciting the passions." Theirs is a treasure that grows richer in the spending. Even from a physiological point of view, they exhibit a marvellous power of endurance. They are not armed for attack; the finest natured are the strongest; their chords answer wonderfully to all appeals of sentiment; they love money with resignation, but glory intoxicates them; they live on a glance, a breath of kindness; their enthusiasm is contagious, and they shed around them the youth and freshness of life. So, without intention or effort, they are constantly bestowing their very selves, they clothe all things with their own enthusiasm. Science they vindicate by the noble fruits they obtain from it; from thorns they cause roses to spring forth, and these roses in their turn they cultivate, giving them an added beauty and fragrance, and fresh blossoms all the season round. Excellent gardeners of the world! Their rôle no doubt has varied with the circumstances and needs of different times; but the urgent necessities of the present time serve only to accentuate it and bring it into higher relief. The ignorance and weakness of women work more real mischief than the ignorance and weakness of men. The passive virtues no longer avail for governing; active virtues are the need of to-day.

In olden days, if men loved the king, it was because he belonged to them all, and represented something indispensable to every society, a person with no private interests, but wholly devoted to the interest of the public. Furthermore, he had no possessions entirely his own, not even a park, not even his palace. Now, daring as the idea may appear, let us say that women also can only reign on condition of communizing their souls. Otherwise, they will lose all influence, even with their sons. A woman comes short of essential duties if she stops at bemoaning the evils of the times and playing patroness to good little schoolboys, instead of learning for herself and revealing to others what the evils of the times really are, of drawing out the manhood slumbering within us, and giving it new graces. She bears the burden of human joy. And a woman of intelligence and leisure has, in this particular, duties more complicated than she who milks the cows or who minds the poultry.

She must think and love by her own energy, instead of bearing in her heart a thousand undeveloped sentiments. Her husband and her friends hunt, speculate, work, make havoc of their lives. Even so; she has no right to do the same. If she does not redeem men when she can, surely it is she who ruins them!

No difficulty will discourage her if she first fully realizes that she possesses all that is needful for success, and then sets her responsibilities in a clear light.

She will sometimes make mistakes; enthusiasm itself, the delicious art of giving things charm, has its perils, carrying one away into the unreal, opening a loophole for illusion, day-dreams, prejudices, fictions. What matters it, so long as the tree is vigorous? Would you fell a superb poplar because you noticed upon it some sprigs of mistletoe?

A woman may also go astray in point of vanity. That is a pretty common folly (even among men), and very provoking when it is shown in questions of etiquette or dress. But why should we not agree that there is a noble, an excellent form of vanity, which consists in being thoroughly acquainted with the things one can love, rejoicing in the apostleship one exercises, and securing success therein by cultivating diligence, refinement, considerateness, industry, persuasiveness? Where is the harm?

But we need not dwell on these fears. The special goal of a woman's life, that in which it is distinguished from the life of men, is manifest; it is the great things, the things to be loved, the things which do not "pay." Man serves money. You make it your servant, ladies, and you must aim higher, at the things that are not bought and sold; attachments, real friendships—those are your speculations. Be faithful to your aim. In faithfulness is redemption.

A moment! As I bow to you, I seem to see on my wall, in place of a modern paper, a grand fresco of long ago, an exquisite symbol of your reign: the Angel from Heaven, kneeling in humble adoration before the spotless Motherhood, proclaiming that from your devotion shall proceed the welfare of mankind. The scene is simple and sweet, the color serene: a closed room, a curtain hanging, barely a glimpse of the sky.

XVI

ART AND MORALITY

BY

FERDINAND BRUNETIÈRE

FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY]

IT is not the purpose of this series to attack or to condemn. It seeks rather to understand, and to uphold. Yet there are some errors so obtrusive that one can only advance by pushing them aside, so blatant that the busy man is apt to accept them as being established when really they are merely being shouted. Such an error we here confront. The high mission of art, its intimate relation with much that is noblest in life, has perhaps been brought home to each of us by the words of Mr. Howells and Mr. DeMaule; while closely allied with this broad general question of the purpose of art is the problem, much discussed in present days, of art's relation to morality. Now, it has been shouted at us that no such relation exists—as though anywhere in all this universe any object could stand isolated, untouching and untouched by its surroundings! On the other hand, some men have thought that the whole deep subject of morality is perhaps best approached through its relationship to art.

We in this country are sometimes accused of being too "Puritan" a people, and of being, like our English cousins, too heavily "of the earth." Hence it is perhaps as well that we should here listen to the word of a continental European, some leading man of letters known to and respected by us all. Such a man is, or alas, was, Ferdinand Brunetière, who died last fall. He was one of the "Forty Immortals," the Royal Academy of France; he was acknowledged the foremost critic of our day; and he was *well known, in America as well as Europe, as a lecturer of rare grace and power. The following address was delivered by him in Paris under the auspices of the Société des Conférences; and the present translation was made for the* Living Age, *of Boston, is covered by its special copyright, and is here used by the courteous permission of its editors. M. Brunetière's dissection of the principles of art must prove to a layman both instructive and interesting; his outlook on morality may be of even wider value.*

Ladies and Gentlemen:—

In order that I may not surprise any one, and also that I may secure to myself the benefit of my frankness, I will tell you at the very beginning that, in this lecture, I purpose to be long, tiresome, obscure, and commonplace withal. And, in truth, the fault will not be entirely in me, but in the subject I have chosen: Morality in Art, or rather, Art and Morality, a trite subject, as you know; for since the time of Plato, at least, it has been the common ground of conversation in academies, salons, studios, schools; and in spite, or rather because, of its banality it is a subject both complex and difficult.

I say because of its triteness; and indeed one of the great mistakes we make in regard to "commonplaces" is believing them easy to deal with. We have no doubt that the easiest thing in the world to-day is to be, or seem to be, original; and the means thereto have become so simple! We simply have to maintain the opposite of what people around us think; to say of charity, for example, that there is no need to practise it—and that is what a whole school is teaching—to say of justice that there is no need to administer it; to say of patriotism that it is a prejudice of another age; and twenty paradoxes of the same nature. This is a sure way of astonishing, of cheaply shocking, one's readers or hearers, and to-day it is the A B C of the art of the paragrapher and of the platform lecturer.

In these days intellectuality merely consists in thinking the opposite of other people! But, on the other hand, to think like everybody else; to seek solid reasons and precise reasons that are those of almost all reasonable people or of all cultivated people; to confirm people, as need be perhaps, in what the learned Professor Lombroso has called their misoneism—and which is only a wise distrust of novelty—to tell them there are ideas, old ideas, without which the life of humanity cannot do any more than without bread; in a word, to communicate to them the rare courage, the unusual audacity, of not wishing, at any price, to appear more "advanced" than their times—that, ladies and gentlemen, yes, that is a difficult undertaking, that is a hazardous undertaking: and that is what I would try to do to-day.

I

You know the problem, and I have only to remind you of the terms in which it is stated. If we are to believe the artists in this matter, at least certain of the artists, and the greater number of the critics, or æsthetes, but specially the journalists, Art, great Art, Art with a capital A, would transform, would transmute into pure gold everything it touches, would sublimate it, so to speak; and would make a thing to be admired out of a thing obscene or most atrocious. Do not some call this a means of purgation?

> "There's not a monster bred beneath the sky,
> But, well disposed by art, may please the eye."

Pascal said the same thing, but in a far more Jansenist manner, when he wrote: "What a vanity is painting, which attracts our admiration by the imitation of things which we do not admire in reality." You see that I am keeping my promise, and one could scarcely bring forward more familiar quotations.

Illustrious examples, moreover, confirm, or seem to confirm, the sentence of Pascal and the verses of Boileau. We admire in good faith, we credit ourselves with good taste for admiring, under Greek names, Venuses which we would not dare to name in French; and if we strip (I well know it is a sacrilege), but if we do really strip the subject of Corneille's "Rodogune" or of Racine's "Bajazet," for example, of the prestige of poetry, which transfigures them; if we reduce both of them to the essence of the fable which sustains them, what will remain of them but two intrigues of the harem, which would be all very well in their place in the annals of crime and indecency.[1]

Yet we are told, neither "Bajazet" nor "Rodogune," especially, are works which we can tax as immoral. In seizing on these intrigues, the poet—and it is his privilege—has transformed their nature. That man would be condemned, he would be disqualified, who, in the presence of the goddesses of Praxiteles, felt emotions other than those of the most chaste and disinterested admiration. The fact is, we are further told, the artist or the poet has lifted us above what is instinctive or animal in us; they have performed this miracle by placing us—how, is not very well known, by a secret known only to them—in a sphere where the gross excitements of sense are unknown; they have freed us from ourselves (you know the theory of the liberating power of art, that of the "purgation of the emotions," and I need only to allude to it in passing[2]); and we have entered with them into the region of supreme calm and of divine repose.

> La Mort peut disperser les univers tremblans,
> Mais la Beauté flamboie, et tout renait en elle,
> Et les mondes encore roulent sous ses pieds blancs.[3]

That is not my opinion.

And first, if this were the place to produce texts, I should not be embarrassed to prove that Greek sculpture—I mean that of the great epoch—fell short of that character of ideal purity that we are accustomed to attribute to it. It is pagan; and we must remember that when we speak of it! And paganism is not here or there, the religion of Jupiter or that of Venus, the mysteries of Eleusis or the Thesmophoria, but simply, and in a word, the adoration of the energies of nature. Here custom makes us blind; but in order to see clearly, think what the amours of the chief gods—Europa, Danaë, Leda, Semele, Ganymede—have become with an Ovid, for example, or with very great painters, a Michael Angelo, a da Vinci, a Correggio, a Veronese; and more generally, all those voluptuous fictions which, after having furnished the materials of classic art, have come to their end in the terrible games in the amphitheatre. Ask yourselves, in another art and in another order of ideas, whether—when we come from seeing this "Bajazet" or this "Rodogune" played, of which I was speaking just now—whether the impression which we carry from it has not something of mingled estrangement, of suspicious estrangement?

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[1] It is well known that Racine's boldness in the choice of his subjects, as in his freedom of observation and in the detail of his style, has long before equalled or surpassed the most audacious liberty that romanticism could imagine at a later time.—B.

[2] See Hegel's *Aesthetik*, and Schopenhauer on the æsthetics of poetry in *The World as Will and Idea*

[3] "Death may shatter the trembling universe; but Beauty's torch ever flames aloft, and all things revive, and the worlds once more roll on beneath her white feet."

On this point there is a confession of Diderot which you will find quite eloquent, and which will show, too, how this creator of "art criticism" admired the "Antiope" by Correggio.[1] Alas! gentlemen, Corneille, the great Corneille, is not always moral: And I mean by that that I would not be sure of the quality of the soul formed in the school of his "heroism" alone. It would be lacking in what Shakespeare has so finely called "the milk of human kindness."

I continue, ladies and gentlemen, to say trite things, exceedingly trite things, things even worthy of Mrs. Grundy, and what would the case be if I wished to take my examples from music instead of from painting, sculpture, or poetry? But this is the most banal of all these things—I mean that, of which you are all secretly, though perhaps without knowing it, most certainly convinced; yet which is most difficult to prove. It is that these examples have nothing that need astonish us if in every form or every species of art there is, as principle or germ, a furtive immorality. Note that I am not speaking of inferior forms of art; of the café-concert song, for example, of the vaudeville, or of the dance. Of the dance! Yes, I know that David danced before the ark, and we hear every day much talk of hieratic dances, of sacred dances, of martial dances. There is also the danse du ventre; and I should not be at all surprised if some grave author should find it symbolic. But symbolic or expressive of what? That is the point; and no one else will pretend that it is expressive of decency or modesty. "How much there is to a minuet!" said a famous dancing master. Why, certainly, but how much of what? For, certainly the opera ballet may have all sorts of qualities—qualities that I myself may have the weakness not to despise: that they have not the quality of elevating the mind is something of which I am certain! Neither has a café-concert song, nor a vaudeville.

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[1] "Salon de 1761," and Letter to Mlle. Voland, 17th Aug., 1759.

But since this is not what we ask of them, I will not insist. That would be to make myself ridiculous! Let us take the highest things. I speak to you of great art, of the greatest art: it is in the notion of great art that I say a germ of immorality is enveloped; and it is here that I am going to become wearisome. Of, rather, not yet, ladies and gentlemen; that will be presently; for I must first of all tell you of the memorable exploit of M. Taine, the most glorious of his exploits, and the one which most eloquently testifies that in him sincerity of research and uprightness of character did not yield to brilliancy of talent.

He began, as you know—in conforming with his intention of finding an objective foundation for critical judgments, and thus of rescuing the works of literature and art from the caprice of particular opinions—by taking the attitude which I will not call indifferent or uninterested, but impartial and impersonal, which is that of the zoölogist before the animal or of the botanist with regard to the plant. When the zoölogist studies the habits of the hyena or of the antelope, of the jackal or of the dog, and when the botanist describes to us the rose or the *Datura stramonium*, the belladonna or "the sacred blade which gives us bread," you know they always use the same patient method, and we do not see them angry with the ferocious beast or the poisonous plant. We do not find them changing either tone or composure of mind with their subject. Taine tried to imitate them, and for a moment he could believe that he had succeeded; when, as yet knowing only France and England, on his appointment as professor of æsthetics in the École des Beaux-Arts, he visited Italy. That was a revelation. The difference between the best, the mediocre, and the worst, that difference, that sense of difference, to which the spirit of system so easily blinds us in literature, because words express ideas and because we have a leaning toward ideas that resemble our own, however feebly they may be expressed—this difference which we do not always appreciate in music, because music is a kind of science as well as an art, and especially because our judgments do not anywhere depend more on the state of our nerves than in music—this, on the other hand, stands out clearly in painting, in sculpture; and Taine was forcibly struck by it.

That, ladies and gentlemen, is why, when he began those celebrated lectures on "The Production of the Work of Art," on "Art in Italy," "Art in Holland," "Art in Greece," on "The Ideal in Art"—certainly, with the work of Eugene Fromentin on "The Early Masters," and some rare writings of M. Guillaume, the most remarkable things which art criticism has produced in our times[1]—that is why it appeared to him necessary to classify, to judge works, to establish "scales of values"—what is more pedantically called an æsthetic criterion—in order to judge them. And where did he find this criterion, gentlemen, after having long sought for it, where did he find it, he, the pupil of Condillac and of Hegel, the theorist and philosopher of the impassibility of criticism, whose most serious reproach to the Cousins and Jouffroys was that of trying to bring everything to the "moral point of view"? What is the sign by which he declared that the most elevated in the museum of masterpieces can be recognized?

It is by what he calls "the degree of beneficence in the character."

And what, then, are the works he places highest in the heaven of art—he, I repeat, the theorist of naturalism, whose deeper sympathies all went, in spite of himself, to the manifestations of force and violence? Now it is "Polyeucte," "le Cid," "les Horace," it is "Pamela," "Clarissa," "Grandison," it is "Mauprat," "François le Champi," "La Mare au Diable," it is "Hermann and Dorothea," it is Goethe's "Iphigenia," it is Tennyson with his "Idylls of the King." Who, in very truth, would have suspected it only three or four years before, when he wrote his "History of English Literature," and when, with an energy of style which at times resembled a gymnastic feat, he glorified, in the drama of Shakespeare or in the poetry of Byron, the splendid villany of Don Juan or of Iago?

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[1] Fromentin in painting and M. Eugene Guillaume in sculpture (see his essay on Michael Angelo) have added to Taine's criticism what it lacked on the side of "technique."—B.

I do not discuss these judgments, gentlemen; I do not deny any of them to-day; I do not speak to you of the reservations they permit, and of the principal ones which the author himself has made. But I see in them an instructive testimony—a presumption, if you like—for what I was saying to you just now: that is, that the art which has only itself as an object, the art which does not care for the quality of the characters it expresses; the art, in a word, which does not take account of the impressions which it is capable of making on the senses or of exciting in the mind, that art, however great in the artist, I do not say is inferior (that is another question), but I say that it necessarily tends to immorality. I am now going to try to give you the reasons for this.

II

There is one reason which, if I am not mistaken, is as clear as noon-day; and which is that every form of art, in order to reach the mind, is obliged to have recourse to the mediation, not only of the senses, but of the pleasure of the senses. No painting but must first of all be a joy to the eye! No music but must be a pleasure to the ear! No poetry but must be a caress! And that very thing, we may remark in passing, is one of the reasons for the changes in fashion and taste. The works exist; and whether good or bad, they remain what they are. We like them or we do not like them! They do not change in character; the "Iliad" is always the "Iliad," Raphael's "School of Athens" is always the "School of Athens." But the senses become refined, or rather they are sharpened; they become more subtle and more exacting; they require, in order to experience the same quantity of pleasure, a greater amount of excitation. As has been well observed, "la Dame Blanche," "le Pre-aux-Clercs," and so many other operas we to-day call out-of-date—although their representation once was profitable to dozens of theatres in Germany—these works doubtless gave to our fathers the same kind of pleasure as "Carmen," for example, or "Die Meistersinger," gives us. It is because their less practised ears were less exacting.

Have you never asked yourselves at times whence comes the scorn it is fashionable, in the last few years, to show toward Raphael's painting? Independently of the element of snobbery which is certainly mixed with it—and which consists in people thinking that this gives them the air of connoisseurs—it is because after the lapse of fifty years our eyes have learned to enjoy color far more intensely than formerly. The sense for color, which, as you know, has had a long history, and the increasing complexity of which in the progress of time we can follow, seems to have profited by what the sense of design and form has lost. And we delight in reds or blues, yellows or greens to-day, as such, demanding only vigor or delicacy. Perhaps this, too, is the reason, or one at least, for the development of landscape. The chief factor of landscape is light or color, a pleasure purely sensuous, or primarily sensuous, which it affords us; and do not the very words we use to admire, for example, a canvas by Corot indicate it, when we speak of the calm, of the freshness, of the melancholy, which we breathe there? All that is not only sensed, but sensuous; and I do not think I need support this point any further.

But there result from this, ladies and gentlemen, several consequences; and thus it is that we see—I say, in history—that when art is left to itself and seeks its principle only in itself—poetry, music, or painting—it degenerates into a mass of artifices to stir up sensuality. Then no one asks of it anything more; it itself no longer thinks of anything but of pleasing, and of pleasing at any price, by every means; and it literally changes from a leader or from a guide, into a kind of go-between. That is the only name which fits it when I think of the close of the eighteenth century, of the novels of Duclos and of Crébillon the younger, of that of Laclos: "les Liaisons dangereuses"; of the sculpture of Clodion; of the painting of Boucher, of Fragonard; of the libertine engravings of so many dandies; of that furor of eroticism which disgraces not only the "Poesies" of Parny, but even those of André Chenier.

Let us be bold enough to confess it; all this art which is so praised to us, which is still celebrated, all this art, in all its forms, was, for nearly half a century, scarcely anything but a perpetual incentive to debauch; and do you think that, although it be called elegant, debauchery is any the less dangerous? As for me, I believe it is far more so!

Here is something graver still. At heart, when they are not devoid of all moral sense, these Fragonards or these Crébillons cannot but know that they ply a shameful trade. But the seduction of form sometimes works in a more subtle and insidious fashion, for which the artist or the public can scarcely themselves account, and of which the effects are more disastrous; for while corrupting the principle of art there is the appearance of respecting it; *optimi corruptio pessima.* When an exaggerated importance, not to say an importance which ignores all else, is attributed to the form, then it is that there results, from this very importance, what an Italian critic, writing of the decadence of Italian art, has justly called "the difference to the content."[1] That is when the painter, Correggio or Titian, with the same hand, as skilful, as caressing, as licentious, but as sure, with which he yesterday painted a "Madonna" or an "Assumption," to-day paints, warm and amber on a dark background, the nudity of a courtesan. It is when a Montesquieu, with the same pen with which he has thrown on paper a sketch of the "Spirit of Law," writes the "Persian Letters" or the "Temple de Gnide." Or better still, it is when relaxation is taken after writing a "Stabat" by writing the music of a ballet. For, what, indeed, do the things we say matter? What must be considered is the manner of saying them! Form is everything, the basis is nothing, if it is not the pretext or occasion for form. And, as this striving, as this care, as this passion for form never fails to lead to new effects; as the qualities lost are, or seem to be, replaced by others; as the execution becomes more masterly or more skilful, it cannot at first be seen where that leads to. That, ladies and gentlemen, leads directly to dilettanteism; and dilettanteism is the death both of all art and of all morality.

Oh, certainly, I know very well I speak like a barbarian, not to say like one possessed; at all events, like an iconoclast; and you are used to see something else in dilettanteism. Dilettanteism, I know, for the most of those who profess it and glory in it, for the most of those who are in sympathy with it, means independence of mind, liberty, diversity, superiority of taste; it means absence of prejudices; it is the faculty of comprehending everything. But, gentlemen, is it also the faculty of excusing everything? For, indeed, we who believe in anything, and who have what are called "principles"—you know that that means to-day that we are limited on all sides—can any one imagine that, when we adopt, when we maintain, an opinion, we have not seen the reasons for the contrary opinion, or the difficulties of the one we adopt? Alas! there is not a critic or historian worthy of the name who does not argue against his tastes, who does not combat his own pleasures, who does not harden himself against the things that attract him. But dilettanteism is nothing but an incapacity for taking sides, an enfeeblement of the will, when it is not a clouding of the moral sense; and—on the most favorable supposition—a tendency, eminently immoral, to make of the beauty of things the measure of their absolute value.

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[1] Francesco de Sanctis, "Storia della Letterature Italiana."

When art comes to that—and it necessarily comes to that whenever it seeks its end only in itself or in what is emphatically called the realization of pure beauty—I once more repeat, it is not only art which is ruined: it is morality, or, if you want something more precise, it is society, which has made an idol of it. We have a memorable example of this in the Italy of the fifteenth and of the sixteenth centuries, assuredly one of the most corrupt societies of history, according to the admission of all historians; the Italy of all these tyrants to whom we seem to have pardoned everything because they have had triumphal mythologies painted in fresco on the walls and ceilings of their palaces; or because the daggers they buried in the breasts of their victims were marvellously carved by a Benvenuto Cellini. And do you know whence is this corruption, gentlemen? Precisely from this idolizing of art, or, if you prefer it, from the subordination of every part of public and private life to art and its demands. An excellent critic has said:

"The Italians of the Rennaissance, under the sway of the fine arts, sought after form, and satisfied themselves with rhetoric. Therefore we condemn their moral disquisitions and their criticisms as the flimsy playthings of intellectual voluptuaries. Yet the right way of doing justice to these stylistic trifles is to regard them as products of an all-embracing genius for art, in a people whose most serious enthusiasms were æsthetic. . . . If the methods of science may be truly said to regulate our modes of thinking at the present time, it is no less true that, during the Rennaissance, art exercised a like controlling influence."

Note, ladies and gentlemen, this last comparison; we shall return to it in a little while. Penetrated with the idea of the "beautiful," Italy went so far as to find it in crime. It recognized in a crime well done, boldly conceived, skilfully executed, and audaciously avowed, merits and analogues to those she applauded in her works of art. Why is that? You see why, perhaps. It is in distinguishing and dividing the invisible, in separating the inseparable, in dissociating the form from the substance; it is in placing in the execution all the merit of art. As long as this tendency found its counterpoise in the sincerity of the religious, moral, social, or political sentiment, it gave to the world the masterpieces which you know, from the "Divine Comedy" to the decoration of the Sistine. But according as the tendency was able to develop freely, the decadence of art was seen to commence, followed by the decadence of morality. That is a first-class proof, in my opinion—a proof by the facts, a proof by history—that every form of art contains a principle of immorality, and there is another in the fact that it is obliged to address the mind only by the mediation of the pleasure of the senses, of which art must exercise a wise mistrust, the chief part of which will be never to seek its end in itself.

It is to that, you know, that people have tried to answer, in giving as its end the imitation of nature; and as regards this, I begin by declaring that two things are equally certain: that we are cured of dilettanteism or of virtuosity only by returning to the imitation of nature; and the other is that if the imitation of nature is not, perhaps, the end of art, it is at least the principle. "All rules," said a great painter, "have been made only to aid us in placing ourselves before nature, and thus to teach us to see it better"; and a great poet has said before him:

> "Nature is made better by no mean,
> But nature makes that mean; so, over that art
> Which you say adds to nature, is an art
> That nature makes."

But what is this nature which it is a question of imitating? How, in what measure, ought we to imitate it? If we feel in us any temptation to correct it, or, as is said, to perfect it, ought we to yield to it? And how, in short, have morals or morality accommodated themselves? I mean, how, in fact and in history, have they accommodated themselves to that recommendation and that principle?

I will not examine, gentlemen, whether nature is always beautiful, or whether it is never so. The question would take us too far afield. Truly, I, for my part, will freely say that if colors are not in objects, but in our eye (and that is proven), the proof would have greater validity for that relative and changing quality which is called "Beauty." Plato has said, or rather has been made to say, that "the beautiful is the splendor of the true"; and I admire Plato; none the less, this is an example of one of these immortal blunders which we piously transmit from generation to generation. If we only take the trouble to try to understand ourselves, there is no "beauty" in a geometrical theorem, nor in a chemical law, or at least the beauty shines in it only with a mild brilliance, modest and timid. There is beauty, in the human sense of the word, only in those very general laws that are, properly speaking, hypotheses rather than laws, and of which I do not wish to speak disparagingly, because it may be that the search for them is the very end, the highest end, of science. But, on the other hand, we might easily show that there have been some very great mistakes. But, I repeat, and without wishing to examine the question, ugliness as well as beauty is in nature; and you know, we all know, some artists who have seen it alone. The romanticists have even made the representation of the ugly an essential part of their æsthetics—and it certainly is not on this point that contemporary naturalism has disavowed them.

What is still more certain, and what is especially important to us to-day, is that, beautiful or ugly, nature is not "good"; and I scarcely need to maintain this point, since the Schopenhauers, the Darwins, the Vignys, have firmly established it. Do not let us needlessly complicate matters, and do not let us embarrass ourselves with metaphysical complications. If the first need of a creature is "to preserve its being," nature, you know well enough, has, as it were, surrounded us with snares, and we cannot make a movement without running the risk of perishing by it. Life is spent in learning to live, and no sooner have we succeeded in it than we die. Does the living console us, and can we say, with the poet,

"Mais la nature est la, qui invite et qui t'aime
Plonge-toi dans son sein qu'elle t'ouvre toujours"?[1]

Her "bosom" is rather a stepmother's; and her indifference to us is equalled only by her lack of regard for all that we call by the name of good or bad.

"On me dit une mère et je suis une tombe,
Mon hiver prend vos morts comme son hecatombe,
Mon printemps ne sent pas vos adorations."[2]

Let us go still further, gentlemen; nature is immoral, thoroughly immoral, I may say immoral to such a degree that everything moral is, in a sense, and especially in its origin, in its first principle, only a reaction against the lessons or counsels that nature gives us.[3] *Vitium hominis, natura pecus*, I believe St. Augustine has said; there is no vice of which nature does not give us the example, nor any virtue from which she does not dissuade us. This is the empire of brute force and unchained instincts, neither moderation nor shame, neither pity nor compassion, neither charity nor justice; all species are armed against one another, *in muua funera;* all passions aroused, every individual ready to oppose every other—that is the spectacle that nature offers us; and if we imitate it, who does not see and who does not understand what humanity would become in so doing? Plunge us into nature! Why, gentlemen, if we were not careful, that would be to plunge us into animality; and that is what has not been understood by certain who are inviting us to take "nature" only for a guide in all things—that they were inviting us to go back again over the very steps of history and civilization. We have become men, and can become more so each day only by detaching ourselves from nature, and by trying to institute in the midst of it "an Empire within an Empire."

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[1] "But nature is ever there, inviting thee and loving thee; plunge into her bosom, ever open for thee."

[2] "They call me a mother, and I am a tomb; my winter takes your dead as its hecatomb; my spring does not listen to your worships."

[3] I have tried to show this in a brochure, "La Moralité de la Doctrine Evolutive"

Shall I add to this that it is not always true? That is what I ought to do if I keep myself narrowly within the bounds of my subject. Nature has its failures, it has its exceptions, it has its monstrosities. If we are to attach a precise meaning to the words, which will make us understand, it is not "natural" to be blind or a hunchback; and that is what so many artists readily forget. They also forget that

> "Some thoughts may be too strong to be believed."

We see examples of it every day. Every day there happens the reality that resembles a fiction, and, on the other hand, the fiction that one would take for a reality. It is even a commonplace with novelists to say that they invent nothing that reality does not surpass. . . . But all these considerations are purely æsthetic, and to-day I am interested in the relations between morality and art.

Now you see that they are of such a nature that, as we have just now seen, immorality may be engendered in the very seduction of the form; so in the same way it is always to be feared lest it may also result from a too faithful imitation. Examples of this are innumerable in the history of painting, and especially of literature. But, as I should compromise myself if I here invoked the memory of the "Tales" of La Fontaine, or of his "Fables," it is the author of "Andromaque" and of "Bajazet" that I shall ask to offer me his repentance. For, indeed, when this great man; in the maturity of life and genius, not yet having reached forty—that is, the age at which Molière had just begun to write[1]—abandoned the stage, what sentiments do you think dictated his conduct? He was afraid of himself, afraid of the truth of the paintings he had made; of the terrible fidelity with which he had rendered what is most natural in the passions; of the justification that he had found for their excess in their conformity to instinct; and that is why from that moment his life was nothing but one long expiation for the errors of his genius. Let us regret it if we will! But let us not have minds so narrow as to be astonished at it; nor especially to blame the poet for it; and let us consider that at this very moment there is an example of this very thing in him who was in his hour the illustrious novelist of "War and Peace," and of "Anna Karenina." You will find the proof of this in the work "What is Art?" in which he wages the same warfare as I do to-day—and if this endeavor appears only ordinary in a critic, or in a historian of ideas, so much the worse for those who did not understand how heroic it is in a novelist.

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[1] Racine, born 1639, renounced the stage, 1677. Molière, born 1622, presented the "Précieuses Ridicules," 1659.

In that work he brings to light a final cause of that immorality which we can look upon as inherent in the very principle of art. I mean a condition which seems to be imposed on the artist, and which consists, in order to assure his originality, not precisely in his cutting himself off from the society of other men, and shutting himself in his "ivory tower," but in his distinguishing himself from the crowd. La Bruyère has excellently said, "If we always listened to criticism there is not a work that would not be completely founded on it"; and he was right. Painter, poet, sculptor, or musician, if the originality of the artist is to feel, by the same things, sensations different from other men, it would seem that one of his cares should be not to let them in any way become "banal," and consequently it would seem that this right of separation from the crowd cannot be denied him. But to what dangers at all times, and especially at a time like ours, does not the application of this principle lead?

By it, humanity is divided into two kinds of men: "Artists," who make art, and the "Philistines," the "Bourgeois," who do not make it, or who do not understand it as the "artists" do, or who do not like the same art as they. In this connection, recall Flaubert in his "Correspondence," or the Gencourts in their "Journal." It has been said, and I hasten to subscribe to it, "What love, what passion, what religion for their art!" And, in truth, that is admirable! But also what ignorance, what thoughtlessness for all that is not art and their art; what scorn of their contemporaries, of the "Messrs. Dumas, Augier, Feuillet," of all the novels that are not "Madame Bovary," of all the comedies that are not "Henriette Maréchal"! Evidently all of us—we who believe that there may be something else in life than art—in their eyes we are all only simple Bouvards or frightful Peceuchets. We are the crowd, and the crowd is always to be despised.

"I believe that the crowd, the flock, will always be hateful. In so far as the people do not bow before the mandarins, in so far as the Academy of Sciences will not take the place of the Pope, society to its very roots will be only a lot of sickenin ghumbugs."

I do not stop over the strangeness of the phrase—which would be worthy of a place on the wall of the editor's office—but you see the sentiment! I do not even reply that if it is by works that we must ultimately test doctrines, we can conceive of a more useful employment in life than writing "Paradise Artificiel," "Tentations de Saint-Antoine," "Faustin," and "Fille Elsa." But I ask you, gentlemen, whether the consequence of the doctrine is not to make art consist in what is most inhuman and most foreign to our occupations, our cares, our anxieties!

Not that for this reason the authors repel praises or admiration. "Money is always good," said an Emperor; and our "Artists" think that from whatever hand it may come, admiration is always good to take and to retain if possible. Only, if, in the midst of these praises, any misunderstanding arises between the artist and the public, it is always the public that is in the wrong; and let us render this justice to the artists; they think it a matter of honor to aggravate the misunderstanding. Ah, but we are reproached for our harshness of manner! Well, we will be still more harsh, and we will elevate our very lack of feeling into a principle of art. Ah, but we are told that they claim from us emotion and feeling! Well, then we will take shelter in our indifference and coldness! What do we care for the miseries of humanity! "The crowd is always hateful!" We are the mandarins, before whom you must bow! To others the business of justice and charity! As for us, we are busy with art; that is, we are pounding colors and we are cadencing phrases. We are noting sensations, and we are producing artificial ones to note! We are doing "artistic writing," and if we are not admired it is so much the worse for our contemporaries! But it is all the better for us, for he who does not understand us judges himself; and the incomprehensibility of our invention is simply a proof of our superiority. It pleases us to be misunderstood.

Thus it is that people bury themselves in a proud self-satisfaction; and that would not matter if it did not entail the monopolizing of the attention by a coterie! But what I hate about these paradoxes—and without taking into account the fact that they do nothing less than cut art off from its communications with life—is that they are eminently and insolently aristocratic. A little indulgence, O great artists, and permit us to be men! Yes, permit us to believe that there is something else in the world as important as pounding colors or cadencing phrases! Do not imagine that we are made for you, and that for six thousand years humanity has travailed, has labored, has suffered, only to establish your mandarinate. We could do without you much more easily than without many other things! And you yourselves, after all, how, on what, in what conditions would you live if the incessant toil of these Bouvards, whom you despise, and of these Pecuchets, for whom you have nothing but ironies sufficiently cruel, did not assure you the security of your leisure, the peace of your meditations, a public to admire you, and, I may even say, your daily bread?

III

Whither does this discourse tend, ladies and gentlemen, and what are the conclusions I wish to draw from it? That art, as has been said of love, is mixed, especially in our time, "with a host of things with which it has no more to do than the Doge has with what is done in Venice." Of course, and, for that matter, nothing need hinder a picture dealer or a book publisher from being a true "artist." That has been seen more than once in history. The studio of more than one great painter in Italy or in Flanders has often been nothing more than a manufactory of cartoons or of canvases, and two of the rare surviving works of our eighteenth century, "Manon Lescaut" and "Gil Blas," were, as was then said, made for the publisher. No, it is not the love of lucre that is the worst enemy of art.

Ladies and gentlemen, I do not mean, either, that the artist or the writer ought to metamorphose themselves into moral preachers. There are sermonizers and moralists for that, whose purpose or trade it is. Whatever admiration I have for Richardson, that is what prevents me from speaking of "Clarissa Harlowe" with the declamatory enthusiasm of Diderot, and still more from daring to place his "Pamela" or his "Grandison" so high in the history of art as you have seen that Taine has placed them. We must try not to confuse anything!

But, as I have tried to show you, if every form of art, so far as it is a pleasure of the senses, and in so far as it is an imitation and consequently an apology for nature, and, again, in so far as it develops in the artist this ferment of egotism which is a part of his individuality—if every form of art, when thus left to itself, runs the inevitable risk of "demoralizing" or of "dehumanizing" a soul, then we must premise, in the first place, that art has not all the liberties. "Stop, my child," said Montesquieu to his daughter, whom he found reading the "Persian Letters," "stop; that is a book of my youth that is not made for yours"; and I have told you that in my opinion it was not to become a convert that Racine abandoned the theatre, but that he believed he ought to become a convert because he had written plays, or rather because he was the creator of his plays, the father of Hermione, of Roxane, and of Phèdre. As for the aged Corneille, he did not feel the need of becoming a convert. Why so? For a very simple and sufficiently evident reason! Because in his old age, as in the morning of his glory, he was convinced that Rodrigue had done right in avenging Don Diègue's honor; that Horace was excusable for having hurled in Camille's teeth the curses she spewed forth against Rome; that Polyeucte was to be praised for having overthrown the idols, and for having preferred the conversion of Paulina to the tranquillity of their amours. He did not become a convert, because he believed that he never excited other than generous and noble passions, even if he thought more than once of depicting base or sanguinary ones. He did not become a convert, because, as Taine told you just now, he believed that he, "whose hand had sketched the soul of the great Pompey," worked only for the exaltation of the "Will"; and of all the human faculties, will, real will, is at once the rarest of things, and the thing of which men have always thought the most, first, because it is the rarest, and then because it is the real cause of personal and social progress.

This is the same thing as saying, in the second place, that if the end of art is not to move the passions or to tickle the senses, neither can it be complete, and narrow itself in any way within itself. There are several ways of interpreting the theory of "art for art's sake," and on this point, as on all, it is only a matter of coming to an agreement; and unfortunately that is most frequently what people do not want to do. But if the theory of "art for art's sake" consists in seeing in art only art itself, I know of nothing more false, and I have tried to tell you why. Art has its object and its end outside of and beyond itself; and if that object is not exactly moral, it is social, which, for that matter, is the same thing. Whether we are painters or poets, we are not allowed to forget that we are men; and in return for the society of men we must give the means of propaganda or of action, which we hold from them alone. Do you remember in this connection, or do you know, that page of Alexandre Dumas? I say "do you know"; for you will not find it in all the editions of his plays, but only in that which is called the "Edition des Comédiens":

"What has made the dramatic poets great, what has most ennobled the stage, are the subjects which at first sight seemed absolutely incompatible with the habits of the stage or of the public. Thus we cannot be told, 'Stop here or there.' All that is man and woman belongs to us, not only in the relations of these two creatures between themselves by the sentiments and the passions, but in their isolated or collective relations with all kinds of occurrences, of customs, of ideas, of powers, of social, moral, political, and religious laws, which, in turn, produce their action on them."

That, certainly, might be better said; and I sometimes fear, gentlemen, that, one or two pieces aside, imperfection of form will draw the drama of Alexandre Dumas into oblivion; but you understand sufficiently well what he means, and I assent to it entirely. Art has a social function, and its true morality is the conscientiousness with which it discharges this function.

You will tell me that this formula is vague, and I acknowledge it. If it were not vague, if it had the precision of a geometrical formula or of a medical prescription (are medical prescriptions so very precise?) we should no longer be dealing with art, or criticism, or history, but with science. Let us leave the learned in their laboratories, and let us not imagine that we can find the secret of genius or moral law in the bottom of a retort. But for that, ladies and gentlemen, you must give me your attention for a moment longer.

There is scarcely any doctrine more widely diffused among us than that of "the relativity of knowledge." But what exactly does it mean? That is what many people do not seem to know who none the less profess belief in it; and you see how it can be reclothed with meaning.

To say that everything is relative may mean that nothing is false and nothing is true, but everything is possible; everything therefore is probable; and each of us becomes "the measure of all things," as the ancient sophist taught; all opinions have worth, and the only difference between them is the manner of expressing them. I do not pause, gentlemen, over this interpretation.

But in the second place, to say that everything is relative may mean that everything depends, not only for each of us individually, but for man in general, the species, on the constitution of its organs, and that, if we had our cranium made otherwise, or if we had six senses, for example, in place of five, or four dimensions in place of three, the universe would appear to us under an aspect entirely different from that which we know. Bodies would be revealed to us by other qualities; we should perceive in them what we do not now perceive, unknown forms and nameless colors. It is very possible and I readily believe it! But I know nothing about it, nor does any one else; and besides it does not matter. If in another planet bodies have *n* plus 1 dimensions instead of three, how can that affect us as long as we know nothing about it, and when there are only three on this earth? What does it matter to us that the color of the flower or the taste of the fruit is in our eye, or in our palate, provided that the rose is always red and the orange is always scented? Do you feel yourselves humiliated or chagrined by it?

But there is a third way of understanding the relativity of knowledge, and the best, which is—as Pascal said, and also both Comte and Kant—that "all things being causes and caused, aiding and aided," a thing can be exactly defined only by its relations to another thing. Each of you is seated in his place in this room. But how can I give an idea of it to any one outside? That will be done only in beginning by describing the arrangement of the room, of the seats, my situation, the left chair, the right chair, that at the back, that at the front, and ten, twenty, other details. In other words, every object is relative to an infinity of others with which it stands in relations more or less constant, and moreover, according to their nature, more or less complex to determine. Or, again, and in general philosophical terms if you wish, everything is entangled in a system of relations from which its character results; and that is what Pascal meant when he added to the other part of the phrase which I have just recalled to you: "I hold it impossible to know the parts without knowing the whole, as it is to know the whole without knowing the parts." If we knew only Racine's "Thébaide," just think what a strange idea we should have of his genius; and how badly we should know it if we did not know who preceded and followed him! A certain knowledge of the "Cid" and of "Polyeucte" thus forms a part of the very definition of "Andromaque" or of "Phèdre," and that definition, in turn, needs to be completed by some knowledge of "Zaïre" and of "Mérope." We know Racine truly only when we know him in his relation to Voltaire and Corneille, and all these in their relation to Shakespeare or to Euripides, and all in relation to a certain idea of tragedy, which still other relations determine.

If we put ourselves at this point of view, we perceive, gentlemen, that the definition of art is thus relative to the definition of other social functions, to which it holds, or ought to hold, determinate relations; or if you prefer, it appears that, like religion, like science, like tradition, art is a force, the use of which cannot be regulated by itself and by itself alone. These forces must be balanced among themselves in a well-ordered society; and none among them can establish its absolute domination over the others without harm, and sometimes disaster, resulting therefrom. If it is religion that gains the day and subordinates tradition, science, and art, the history of the Papacy of the middle ages is there to tell us of the grandeurs, but also of the dangers of theocracy. If it is tradition, custom, superstitious respect for the past, which make themselves masters of consciences, and consequently of actions, it seems to me—I dare not say more—but it seems to me that the example of China emerges from the shade at this moment to teach us, with its advantages of stability, the dangers of immobility. If art in its turn seizes the entire life, in order to govern it, it may indeed flatter the imagination of some dilettantes; but we have looked closely at this matter just now, and the Italy of the Renaissance, to which I can add the Greece of the decadence, is there to prove to us that the danger is not any less. I would say freely it is greater still, or as great, when we give over, as has been tried in our days, to positive and experimental science the work of directing or ordering existence. On the contrary, gentlemen, the great epochs of history are precisely those in which these forces have been placed in equilibrium—and such have been, in France chiefly—the great years of the seventeenth century, or the early years of our own.

Does the realization of that equilibrium depend on the will of men? And are we able at every moment of the period to prevent one of the forces from advancing in excess of the other? For my part, gentlemen, I believe we can. I believe that, if we wish, we can maintain the authority of tradition against the craze of novelty. I believe that it depends only on ourselves to prevent even religion from encroaching on the liberty of scientific research. I believe that we can stem, check, prevent science from overstepping the limits of its own domain. And I also believe that—just as science is characterized by a sort of moral indifferentism,[1] so art, as I have tried to show you, is characterized on its part by an unconscious tendency to immorality—we can, if we will, annul these effects, not only without harming it, but in directing it to its proper object. But will would be needed; and unhappily we live in a time when—to give meaning to an old distinction that might be thought very subtle and very vain and which profound philosophers have denied—the failure, or rather the enfeeblement, of the will has perhaps no equal except in the increasing intensity of the desires.

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[1] See the brochures: "Science et Religion," "Education et Instruction," and "La Moralité de la Doctrine Evolutive."

XVII

WOMAN

"MARRIAGE CUSTOMS AND THEIR MORAL VALUE"

BY

ELIZABETH S. DIACK

AND

WILLIAM LILLY

SECRETARY OF THE CATHOLIC UNION OF GREAT BRITAIN

CLOSE allied to the question of morality in general, comes the question of woman in her relation to life and to man. We face the narrower problem first, her relation to the man. For historic information our readiest appeal is to the well-known English authoress upon the subject, Elizabeth Stitchell Diack. She outlines for us "the woman of the past" as her confrère, Mr. Robinson, has outlined the man. Aiming then to carry our study up to the present day, we present briefly the thought of Mr. Lilly. The Hon. William S. Lilly, M.A., J.P., is a Roman Catholic; in fact his long service as secretary to the Catholic Union of Great Britain, a post which he has held since 1874, enables him in some sort to speak officially for the Catholics of England, as Cardinal Gibbons has already spoken to us for those of America. Moreover, it is well that on this serious question of marriage we should listen to the views of the Catholic body among our contemporaries.

Matrimony, once apparently the most firmly established and settled of human institutions, begins in these inquisitive and skeptic days to find itself no longer unquestioned. Its security is assailed; its wisdom is doubted; nay, its very morality is held open to dispute. Trial marriages and "ten-year periods" are discussed with an openness that a single decade ago would have been impossible.

Under these circumstances the Catholic Church should have a hearing; for it is an established fact that during many centuries that church has been the most emphatic and insistent of the opponents of divorce. In reading Mr. Lilly's presentation of the moral aspects of the question, it were well also to turn back (address IX) and note how these are reinforced by Mr. Wallace's analysis of the same subject from its scientific side.

Among the primitive nations of the world woman was commonly regarded as a chattel or slave—a creature existing and originally created merely to minister to the wants of man. The Egyptians alone treated her with respect and consideration.

In Ancient Egypt monogamy was practised, although it was not enjoined by law. There is no evidence of the existence of a marriage ceremony, but the marriage contract secured to the wife certain rights, one of which was that of complete control over her husband, who promised to yield her implicit obedience! Nearness of relationship was no barrier to wedlock, the union of brother with sister being quite common.

Women, both married and unmarried, participated with the men in all the pleasures of social intercourse. They took part in the public festivals, shared in banquets, drove out in their chariots, and made pleasure excursions on the Nile. At banquets the guests were entertained chiefly with music and dancing. Singing was also an esteemed accomplishment, and the more solid part of their education must have been attended to, as women often held important offices in the priesthood. They presided at birth and officiated as mourners at death and burial.

Ladies of rank occupied their spare moments in embroidery and in the cultivation of flowers, of which they were passionately fond, and which were lavishly used on all festive occasions. Women of the humbler classes were employed in spinning, and in the rural districts in tending cattle and sheep, and in carrying water—the heavier employments being left to the men.

This halcyon state of affairs lasted only during the days of Egypt's greatness; during the period of her decline her daughters were fearfully downtrodden and degraded. The hardest manual labor was assigned to them, and they suffered cruel punishments for the crimes of their fathers, husbands, or brothers, as the case might be. Sometimes they were publicly beaten with sticks, at others thrown into dungeons or sent to work at the mines, where the miseries they endured were so great that, as the old historian tells us, they longed for death as far preferable to life.

In Babylonia, and also in Persia, woman was a mere chattel of man. She had no rights, and was supposed to have no feelings. Assyrian maidens had no voice in the disposal of themselves in marriage. Those of marriageable age were once a year collected and brought together into one place, there to be sold to the highest bidders. The most beautiful were offered for sale first, and these were eagerly competed for by the wealthy men of the community desirous of marrying. With the money obtained for the beauties, the plain and deformed ones were dowered, so that they, too, might obtain husbands, they being given to the men who offered to take the smallest sums. Each purchaser was obliged to give security for the due fulfilment of the marriage contract—marriage being a condition of purchase—and for the public acknowledgment of his newly acquired wife. If a pair found on coming together that they could not live amicably the husband could return his purchase and receive back his money, but the wife who repudiated her husband was condemned to be drowned. Womanly purity was discountenanced by the Babylonians, and woman's life was held in light esteem. During a period of revolt thousands of women were massacred by their own nearest relatives, merely to save the provisions which otherwise they would have required.

In Ancient Greece the position of woman varied in the different eras and in the different states. In the renowned State of Sparta women were regarded as instruments for the production of strong, robust citizens for the State, and great care was taken that they should be well developed physically. They were from their earliest youth allowed the utmost liberty, and were exercised in running, wrestling, and boxing, accomplishments which they displayed in the public games at the theatre. Scantily clad, so as to allow perfect freedom of motion, and crowned with flowers, they also took part in the religious ceremonies, and sang and danced at the national festivals. On ordinary, as on festive occasions, the dress of the Spartan women was of the simplest description. A woollen robe loose at one side, and fastening with clasps over the shoulder, was the attire of maidens, while married women wore also an upper garment and a veil. The wearing of embroidery, gold, and precious stones was restricted to prostitutes.

When they married, which, according to Plutarch, was not till they had arrived at maturity, they were always well dowered. We are told by the same writer that the Spartan bride was dressed "in man's clothes," and had her hair "cut close to the skin." Her troth was plighted, not to her husband, but to the State, and patriotism seems to have been a leading sentiment in her bosom. For some time after her marriage the wife continued to reside with her parents, seeing her husband but occasionally, by stealth, and disguised in masculine apparel. Specially beautiful women were allowed to have several husbands, and so lightly was the marriage tie regarded that a man could, if he chose, give away his wife without any legal process whatever. Indeed, it was considered rather a meritorious action for him to do so. Heiresses were at the disposal of the king, who, without consulting either themselves or their parents, bestowed them upon the poorest citizens, that the wealth of the nation might be equally distributed among all classes.

During the frequent absences of their warlike lords the Spartan women had entire control of their households and their affairs. So much power did they enjoy in comparison with other women of the time, that a foreign lady on one occasion said to Gorgo, the wife of Leonidas, "You of Lacedæmon are the only women in the world that rule the men," whereat the Spartan quickly retorted, "We are the only women that bring forth men."

In other parts of Greece women led lives of strict seclusion. They seem to have scarcely been allowed to leave their own apartments, which were always situated in the back, and commonly in the upper part of the house, so as to insure the utmost privacy. Young girls had to ask permission to go from one part of the house to another, and the reputation of a newly married woman was in danger if she were seen out of doors. When she became a mother she enjoyed a little more freedom, though only during her husband's pleasure, for those of a jealous temperament kept their wives in close confinement. By the laws of Solon women were prohibited from leaving home with more than three changes of clothing and a certain allowance of provisions, or a basket of more than a cubit's length. Neither were they permitted to appear in the streets at night, save in a chariot and preceded by torch-bearers. It is said that those strict laws were framed in order to check the depravity of the daughters of Athens, but it was not only to the peregrinations of women that the laws of the great Athenian extended, but to all the details of daily life, including even eating and drinking.

The ordinary employments of women, apart from their domestic duties, were spinning, weaving, embroidery, and other kinds of needlework. Instruction in these mechanical arts seems to have been all the education they received—all that was considered necessary or fitting for them. "She is the best woman," says Thucydides, "of whom least is said either of good or evil."

An orphan heiress was compelled by law to marry her next-of-kin, in order to keep the property in the family. When, however, she had married prior to the death of her father, she could, at his decease, be taken from her husband and given to her relative along with her estate, the bond of wedlock, as in Sparta, being somewhat loosely regarded and quite easily dissolved.

As in Sparta, too, a man could give away his wife either for a time, or permanently, as he desired. It was by no means the most depraved or the meanest of mankind who exercised this strange privilege, Socrates and Pericles being among the number.

During the golden age of Athens, when the ashes of her illustrious law-giver had long been at rest in his native isle (for Solon was an Athenian but by adoption), the daughters of the classic city enjoyed more freedom than they had done in earlier days. Husbands when they went from home often took their wives along with them, but from a moral point of view it was not always the best of society into which they were thus introduced. The house of the celebrated Aspasia, the mistress of Pericles, was a favorite resort of even the wisest and highest cultured of the citizens of Athens. This remarkable woman was noted, not only for her beauty, but for her talents, and for the elevation to which she had attained in learning. The unfortunate class to which she belonged was then the only class of women in Athens that enjoyed freedom and culture. Whether from a desire to heighten their charms by means of a knowledge of "divine philosophy," or from a genuine love of learning, many of them frequented the schools and the company of philosophers and studied mathematics and other sciences. Their personal beauty often made them the chosen models of painters and sculptors, and the themes of licentious poets, and, as we have already said, Aspasia, who was at their head, wielded such a powerful influence over even their best and wisest men that they resorted to her house as to a lecture-room, accompanied by their wives. They evidently wished the latter to profit by the learned and brilliant conversation of the gifted courtesan, who at least had taught them that the life of ignorance and seclusion to which they doomed their women was that which was least calculated to develop their mental powers and render them congenial companions. The corrupt condition of society, however, may be inferred from the fact that such women occupied a prominent, almost a leading, position in it, and, indeed, at this period, the golden age of Grecian art and literature, learning, luxury, and vice were equally dominant in "the eyes and light of Greece," as her panegyrists called Athens.

"In the brave days of old" the Roman patriarch could, with the sanction of the law, throw his daughter into a dungeon, deprive her of food, lash her with the scourge, sell her as a slave, or slay her with the sword. When she married, her husband assumed over her the same power. She could, like the Grecian woman, inherit either the whole or a part of her father's estate; but whatever property she possessed, or whatever right of inheritance, was at marriage passed over to her husband. She could be divorced for drinking wine, or even for having in her possession the keys of any place in which it was kept. A wife could, however, be divorced almost at pleasure, provided that her dowry was returned along with her. For a considerable period a woman was forbidden by law to wear a garment of various colors, to have personal ornaments weighing more than half an ounce of gold, and to drive in a chariot within a mile of the city. In those early days the women were employed in cooking, spinning, weaving, and sewing.

When the Romans became rich in the usual way, by plundering their neighbors, the laws relative to woman's dress and recreation were repealed; the domestic duties were relegated to slaves, and the Roman matron blossomed into a lady of fashion.

There were "blue-stockings" as well as "belles," however, among the ladies of ancient Rome. The speech of Hortensia against the unjust taxation of women, delivered before the three assassins who governed Rome during the second triumvirate, is mentioned admiringly by Cicero, and her courage must have been as great as her eloquence, since no man could be found to undertake the perilous task. In another of Italia's cities it is evident that the "new woman" was in existence at a very early date. One of the inscriptions found among the ruins of Pompeii shows that women were put forward by women as candidates for seats on the board of magistrates, but whether successful or not in gaining the coveted office is not recorded. Honored, however, above all other women were the vestals, to whose care were committed the sacred relics upon which the safety of the city was supposed to depend. Often they were the custodians of wills and other important documents, and enjoyed many privileges denied to ordinary mortals.

The usual accomplishments of the Roman maiden were music and dancing. During the Empire, however, ladies were skilled in fencing, boxing, and wrestling, and often appeared in the amphitheatre as competitors for the prize. They appeared there more frequently, however, as spectators of the bloody gladiatorial combats in which unfortunate slaves, unhappy captives, or not less unhappy criminals were butchered to make a Roman holiday. Cruelty, gluttony, and even drunkenness had become prominent traits in the character of the Roman lady of those latter days, and those ugly vices are apt to obscure the virtues of the simple matrons, the pure-minded Lucretias of early Rome.

Among the ancient Germanic tribes women were regarded with peculiar reverence, and were commonly treated as the equals, sometimes as the superiors, of men. They were believed to be recipients of messages from the gods, and, like the rhapsodists of Greece, they were the repositories of the unwritten history of the race, the reciters of the poems in which were commemorated the stories of the tribal heroes. The "wise women," who were carefully set apart from the rest, were believed to be endowed with the power of lifting the veil of the future and learning the decrees of fate, and so were often consulted as oracles. Others were supposed to be gifted with supernatural powers, because of their allegiance to malignant divinities. The daughters of kings and princes were often priestesses, but what were their official duties it is difficult to say. We are told by Tacitus that the priests settled disputes, awarded and inflicted punishments, and attended the armies to battle.

Both sexes were remarkable for their conjugal fidelity, monogamy being practised except in the case of royalty, the possession of more than one wife being a purely regal privilege. The marriage ceremony in those primitive times was exceedingly simple, consisting chiefly of the interchange of presents in the presence of the friends assembled for the feast. Says Tacitus, "To the husband the wife gives no dowry, but the husband to the wife." The present of the bride, he continues, "consisted of oxen, horses, and arms to intimate to her that she was to share in the toils and dangers of her husband as well as in his pleasures." This it was customary for her to do, for the wife of the ancient German was her husband's companion and counsellor in time of peace and his comrade in time of war.

Of the male sex, he says, "those who are bravest and most warlike among them never do any work or mind any business, but, when they are not engaged in war or hunting, spend their whole time in loitering and feasting, committing the management of their houses, lands, and all their affairs to their women, old men, and children." This custom, which to the Roman seemed so strange and so contemptible, was doubtless but a relic of the earlier mother age, when woman was not the dependent of, but the teacher and ruler of, man. Students of German mythology claim that from woman proceeded agriculture, medicine, tradition, and family life—from man, warfare and hunting. Long before the father had become a member of the family group, the mother reigned supreme in the den, teaching to her children the knowledge she had acquired in her efforts to provide for herself and offspring. For a long period such property as there was descended through the mother, and the management of the houses, lands, and all the affairs pertaining to them was in all likelihood due, not to the indolence of the men, but to the fact that woman had not entirely given place to man as head of the household.

The social customs which prevailed among the ancient Britons were in many respects similar to those of Germany. Both Germans and Britons lived in the semi-promiscuous fashion which seems to have led the Romans to form such a low estimate of their morals. Their houses consisted of but one apartment, which was shared by men, women, and children, who during the night rested on one continuous bed of rushes. This mode of life must have seemed exceedingly barbarous to the civilized, luxurious Romans, but that the wives of the Britons were held in common, as is stated by Julius Cæsar, is, we consider, extremely doubtful. The treatment of Cartismandna, the adulterous queen of the Brigantes, whom her indignant subjects obliged to vacate the throne in favor of her injured husband, tends to induce the belief that they did not so lightly look upon the marriage bond, and that monogamy was practised by all classes of society. In Wales, however, wedlock was by no means indissoluble. There a man could divorce his wife upon very slight pretext, and a wife could separate from her husband for such a slight cause as a disagreeable breath. By the laws of Hoel Dda, who was a prince of that country in the tenth century, a man was allowed to give his wife three blows with a stick upon any part of the body except the head if she committed adultery, if she squandered his means, if she pulled his beard, or "called him opprobrious names," but if the beating were more severe or for any more trifling reason, he was fined.

It is difficult to determine what was the exact status of woman in every part of Britain in that olden time. By the law of regal succession a British king was succeeded by his daughter or by his widow, if he left no son. It was in this way that the famous Boadicea became Queen of the Iceni.

In the ordinary ranks of life a man's property was at his death divided equally among his sons. What share was apportioned to his daughters is not quite clear. Among the Saxons on the Continent it was customary for the daughters to receive a smaller share than their brothers. In like manner the laws of Wales in the tenth century decreed that a daughter receive but half as much as falls to her brother of their father's inheritance. There is, however, a law of King Canute from which it appears that sons and daughters were made equal, as they may have been in even earlier times.

Although the British woman was in many cases legally recognized as the equal of man, she was by no means considered fit to be her own guardian, but during her whole life was in the care of one of the opposite sex. While unmarried she was, of course, under the control of her father. At his death her brother took his place, or, if she had none, her nearest male relative. The women who had no relations fell to the guardianship of the king. A married woman was under the legal control of her husband, provided that she had been married with the consent of her previous guardian, whose authority could not be taken from him without his consent. His compliance was usually gained by means of ample presents, sometimes so ample that it became necessary to pass a law fixing the amount for people of all ranks. The value of the presents varied not only according to the rank, but according to the condition of the woman, only half as much being paid in the case of a widow as was paid for a maiden of the same rank. The man who married without the consent of his bride's guardian had no legal authority over his wife nor any of her possessions, and had to suffer various severe penalties for his crime (*mundbreach*), for such it was reckoned.

Marriage was celebrated with a great deal of festivity, although the ceremony was, like that of the Germans, of the simplest description. Among the guests were included all relatives within the third degree. Each guest was expected to give a present to the bride and bridegroom, and the latter also received a present from the guardian of the bride. This "faderfium" was all the dowry which the husband received with his wife. On the morning after the marriage the bridegroom had to retaliate by presenting a valuable gift to his wife. This "morgaengife" (morning gift) became her own separate property, to which she had exclusive right.

The ancient British woman appears to have been as fond of dress as were her Continental sisters, the women of Gaul. Boadicea is described by Dio as wearing a short tunic of thick woollen cloth, over which was a long mantle reaching nearly to the ground. Massive gold ornaments were worn by both sexes, the gold chains of Caractacus and of Boadicea being thought worthy of special mention by the Roman historians. Luxuriant tresses were also esteemed "a thing of beauty," and the golden hair of the ill-fated Queen of the Iceni is said to have floated far down over her armor when engaged in battle. Indeed, it is evident, from all that we can learn of the women of the remote past, that they did not differ so widely from the women of the present day as the lapse of time would lead us to expect, and that, apart from outward circumstances, they were women "in all things like as we are."

MARRIAGE AND MODERN CIVILIZATION

BY

W. S. LILLY

"A person is a man endowed with a civil status" (*civili statu prœditus*) was the definition of Latin jurisprudence. And this was the conception of personality which Christianity found in the Roman Empire, and transformed. Far other was its teaching as to personality. Christianity revealed human nature to itself, exhibiting man as self-conscious, self-determined, morally responsible; as by his very nature invested with rights inalienable and imprescriptible, and encompassed with correlative duties; as lord of himself in the sacred domain of conscience, and accountable there only to Him whose perpetual witness conscience is. This was, in fact, a new principle of individuality. The individual of the later Roman jurisprudence was the citizen, just as the individual among the Germanic invaders of the decadent Empire was the member of the tribe. Slaves were regarded as mere things. Christianity vindicated the moral and spiritual freedom of men as men, proclaimed their universal brotherhood, and insisted that before their Creator and Judge, rich and poor, bond and free, meet together in the essential equivalence of human personality. Victor Hugo's picturesque saying is literally true—truer even than he realized: "The first Tree of Liberty was that Cross on which Jesus Christ offered Himself in sacrifice for the liberty, equality, and fraternity of mankind."

So much as to the root idea of modern civilization: the idea of differentiating it from all other civilizations: the idea of human personality. "*Tu homo, tantum nomen si te scias*" ("How great, O man, is the name thou bearest, if thou only knewest!") said St. Augustine. But by this revelation of the dignity of human nature—I might say the sanctity, *homo res sacra homini*—the weaker half of humanity benefited far more than the stronger half. The proclamation of the spiritual equality of woman with man in the new order—"In Jesus

Christ there is neither male nor female"—notwithstanding her natural subjection to him economically, brought about what may well appear the most wonderful part of the great change due to the influence of Christianity. The estate of woman in the Roman Empire has been pithily expressed by one of the most recent, and not the least authoritative, of its historians. "She was degraded in her social condition," writes Merivale, "because she was deemed unworthy of moral consideration; and her moral consideration, again, sank lower and lower precisely because her social condition was so degraded." Among the Jews—and we must never forget that Christianity first came before the world as a Jewish sect—her place was no higher; indeed it was lower. Divorce was practised by the Hebrews to an extent unknown even in the lowest decadence of imperial Rome. The text in Deuteronomy authorizing a man to put away his wife if he found in her some blemish (*aliquam fœditatem*, as the Vulgate has it) was interpreted most liberally by the Rabbis. Any cause of offence was sufficient, according to Hillel: for example, if a woman let the broth burn; and Akiva lays it down that a man might give his wife a bill of divorcement if he could find a better-looking spouse. Polygamy, too, was at the least tolerated, if it was not largely practised; indeed, it still survives among the Jews of the East, and did not disappear among those dwelling in the West until the prohibitory law of Rabbi Gershom ben Jehudah was passed in the Synod of Worms (A.D. 1020).

But Christianity did more than merely vindicate the personality of woman. It protected her personality by what a learned writer has well called "the new creation of marriage." There are few things in history more astonishing—we may say, in the strictest sense, miraculous—than the fact, for fact it is, that a few words spoken in Syria two thousand years ago by a Jewish peasant, "despised and rejected of men," brought about this vast change, which has wrought so much to purify and ennoble modern civilization; surely an emphatic testimony to the truth of the Evangelist's assertion: "He knew what was in man." De Wette remarks, with his usual judiciousness. "Christ grounds wedlock on the original interdependence (*Zusammengehörigkeit*) of the two sexes, established by God, and lays it down that, as one cannot exist without the other, the inseparability of their union should follow. This union is, indeed, the work of man; but it takes place, and ever should take place, through an inner tendency (*Drang*), proceeding from the original interdependence of the sexes, through *love*. The separation, on the other hand, . . . [of those who thus come together] takes place through human arbitrariness (*Willkür*), or through lusts and passions which unfairly or inconsistently annul what was ordained in conformity with the original law of Nature" ("was dem ursprünglichen Naturgesetze gemäss gestiftet war").

This is the Magna Charta of woman in modern civilization: this lifelong union of two equal personalities; this gift of one woman to one man as *adjutorium simile sibi*, a help like unto him—"not like to like, but like to difference"; a union, a gift, consecrated by religion and made holy matrimony. But I may observe in passing, Christianity did even more than this to secure the position of feminine humanity in that new order of society which it was to mould. Soon—how soon the Catacombs bear witness—the type of womanhood idealized in the Virgin Mother assumed a prominent place in the devotions of the faithful; and as this idea germinated in the Christian consciousness, Mary received a worship inferior only to that offered to her Son. The conception presented by the Madonna would have been foolishness to the antique Greeks, and Romans too. It was a stumbling-block to the Jews, contemptuous of the daughters of her who figures so poorly in the account received by them "of man's first disobedience and the fruit of that forbidden tree." The Christian Church, from the earliest times, delighted to think of Mary as the second Eve, who had undone the work of the first, and had brought life instead of death into the world, *mutans Evæ nomen;* changing the name of the temptress into the "Ave" of the angelic salutation. And when a thousand years had passed away, and chivalry arose, the "all but adoring love" of Christians for her, powerfully stimulated the quasi-religious veneration paid in the Middle Ages to the graces of feminine nature, a veneration which, striking a note before unheard in the world, has inspired the highest poetry of modern civilization. Such was the influence exercised on the place of her sex in the new order of society by "the Mother of fair love, and fear, and knowledge, and holy hope." "Born of a woman" is the true account of the modern home, with its refined and elevating influences. That is the characteristic specially marking off the Christian family from the other families of the earth. It is founded on woman, not on man.

We must, however, remember that the conception of matrimony, which was so powerfully to affect modern civilization—for that is my immediate theme—was not fully and firmly established for centuries. Lotze excellently observes: "The relation of Christianity toward the external condition of mankind was not that of a disturbing and subversive force. But it deprived evil of all justification for permanent continuance . . . when the spirit of Christian faith made itself felt in the relations of life." The Church at the beginning accepted, generally, the marriage customs prevailing in the Roman Empire. The Christian bride, like her pagan sisters, wore the long white robe with the purple fringe, the yellow veil, the girdle which the bridegroom was to unloose. The ring, the coronation—still retained in the Eastern Church—the joining of hands, continued to beautify the nuptial rite for the votaries of the new faith. But for them it was hallowed by a prayer of benediction, offered by a bishop or priest; and, sometimes, by the Eucharistic Sacrifice. Again, the Church, like the Roman legists, recognizes the essence of marriage as residing in the free consent of the man and woman contracting it. But from the first she regarded it as something more than a contract—as a state of life divinely ordained for ends of the natural order, but hallowed by a supernatural significance into an august mystery of religion. And therefore she utterly rejected the view which she found prevalent in the Roman Empire, that, as it had been contracted by mutual consent, so by mutual consent it might be dissolved. From the first she insisted upon its permanency as well as upon its unity.[1] So much is absolutely certain. But was it possible for this sacrosanct bond to be dissolved in its essential character? It is quite clear that the early Church never held as lawful the remarriage of either husband or wife during the lifetime of either, if separated for any other cause than adultery. It is equally clear that on the question whether, if adultery did invalidate the bond, both the innocent and the guilty party, or either of them, might remarry, the Church gave no certain sound for long centuries. The balance of authority among her weightiest teachers is against all such remarriage. But they are divided in opinion; nay, some of the greatest of them waver in their judgment, inclining now to one side, now to the other. Gradually the loftier and sterner view of the Christian concept was apprehended in the West, and maintained by the Roman Pontiffs,[1] though not till the opening Middle Ages was the absolute indissolubility of marriage, when once rightly contracted, save by the death of one of the contracting parties, firmly established in the canon law. It is the doctrine set forth by Gratian, whose *Decretum* (A.D. 1140), a work of supreme authority, is the basis of the *Corpus Juris Canonici;* and from his time to our own it has been universally accepted throughout the Catholic Church.

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[1] And a second marriage, after the death of either, was regarded with much disfavor, as it still is in the Greek Church. Athenagoras calls it "a decent adultery"; Clement of Alexandria, "fornication." St. Gregory Nazianzen, while conceding to the bigamist "pardon and indulgence," terms a third marriage "iniquity," and pronounces that he who exceeds that number is "manifestly bestial." St. Jerome allows that

It is a true saying that a man is formed at the knees of his mother. The kind of men found in a civilization depends upon the kind of women found in it. The ethos of society—what Burke called "the moral basis"—is determined by women. And their goodness or badness, as our very language bears witness, depends upon their purity. That is the root of all feminine virtues, and the source of a people's genuine greatness. Renan's saying is so true as to be almost a truism: "La force d'une nation c'est la pudeur de ses femmes." And the great

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those who contract more than one marriage may remain in the Church, but on sufferance only, and likens them to the unclean beasts in Noah's ark.

[1] Even so late as A.D. 726 Pope Gregory the Second, in a letter to St. Boniface, while recommending that a man whose wife's health forbade conjugal intercourse should not marry again, left him free to do so provided he maintained her. Gratian remarks that this concession "is altogether opposed to the sacred canons; nay, even to the Evangelical and Apostolic doctrine." It is certainly opposed to the view taken by all Gregory's successors in the Roman See, and, so far as we know, by all his predecessors.

bulwark of woman's chastity is the absolute character of matrimony.

We owe, then, to the severe teaching of the Catholic Church that institution of indissoluble monogamy which, more than anything else, marks off our modern civilization from all other civilizations. It is matter of history, over which we need not linger, how unflinchingly the Catholic Church[1] has upheld the integrity of that institution throughout the ages. Nor need we examine the arguments adduced by her divines in support of it. I may, however, make an observation on the criticism to which one of those arguments is manifestly open. Theological writers, when maintaining that indissoluble monogamy is divinely instituted—and surely with reason, for it issues from the divinely ordained nature of things in their ethical relations—have been confronted with the obvious difficulty presented by the practice of Hebrew patriarchs and kings, of acknowledged sanctity, with whom they claimed solidarity. Their favorite expedient for meeting this difficulty is the hypothesis that a Divine dispensation for polygamy was granted to the human race from the time of the flood associated with that familiar figure of our childhood, the Noachian ark, and was revoked by Christ. It is objected that they do not disclose the manner in which this stupendous indulgence was proclaimed to mankind, or explain why knowledge of its summary cancellation was withheld from the countless millions affected thereby. The objectors do not understand that theological fictions, like legal, have their proper office in certain stages of social evolution, as necessary stepping-stones on which our race rises to higher things.

But, as a matter of fact, the institution of marriage in our modern civilization rests, not on argument, but on authority. The nations to which the Catholic Church taught the doctrine of Christ did not heckle their teacher; they received her as the prophet of God, and believed her on her bare word. The great religious revolution of the sixteenth century is congruously termed Protestanism. Its imitators differed widely upon a great many matters. But Henry the Eighth and Luther, Calvin and Zwingli, Knox and Münzer, however varying their private judgments in things theological, were all agreed in protesting against the authority of the Pope, and in substituting for it their own. And when the authority of the Apostolic See was cast off, much of the doctrine and discipline which it upheld was mutilated. The doctrine and discipline of marriage did not escape this fate. In England, indeed, though the schism arose from the refusal of the Sovereign Pontiff to prostitute Christian matrimony to the lust of a tyrant, the institution itself was left intact.[1] This, it may be observed in passing, was by no means due to Cranmer. His own history, perhaps, sufficiently explains his aversion from the Catholic doctrine of marriage. At all events, it is abundantly clear that he was as willing to relax the nuptial bond for the world in general as to cancel it for his master. The legislation on divorce which he proposed to substitute, in the *Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum*, for the Catholic law might have satisfied even Luther, whose practice is sufficiently indicated by his own marriage, and by the dispensation for polygamy given by him to the Landgrave Philip of Hesse.

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[1] It cannot be too emphatically stated that, in the Catholic Church, divorce, in the modern sense of the word—the dissolution of the marriage bond—is never granted, and is never recognized. The common phrase, "the divorce of Henry the Eighth," has given rise to much popular misapprehension. It was not a divorce, as the term is now understood, but a declaration of nullity, which Henry the Eighth sought, and the Holy See refused.

The earlier generations of the Lutheran sect appear to have followed its founder's views concerning the relations of the sexes *haud passibus æquis*. From the first, indeed, it allowed divorce for adultery and malicious desertion, as did also the sect founded by Calvin. But it was not until the eighteenth century that the dissolution of the matrimonial tie was accorded by Protestant consistories for such reasons as "uncongeniality," "irreconcilable enmity," and the like. In fact, as Protestantism developed, the pronouncements of its pundits concerning the bond of marriage became laxer. Nor was this laxity confined to its more rationalistic forms. Even the greatest of the Puritans, John Milton, in that masterpiece of eloquence, erudition, and invective, *The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, "pushes the

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[1] In theory, but not in practice. Between the Reformation and the establishment of the Divorce Court (A.D. 1857) many marriages were dissolved by Act of Parliament, the Anglican bishops not protesting and in some cases expressly consenting.

Protestant license," to borrow the phrase of his editor, very far. The position which he sets himself to establish is "that indisposition, unfitness, and contrariety of mind, arising from a cause in nature unchangeable, hindering and ever likely to hinder the main benefits of conjugal society, which are solace and peace, is a greater reason of divorce than natural frigidity, especially if there be no children, and that there be mutual consent."

This was, substantially, the position taken by the publicists of the French Revolution—the second Act in that great European drama which opened with the Protestant Reformation. Of course the foulness which they preached in their crusade against Christianity would have been rejected with horror by Milton's God-fearing soul. Purity they regarded as "a new disease brought into the world by Christ"; modesty as "a virtue fastened on with pins"; holy matrimony as "a superstitious servitude." And their legislation, when they obtained the power to legislate, was the faithful expression of these opinions. Their great "reform" was to reduce marriage to a civil contract, terminable by the consent of the contracting parties. Other grounds of divorce enumerated by their law of 1792 were insanity, desertion, absence, emigration, and incompatibility of temper on the allegation of either husband or wife. The measure seems to have been successful beyond the expectation of its authors. During the twenty-seven months following its enactment six thousand marriages were dissolved in Paris alone, and in the year 1797 the divorces actually outnumbered the marriages. Duval, in his *Souvenirs Thermidoriens*, tells us:

"People divorced one another with the least provocation; nay, they divorced without any provocation, and with no more ado than they would have made for an expedition to gather lilacs in the meadows of Saint-Gervais, or to eat cherries at Montmorency. The husband had a mistress, and was tired of his wife; the wife had a lover, and desired nothing better than to be rid of her husband. They informed one another of the state of the case, set out together for the city hall, acquainted the mayor that they could no longer bear each other, and on the same day, or the next, the divorce was granted for incompatibility of temper. And the children—what became of them?

What did it matter? The spouses were free from one another; the most important thing was achieved. Moreover, it was not rare, on account of the ease with which marriages could be dissolved, to find couples who had been divorced five or six times in as many months. Occasionally very ludicrous things happened. Once two couples acted after the manner of La Fontaine's *Troqueurs*, that is to say, they arranged an exchange of husband and wife among themselves: and the two couples were on such good terms that the double-wedding breakfast was held at their joint expense."

The Napoleonic Code somewhat curbed this bestiality, and, at the Restoration, the old Catholic marriage legislation was reinstated in France. But the Third Republic has reënacted divorce by the law of the 27th of July, 1884, carried by the persistent endeavors of M. Naquet, a measure which, though going beyond the corresponding legislation in England, is less licentious than the law of the First Republic.

The French Revolution is the immediate source of a number of sophisms concerning man and society which have worked their way into popular favor throughout Europe during the last century, and now tyrannize as shibboleths. They are, one and all, underlain by that spurious individualism which is of the essence of Rousseau's teaching, and which the Revolution, happily described by Burke as "an armed doctrine," endeavored to translate into fact. The atomism, real or imaginary, of certain unstable tribes in the lowest stages of civilization, was for Rousseau the true ideal of the family. It is a false ideal; but it is the ideal which so-called Liberalism has persistently endeavored to realize. There can be no doubt that the attack on the permanency of marriage throughout Europe, which has already been crowned with so much success, is an outcome of this ideal—an ideal essentially anarchic. When the Divorce Court was established in England, that sagacious publicist Le Play—whose writings, I fear, are hardly known in this country—saw in it "a symptom of the decline of public morality; "elle affaiblit," he observed, "dans l'esprit de la nation le principe de l'ordre supérieur." But, of course, what has been accomplished here by the opponents of indissoluble marriage, falls far short of their achievements elsewhere. In Germany, "insuperable aversion" is recognized as a ground for divorce; so is "hopeless insanity," or "malignant inconsistency," or "quarrelsomeness," or "a disorderly mode of life," or "drunkenness," or "extravagance." In Sweden, "hatred, ill-will, prodigality, drunkenness, or a violent temper" suffices. The Protestants of Austria may divorce one another for "violent dislike." In Switzerland, "marriage relations greatly strained" are recognized as a valid reason for dissolving the marriage. But in the last-mentioned country a still further "reform" is desired by the party of "progress," and an appeal, by way of referendum, to the "yea and no of general ignorance" is contemplated, with a view of legalizing divorce whenever "a profound disorganization" of such relations occurs.

The American courts take a very liberal view of cruelty. It appears that they have granted divorce to a petitioning wife on this ground when her husband "did not wash himself, thereby inflicting great mental anguish on her"; when "he accused her sister of stealing, thereby sorely wounding her feelings"; when, "after twenty-seven years of marriage, he said: 'You are old and worn out; I do not want you any longer'"; when "he would not cut his toenails, and she was scratched severely every night"; when "he persisted in the use of tobacco, thereby aggravating sick headaches, to which she was subject." A petitioning husband, on the other hand, has obtained from them the dissolution of his marriage for such instances of cruelty as the following: when "his wife pulled him out of bed by the whiskers"; when "she upbraided him, and said: 'You are no man at all,' thereby causing him mental suffering and anguish"; when "she refused to keep his clothes in repair, and even to cook, and never sewed on his buttons"; when "she struck him a violent blow with her bustle."

This is the condition into which the institution of marriage has already come in modern civilization. And the causes to which this is due are yet working, and with ever-increasing activity. Materialism, disguised and undisguised, is the fashionable philosophy of the day.[1] It is fatal to the idea of human personality, and, consequently, to the spiritual prerogatives of woman. It means to her, as Dean Merivale has well observed in his striking *Lectures on the Conversion of the Northern Nations*, from which I quoted in an earlier portion of this paper, "a fall from the consideration she now holds among us." It means that she must "descend again to be the mere plaything of man, the transient companion of his leisure hours, to be held loosely, as the chance gift of a capricious fortune."

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[1] For the proof of this statement I must refer the reader to Chapter I. and to the Appendix in my work *On Right and Wrong.*

Such transient companionship, such loose holding, appear to many careful observers the substitute for Christian marriage which will be found in the world as Christianity becomes generally discredited; a consummation which they deem imminent. To quote at length even the more considerable of contemporary publicists who have expressed this view, would take me far beyond my present limits. I can here cite only a very few words from three of them. Mr. Karl Pearson, in his learned and able work, *The Ethic of Free Thought*, writes: "Legalized life monogamy is, in human history, a thing but of yesterday; and no unprejudiced person can suppose it a final form. A new sex relationship will replace the old. Both as to matter and form it ought to be a pure question of taste, a simple matter of agreement between the man and woman." Mr. Pearson, in his most suggestive volume, *National Life and Character*, holds that as "the religion of the State" replaces Christianity, which he thinks it is swiftly and surely doing, it will be "impossible to maintain indissoluble marriage," and "the tie between husband and wife" will "come to be easily variable, instead of permanent." Similarly, Mr. H. G. Wells, in the singularly interesting *Anticipations*, with which he has just favored the world, deems it "impossible to ignore the forces making for a considerable relaxation of the institution of permanent monogamous marriage in the coming years," and holds it "foolish not to anticipate and prepare for a state of things when not only will moral standards be shifting and uncertain, admitting of physiologically sound *ménages* of very variable status, but also when vice and depravity, in every form that is not absolutely penal, will be practised in every grade of magnificence, and condoned."

I own I think this prognostication of the return of modern civilization to "the morals of the poultry yard" well warranted by the signs of the times. It rests, indeed, upon the assumption that the revolution in the relations of the sexes, steadily progressing since the destruction of the religious unity of Europe, will continue unchecked. Whether that assumption is correct "only the event will teach us, in its hour." Of course we must not forget that human affairs seldom advance for very long in a straight line. "Inest in rebus humanis quidam circulus." The future rarely corresponds with the forecasts of even the wisest. Still, as we look around the world, it is impossible not to recognize the strength of the forces which militate against marriage. I know well that we cannot count reason among them. The human reason, properly disciplined and correctly exercised, is capable of ascertaining the ethical principles necessary to enable man to arrive at his natural ideal—the harmonious development of all his powers in a complete and consistent whole. And from these principles is derived the true norm of matrimony so well expressed by the great jurisconsult of ancient Rome: "Conjunctio maris et feminæ est consortium omnis vitae; divini et humani juris communicatio." A state of life involving the fusion of two personalities, and fraught with consequences most momentous to both, and to society, its unity and indissolubility issue from the nature of things in their ethical relations.

The only real witness in the world for the absolute character of holy matrimony is the Catholic Church. And whether men will hear, or whether—as seems more likely—they will forbear, she warns them that to degrade indissoluble marriage to a mere dissoluble contract, to a mere regulation of social police, to a mere material fact governed by the animal, not the rational, nature, will be to throw back modern civilization to that wallowing in the mire from which she rescued it.

XVIII

UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

"THE ESSENTIAL EQUALITY OF MAN AND WOMAN"

BY

FRANCES POWER COBBE

AND

WILLIAM K. HILL

DISMISSING the moral side of the problem of woman in her relations with man, we turn now to its practical aspect. What is woman's position in the world to-day, and what is it like to be in the immediate future? This, in every public woman's mind, hurls us at once upon the question of woman suffrage, or "universal suffrage" as many of its advocates prefer to call it. Any vehemently argued issue is perhaps better understood by viewing it from a distance; and so we have purposely dealt with this agitated theme, not as it presents itself to any one of its supporters in America, but as it strikes our English cousins. Frances Power Cobbe has long been a leading name among woman suffragists. A granddaughter of Archbishop Cobbe, of Dublin, Miss Cobbe early became a leader in religious circles, and in her own career has exemplified the principles for which she stands, being widely known as a lecturer, an author, and a journalist. The following address was first delivered by her before the Ladies' Club in Clifton.

Lest her view of the matter might be thought one-sided we supplement it with a discussion by a "mere man," who approaches the subject in its broader aspect. Going beyond "suffrage" Mr. Hill inquires as to the equalities and inequalities of the sexes, mental, moral, and physical. He even attempts to strike a scientific balance and deduce results.

UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

There are two sides from which we may regard the woman-suffrage demand: the *Justice* of it and the *Expediency* of it.

I am one of those who would always place the former in the foreground, for I believe with Cicero that "nothing is right because it is expedient, but it is expedient because it is right." When we have ascertained the righteousness of any line of action, public or private, we may be pretty sure that, in God's world, it will turn out sooner or later to have been the expedient course; if not in the lower sense and connected with our baser interests, yet in the higher, connected with those in which the happiness and honor of human life consist.

Now as regards the Justice of the claim of women to the franchise, we must of course admit at starting that the whole idea of representative government is a modern one, and that the abstract idea of justice—what Kant would call "a Law fit for Law Universal"—is difficult of application to it. We might have lived still under a government at any stage between a Greek democracy, where every man has his own representative in the market-place, and a Russian autocracy, where the Autocrat may say like Louis XIV., *L'état c'est moi.* But as we stand now in the twentieth century in England, it would seem that (*where men are concerned*) two principles are almost universally accepted as just—namely, that those who are called on to obey the laws should have a voice in making them; and that those who pay taxes should have a voice in their expenditure.

These two principles, I remark, are almost universally accepted as just, *for men.* Very few people will refuse to admit that they are so. But why then, I ask, are they not to be held just likewise, and equally, where women are concerned? We too are called upon to obey the laws. Why should not we have a voice in making them? We too (alas!) are called upon to pay taxes. Why should not we have a word to say about their expenditure? This is our contention. That what is just for the *gander* would also be just for the *goose!* At least the *onus* of proving that it is not so lies with our opponents.

Of course the real origin and still existing source of this failure of justice is the old, old story of the subjection of the weak to the strong—the inevitable, and (not blamable) omnipotence of men in times when Might made Right; and a natural survival of the old state of masculine overbearing under happier and softer conditions, in the minds both of men and women. It is an *idée fixe* with both sexes that men should rule, and women be ruled. But now, surely, the time has come when the problem may be regarded dispassionately and without prejudice by both parties, and the question pressed home: Why, if it be just to give *men*, who have to obey the laws and pay taxes, a voice in making the laws and expending the taxes, is it not also just to give the same voice to women who have to do both, the same as they?

I apprehend that very few, even of the sternest opponents of our claims, will attempt to dispute them on these abstract grounds of justice *pur et simple.* But they will say that, where public interests are concerned, other things must be taken into consideration beside abstract and theoretic justice; and that the weakness of women renders them by nature unfit to take part in government or public affairs; that their inclusion in the constituencies would *water down* the political life of the nation and weaken the constitution; and that there are other objects to which their whole attention should be given—namely, to housekeeping and baby-rearing.

Now let us face this argument from the inferiority of women frankly. It *is* true! Women, on the whole, *are* intellectually as well as physically less strong than men. That is, if we set up almost any standard of ability or genius or erudition, we shall find a good many more men than women attain to it. The highest standard of all no woman has ever yet reached; and accordingly we have been contemptuously taunted with the question:

> "Where is your *Hamlet*, your *Macbeth*,
> Your soul-wrought victories?"

"*Nowhere*," I cheerfully answer, unless poor Sappho (whom Aristotle ranks alongside of Homer and Æschylus) attained it; and *her* works (all the nine books save a few fragments!) men have, unfortunately, managed to lose. I have also recently learned that many of the hymns in the Rig Veda are by female Rishis. That these are absolutely Divine is the belief of all Brahmins. I possess an idol of Brahma the Creator, which represents him as holding the four Vedas in his four hands, and reading them with his four heads. Think of the chief God of the Trimurti reading a woman's writing![1]

But now arises the question: Has the possession of genius sufficient to write "Hamlet" and "Macbeth" anything to do with the exercising of the voting power in the United Kingdom as at present constituted?

If it be so, then the whole Celtic population would be justly disfranchised, for there has never been a Celtic Shakespeare, or Homer, or Dante, or Milton, any more than there has been a woman of the same exalted intellectual rank. But if no one would dream of urging this deficiency against a good Scotch, Welsh, or Irish farmer as a reason why he should not cast a vote for the candidate he prefers at his county election, is it not ridiculous to use it as a reason for refusing the same franchise to us women? The same argument applies in the still higher field of philosophy. There has never been a female Plato or Kant. But neither has there been a Celtic Plato or Kant.

There would be some fairness in arguments on this line if some intellectual test, high or low, were made the condition of ability to vote for a member of Parliament. In that case it might be a proportionately small number of women who would reach it. But there would be *some;* and that would end the injustice of the present state of things.

But admitting frankly the inferiority of our sex as regards great epics and tragedies and systems of philosophy, we must here put in a pertinent question: Whether women have proved themselves likewise inferior in *that* gift—power, faculty—whatever we may call it, which alone concerns the question in hand? *Are* women bad politicians, bad administrators, incapable naturally of understanding and guiding aright our ship of state? I will tell my reasons for urging this question.

I possess at home two heavy volumes of tables of ancient and modern history, in which I noted down (in my long-past studious youth) all the sovereigns of all the countries concerning which I was able to glean any information; using a little system of my own for showing at a glance their descents and successions. It occurred to me some time ago to count over the names in these tables; and I found there were more than 2,500 *men* sovereigns on record—kings and emperors; and of these a proportion of something like 5 per cent. were to be ranked as "eminent" or "illustrious" rulers, according to Mr. Francis Galton's definitions.

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[1] The Psalm which says: "The Lord gave the Word, great was the company of the preachers," ought (I am informed by the best Hebrew scholars) to be translated: "The Lord gave the Word. The *heraldesses* who proclaimed it were a great host."

Among them, at long intervals, in almost every country appeared also Queens, numbering altogether 51. But in that half hundred, nearly half were indisputably "eminent" or "illustrious"; some of them the best rulers which their countries ever possessed. We cannot enter far into this inquiry (I have often begged my literary friends to undertake it carefully), but I will just name a few out of the small number of women who have ever reigned as independent sovereigns, and ask the reader to consider whether they do not stand out lustrously in the pages of history? [1]

I must begin in order of time (even if modern investigation leaves them as half-mythical personages,) with the great SEMIRAMIS, and her successor (after five generations) NITOCRIS of Babylon. Both of these queens are credited by Herodotus with vast works of public beneficence connected with the great Rivers; and the former, Diodorus says, "traversed all parts of the vast Assyrian Empire, erecting great cities and stupendous monuments, and opening roads through savage mountains." NITOCRIS, Herodotus describes, as building a sort of drawbridge over the Euphrates, and making other great works.

After a second NITOCRIS (called in the Turin Papyrus NETAGERTI), Queen of Egypt, who is said to have wreaked a fearful retribution on her brother's murderers and then to have buried herself alive; [2] we come at last to firm grounds of history in the actual movements of the glorious reign of Queen HATEPSU (or more properly HATSHEPSUT) at Deir-el-Bahri, and the great obelisks at Karnak. It is little to say to those who have studied these monuments, and the wondrous story of her Embassy to the Land of Punt, that Queen HATEPSU was one of the most enlightened princes of the ancient world, and one of the grandest of the mighty Pharaohs.

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[1] Many of the 51 above counted as Queens-Regnant were the daughters of preceding sovereigns, married to their successors, and practically not more independent rulers than other Queens-Consort.

[2] See *History of Egypt* by Flinders Petrie, Vol. I., p. 105.

Again we find DEBORAH among the Judges; a woman whose generalship saved Israel from the tyranny of Jabin, and secured peace for the land for forty years; and whose "Song" remains to us (as recent criticism avers) the most ancient fragment of Hebrew Scripture. Again we find ARTEMISIA, the heroine of Salamis, who alone saved her ships in that disastrous battle, and for whose life the (not very chivalrous!) Athenians offered a reward of 10,000 drachmas because they "could not bear to be beaten by a woman"; also the second ARTEMISIA, of Halicarnassus, who built to her husband's memory the sublime *Mausoleum*, which has been ever since the archetype of noble funeral monuments.

Again: ZENOBIA, the magnificent and illustrious Queen of Palmyra, the friend of Longinus, of whom her conqueror, Aurelian (who so meanly compelled her to adorn his triumph) said that he had "never encountered so brave and resolute a foe."

Passing to the Western world we have our own British BOADICEA defying all the power of Rome, and, when she could do so no longer, killing herself to escape capture. Later on, MARGARET, Queen of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, reached, as we read, by her great ability as a sovereign and diplomatist, "a degree of power unequalled in Europe since Charlemagne." ISABELLA II., Queen of Castile, to whose discernment of the genius of Columbus the world owes the discovery of America. Our own Queen ELIZABETH, of whose greatness it is needless to speak; MARIA THERESA, of Austria, of whom we read that she "made great financial reforms," and that in her reign "Agriculture, Manufacture and Commerce flourished, and the national revenue greatly increased." CATHERINE II., of Russia, no doubt a bad woman, but not perhaps a very bad Empress, to whom it is noticeable that, alone of all female sovereigns, the title of "*Great*" has been appropriated! Then we have the present mysterious Empress of China—"SHE"—who, whether innocent, or a monster of cruelty and craft, is probably the ablest living person, man or woman, among the four hundred millions of the Celestial Empire. And lastly, and greatest and best of all, QUEEN VICTORIA OF ENGLAND. Few will be found to say that this true Woman—fond wife, tender mother, kind and sympathizing friend to all who suffered—was not at least as good a politician as any male voter in her dominions, nay, perhaps as any of her illustrious subjects in the great "Victorian Age" which bears her name. Yet Queen Victoria was *not* "a genius." Her simple books show no trace of an intellect, or an imagination, which could have composed a *Hamlet*, or a *Macbeth*, or a *Paradise Lost;* still less a *Phædo*, or a *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. She was, in short, a "mere woman"; we might say a typical, duty-loving woman. But nevertheless she was (quite indisputably) a first-rate *Statesman!*

Thus I think we may fairly contend that if, in any branch of human intelligence, women are the equals of men, it is precisely in the one from which they are carefully excluded by law, unless they happen to be born princesses! *Then*, indeed, they are placed at the top of the constitution; and for sixty years we never hear a complaint of their incapacity for politics.

Where then, I ask, can be found any plea of justice for excluding our whole sex from the very simplest and smallest of political rights, when in *that* field at all events we have been proved to possess at least equal faculty with men? What right have our legislators to continue to classify for this important purpose every living woman—blameless as to crime, and of full age to form a solid judgment—as if she were of necessity by nature always a pauper, an idiot, a criminal, or a minor?

The refusal to us of Parliamentary votes is assuredly a rank injustice, and it practically involves a score of other injustices resulting from our unrepresented position, which causes our interests inevitably to go to the wall. We demand therefore in all seriousness and earnestness that this injustice be done away with in the United Kingdom, as it has been done away with in our Southern Colonies, and in the Isle of Man, with none but beneficial results to the whole community.[1]

But now let us turn from the painful and, I confess, to me, irritating subject of the Injustice of which we complain in the refusal to us of the suffrage on the same terms as men, and consider for a few pleasant moments what may happen if the sense of justice in men ever rise high enough to induce them to grant us our natural rights. We have no means to force this concession on men. That is our misfortune. We have no *pou sto* from which to work, and sorely we have wanted one! But I believe in the universal progress of all humanity; and that the day will come when the difference of the constitution which stands between us will appear (as in truth it is) absolutely unreasonable and absurd, and the expediency of granting to us women the Parliamentary suffrage will become manifest.

I am persuaded that the right of voting (small as it seems) will carry with it (if we ever obtain it) a great intellectual and moral uplifting of women. We are all—men and women—subject to a law of our nature which I have described elsewhere as the *Contagion of the Emotions;* and to be despised is, in all but the very strongest natures, to despise ourselves. Now the refusal to us of the franchise in its present largely extended area is to *deconsider* us; to place us in an inferior category from even very ignorant and low-class men. It is degrading to our whole sex, *qua* sex; and it is impossible for any of us who are of an age and pecuniary position in which we should have votes if we were men, not to feel this, and to recognize that, in the judgment of our fellow-countrymen, we are an inferior class of beings. This comes home to us more in the country than in a town, for there we are directly confronted with masculine privileges. Our own farmers, our servants, our very laborers, be they never so ignorant and stupid, have a voice in elections while we have none. It is all very well for men to glorify womanhood in prose and verse, and treat us with special courtesy, and even to worship the Madonna! At bottom most men feel to us as we do to children; and this acts most injuriously on our own characters in making us childish.

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[1] The following is a letter testifying to this fact from my friend Dr. John Ellis McTaggart, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, who is married to a New Zealand lady:

"So I jot down the following conclusions in which we both agree:—

(1) The Colony is completely satisfied with it.

(2) The percentage of women who vote is smaller, but only slightly smaller, than the percentage of men.

(3) Neither political party has gained by it—the women apparently dividing themselves in the same proportions as the men between the two parties.

(4) It has substantially, but not overwhelmingly, strengthened the temperance vote."

Now if we can obtain votes men will begin to adopt a different tone toward us, for they will want to interest us in their politics. It will not be a rapid change on their side or on our own; but it is bound to come in time. They will also seek more often the society of women who, as we all know, are apt to be a good deal left to themselves when they happen to be widows, or old maids, without any very special attractions. It is in every way desirable that the two sexes should frequently converse freely together, to the strengthening and enlarging the minds of women (and even putting animal spirits and pluck into them); and, we may hope, on the other side, to the softening and purifying of the minds of men. If I had the choice of associating only with women, or only with men, I should have no hesitation in preferring women's society. But, as the children say, "*Both is best*," and there is always a loss when men never converse with women or women never converse with men. You know what George Eliot says, "The masculine mind—*what there is of it*—is always of a superior order!" I should always advocate every plan bringing us into common work and play—to sit on committees together and unite as much as possible in all public action. I even took on myself once to tell the lady Principal of one of our new colleges for women at Oxford, that I thought she ought to be a married woman with a husband who would sit at the head of the dinner table every day and lead the conversation! I believe it would be an excellent arrangement; better for the students than many a course of Lectures.

Many of my readers must have noticed the different *nuance* in the talk of English and of American gentlemen to women. In America, though the women have not as yet votes, except in a few States, they have attained a different social position from that which we hold in England: and consequently an American man talks *up* to us; very visibly taking it for granted that we know as much and have as good a judgment of the subject in hand as himself. An Englishman on the contrary usually talks *down* to us. He assumes that we know little or nothing; and that our opinions (if we have any) are hardly worth ascertaining. This he does pretty universally to ladies who are strangers to him. Only if he happen to know that the woman to whom he is speaking is the possessor of brains, he is apt to treat her in a still more aggravating manner, and to imply, in all he says, that she is not as other women are, "fools and slight," but stands apart from her sex—a very great insult as we must all consider it. After a certain number of years of the new *régime* I am convinced that the minds of women would grow larger and stronger, even as their bodies have done in the last forty years by fresh air and exercise, and then a generation will arise in which women will scarcely be called any longer the "weaker sex."

But the moral and intellectual advantages to women personally which the franchise would in time—slowly perhaps, but surely—bring; and also the actual material gain which in many cases it would involve by compelling Parliamentary attention to the Bills in which their interests are concerned—these gains are secondary to the great issue: "What will be the influence of the feminine vote on the politics of the nation at large?" For a long time it will, of course, not tell very greatly in varying this policy one way or another; but as time goes on, it must turn the balance on many questions. Will that influence be for bad or for good?

I am sure that, on the whole, it will be greatly for good. Mistakes may be made, and no doubt women will be affected like men by waves of popular sentiment, causing them sometimes to throw their weight wrongly. But in the long run there can be little doubt that both the conscientiousness and the tenderness of women will influence public affairs and the making of laws in the direction of greater humanity toward all the poor and suffering, to captives, to criminals, to children, to the aged, to animals; and also in that of public morality; in that of temperance; and finally, in that of peace. No Member of Parliament, depending largely for his election on the votes of women, will (for example) sanction the licensed torture of animals, on the ground that it is hoped it will pay in useful discoveries.

Thus viewing the whole field of politics, I do not doubt that the concession of the suffrage to women on the same terms as men now hold it (or on any terms on which they may hold it from time to time), will be expedient as well as just. We are not a sex of saints and sages, though there have been some saints and sages here and there belonging to us; and also a great many sinners and fools. But on the whole we are less often criminals than are men; perhaps we are a little less selfish; and certainly more conscientious than ordinary men. In short, in the lump, women are better than men, though not so strong and not so clever. As Theodore Parker well defined it: We are not the equals of men, but their equivalents. We are not their equals physically, æsthetically, or perhaps intellectually. They are not our equals in things higher than these—in the regions of morality and of the affections, human and divine.

But if this be conceded, is it not to under-estimate *goodness* itself, to doubt that this *better* weight, thrown into the scales of politics, will be beneficial? Once again, I am convinced, it will be proved (as I started by affirming), that what is JUST will always be, in the highest sense, also EXPEDIENT.

"THE ESSENTIAL EQUALITY OF MAN AND WOMAN"

BY

WILLIAM K. HILL

Of the many controversies which occupy the intellectual activities of the human race, probably none is more ancient, interesting, and long-lived than that which concerns the relative position of the sexes in respect to capacity. Before the dawn of civilization there was presumably no controversy on this point. If any wandering doubt entered the mind of any individual woman, either she kept it to herself or the prompt application of a male hand or foot silenced its expression forever. Later on in the pre-Christian civilizations of Southeastern Europe, if womanhood was recognized as reaching nearer to the admitted superiority of manhood than barbarism believed, the admission was largely theoretical, and its illustrations in the Aspasias and Cornelias of the time were few and far between. The standard set up by Christ, if it took root at all, was soon disfigured by the famous gloss of his Apostle Paul. "In like manner, ye wives, be in subjection to your own husbands, . . . beholding your chaste behavior coupled with fear, . . . in the incorruptible apparel of a meek and quiet spirit, . . . as Sarah obeyed Abraham, calling him lord." The mediæval appreciation of womanhood, as is well known, was merely a vision of passion and fancy which rose above rational equality into the region of fulsome adulation. Thence through many stages of effort we have arrived at the so-called emancipation and higher education of woman, upon which disfranchisement is perhaps the last remaining blot of any magnitude.

But it is just in the fact of the persistence of this great and dark blot, and of the many smaller and lighter blots scattered over the sphere of sex-equality, that a great interest lies and much food for reflection. Why, when so many doors have been opened to women, are the great doors of the parliament-house and several other small wickets still closed to them? The answer will, I think, be found in the fact that, out of the sum of manhood, there are still but few men who, at all times and under all circumstances, really believe in the essential equality of the sexes. Of the rest, the majority are still sceptical, and the minority believe only with half their heart, being too ready to trim their sails to any wind of adverse criticism blown up by the passing crazes of the Press and platform, or the drawing-room.

Under these circumstances it is still a matter of interest to try and throw new light upon this ancient controversy, and unveil, if it be possible, the subconscious opposition which makes so many men admit in theory the equality of the sexes and yet in practice act upon lines which can only be justified by the denial of such equality.

Let us consider, then, these leading characteristics of the human race: reason, imagination, and the initiative which manifests itself in creative work; emotion, courage, moral stability, and truth; strength and endurance.

Reason is equally the characteristic of both sexes, but its derivatives, reasonableness and reasoning, are said to be more strongly marked in man than in woman. Man usually thinks before he acts. Woman is inclined very often to act before she thinks. The truth of this would in no way be lessened by the thoughtful action of the man leading, as so often happens, to a result inferior to that which flows from the impulsive action of the woman. Deliberation is not always a virtue; yet, inasmuch as the man's action is fundamentally rational, it is likely to blunder less often than the sometimes successful intuition of the woman, and, under the conditions of the average, the superiority would lie with the man, assuming that this alleged distinction is really as widespread as men declare. I have heard one of the most strenuous advocates of the emancipation of woman assert that women are inclined to be very unreasonable about small matters in the sphere of the home. But this apparent unreasonableness has a basis in reason not properly appreciated by man. Take one example, which has so often been the subject of satire. Woman thinks punctual obedience to the dinner gong more important than the catching and fixing for posterity of some soul-compelling metaphor or one ray of "the light that never was on sea or land," which is hovering just on the horizon of the imagination, but just out of pen or pencil grip when the gong rings. Is it not because, but for the assiduous cultivation of such distorted estimates of relative importance, she would find the details of domestic management altogether too sordid and wearisome, and, as a result, starve and weaken the great mind that is at hand-grips with inspiration?

In the matter of imagination, as manifested objectively in its works, the only form in which we can estimate it, woman cannot at present set anything against such male achievements as the *Iliad*, the *Divina Commedia*, *Hamlet*, *Faust*, the Venus of Milo, *Tannhäuser*, or the *Choral Symphony*, to cite only a few leading examples.

In the closely allied quality of initiative the weakness of woman is loudly asserted by man and, though I shall have occasion to traverse this contention in certain particulars, it is difficult to cite any considerable number of women who have initiated and shaped with creative touch great works or great movements. The capacity for scheming and intrigue, specially credited to woman, is quite a different and very inferior possession, no less common in man, as any one living amid the seething intrigue of present educational politics will admit. But, taking the quality of creative initiative, Sappho's output is merely fragmentary. Mrs. Browning's emotional beauty and imaginative fervor are, for many, disfigured by lack of musical sense. Cleopatra's statecraft was only destructive; and though Joan of Arc must be credited with the initiation of a truly statesmanlike conception of policy, it is doubtful if her success was due so much to able generalship as to the power of inspiring enthusiasm. The distinguishing characteristics of Elizabeth's greatness were a capacity for recognizing the wisdom of her servants and a devoted patriotism, rather than any such constructive faculty as must be credited to Henry II., Edward I., and others of England's great kings. In like manner the greatness of Victoria was much more the outcome of her success in the practical application of the doctrine of constitutional government than in any constructive power, for which indeed the very system of modern constitutional government left her little scope.

Great deeds may be laid to the credit of emotion in the history of the world when time and circumstance favored the form of stimulus it gives; but the sins chargeable to its account far outnumber these great deeds. Woman has long held the reputation of being more emotional than man.

> "Uncertain, coy, and hard to please,
> And variable as the shade
> By the light quivering aspen made."

The reason commonly assigned is physiological, but I think the true cause is neither so permanent nor so incurable.

In courage, moral stability, mental endurance, and truth it would seem as if man could claim no superiority, and in the last three must even yield to woman; for there are many brave women, and woman's power of mental endurance is famous, while her morality, truth, conscientiousness, and general good behavior, in youth at least, are superior to man's. None the less woman has always been looked upon as more timid than man, while woman and nerves have always been associated in the popular fancy. It is well known that in fundamental virtues woman is more fastidious than man; for Pope's dictum that "every woman is at heart a rake" was merely a sacrifice of truth to epigram; but in the minor verities of social intercourse her laxity has long been the butt of the social satirist. No one charges her with a tendency to covet her neighbor's husband as a man covets his neighbor's wife; but, when it is a case of the neighbor's ox or ass, as symbolized in jewelry, servants, or a double coach-house, she is credited with being of an envious and even malicious disposition. Only two or three times in a century, as in the Humbert case, is she convicted of taking part in a great "deal"; but social fibs and hypocrisies are freely laid to her charge. The most virulent misogynist has never accused her of being *splendide mendax*, like the company promoter; but the support she gives to ceremonial observances whose spirit has long since evaporated, lends point to a charge of small insincerities. Few men have thought more highly of women than Thackeray did, yet he says: "There are some meannesses which are too mean even for man—woman, lovely woman alone, can venture to commit them." Here also I shall have occasion to traverse popular opinion, while admitting the germ of truth from which it is developed.

The asserted inferiority of woman in physical strength and endurance is difficult to controvert; for it may be contended that the endurance of pain, in which she claims a superiority, is merely the endurance which comes of use. The man cries out, because the sensation is strange to him. The woman suffers pain in silence, as one endures the querulousness of old age, because one expects and allows for it. If, however, this be true, it would seem to be a question, not of inferiority, but of habit, with the sole difference that nature has assigned to woman larger opportunities of acquiring the particular habit in question.

Whatever, then, may be the virtue and ability of individual women, and however high such individuals may soar above the average of manhood, it is alleged that, on the main counts of human characteristics, woman in the mass is inferior to man in the mass. I shall presently try to show that, if the statement must be admitted a fact, it is only a present fact. I do not believe that this inferiority of woman need be, or is likely to be, permanent. I come now to my second thesis.

Assuming for the moment that woman's achievement is, up to the present time, inferior to man's, what is the fundamental cause of her backwardness? Surely false training fostered by fallacious tradition.

I have said that woman is now, even in this twentieth century, charged with being more unreasonable than man. If this be true, it is because generations of self-absorbed fathers and unenlightened mothers have steadily brought up their sons in such a manner as to develop reasonableness, and their daughters in such a manner as to develop unreasonableness. The teaching of Euclid in schools is a trite example. Even now in many schools this first essay in logical deduction is begun later by girls than boys. How long is it since elementary—or any—science was generally introduced into the curriculum of girls' schools? But the false lead in the direction of non-reasoning has long been given much earlier and more subtly—in the playing fields by the inferiority of the girls' games for developing reason (compare rounders and skipping with cricket and hockey, battledore and shuttlecock with football), and at home by the consideration which is given to childish whims when shown in the girl, while in the boy they are laughed at as unmanly. This toleration of action upon impulse and fancy has been carried on throughout the woman's childhood and youth until it has justified the Shakespearean satire upon the adult woman: "I have no other but a woman's reason; I think it so because I think it so." For centuries romancers, who are among the most powerful moulders of sex character, have delighted in representing the pretty, but empty-headed, woman's unreasonableness as a positive charm in the eyes of her male adorer, that is, until the practical realities of married life have shown him that reasonableness is a maker, fancifulness a destroyer, of human happiness. In a word, lovers and romancers have combined to describe unreasonableness as a most reasonable thing in woman, and, heredity helping, woman has unconsciously moulded herself in strict accordance with the prosaic doctrine of supply and demand.

Again, aided and abetted by the approving smile of man, woman herself has clipped the wings of her own imagination so that it should not soar over the low walls of the nursery. How should woman conceive Iliads and Divine Comedies, when generations of mothers and grandmothers have taught her that woman's sphere of action is not life, time, or eternity, but the little world of infancy and childhood with its small delights and sorrows, its crude conceptions and narrow horizon of activities? So the Faust of womanhood is dwarfed into Jack of the Beanstalk, who sells his infantile obligations for an immoral purchase of beans. Her Venus of Milo becomes the plump and rosy Cupid of the bath-tub, so much so that her very notion of physical beauty becomes confused with that of physical luxuriance, and she describes a more or less shapeless presentment of healthy flesh and muscle as a "lovely" baby. Later on this early stunting of artistic appreciation brings her to the admiration and adoption of the false anatomy and false curves of the milliner's model. Similarly her sense of musical grandeur is kept chained to the ditties of the Piper's Son and all his fraternity. If she rocks her last cradle on the wrong side of forty, it is small wonder that her musical imagination never gets beyond the Choral Symphonies of the nursery. It is no answer to this argument to cite the large attendance of women at art galleries and classical concerts; for to galleries and concerts they go merely to absorb artistic and musical thought and beauty. The sphere of stimulus to artistic and musical imagination is, for the vast majority of women, the environment of the cradle.

Lastly, woman's physical inferiority also was the product of bad air and sedentary conventions rather than natural defectiveness. Every year opens to her some new profession, long thought to be too arduous for female limbs and feminine minds. Her tenacity and determination in these professions prove that the physical strength of her savage ancestress, who tilled the earth and built the home while her savage lord amused himself with bow and spear, has only been lying in abeyance till a wiser tradition called it forth to labor in the more refined fields of activity which modern civilization throws open equally to both sexes. Everywhere the opening up of woman's intellectual liberty asserts itself in her physical improvement—the height of her figure, the strength of her foot and arm, and the general quickening of her gait and carriage—all pointing to the breaking up of a false tradition of sedentary dulness and spiritual starvation.

False training, then, fostered by fallacious tradition, has lain at the root of that backwardness of woman which has so long been supposed to be the product of inherent and irremediable inferiority, but is now shown to be no more inherent than the rapidly disappearing savagery and coarseness of man, which also were once thought to be the distinguishing and not wholly unworthy mark of his manhood.

And now for my last thesis—Will woman ever be indisputably equal to man, and when? To this question the scoffer, shutting his eyes, answers glibly "no" and "never"; but the thoughtful man, looking round with wide eyes and a pondering mind, and applying the measure of his own experience, notes the rapid progress woman has made even in his own memory. If the bent of his mind leads him to look for the root of things below the efflorescence which alone attracts the average mind, he will observe the significant fact that woman has begun her race for equality with man by first securing the equipment of education.

Education is the great economizer of historic effort, and will enable woman to cover in a few years a field of accomplishment which illiterate man traversed with pain and error and frequent backsliding only in a decade or a century. Therefore woman will move rapidly through the necessary schooling of experience, which man has traversed slowly through the ages. Our curious observer will note yet another significant phenomenon of the twentieth century, which, rumor says, has attained the proportions of a social anxiety in America—the gradual alienation of man from the powerful agent of self-development named above. If man turns from education, which, in the guise of modern science, has been mainly responsible for the abnormal strides made by modern civilization, in order to dull his finer susceptibilities upon the coarser grain of commercial and financial operations—if he allows woman to take over his responsibilities in the matter of brain production—the march of her intellectual and moral development will be proportionately accelerated, and the speed with which she is already overhauling him in the race will grow daily greater. Even now woman's once ready admission of inferiority has grown reticent, and she is generally eager to claim at least an equality of ability with its consequential rights. The modern Harriet Byron is no longer considered to outstep decorum when she enters upon an argument with the modern Walden, and it is no uncommon experience to see a mixed assembly listening with pleasure to an intelligent woman while she expounds her "views" on some matter of current interest. In the middle and upper classes woman is now expected to be intelligent and reasonable as well as pretty, and the absence of the last, when nature happens to be unkind, is more readily tolerated than the absence of either of the first two qualities. Indeed, some of us know cases where wit, wisdom, and character are found to obliterate entirely a positive ugliness which would have made the woman in question impossible in seventeenth and eighteenth century society. Though grace and beauty will always hold sway, the eyes of the lover are becoming less easily dazzled, and the exhilaration which thrills the male being when first inoculated with love's poison is apt to be followed by shrewd questionings as to the quality of the brain that lights the fascinating eyes. Dolls are less easily mistaken for goddesses, and mainly because your true divinity is more in request; for which reason, as the value of the real diamond makes its purchase a work of judgment that reacts upon its value, so the supply of a better class of femininity has aroused a finer male discrimination that is again reacting upon the quality of that femininity.

In the matter of initiative, woman has shown a growing capacity since female emancipation brought opportunities to her. Naturally at first she has displayed this capacity in those spheres which were already the fields of her particular interest when emancipation came—education and philanthropy. The recent movement for the higher education of women, the associations for fostering child-study, co-education and the kindergarten, the temperance and various minor movements, furnish ample evidence of capacity for initiative in woman. If we bear in mind that, chronologically, these movements stand in the history of woman's effort where the Crusades, the Reformation, and the Renaissance stood in the history of man, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, as time and opportunity bring experience and practice, it will be discovered that initiative in woman was never absent, but merely latent. Already on the governing councils of educational bodies, and on certain bodies engaged in municipal administration, woman shares with honor and distinction in the initiation and moulding of constructive work.

I have already noted woman's superiority in the fundamental virtues and the signs of her improvement in the minor verities. Ceremonial with all its insincerity still exerts its subtle influence over woman. The scoffer says "because woman is foolish." The physiologist says "because woman is woman," that is, "a creature that feels rather than reasons." I venture to traverse both assertions, and ascribe her excess of devotion to ceremonial, whether in life or religion, first to the stunting of her reasoning faculty during a long period of male tyranny, with the consequent intensification of the other—the emotional—side of her human nature. Secondly, I attribute it to the greater purity and naïve innocence of her character—the result of long years of training in the cult of "goodness"—which encourages and enables her to read reality into ceremonial shams and make the most soulless simulacrum a real expression of what it should be, but is not—a real feeling. But the reasoning faculty of woman is no longer stunted. It is nourished assiduously by modern science, which knows not sex. Her "goodness" is no longer "goody-goodness." The prudery of affected ignorance has given place to the modesty of discreet knowledge. It is now possible for a woman to know the truths of physiology and yet be pure-minded, just as it is now possible for a man to be manly without being coarse. Both sexes are approximating to a modesty which is independent of drapery and, consequently, to an abhorrence and avoidance of shams, of coverings up, of whited sepulchres, of incongruities between the inside and the outside of the cup and platter. The great agent of this approximation has been modern science, which teaches men and women equally to look before they think, to think before they judge, and to judge before they generalize—a serial process which is fatal to hollow ceremonial and florescent shams. In the matter of physical strength and endurance, the rapid entry of woman into the arena of male labor, as soon as the artificial barriers of prejudice were broken down, and her ever-increasing and successful competition with man, show that the levelling up of her physical strength to his—certain temporary functional derangements excepted—is only a matter of time and training.

Everywhere, then, the rapid rise of woman from the characteristics of a depressed existence to those of a free and equal development shows that her inferiority to man is factitious and not inherent—the result merely of artificial restrictions now withdrawn, not the outcome of a poorer raw material which can never take the higher polish that man has acquired and now boasts to be the proof of a superior metal. That woman, then, will one day be and appear, in all but functional peculiarities, mentally, morally, and physically equal to man appears to me to be beyond a doubt. The question is, when will she arrive at this equality? Reasoning with the rule of actuality, no man can mark the point of future time at which this "consummation devoutly to be wished" will be attained. So many lets and hinderances crowd the path of progress. But, measuring by probabilities, if the present rate of woman's development is maintained, the attainment of equality cannot be far distant in the coming centuries. There is in woman's work, as many have noted, a driving earnestness and a conscientious concentration of effort which far transcend the application of man, who likes to move leisurely and with due attention to comfort and relaxation. This deadly earnestness often dries up the sap of humor and stumbles for want of imagination; but its driving force is enormous and enables progress to cover ground in a surprising fashion. Therefore woman will not require all the centuries man has had to attain a proportionate perfection, and thereafter she will overhaul him by leaps and bounds. But, it may be asked, is it not probable that man's rate of progress may be accelerated when the fear of competition becomes present to his imagination, and may he not thus defy woman and retain his present lead? He may; but the probabilities are against it. For man's progress has been steady and natural, and there is no reason to suppose that its velocity could be materially accelerated. Woman's progress, on the other hand, has been "cabin'd, cribb'd, confin'd," and, now the repression has been suddenly withdrawn, the forward leap of her progress is not unlike the rebound of a new spring that has long been held down against the strong impulse of its potential power. Now she is free, more or less, woman makes haste to reap the fruits of freedom, and her haste will last until she draws level with the rights and powers of man. Then we may hope with confidence—for the grounds of hope are apparent even now—certain elements of her character—whether the product of her sex-individuality or her peculiar fate in the past, it is impossible to say with certainty—will add new elements to the character of man, drawing in exchange new elements to her own. Thereafter, and as a happy consequence, the velocity of their joint progress may exceed that of either in the unregenerate days of sex-prejudice and sex-oppression.

Finally, who will gain most by this equality of the sexes? Surely, man himself; for there is little exaggeration in Otway's panegyric on woman:

"Nature made thee
To temper man; we had been brutes without you.
Angels are painted fair, to look like you;
There's in you all that we believe of heaven:
Amazing brightness, purity, and truth,
Eternal joy, and everlasting love."

Those advantages which the days of woman's suppression gave to man were poor indeed—a little self-complacency, which only detracted from the dignity of his manhood—a little glorification of physical superiority, which was too often associated with intellectual inferiority—a monopoly of avocations, which only loaded him with the burden of himself maintaining his women relatives or seeing them humiliated, like Ruth Pinch, by the mortifications of shabby genteel dependence upon the caprice of insolent vulgarity—or, lastly, the pitiful consciousness of an intellectual superiority, which was daily and hourly revenged by a companionship that could bring neither sympathy, with his aims and aspirations in life, nor help and inspiration in the day of difficulty and defeat. Of all the joys that the emancipation of woman has brought to man, surely none can be greater than that which springs from the life companionship of an intelligent and cultivated wife and the devotion of daughters endowed with all the mental and physical beauties that are developed by modern education in place of the mean aspirations and futile follies of the old days of domesticity and deportment. And when woman has become equal to man, equal in every sense, the charm and happiness of the new companionship will permeate every walk of his life. Let his avocation be the study of " the floor of heaven," that's " thick inlaid with patines of bright gold," a study fraught with the loftiest intellectual suggestion and the charm of an infinite mystery that unfolds a little portion of its wonders day by day and yet remains as vast and incommensurate as ever. How delightful it will be for him to find in the constant companion of his days the rational interest, the intelligent sympathy of a Caroline Herschell, and a help as ready and as valuable as that of any hireling colleague, in place of a vacant look and a puzzled frown, or the irritating indifference of a soul that cannot soar above the price of steak or the misdemeanors of a witless housemaid! How delightful it will be to traverse with a companion of equal intellect and equal culture the glorious treasure-house of history or delve thus aided in the inexhaustible mine of nature! "The soul's armor," says Ruskin, "is never well set to the heart unless a woman's hand has braced it." There is no path now trodden by man which will not become smoother, brighter, and more richly furnished with the light of imagination, the bloom of sentiment, the vigor of thought, and all that elevates the work of reason above the impulse of instinct, by the companionship of "earth's noblest thing, a woman perfected." The married state, so often now but little removed from a "paidotrophic partnership," where, after the first bloom of passion fades, contempt and bitterness are mitigated only by the pleasures of the lower nature, will more often become, as sometimes it does now, a perfect fusion of differing but equipollent entities. The union of these two will add to the treasure of the state a third more perfect twofold organism, and to the world-forces which are building for posterity the impetus of a mighty stream that springs from the union of two noble tributaries, bearing within its bosom a double fertility and in the sweep of its creating current a more than double power.

XIX

SOCIETY

"THE RÔLE OF WOMEN IN SOCIETY"

BY

LADY MARY PONSONBY

WE have endeavored to look on woman intellectually in her relation to the life of to-day, emotionally in her relation to man. It still remains to consider her in connection with that bewildering organization which she has herself built up and to which, instinctively allowing it precedence over all other social problems, we give the general name of society—the association of human beings of the "upper crust."

In America we have no very clearly established cult of aristocracy. It is true that the newspapers of one great city or another occasionally refer to their own particular set of money or idleness, as "society." But no one of the groups thus distinguished holds any special influence except such as rises from intellect or wealth, of the former of which they have assuredly no monopoly, while the other is usually employed much more effectually outside their circle. In England, on the other hand, a recognized aristocracy has long held assured control of life's best gifts. Lady Mary Ponsonby, herself a firmly established member of this favored class, is therefore appealed to here to explain to us the meaning of this social world, "the ladies' world," in its past, its present, and its future.

THEY were very delightful, those Frenchwomen of the eighteenth century. They were witty, clever, unscrupulous; often very loyal, always very powerful, as acknowledged rulers of their house or *salon*, and of Society. Their political opinions were hopelessly wrong, but not more so than those of the men of the time.

Why did they possess a power denied to their English contemporaries; or rather held by these in far less strength? One might inquire why Society in France in the eighteenth century shows to that of England in the present day so many points of resemblance. It might be diverting, but unforeseen difficulties forbid a close comparison. Differences of tradition, of surroundings, of education are to be met with at every turn; yet the analogy is at moments so exact that it should be possible, by keeping the respective threads of resemblance and dissimilarity clear and untangled, to arrive at a fairly true presentment.

The psychological, physiological, analytical introspective method has been done to death. In studies of this order, even of the first rank, let us say such as M. Bourget's *Cosmopolis* or Mrs. Humphry Ward's *Marcella*, the author acts too much as showman; you cannot get rid of his presence; he or she is forever looking over your shoulder, pointing out how you ought to see this and detect the other. The value of impartiality in an artist has often been pointed out, and this rare quality he best shows by leaving it to the spectator to form his own judgment on what he sees, giving him no clue and pursuing him with no comment. This impartiality is more likely to be ours if we gather our information of a past epoch from contemporary memoirs, letters, and individual sayings, rather than from comments and disquisitions in which the place of critic and exponent takes up too much room. As a rule, however, it must be owned that a French writer rarely over-explains. In England we have improved in this respect, but we are still harassed by the over-explicit writer of biography. It is true, certain young and clever authors are drifting away from this position, perhaps too far, into a "green carnation" and cheaply paradoxical vein of impressional writing; yet the general public likes explanation, and, to please it, explanations rounded with literary platitudes are reeled off. On the stage, this mania for explanation, this craving for diffuse details, produces a still more offensive state of things. In order that the inevitable and satisfactory *dénouement* should be rightly understood, it has been found sometimes necessary to add an act to an English adaptation of a French play, so that nothing may be left to the intelligence of the audience. But, in the present inquiry, in spite of our wish to leave the ordinary reader to his unbiassed judgment, it is impossible, even in a slight sketch on so knotty and intricate a question as the *rôle* played by women in past and present times, to ignore what has been written by some of our would-be teachers. When, for instance, some few years ago, Mrs. Lynn Linton made a series of fierce but able attacks on the champions of women's rights, she little guessed that that object of her particular scorn—the new woman—would be as extinct as the ichthyosaurus before the end of the nineteenth century, or that the inference she drew points to a source of power in the famous women in the past which, if analyzed, she would have been the first to reject. Mrs. Lynn Linton in her accounts of the women of Rome and Greece admits that their power was, in the main, in proportion to their frailty. This granted—and that there is no way of accounting for it, except by allowing for the different standard of morality then prevalent or by the fact that love in its sensual aspect will ever prove itself the strongest factor in the art of ruling man—then there is an end of the controversy.

This sceptre Frenchwomen wielded almost irresistibly in the eighteenth century. Their reign was still more remarkable in the seventeenth, but, except to glance at the qualities derived by our eighteenth-century friends from their predecessors, we must refrain from dwelling on the never-failing interest and charms of Mesdames de Sévigné, de Lafayette, de Maintenon, etc. The pedantic tone of the Hôtel Rambouillet was gradually abandoned after the appearance of *Les Femmes Savantes* and *Les Précieuses Ridicules.* After a while, nobody in Society durst indulge in long and wordy *jeux d'esprit.* For all that, a shadow of the old pedantry darkened the social sky at intervals. Mazarin's nieces, especially Marie Mancini, Princesse de Colonna, and la Duchesse de Mazarin, brought Italian exaggeration to bear on

French frivolity, and the result was not a happy one; but it is in the picture of the Cour de Sceaux that the acme of stilted and, at the same time, puerile and extravagant artificiality seems to have been reached.

The manner of life of this Court, inspired by the Duchesse du Maine, as described in the memoirs of the day, fully deserves this description. She paid her satellites to be amusing, but amusing in the mode she prescribed. Amused she would be, by day and by night, and every one had to contribute to this hunt for happiness through what would appear to the uninitiated as the very tedious paths of madrigals, sonnets, *bouts-rimés*, in which the little Duchesse appeared sometimes as Venus, sometimes as Minerva, now as a nymph, then as a siren. *On n'avait jamais une heure devant soi pour être bête en paix;* but the lighter recreations of poetical invitations to dinner, of anonymous compliments inserted in a bouquet, of laborious pleasantries which weary the soul even to hear of, began to pall on the *châtelaine* of Sceaux. Acting became the rage, and the indefatigable Duchesse divided her time between the stage and assiduous studies in astronomy, philosophy, and the classics. Needless to say, each pursuit and study was followed under the special guidance of the favorite reigning in that department. Among the Duchesse du Maine's intellectual disciples—let us put it so—she at one time could boast of Voltaire, who, having quarrelled with the authorities, took refuge at Sceaux. He was hidden away in a room apart, with closed shutters, and there he remained for two months. In the daytime he amused himself by writing his *contes*, and during the night he joined the Duchesse and her friends in their celebrations of *les grandes nuits de Sceaux.* These diversions of the Duchesse du Maine appear to have been more innocent than their title would imply. The form this amusement took made so severe a call on the literary capacity of those engaged in it that even scandal finds no place in the record of these nocturnal orgies. All the ardor, misplaced energy, the Duchesse had spent on fruitless political intrigues and small hole-and-corner conspiracies she now diverted to this frantic struggle against *ennui.* Her sleepless-ness was what led her to turn night into day, and the guests, exhausted with games, madrigal-turning, sonnet-composing, and perhaps, who shall say, love-making, implored with no effect for a moment's peace during the gorgeous breakfasts served to them at sunrise; but the rule held good, in spite of a sleepless night, *de l'esprit, encore de l'esprit, toujours de l'esprit.* With the arrival of Voltaire and Madame du Châtelet the programme was altered, and tragedies, operas, ballets, farces, took the place of less ambitious pastimes. Madame du Châtelet evidently bored Madame du Maine considerably with her mathematics, her translations of Newton's works, her geometrical problems strewn over every available table in the comfortable reception-rooms; so Madame du Maine swept away the learned rubbish and insisted on forcing Madame du Châtelet on to the stage, and making her take an active part in the private theatricals. These, under the new direction, became a scene of indiscriminate social license; Voltaire and Madame du Châtelet inviting every one, known and unknown, to the Théâtre de Sceaux, so that a disturbance took place which threatened to break up the whole concern. Voltaire pleaded, wrote, faltered, and won his way back into favor, begging that the protecting genius, the soul of Corneille, the spirit of the great Condé, would deign to be his literary Egeria; and all ended well. The little Duchesse forgave and retained her star. She pursued her way undaunted, and her seventy-seventh birthday found her still hard at work, amusing herself, vexed now and then at the abrupt departure of some of her friends for the next world, but observing at the same time that after all it was less annoying than to keep her waiting for an entertainment or a card party. Perhaps her rank and her belief in the divinity of royal blood prevented the parties at Sceaux from being quite accurately typical of the artificial and pedantic *salon* which survived long after the Hôtel Rambouillet had been swept away. Be this as it may, one impression is worth noting —that not a trace of the love of the natural to be found even in the most pedantic and pompous moment of the *grand siècle* can be detected in the social atmosphere of Sceaux. We have seen that some interest in that miniature Court was derived from the flavor and point which Voltaire's sayings and doings always seem to carry with them; but how incapable were the Duchesse du Maine and her friends of the enthusiastic appreciation of Lafontaine by Madame de Sévigné and her friends, Madame de Bouillon, Madame de la Sablière, etc.! Their admiration is more striking than the homage paid him by Molière, Racine, and La Rochefoucauld, who, of course, having *le flair littéraire* in a supreme degree, detected the master poet and writer, in spite of his extraordinary simplicity. Madame de Sévigné and her friends loved him for this simplicity. I do not know whether Madame de Maintenon was one of this group, but she certainly felt the reaction toward the natural and the actual that she is always insisting upon in her correspondence. Here we shake off the long and wordy *jeux d'esprit;* the tedious and rounded periods gave way to short and witty epigrams. These were the direct offpring of La Rochefoucauld's maxims. Women decided it was wicked to be bored. A hushed whisper to this effect soon found its way into the sacred precincts of the Court. Madame de Maintenon, who, it may be shrewdly suspected, put on the airs of a pedant to avoid tiresome functions, gave her rival, Madame de Montespan, enough to do when the latter attempted to answer the governess's sarcasms on the empty silliness of the lives of the courtiers; and Madame de Montespan always got the worst of the encounter.

The good-humored but very distinct aversion of Madame de Sévigné to bores inspired some of her wittiest letters and her most brilliant epigrams. The joyousness of her tone (Ninon de Lenclos said of her wit, "La joie de l'esprit en fait la force"[1]) took the sting out of the dart. She gave the word in favor of brightness and she damned heaviness. The notes of her friend Madame de Lafayette on La Rochefoucauld outdid his very maxims in brevity and pith, and very good advice these ladies gave their friends on style. Madame de Coigny, in a letter to Mademoiselle X——, "lui recommande de prendre des notes sur la lecture"; "d'écrire ses pensées c'est une façon de savoir si on est bête. . . . Penser ses lectures, ne pas lire comme si on mangeait des cerises."[1] Their games even had become racy and amusing. One of the most diverting was the game of portraits, when each member of an assembled company, after taking the oath of sincerity, was bound to write a truthful account of himself in a few lines. To relate the disputes and corrections evolved by these worded portraits would take us too far from our present purpose.

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[1] "The joy of wit makes its power."

It is easy to see that the ground for the reign of fair women of the eighteenth century was well prepared. The rule of *la parfaite bonne compagnie* was established in the absence of all moral law, and became an authority from which there was no appeal. The note of perfect and sincere politeness, the distinction in speech, manner, and expression, became a kind of freemasonry protecting the admitted members from any intrusion from without. The acquirements of a perfect manner may seem but a trivial aim; but when we find the code of rules to be observed to include delicacy of touch in dealing with the feelings of others, a readiness of perception as to what would cause offence, the avoidance of all unnecessary friction, the art of praising without flattery, of showing off the merits of others without appearing to protect them; and if you add to these characteristics the charm of ease and naturalness, and the feeling that air, manner, and speech combine to convey graceful and intelligent kindness, you feel inclined to agree with the author quoted by the De Goncourts who compared the spirit of good society at that time with the spirit of charity, a bold comparison, a little in the way of a very modern saying that defines "tact as inspiration in small things."

And so this code of gentle manners and conduct, rigorously enforced, supported the more important fabric of the law of honor—the law from which there is no appeal, the last religion of France. From the grand utterance, "Tout est perdu fors l'honneur," to the present day there have been doubtless violations of that code; and it is, perhaps, ridiculed by those who would rather sneer at it than account for it. In England and in France to-day it is running some risk of extinction from the worship of money, but human nature as we find it in the average gentleman has still an unconscious love of the ideal as represented in the point of honor. In England we prefer the men found dead with the colors of their regiment wrapped around them, to the reformers who cynically advise the disuse of the flag as a useless colored rag. In France, in spite of the destructives who are ready to cry "À bas la patrie! À bas l'honneur!" the current opinion of honest men flows in the opposite direction. The view that the complaisant husband is the lowest animal extant, that to be mercenary in love is vile, that to hold up even the caprice of a woman to the ridicule of one's friends is ignominious, is still held, as a matter of course, by men of honor, at the same time that they are unconscious of the source from which it springs. It is a truth of all time that men are slow to recognize what they owe to beliefs they may have shaken off, but which control their instincts, after the expression of such beliefs in set form has ceased to compel their assent and to embody their convictions.

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[1] "Would suggest taking notes of one's reading; to write one's thoughts is a way to see if one is stupid. . . . Think over your reading, do not read as if you were eating cherries."

In the eighteenth century the code of honor was enforced in vigorous and uncompromising terms, and it is for this reason that we find it regulating the lives of women strongly, if indirectly. In some respects it might seem that the honor of women had never been so lightly regarded, and that unbounded license reigned supreme; but, if we look more closely into the matter, we shall find it not exactly true. To generalize in this way would be as misleading as if, looking back still further, we were to regard the rough and brutal manners in the days of La Fronde as the essential feature of the time. At first sight it seems difficult to believe that the code of honor and morality of the heroes and heroines of that day was based upon a strong belief in themselves. But so it was. The "Gentleman," as he is called in Marguerite de Navarre's heptameron, never doubted that success in love, be it ever so unlawful, must be accomplished, and the lady's consent was rarely questioned; but if she proved severely virtuous, death made the disappointed lover interesting for all time. The crudities, even the indecencies, were never vicious, and the whole atmosphere was charged with more vitality and strength than can be found with their descendants two hundred years later.

But, in judging the standard of conduct in the days of these descendants, we must allow as broad a margin for the spirit of the times as we find ourselves giving their predecessors. Let us take their views on marriage. In marriage, in the eighteenth century, there was little conception of a solemnity, still less of a sacrament. In exceptional instances, in the days of the Marguerites of Navarre and Valois, we find the atmosphere of crime and license lightened by redeeming traits of high loyalty and devotion, and by a distinct note of poetry and religion; but no such gleams illumined their descendants; yet we must allow that a conventional sense of honor persisted, and it led to curious contradictions in its application. The *mariage de convenance et non d'inclination* was as much the rule of good French society in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a rule admitted and applauded, as it is, in spite of denials and disclaimers, in the England of to-day.

Examples show that there was observed a code of honor in dishonor as it were, an unwritten law the breaking of which brought the inevitable penalty of ostracism. The limits of a husband's forbearance were strictly defined, and the net result of the restraint which the necessity of keeping up appearances entailed was that a mystery of romance environed a woman who was known to live a separate existence from the man whose name she bore. A passion faithful and deep might be found to be the key to all that was best in her existence. Some, no doubt, were shameless, but they derived from *les femmes galantes* of the sixteenth century; and even among these, recklessness, but not commonness, was the main factor in their adventurous lives. Some were simply excellent and devoted wives, like the Duchesse de Choiseul, who had never, she said, been able to conceive greater perfection in mind or body than could be found in her very fickle lord.

It was the prerogative of the mother, and the mother alone, to direct the conduct not only of her daughters, but of her sons. A young man, says M. de Ségur, who failed in respectful attention to a woman, or to a man older than himself, knew that the fact would be reported to his mother that very evening. I forget whether it was the Duc de Nivernais or the Prince de Ligne who, upon being asked his permission by his sons to organize a *fête champêtre* or some such entertainment, pointed to their disordered dress after a day's chase and said: "When you have made yourselves fit to enter your mother's apartment and have obtained her leave, I will confirm it."

And so the rule of women became the principle on which rested, not only the government of the family, but also the control of the State. The spontaneous and natural note which strikes one in all these women did and said, the right royal power they wielded by reason of the high level of their intelligence—this power acknowledged by all and justifying their unbounded ambition—had for its foundation charm and strength; but charm gradually fades and strength becomes weakness in the downward course. The proceedings at the Court of Sceaux show the dark side of the picture, and it is painful to discern the beginning of the bad taste, the exaggeration, and the other symptoms of disordered brains which, as the century waxed older, seemed to characterize the bewildered women who succeeded the refined, intelligent *spirituelles*, though often profligate ladies, whose education was begun at the Convent of L'Abbaye-aux-Bois. The woman who could reign undisputed over husband, lover, or king was unable to cope with the attack on Society by the new destructive forces of the intellectual world, and fell into a more and more hopeless condition and became a helpless prey to her nerves. The feverish pursuit of pleasure, the ceaseless round of gatherings, brilliant and pointed with wit, but desperately exhausting in the long run, filled every hour of the day and night, and led, needless to say, to the worst form of reaction, the falling back on self and finding nothing there. Hence the demon, called by them in their despair *l'ennemi*, took up his abode in them. The secret enemy, the incurable complaint, the unconquerable and ever-present foe they dragged smilingly about with them. This foe became the motive power of all their exertions, of all their ill-nature, and of their love of scandal; this gave zest to their intrigues, for to believe themselves amused, they thought, might shake off the obsession. But no, they could not escape it; the disgust of self, of friends, of society, even of solitude, persisted.

La grande ennuyée, Madame du Deffand, tells us that the bore of solitude is the most overwhelming and crushing form of *ennui*. This downward course was marked by stages which have a strange likeness to phases of social life in England at the present day. The description of these vagaries appears in most of the letters and memoirs of that day. MM. de Goncourt have perhaps collected more material than any other modern author on the mode of life of the eighteenth-century *fin-de-siècle* women. One of the points they insist on is the dryness of spirit and want of heart preceding the outbursts of maudlin sentimentality and affectation of tenderness which became the fashion; also the exaggerated manifestations of friendship between women. Hymns to friendship, altars to friendship, eternal vows of constancy became the vogue; also an exchange of love tokens, of colored emblematic knots, etc., the messenger employed to convey these being some effeminate man, who, content with the gossiping companionship of the young married woman, made it often his business to prepare the way for another's more signal success in rousing interest to the point of a real serious *liaison*. The path the young woman followed is defined with clearness. In the beginning, an absorbing friendship taken up at first as a means of showing off a conquest before rivals; this languished, and all of a sudden became unattractive when the little man's visits found her alone with no public to admire her triumph. We are assuming, of course, that she had not the faintest inclination to flirt in earnest with her companion; but if the man was skilful the moment quickly came when a mere friendly gossip gradually led to intimate discussion on the ways of love, the absurdities of husbands, with compromising confidences and vainglorious hints on the part of the would-be lover, followed by more or less naïve admissions of former successes from the newly married lady. Often she was wholly unconscious of danger, had no evil intention; but the spark of coquetry, never very difficult to kindle into flame, would suddenly take fire, her imagination would be stirred, and gradually the harmless badinage and fun would take another aspect, and another guileless spirit would be plunged into fathomless trouble. It is not very clear whether MM. de Goncourt, who give us the most interesting examples of these semi-platonic love affairs, think the devoted woman friend or the complaisant *chien-de-poche* kind of man the more dangerous confidant. What they have no doubt about appears to be that religion, marriage, and love are equally powerless to influence these eighteenth century-ladies. Exceptional devotion in religion, deep attachment in marriage, and passionate loyalty in love are to be found in the seventeenth century, but no trace of anything of the kind can be detected in the eighteenth. Happiness in religion was out of date; a well regulated aspect of mild devotion at Mass was held to be part of good manners, even with the indifferent and the sceptical, and it was easier to assume that aspect than to scoff. Happiness in marriage, said Society, was ridiculous and distinctly plebeian. Happiness in love was unknown, and a *grande passion*, whether fortunate or the reverse, was foolishness. All three—religion, marriage, and love—would, in the current language of the time, prove to be "le néant."

The utter absence of naturalness that we have noted before became more and more accentuated; not a trace of real feeling, not a breath of freshness, not a gleam of light could be detected in this loaded atmosphere in which poor human beings groped, seeking vainly to find they knew not what, and drifting vainly toward their melancholy end. Of course this state of things reacted on the physical condition of these women. They suffered acutely from weakness, overstrung nerves, melancholia, and vapors. "Les vapeurs c'est l'ennui," said Madame d'Epinay; and this although the sufferers were spared neither ridicule nor epigrams, and their imaginary ills were branded as affectations and exaggerations. A more acute observer[1] suggests that they were simply suffering intensely from the great malady of over-civilization, the increase of nervous disease, secret hypochondria, and, above all, from the terrible curse of that mysterious evil hysteria. The doctors now came upon the scene and insisted upon a change of *régime.* This somewhat modified the evil, and a more wholesome programme ensued. Fresh air was prescribed by the great Doctor Tronchin,[2] and to dig in the gardens, to take violent exercise, to pursue some object, and to work at some occupation hitherto unknown became the order of the day; and these pursuits were undertaken with the feverish excitement Society women had formerly shown in ransacking their gay world in search of a new amusement or a new distraction. The study of science, of natural history, of physics, even of metaphysics, filled the days and nights in the place of coquettish rivalries, of every form of amusement, and of the very fanaticism of pleasure. The mad appetite for pleasure was succeeded by an equal ardor for knowledge, and it is evident there was as little reality in this new search for happiness as there had been in the old. We no longer find the fair ladies affecting languor and exhaustion, perhaps having persuaded, as somebody said Madame d'Estarbey did, the doctor to bleed them, to give their looks a kind of delicate and sentimental interest; but their very attitude was changed. See, we now find them in a costume of stern simplicity, pale, with no trace of rouge, their eyes heavy with fatigue from brain work, the brow resting carelessly on the right hand, with a general look of undisturbed attention. This was, indeed, a new picture, and when at last they were roused they were no longer to be found as of yore flitting from fair to opera, from jewellers' to milliners' shops. Now courses of political study, of philosophical systems, of scientific theories, took up the spare hours, and, scarcely less exhausted than they had been before with frivolity, they slept but a few hours, to resume next day their arduous and self-imposed task.

[1] See *Mémoires de la Comtesse de Boufflers.*

[2] See *Les Sports de l'Ancienne France* by Jusserand.

And now we must leave our French friends, and with regret we do so. There is something pathetic in the way those who formed French Society hastened on to their doom, in a wholly unconscious way. They had no suspicion of the coming catastrophe. It was as well they did not foresee the Reign of Terror; but when it came they met their fate courageously.

We must now turn to the English compeers of the Frenchwomen of the seventeenth century. Here, till we get to the crucial point of the comparison, we shall find the task of sustaining the interest somewhat difficult. For it cannot be denied that the Frenchwomen of the seventeenth century were more interesting than the ancestors of the Englishwomen of the eighteenth. During the epochs under notice, the eighteenth century in France and the nineteenth in England, the charm as in the seventeenth century remains with France until we get to the end of both centuries, when the likeness between the women of the two centuries became very close. At their best the English of the eighteenth century seems to be too nearly a replica of their French contemporaries to be very arresting; but it is worth considering how a certain view of tradition derived from the latter can be traced to the end of the nineteenth century. There is also the temptation to linger over contemporary letters and memoirs, of which we have a good supply. Horace Walpole, dealing out his criticism and sharpening his wit on Lady Mary W. Montagu's ugly manners and Lady Craven's spitefulness, brings into full light many details of these ladies' lives they little guessed would ever see the light. This rather adds to the pleasure of reading what they carefully prepared for publication, for one does so with a liberal discount. There are moments when Lady Mary fearlessly exposes the follies of foreign Courts. "One foundation of these everlasting disputes," she writes, "turns entirely upon rank, place, and the title of Excellency"; and in other letters she gives a graphic description of the follies and futilities of English society, concerning which she seems to show more insight than her celebrated censor. And the same may be said of Lady Craven, who, however, was by no means on the same level as her rival; but if she failed, as Horace Walpole said she did, to understand Lady Mary's best points, she was her equal in accurate delineation. For instance, in her letters to the Margrave of Anspach, whom she afterward married, she speaks of the misrule of the unspeakable Turk, of the discomfort and absurd ceremonials of the small Italian Courts; and the whole of her correspondence is seasoned with a fine insular savor of admiration for British freedom and British comfort, expressed in forcible and epigrammatic terms. Horace Walpole might, with his exaggeration and cosmopolitanism and his surrender through old Madame du Deffand, to French influence, almost have envied Lady Craven. And so it was with others in the same Society —Lady Cowper, Mrs. Montague, and a long way after them Mrs. West and others. They give one the same impression of possessing considerable cultivation and fine manners, but with stilted tediousness. Of the vein of Puritanism which had certainly permeated the middle class and the more retired upper class, as is shown in Rachel Lady Russell's and Lady Herbert's letters, etc., traces still remain in English Society. But it takes the light and air out of the subject, and confirms the impression that neither by way of contrast nor of likeness can the women of the eighteenth century in France be compared with those of the same epoch in England.

Before we reach our friends of to-day we must give a glance at their immediate predecessors, their mothers and grandmothers; and the experience of anyone with half a century's experience ought to be useful in helping us to see Society in the first part of this century as it really was. The great Whig Houses had much to say in the training of the smart world of those days. The traditions of perfect manners, lax morality, political shrewdness, excellence of taste, unrivalled skill in holding a *salon*, were handed down from mother to daughter, till the ebb of the tide set in during the fifties; then it is curious to observe the decline of each of these traditions. Who does not remember, if he is old enough, the courtesy without patronage, the gentleness to inferiors, the rigorous but perfectly natural bearing, which never failed, however morality or religion might fare in the days of his grandmothers? When I was a child it appeared to me impossible to believe that there could be any other way of getting old but that with which I was familiar. But, full of point and amusement as were her sayings, merciless as she was to false fine ladyism, swift and cutting as were her caustic, witty snubs to both old and young, yet I feel when I look back that old Lady G—— must have been a milder reproduction of the preceding generation; for the disintegrating forces of the French Revolution were at work in England, and a woman whose husband knew his Voltaire and Rousseau by heart found the Whig edition of liberalism strongly tinged with ideas which could revolutionize in a bloodless way the exclusive aristocratic upper classes; while the middle classes were protected by the Puritan influence from this disturbing agent.

And so it came about that the puzzled, restless phase which came over French society at the end of the eighteenth century began to undermine English society in the sixties and seventies of the nineteenth in a dull respectable way; manners became democratized, *salons* lost their prestige because the entertainer no longer believed in herself. Of a group of *salons* which still held their own fifty years ago, Lady Palmerston's was the most successful and the most powerful politically, because the widest and the most cosmopolitan. Her charm and great distinction were unhampered by any shade of strictness. She had a delightful *naïveté* in the choice of her political agents that would make us smile now. "I think," she would say, "I shall send the Flea to Rotten Row (a certain little Mr. Fleming, who had the art *de se faufiler partout*), to report to me what the feeling of the country is on last night's debate." Her two daughters, Lady Shaftesbury and the incomparably witty Lady Jocelyn, helped her not a little.

Lady Granville's *salon* was of a different sort—more exclusive, much more affected, and frequented by foreigners. She had the French gift of receiving without effort. Sitting at work with a shaded lamp near her, she would call out with a word from among those passing through to the tea-room a friend with whom she wished to talk, and one always longed to hear what she was saying, for the friend on the sofa looked very happy and much amused; even "the lodger," Charles Greville, who lived on the floor above in Bruton Street, thawed in that corner. Of course, there was the immense advantage of the presence of the master of the house, who, with his wonderful instinct for society, rapidly arranged and rearranged groups, so that a bore, if such were admitted by mistake, found himself neutralized by being handed to some one fully capable of dealing with him. Lady Palmerston, Lady Granville, and Lady Holland may be said to be the last charming *mondaines convaincues*, who never doubted what they should do and say to maintain their power. They sometimes indulged in an inner circle of intimate (small) dinners and tails to dinners, but, on the whole, devoted themselves mainly to the interest of "the party," and received all—and a very long list it was—with the most perfect manner, which was simply no manner at all. Each guest, young and old, left the house with the conviction that special attention and marked sympathy had been shown to him.

The later attempts to fill this *rôle*, the *grande dame* holding a *salon*, were not successful. Strawberry Hill had in Frances Lady Waldegrave's reign a reputation of its own. As a country house it was an amusing one to go to, though her receptions were a little too much of a scramble for it to be distinguished in its *façon d'être*. The generous qualities of the hostess and the mixed character of her guests made up a whole which, as a feature of the epoch, has a special value. Yet, as a *salon*, held by a *grande dame*, it was beside the mark. The strings were beginning to get tangled and to respond no longer to the hand that played with them with a political purpose, and it failed, in spite of skilful combinations and strong personal influence. In later attempts the failure was still more marked; to watch the pulling at bell-wires that rang no bells became to the looker-on oppressive and sometimes ludicrous. Before we leave the last of the *salons* for duller company, there is one personality who ought to find a place in a sketch, however slight, of the world in which

Lady Palmerston and Lady Granville reigned supreme. Lady William Russell did not attempt to hold a *salon;* she spent much of her time abroad, and, when she came to England, lived in the simplest foreign way, her establishment consisting of few servants beyond her courier and her maid. But, though not attempting the *rôle* of hostess, she was almost indispensable at the *salons* of her friends, and still more so at the small *recherchê* dinners which were the fashion among the *crême de la crême.* She was by far the strongest personnality of that time, a powerful woman, powerful to violence. (So said rumor.) To the fascination which strength of character gives its owner she added the charm of being so free from insularity and provincialism that many people were puzzled as to her nationality. Each country claimed her as its own. A Parisian was at once arrested by her wittily expressed appreciation of both ancient and modern *régime*, of both solid and frivolous literature in France. Then she might be heard talking to the German Ambassador on abstruse political questions; she was equally able, in the purest Tuscan, to discuss with an Italian cardinal the latest news from the Vatican. All this without the slightest pose or effort. She brought up her three sons in a way of her own, utterly unlike any English system of education ever heard of. A Catholic herself, she hated the priest, and wished to have only inscribed on her grave: "The mother of Hastings, Odo, and Arthur."

We must leave these interesting personalities and pass on to a very dull epoch, glancing on the way at the theological High Church phase kindly interpreted by Miss Sewell and Miss Yonge. An ideal founded on the inculcation of obedience to the Church, instilled in brothers and cousins from Oxford, gave the more intelligent of the young women in the fifties some perception of what culture might imply; but its pursuit was on the whole uninteresting, still more so were the lives of their frivolous sisters, made up as they were mainly of a great deal of silliness, of love of dress that didn't result in good dress, of flirtations with no background of wit, vice sometimes having its turn at the wheel; but even the vice of that period was dull.

We have arrived at the point at which we may consider the question with which we started—what is common to the Frenchwomen of the eighteenth century and the English of the nineteenth—and this misgiving arises. Are not the dissimilarities so marked as to destroy all resemblance? Yet it is the one interesting point in the study, so the doubt must be conquered. An additional difficulty lies in the avoidance of any portrait-painting. Just as the *roman à clef* is generally very poor art, so in an essay, however unpretending, it would be odious to bolster up the interest by dealing with distinct personalities and not with types. Time is pressing, and some one else said the other day, *à propos* of the expression, "Now the psychological moment has arrived." ` You are talking as they did in the early nineties, and the types change before your very eyes.

Why, ten or fifteen years ago we had the academic fad. The higher education of women was the cry. It touched Society vaguely: Lady So-and-so was determined to send her daughters to Girton of Newnham. The ordinary English and even French governesses were made to wince when comparisons were made between the effect of their teaching and the result of a college course. In many a middle or professional home it came as a solution to the dreary problem of how the girls of the family were to earn their bread, besides giving them the unexpected joy of finding their brains to be undoubtedly fit for something. Those who hate academic training in either men or women railed at the *naïf* belief that to follow the exact curriculum which produced such poor results in men would advance the general status of women. Its evident narrowness and want of elasticity could not strike the enthusiastic promoters of the higher education. Enthusiasts are usually found to be without a sense of humor, and the inefficiency and defects of the women's colleges were scarcely apparent even to outsiders, who were, if in sympathy with the movement, too full of admiration for the wonderful energy and zeal, the untiring and self-denying devotion, of the founders, to find it in their hearts to criticise. They did not observe the deteriorating effect of the strain of over-work during the growing years of the young girls who were forced into competition with strong men, the majority of whom cared not to beat them. Every faculty was bent to the task of obtaining marks. Commercially it answered to send such well-equipped teachers into the market, and this, in a way, met one of the pressing wants of the day. But later, in the homes of the intelligent classes, this practical solution was before long pronounced to be inadequate, and disappointment was felt by the parents of the very hard, trenchant, cut-and-dried young prig who returned from time to time to the home she had learned to contemn.

Now, the colleges have proved that they have to deal with influences more potent even than ignorance. In Society the ineradicable love of dress and the eternal power of physical beauty prevented at any time any great warmth of enthusiasm in the direction of intellectual training. Men disliked it. They had been used to the toy and doll's house theory. Useless to quote women of past ages; neither men nor women had imagination enough to see that, with all their weaknesses, not to speak of their vices, the women of the Middle Ages were a superior kind of animal to the average Englishwoman of the last decade of the nineteenth century.

The cult of the Virgin Mary in the Middle Ages did far more to raise the status of women than any other cause at work since the age of chivalry, and the efforts toward intellectual discipline in our day are futile in comparison. Still these efforts indirectly affected later developments of women's energies, and may play a more considerable part in the history of the woman of the twentieth century than we expect at present.

The "new woman" followed the student, but was gradually demolished by common consent, and the artillery spent in her destruction some ten years ago by such opponents as Mrs. Lynn Linton, of the *Saturday Review*, was rather a waste of force.

So quickly do we move on in these days, so rapidly do different ideals and different ways and customs start into life and follow each other, that what was a true description of society two or three years ago may be an inaccurate picture now. Yet I believe that some members of each of these older groups survive in the present day. Such as those who led society before, in the main lead now; in so far as they do not, it is due to the uneasiness, very like that prevailing at the end of the eighteenth century that is beginning to show itself. The novelty of playing at intellectualism is beginning to lose its charm. Those who are born intellectual or have inherited literary aptitudes remain in a way masters of the situation. There are not many of these, and even they are amused by the desperate recklessness of experiment that seems to be not only a reaction against conventionality, but to result from a mad desire to exhaust every form of amusement, and indeed of vice. The husband-snatching, the lover-snatching—in short, the open profligacy—becomes unattractive because nobody is shocked. Gambling is resorted to, but that is such an exclusive passion that it protects its votaries from destruction by other forms of vice. In some cases the quality of attention required of the gambler is intermittently applied to other aims, and the scholar gambler is in a fair way to become a type. What remains? The Kingdom of Bore. We have seen how the Frenchwomen, *fin du 18ième siècle,* after exhausting every form of excitement, were found calling out for the *néant;* and the parallel is curiously close and suggestive. But history, as we know, does not actually repeat itself, and those Frenchwomen gave up trying to understand the days they lived in. There was a feeling of storm in the air that oppressed them, and whose cause they had neither the mental nor moral equipment to discern. So they sat and waited to see what would come, and the great storm did come and swept them all away before they had had time to understand it. Here such a storm may or may not come; should it come, it would be met more intelligently—who knows? perhaps guided and directed; but what would be the outcome it is idle to try to predict. The older generation sometimes amuse themselves by conjecturing what *régime* will follow the present.

Several thousand years ago the form of confession prescribed by the Egyptian priests was a negative pronouncement—I have not stolen, murdered, etc., and so on, leaving the Deity to infer what sins have been committed. We might take the hint and find that a negative position has more chance of holding its own than a positive assertion, and the humble but definite aim of searching for facts, not theories, may prove a successful mode of arriving at something like a conclusion. I believe that the woman of the twentieth century will *not* in any way resemble the platforming, noisy, aggressive ladies of the advanced school, who may themselves be traced to the terrible new woman who afflicted us for a short time; but I also believe that the extinct woman—like Ibsen's master-builder's wife, Mrs. Solness—who threatened at one time to be rehabilitated by the force of reaction, has no chance at all of reincarnation. Nor do I think the *courtisane de haut étage* doubled with the philanthropist is a type that will commend itself to English opinion, for the men held in bondage by her are seldom those on the first line. Nor will the scholar and purely literary woman, or the *grande dame* who dabbles in literature, science, and art, and leads a charming life of eclecticism, æstheticism, and many other isms, prevail, for none of these are adequate; they are not the size, as an American would say. Our successors will insist on something built on a larger and wider conception of life, a type higher and nobler, and therefore more fascinating; for, after all, there seems to be lacking in the very distinct types I have tried to sketch that great quality of charm which is all too absent from the ordinary Englishwoman.

Charm! who can define it? It is an essence, a mystery; it rules in spite of vice and wickedness, not by reason of them. From Helen of Troy to Mary Stuart, the women who charmed look out through the mist of centuries with their "basilisk eyes," and arrest even now those who would, if they could, resist their fascination. Who that has seen Sarah Bernhardt as Cleopatra slowly stepping from the barge toward Anthony, with the simple words in the golden voice, "Je suis la Reine d'Egypte!" who that has felt with Swinburne that Mary Stuart's cold cruelty prevailed not with Chastelard, for with her Ronsard in hand he met death with joy so that he might see that beautiful wicked face once more; who that has felt the power of these and other instances (why should we multiply them?) will deny that there is here an inscrutable secret? Baffled we *must* ever be if we try to explain the mystery. We feel it, though we cannot analyze it. But we should beware of one pitfall. In this, as in all mysteries, we have an instance of a duality which cannot be overlooked. It is easy enough to consider only one side of the question. Take the physical side alone: it does not require the lore of a Brantôme or a Boccaccio to point out that, if we do not acknowledge the power of beauty over the senses, we shall go terribly astray. But is this all? Surely the other aspect of the mystery inevitably must be met. The wit, the intellectual fire, the quickness of apprehension, what would sensual beauty be without these? Take them together, and you feel what magnetic charm may be, though you cannot explain it. The number of those who possess the secret is not so great in the present day that we need fear the subjugation of the entire race of man in the twentieth century. The exceptions to the commonplace must always be few.

Rare instances may exist now. Let us be thankful for them, as we are for genius, and turn our attention to the future woman. The future woman! There are many burning questions she will help to disentangle, but we cannot touch upon them here. Probably the improvement in her economic conditions may, as the Americans foresee, effect wonders. But I shall be told that I have for my ideal something made up of Vittoria Colonna, Diane de Poitiers, and Miss Nightingale. No, my aim is much more humble. I dream of a possible woman having something of the frank, fearless grace, the self-reliant daring, the open-air freedom of the Englishwoman of the past. Give her also charm and sympathy and capability of deep passion, and we may find . . . but, if I do not take care I shall begin to predict, and I have promised not to do so.

THE CHILD

"THE BEGINNING OF THE MIND"

BY

H. G. WELLS

ARE our children getting the very best training possible for those trials of life which they, like the rest of us, must one day face? To every father and mother that question ranks high among the most important. Even some of us who are not parents may, perhaps, have recognized the value of the question as bearing on the future of the world, and may be willing to give the subject closer consideration. Is it possible that the way of the beast with its cub is not the best way? that intellect is better than instinct in the raising of the human young? The Indian mother lashed her pappoose upon her back, and there it hung, to live or to die as chance might fall, as the Great Spirit willed. We have rejected "instinct," in that aspect at least, and summon intellect in the guise of learned doctors to advise us as to every step in our darling's physical career. But in matters of mentality, so far as babies are concerned, we still cling to the blind method of instinct. The child learns what it can, what chance dictates, though these things may easily mean life or death to its mental and its moral being.

Perchance we have only acted thus at hazard because along these lines science has offered us no positive guide. Physicians for the mind and soul have no such assured authority among us, no such positive facts upon which to act, as have their brethren of the body. Each of us therefore, however unwilling and incompetent, feels himself compelled to assume the responsibility *of the judge, and to do for his children what to him seems good. With most of us, it is to be feared, this results merely in letting things drift till the child is old enough to go to school. Then as the little one begins its second birth into the world of books, we marvel to find its character already partly formed. It is, we say, a bright child or a determined one. It has caught—feeble verb vividly suggestive of our own sense of haphazard helplessness—it has caught some ideas quickly, others it has failed to assimilate. Heredity, which accuses our ancestors equally with ourselves, is a so much more comfortable explanation to offer for the youngster's failures, than to blame them upon our own ignorance, misguidance, and neglect.*

Fortunately, for our recently awakening consciences, science begins to investigate this subject along with others. The whole problem is as yet at an elementary stage; but no suggestions have been advanced more valuable than those of Mr. H. G. Wells. Mr. Wells, who first became known to most of us some dozen years ago as a writer of fantastic tales about the future, has gradually, with deepening interest in the social problems he portrayed, abandoned the story-telling part of his books and plunged ever more thoughtfully and earnestly into their philosophic side. To-day he stands among the most vigorous and most advanced of our social teachers, an "Associé de l'Institut International de Sociologie." *He preaches a "New Republicanism," to which he makes occasional reference below. His "New Republicans" are to devote themselves to the future and ignore the past, to bind themselves not to any single land, but to a league of new thought and higher purpose extending through all lands. Perhaps these ideas are fanciful, but nothing could be more practical than his approach to the practical problem of the conditions which do and which should surround the child.*

THE newborn child is at first no more than an animal. Indeed, it is among the lowest and most helpless of all animals, a mere vegetative lump; assimilation incarnate—wailing. It is for the first day in its life deaf, it squints blindly at the world, its limbs are beyond its control, its hands clutch drowningly at anything whatever that drifts upon this vast sea of being into which it has plunged so amazingly. And imperceptibly, subtly, so subtly that never at any time can we mark with certainty the increment of its coming, there creeps into this soft and claimant little creature a mind, a will, a personality, the beginning of all that is real and spiritual in man. In a little while there are eyes full of interest and clutching hands full of purpose, smiles and frowns, the babbling beginning of expression and affections and aversions. Before the first year is out there are obedience and rebellion, choice and self-control, speech has commenced, and the struggle of the newcomer to stand on his feet in this world of men. The process is unanalyzable; given a certain measure of care and protection, these things come spontaneously, with the merest rough encouragement of things and voices about the child they are evoked.

But every day the inherent impulse makes a larger demand upon the surroundings of the child, if it is to do its best and fullest. Obviously, quite apart from physical consequences, the environment of a little child may be good or bad, better or worse for it in a thousand different ways. It may be distracting or over-stimulating, it may evoke and increase fear, it may be drab and dull and depressing, it may be stupefying, it may be misleading and productive of vicious habits of mind. And our business is to find just what is the best possible environment, the one that will give the soundest and fullest growth, not only of body, but of intelligence.

Now from the very earliest phase the infant stands in need of a succession of interesting things. At first these are mere vague sense impressions, but in a month or so there is a distinct looking at objects; presently follow reaching and clutching, and soon the little creature is urgent for fresh things to see, handle, hear, fresh experiences of all sorts, fresh combinations of things already known. The newborn mind is soon as hungry as the body. And if a healthy well-fed child cries, it is probably by reason of this unsatisfied hunger, it lacks an interest, it is *bored*, that dismal vacant suffering that punishes the failure of things living to live fully and completely. As

Mr. Charles Booth has pointed out in his *Life and Labor of the People*, it is probable that in this respect the children of the relatively poor are least at a disadvantage. The very poor infant passes its life in the family room, there is a going and coming, an interesting activity of domestic work on the part of its mother, the preparation of meals, the intermittent presence of the father, the whole gamut of its mother's unsophisticated temper. It is carried into crowded and eventful streets at all hours. It participates in pothouse soirées and assists at the business of shopping. It may not lead a very hygienic life, but it does not lead a dull one. Contrast with its lot that of the lonely child of some woman of fashion, leading its beautifully non-bacterial life in a carefully secluded nursery under the control of a virtuous, punctual, invariable, conscientious rather than emotional nurse. The poor little soul wails as often for events as the slum baby does for nourishment. Into its gray nursery there rushes every day, or every other day, a breathless, preoccupied, excessively dressed, cleverish, many-sided, fundamentally silly, and universally incapable woman, vociferates a little conventional affection, slaps a kiss or so upon her offspring, and goes off again to collect that daily meed of admiration and cheap envy which is the gusto of her world. After that gushing, rustling, incomprehensible passage, the child relapses into the boring care of its bored hireling for another day. The nurse writes her letters, mends her clothes, reads and thinks of the natural interests of her own life, and the child is "good" just in proportion to the extent to which it doesn't "worry."

The ideal environment should contain the almost constant presence of the mother, for no one is so likely to be constantly various and interesting and so untiring as she. It is entirely on account of this ideal environment that monogamy finds its practical sanction, because it insures the presiding mother the maximum of security and self-respect. A woman who enjoys the full rights of a wife without a complete discharge of the duties of motherhood profits by the imputation of things she has failed to perform. To secure an ideal environment for children in as many cases as possible is the second of the two great practical ends—the first being sound births, for which the rules of sexual morality exist.

The ideal environment should no doubt centre about a nursery—a clean, airy, brightly lit, brilliantly adorned room, into which there should be a frequent coming and going of things and people; but from the time the child begins to recognize objects and individuals it should be taken for little spells into other rooms and different surroundings. In the homely, convenient, servantless abode over which the able-bodied, capable, skilful, civilized women of the future will preside, the child will naturally follow its mother's morning activities from room to room. Its mother will talk to it, chance visitors will sign to it. There should be a public or private garden available where its perambulator could stand in fine weather; and its promenades should not be too much a matter of routine. To go along a road with some traffic is better for a child than to go along a secluded path between hedges; a street corner is better than a laurel plantation as a pitch for perambulators.

When a child is five or six months old it will have got a certain use and grip with its hands, and it will want to handle and examine and test the properties of as many objects as it can. Gifts begin. There seems scope for a wiser selection in these early gifts. At present it is chiefly woolly animals with bells inside them, woolly balls, and so forth, that reach the baby's hands. There is no reason at all why a child's attention should be so predominantly fixed on wool. These toys are colored very tastefully, but as Preyer has advanced strong reasons for supposing that the child's discrimination of colors is extremely rudimentary until the second year has begun, these tasteful arrangements are simply an appeal to the parent. Light, dark, yellow, perhaps red and "other colors" seem to constitute the color system of a very young infant. It is to the parent, too, that the humorous and realistic quality of the animal forms appeal. The parent does the shopping and has to be amused. The babyish parent who really ought to have a doll instead of a child is sufficiently abundant in our world to dominate the shops, and there is a vast traffic in facetious baby toys, facetious nursery furniture, "art" cushions and "quaint" baby clothing, all amazingly delightful things for grown-up people. These things are bought and grouped about the child, the child is taught tricks to complete the picture, and parentage becomes a very amusing afternoon employment. So long as convenience is not sacrificed to the æsthetic needs of the nursery, and so long as common may compete with "art" toys, there is no great harm done, but it is well to understand how irrelevant these things are to the real needs of a child's development.

A child of a year or less has neither knowledge nor imagination to see the point of these animal resemblances—much less to appreciate either quaintness or prettiness. He is much more interested in the crumpling and tearing of paper, in the crumpling of chintz, and in the taking off and replacing of the lid of a little box. I think it would be possible to devise a much more entertaining set of toys for an infant than is at present procurable, but, unhappily, they would not appeal to the intelligence of the average parent. There would be, for example, one or two little boxes of different shapes and substances with lids to take off and on, one or two rubber things that would bend and twist about and admit of chewing, a ball and box made of china, a fluffy, flexible thing like a rabbit's tail with the vertebræ replaced by cane, a velvet-covered ball, a powder puff, and so on. They could all be plainly and vividly colored with some non-soluble inodorous color. They would be about on the cot and on the rug where the child was put to kick and crawl. They would have to be too large to swallow and they would all get pulled and mauled about until they were more or less destroyed. Some would probably survive for many years as precious treasures, as beloved objects, as powers and symbols in the mysterious secret fetichism of childhood—confidants and sympathetic friends.

While the child is engaged with its first toys, and with the collection of rudimentary sense impressions, it is also developing a remarkable variety of noises and babblements from which it will presently disentangle speech. Day by day it will show a stronger and stronger bias to associate definite sounds with definite objects and ideas, a bias so comparatively powerful in the mind of man as to distinguish him from all other living creatures. Other creatures may think, may, in a sort of concrete way, come almost indefinably near reason (as Professor Lloyd Morgan in his very delightful *Animal Life and Intelligence* has shown); but man alone has in speech the apparatus, the possibility, at any rate, of being a reasoning and reasonable creature. It is, of course, not his only apparatus. Men may think out things with drawings, with little models, with signs and symbols upon paper, but speech is the common way, the highroad, the current coin of thought.

With speech humanity begins. With the dawn of speech the child ceases to be an animal we cherish, and crosses the boundary into distinctly human intercourse. There begins in its mind the development of the most wonderful of all conceivable apparatus, a subtle and intricate keyboard, that will end at last with thirty or forty or fifty thousand keys. This queer, staring, soft little being in its mother's arms is organizing something within itself, beside which the most wonderfully organized orchestra one could imagine is a lump of rude clumsiness. There will come a time when, at the merest touch upon those keys, image will follow image and emotion develop into emotion, when the whole creation, the deeps of space, the minutest beauties of the microscope, cities, armies, passions, splendors, sorrows, will leap out of darkness into the conscious being of thought, when this interwoven net of brief, small sounds will form the centre of a web that will hold together in its threads the universe, the All, visible and invisible, material and immaterial, real and imagined, of a human mind. And if we are to make the best of a child it is in no way secondary to its physical health and growth that it should acquire a great and thorough command over speech, not merely that it should speak, but, what is far more vital, that it should understand swiftly and subtly things written and said. Indeed, this is more than any physical need. The body is the substance and the implement; the mind, built and compact of language, is the man. All that has gone before, all that we have discussed of sound birth and physical growth and care, is no more than the making ready of the soil for the mind that is to grow therein.

As we come to this matter of language we come a step nearer to the intimate realities of our subject, we come to the mental plant that is to bear the flower and the ripe fruit of the individual life. The next phase of our inquiry, therefore, is to examine how we can get this mental plant, this foundation substance, this abundant mastered language best developed in the individual, and how far we may go to insure this best development for all the children born into the world.

From the ninth month onward the child begins serious attempts to talk. In order that it may learn to do this as easily as possible it requires to be surrounded by people speaking one language and speaking it with a uniform accent. Those who are most in the child's hearing should endeavor to speak —even when they are not addressing the child—deliberately and clearly. All authorities are agreed upon the mischievous effect of what is called "baby talk," the use of an extensive sham vocabulary, a sort of deciduous milk vocabulary that will presently have to be shed again. Froebel and Preyer join hands on this. The child's funny little perversions of speech are really genuine attempts to say the right word, and we simply cause trouble and hamper development if we give back to the seeking mind its own blunders again. When a child wants to indicate milk, it wants to say milk, and not "mooka" or "mik," and when it wants to indicate bed the needed word is not "bedder" or "bye-bye," but "bed." But we give the little thing no chance to get on in this way until suddenly one day we discover it is "time the child spoke plainly." There comes an age when children absolutely loathe these adult imbecilities. Preyer has pointed out very instructively the way in which the quite sufficiently difficult matter of the use of I, mine, me, my, you, yours, and your is made still more difficult by those about the child adopting irregularly the experimental idioms it produces. When a child says to its mother, "Me go mome," it is doing its best to speak English, and its remark should be received without worrying comment; but when a mother says to her child, "Me go mome," she is simply behaving stupidly and losing an opportunity of teaching her child its mother-tongue.

In learning to speak, the children of the more prosperous classes are probably at a considerable advantage when compared with their poorer fellow-children. They hear a clearer and more uniform intonation than the blurred, uncertain speech of our commonalty, that has resulted from the reaction of the great synthetic process of the past century upon dialects. But this natural advantage of the richer child is discounted in one of two ways: in the first place by the mother, in the second by the nurse. The mother in the more prosperous classes is often much more vain and trivial than the lower-class woman; she looks to her children for amusement and makes them contributors to her "effect," and by taking up their quaint and pretty mispronunciations and devising humorous additions to their natural baby talk, she teaches them to be much greater babies than they could ever possibly be themselves. They specialize as charming babies until their mother tires of the pose, and then they are thrust back into the nursery to recover leeway, if they can, under the care of governess or nurse.

The second disadvantage of the upper-class child is the foreign nurse or nursery governess. There is a widely diffused idea that a child is particularly apt to master and retain languages, and people try and inoculate with French and German as Lord Herbert of Cherbury would have inoculated children with antidotes for all the ills their flesh was heir to —even, poor little wretches, to an anticipatory regimen for gout. The root-error of these attempts to form infantile polyglots is embodied in an unverified quotation from Byron's *Beppo*, dear to pedagogic writers—

> "Wax to receive and marble to retain".

runs the line—which the curious may discover to be a description of the faithful lover, though it has become as firmly associated with the child-mind as has Sterne's "tempering the wind to the shorn lamb" with Holy Writ. And this idea of infantile receptivity and retentiveness is held by an unthinking world in spite of the universally accessible fact that hardly one of us can remember anything that happened before the age of five, and very little that happened before seven or eight, and that children of five or six, removed into foreign surroundings, will in a year or so—if special measures are not taken—reconstruct their idiom and absolutely forget every word of their mother-tongue. This foreign nurse comes into the child's world, bringing with her quite weird errors in the quantities, the accent, and idiom of the mother-tongue, and greatly increasing the difficulty and delay on the road to thought and speech.[1] And this attempt to acquire a foreign language prematurely at the expense of the mother-tongue, to pick it up cheaply by making the nurse an informal teacher of languages, entirely ignores a fact upon which I would lay the utmost stress in this paper, which indeed is the gist of this paper, that only a very small minority of English or American people have more than half mastered the splendid heritage of their native speech. To this neglected and most significant limitation the amount of public attention given at present is quite surprisingly small.

There can be little or no dispute that the English language in its completeness presents a range too ample and appliances too subtle for the needs of the great majority of those who profess to speak it. I do not refer to the half-civilized and altogether barbaric races who are coming under its sway, but to the people we are breeding of our own race—the barbarians of our streets, our suburban "white niggers," with a thousand a year and the conceit of Imperial destinies. They live in our mother-tongue as some half-civilized invaders might live in a gigantic and splendidly equipped palace. They misuse this, they waste that, they leave whole corridors and wings unexplored, to fall into disuse and decay. I doubt if the ordinary member of the prosperous classes in England has much more than a third of the English language in use, and more than a half in knowledge, and as we go down the social scale we may come at last to strata having but a tenth part of our full vocabulary, and much of that blurred and vaguely understood. The speech of the Colonist is even poorer than the speech of the home-staying English. In America, just as in Great Britain and her Colonies, there is the same limitation and the same disuse. Partly, of course, this is due to the pettiness of our thought and experience, and so far it can only be remedied by a general intellectual amplification; but partly it is due to the general ignorance of English prevailing throughout the world. It is atrociously taught, and taught by ignorant men. It is atrociously and meanly written. So far as this second cause of sheer ignorance goes, the gaps in knowledge are continually resulting in slang and the addition of needless neologisms to the language. People come upon ideas that they know no English to express and strike out the new phrase in a fine burst of ignorant discovery. There are Americans in particular who are amazingly apt at this sort of thing. They take an enormous pride in the jargon they are perpetually increasing—they boast of it, they give exhibition performances in it, they seem to regard it as the culminating flower of their Continental Republic—as though the Old World had never heard of shoddy. But indeed they are in no better case than that unfortunate lady at Earlswood who esteems newspapers stitched with unravelled carpet and trimmed with orange peel the extreme of human splendor. In truth, their pride is baseless, and this slang of theirs no sort of distinction whatever. Let me assure them that in our heavier way we in this island are just as busy defiling our common inheritance. We can send a team of linguists to America who will murder and misunderstand the language against any eleven the Americans may select.

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[1] The same objection applies to the Indian ayah and the black "mammy," who are such kind, slavish, and picturesque additions to the *ensemble* of white mother and children.

Of course, there is a natural and necessary growth and development in a living language, a growth that no one may arrest. In appliances, in politics, in science, in philosophical interpretation there is a perpetual necessity for new words, words to express new ideas and new relationships, words free from ambiguity and encumbering associations. But the neologisms of the street and the saloon rarely supply any occasion of this kind. For the most part they are just the stupid efforts of ignorant men to supply the unnecessary. And side by side with the invention of inferior cheap substitutes for existing words and phrases, and infinitely more serious than that invention, goes on a perpetual misuse and distortion of those that are insufficiently known. These are processes not of growth but of decay—they distort, they render obsolete, and they destroy. The obsolescence and destruction of words and phrases cuts us off from the nobility of our past, from the severed masses of our race over-seas, far more effectually than any growth of neologisms. A language may grow—our language must grow—it may be clarified and refined and strengthened, but it need not suffer the fate of an algal filament and pass constantly into rottenness and decay whenever growth is no longer in progress. That has been the fate of languages in the past because of the feebler organization, the slenderer, slower intercommunication, and above all the insufficient records of human communities; but the time has come now—or at the worst is rapidly coming—when this will cease to be a fated thing. We may have a far more copious and varied tongue than had Addison or Spenser—that is no disaster—but there is no reason why we should not keep fast hold of all they had. There is no reason why the whole fine tongue of Elizabethan England should not be at our disposal still. Conceivably Addison would find the rich, allusive English of George Meredith obscure; conceivably we of this time might find a thousand words and phrases of the year 2000 strange and perplexing; but there is no reason why a time should ever come when what has been written well in English since Elizabethan times should no longer be understandable and fine.

The prevailing ignorance of English in the English-speaking communities enormously hampers the development of the racial consciousness. Except for those who wish to bawl the crudest thoughts, there is no means of reaching the whole mass of these communities to-day. So far as material requirements go it would be possible to fling a thought broadcast like seed over the whole world to-day, it would be possible to get a book into the hands of half the adults of our race. But at the hands and eyes one stops—there is a gap in the brains. Only thoughts that can be expressed in the meanest commonplaces will ever reach the minds of the majority of the English-speaking peoples under present conditions.

A writer who aims to be widely read to-day must perpetually halt, must perpetually hesitate at the words that arise in his mind; he must ask himself how many people will stick at this word altogether or miss the meaning it should carry; he must ransack his memory for a commonplace periphrase, an ingenious rearrangement of the familiar; he must omit or over-accentuate at every turn. Such simple and necessary words as "obsolescent," "deliquescent," "segregation," for example, must be abandoned by the man who would write down to the general reader; he must use "impertinent" as if it were a synonym for "impudent" and "indecent" as the equivalent of "obscene." And in the face of this wide ignorance of English, seeing how few people can either read or write English with any subtlety, and how disastrously this reacts upon the general development of thought and understanding amidst the English-speaking peoples, it would be preposterous, even if the attempt were successful, to complicate the first linguistic struggles of the infant with the beginnings of a second language. But people deal thus lightly with the mother-tongue because they know so little of it that they do not even suspect their own ignorance of its burden and its powers. They speak a little set of ready-made phrases, they write it scarcely at all, and all they read is the weak and shallow prose of popular fiction and the daily press. That is knowing a language within the meaning of their minds, and such a knowledge a child may very well be left to "pick up" as it may. Side by side with this they will presently set themselves to erect a similar "knowledge" of two or three other languages. One is constantly meeting not only women but men who will solemnly profess to "know" English and Latin, French, German, and Italian, perhaps Greek, who are in fact—beyond the limited range of food, clothing, shelter, trade, crude nationalism, social conventions, and personal vanity—no better than the deaf and dumb. In spite of the fact that they will sit with books in their hands, visibly reading, turning pages, pencilling comments, in spite of the fact that they will discuss authors and repeat criticisms, it is as hopeless to express new thoughts to them as it would be to seek for appreciation in the ear of a hippopotamus. Their linguistic instruments are no more capable of contemporary thought than a tin whistle, a xylophone, and a drum are capable of rendering the Eroica Symphony.

In being also ignorant of itself this wide ignorance of English partakes of all that is most hopeless in ignorance. Except among a few writers and critics, there is little sense of defect in this matter. The common man does not know that his limited vocabulary limits his thoughts. He knows that there are "long words" and rare words in the tongue, but he does not know that this implies the existence of definite meanings beyond his mental range. His poor collection of every-day words, worn-out phrases, and battered tropes constitute what he calls "plain English," and speech beyond these limits he seriously believes to be no more than the back-slang of the educated class, a mere elaboration and darkening of intercourse to secure privacy and distinction. No doubt there is justification enough for his suspicion in the exploits of pretentious and garrulous souls. But it is the superficial justification of a profound and disastrous error. A gap in a man's vocabulary is a hole and tatter in his mind; words he has may indeed be weakly connected or wrongly connected—one may find the whole keyboard jerry-built, for example, in the English-speaking Baboo—but words he has not signify ideas that he has no means of clearly apprehending; they are patches of imperfect mental existence, factors in the total amount of his personal failure to live.

This world-wide ignorance of English, this darkest cloud almost upon the fair future of our confederated peoples, is something more than a passive ignorance. It is active, it is aggressive. In England at any rate, if one talks beyond the range of white-nigger English, one commits a social breach. There are countless "book words" well-bred people never use. A writer with any tenderness for half-forgotten phrases, any disposition to sublimate the mingling of unaccustomed words, runs as grave a risk of organized disregard as if he tampered with the improper. The leaden censures of the *Times*, for example, await any excursion beyond its own battered circumlocutions. Even nowadays, and when they are veterans, Mr. George Meredith and Mr. Henley get ever and again a screed of abuse from some hot champion of Lower Division Civil Service prose. "Plain English" such a one will call his desideratum, as one might call the viands on a New Cut barrow "plain food." The hostility to the complete language is everywhere. I wonder just how many homes may not be witnessing the self-same scene as I write. Some little child is struggling with the unmanageable treasure of a new-found word, has produced it at last, a nice long word, forthwith to be "laughed out" of such foolish ambitions by its anxious parent. People train their children not to speak English beyond a threadbare minimum; they resent it upon platform and in pulpit, and they avoid it in books. Schoolmasters as a class know little of the language. In none of our schools, not even in the more efficient of our elementary schools, is English adequately taught. . . . And these people expect the South African Dutch to take over their neglected tongue! As though the poor partial King's English of the British Colonist was one whit better than the Taal! To give them the reality of what English might be: that were a different matter altogether.

These things it is the clear business of our New Republicans to alter. It follows, indeed, but it is in no way secondary to the work of securing sound births and healthy childhoods, that we should secure a vigorous, ample mental basis for the minds born with these bodies. We have to save, to revive this scattered, warped, tarnished, and neglected language of ours, if we wish to save the future of our world. We should save not only the world of those who at present speak English, but the world of many kindred and associated peoples who would willingly enter into our synthesis, could we make it wide enough and sane enough and noble enough for their honor.

To expect that so ample a cause as this should find any support amongst the festering confusion of the old politics is to expect too much. There is no party for the English language anywhere in the world. We have to take this problem and deal with it as though the old politics, which slough so slowly, were already happily excised. To begin with, we may give our attention to the foundation of this foundation, to the growth of speech in the developing child.

From the first the child should hear a clear and uniform pronunciation about it, a precise and careful idiom and words definitely used. Since language is to bring people together and not to keep them apart, it would be well if throughout the English-speaking world there could be one accent, one idiom, and one intonation. This there never has been yet, but there is no reason at all why it should not be. There is arising even now a standard of good English to which many dialects and many influences are contributing. From the Highlanders and the Irish, for example, the English of the South are learning the possibilities of the aspirate *h* and *wh*, which latter had entirely and the former very largely dropped out of use among them a hundred years ago. The drawling speech of Wessex and New England—for the main features of what people call Yankee intonation are to be found in perfection in the cottages of Hampshire and West Sussex—are being quickened perhaps from the same sources. The Scotch are acquiring the English use of shall and will and the confusion of reconstruction is world-wide among our vowels. The German *w* of Mr. Samuel Weller has been obliterated within the space of a generation or so. There is no reason at all why this natural development of the uniform English of the coming age should not be greatly forwarded by our deliberate efforts, why it should not be possible within a little while to define a standard pronunciation of our tongue.

We have available now for the first time, in the more highly evolved forms of phonograph and telephone, a means of storing, analyzing, transmitting, and referring to sounds, that should be of very considerable value in the attempt to render a good and beautiful pronunciation of English uniform throughout the world. It would not be unreasonable to require from all those who are qualifying for the work of education the reading aloud of long passages in the standard accent. At present there is no requirement of this sort in England and too often our elementary teachers at any rate, instead of being missionaries of linguistic purity, are centres of diffusion for blurred and vicious perversions of our speech. In the pulpit and the stage, moreover, we have ready to hand most potent instruments of dissemination, that need nothing but a little sharpening to help greatly toward this end. At the entrance of almost all professions nowadays stands an examination that includes English, and there would be nothing revolutionary in adding to that written paper an oral test in the standard pronunciation. By active exertion to bring these things about the New Republican could do much to secure that every child of our English-speaking people throughout the world would hear in school and church and entertainment the same clear and definite accent. The child's mother and nurse would be helped to acquire almost insensibly a sound and confident pronunciation. No observant man who has lived at all broadly, meeting and talking with people of diverse culture and tradition, but knows how much our intercourse is cumbered by hesitations about quality and accent, and petty differences of phrase and idiom, and how greatly intonation and accent may warp and limit our sympathy.

And while they are doing this for the general linguistic atmosphere, the New Republicans could also attempt something to reach the children in detail.

By instinct nearly every mother wants to teach. Some teach by instinct, but for the most part there is a need of guidance in their teaching. At present these first and very important phases in education are guided almost entirely by tradition. The necessary singing and talking to very young children is done in imitation of similar singing and talking; it is probably done no better, it may possibly be done much worse, than it was done two hundred years ago. A very great amount of permanent improvement in human affairs might be secured in this direction by the expenditure of a few thousand pounds in the systematic study of the most educational method of dealing with children in the first two or three years of life, and in the intelligent propagation of the knowledge obtained. There exist already, it is true, a number of Child Study Associations, Parents' Unions, and the like, but for the most part these are quite ineffectual talking societies, akin to Browning Societies, Literary and Natural History Societies: they attain a trifling amount of mutual improvement at their best, the members read papers to one another, and a few medical men and schools secure a needed advertisement. They have no organization, no concentration of their energy, and their chief effect seems to be to present an interest in education as if it were a harmless, pointless fad. But if a few men of means and capacity were to organize a committee with adequate funds, secure the services of specially endowed men for the exhaustive study of developing speech, publish a digested report, and, with the assistance of a good writer or so, produce very cheaply, advertise vigorously, and disseminate widely a small, clearly printed, clearly written book of pithy instructions for mothers and nurses in this matter of early speech they would quite certainly effect a great improvement in the mental foundations of the coming generation. We do not yet appreciate the fact that for the first time in the history of the world there exists a state of society in which almost every nurse and mother reads. It is no longer necessary to rely wholly upon instinct and tradition, therefore, for the early stages of a child's instruction. We can reinforce and organize these things through the printed word.

For example, an important factor in the early stage of speech-teaching is the nursery rhyme. A little child, toward the end of the first year, having accumulated a really very comprehensive selection of sounds and noises by that time, begins to imitate first the associated motions, and then the sounds of various nursery rhymes—pat-a-cake, for example. In the book I imagine, there would be, among many other things, a series of little versicles, old and new, in which, to the accompaniment of simple gestures, all the elementary sounds of the language could be easily and agreeably made familiar to the child's ears.

And the same book I think might well contain a list of foundation things and words and certain elementary forms of expression which the child should become perfectly familiar with in the first three or four years of life. Much of each little child's vocabulary is its personal adventure, and Heaven save us all from system in excess! But I think it would be possible for a subtle psychologist to trace through the easy natural tangle of the personal brier-rose of speech certain necessary strands, that hold the whole growth together and render its later expansion easy and swift and strong. Whatever else the child gets, it must get these fundamental strands well and early if it is to do its best. If they do not develop now their imperfection will cause delay and difficulty later. There are, for example, among these fundamental necessities, idioms to express comparison, to express position in space and time, elementary conceptions of form and color, of tense and mood, the pronouns and the like. No doubt, in one way or another, most of these forms are acquired by every child, but there is no reason why their acquisition should not be watched with the help of a wisely framed list, and any deficiency deliberately and carefully supplied. It would have to be a wisely framed list, it would demand the utmost effort of the best intelligence, and that is why something more than the tradesman enterprise of publishers is needed in this work. The publisher's ideal of an author of an educational work is a girl in her teens working for pocket-money. What is wanted is a little quintessential book better and cheaper than any publisher, publishing for gain, could possibly produce, a book so good that imitation would be difficult, and so cheap and universally sold that no imitation would be profitable. . . . But in this discussion of school-books and the like, we wander a little from our immediate topic of mental beginnings.

At the end of the fifth year, as the natural outcome of its instinctive effort to experiment and learn acting amidst wisely ordered surroundings, the little child should have acquired a certain definite foundation for the educational structure. It should have a vast variety of perceptions stored in its mind and a vocabulary of three or four thousand words, and among these and holding them together there should be certain structural and cardinal ideas. They are ideas that will have been gradually and imperceptibly instilled, and they are necessary as the basis of a sound mental existence. There must be, to begin with, a developing sense and feeling for truth and for duty as something distinct and occasionally conflicting with immediate impulse and desire, and there must be certain clear intellectual elements established already almost impregnably in the mind, certain primary distinctions and classifications. Many children are called stupid and begin their educational career with needless difficulty through an unsoundness of these fundamental intellectual elements, an unsoundness in no way inherent but the result of accident and neglect. And a starting handicap of this sort may go on increasing right through the whole life.

The child at five, unless it is color blind, should know the range of colors by name and distinguish them easily, blue and green not excepted; it should be able to distinguish pink from pale red and crimson from scarlet. Many children through the neglect of those about them do not distinguish these colors until a very much later age. I think also—in spite of the fact that many adults go vague and ignorant on these points—that a child of five may have been taught to distinguish between a square, a circle, an oval, a triangle, and an oblong, and to use these words. It is easier to keep hold of ideas with words than without them, and none of these words should be impossible by five. The child should also know familiarly by means of toys, wood blocks, and so on, many elementary solid forms. It is matter of regret that in common language we have no easy, convenient words for many of these forms, and instead of being learnt easily and naturally in play they are left undistinguished and have to be studied later under circumstances of forbidding technicality. It would be quite easy to teach the child in an incidental way to distinguish cube, cylinder, cone, sphere (or ball), prolate spheroid (which might be called "egg"), oblate spheroid (which might be called "squatty ball"), the pyramid, and various parallelopipeds, as, for example, the square slab, the oblong slab, the brick, and post. He could have these things added to his box of bricks by degrees, he would build with them and combine them and play with them over and over again and absorb an intimate knowledge of their properties, just at the age when such knowledge is almost instinctively sought and is most pleasant and easy in its acquisition. These things need not be specially forced upon him. In no way should he be led to emphasize them or give a priggish importance to his knowledge of them. They will come into his toys and play mingled with a thousand other interests, the fortifying powder of clear general ideas, amidst the jam of play.

In addition the child should be able to count, it should be capable of some mental and experimental arithmetic, and I believe that a child of five might be able to give the *sol-fa* names to notes and sing these names at their proper pitch. Possibly in social intercourse the child will have picked up names for some of the letters of the alphabet, but there is no great hurry for that before five certainly, or even later. There is still a vast amount of things immediately about the child that need to be thoroughly learnt, and a premature attack on letters divides attention from these more appropriate and educational objects. It should be able to handle a pencil and amuse itself with freehand; and its mind should be quite uncontaminated by that imbecile drawing upon squared paper by means of which ignorant teachers destroy both the desire and the capacity to sketch in so many little children. Such sketching could be enormously benefited by a really intelligent teacher who would watch the child's efforts, and draw with the child just a little above its level.

The child will already be a great student of picture-books at five, something of a critic (after the manner of the realistic school), and it will be easy to egg it almost imperceptibly to a level where copying from simple outline illustrations will become possible. About five, a present of some one of the plastic substitutes for modeling clay now sold by educational dealers, *plasticine* for example, will be a discreet and acceptable present to the child—if not to its nurse.

The child's imagination will also be awake and active at five. He will look out on the world with anthropomorphic (or rather with pædomorphic) eyes. He will be living on a great flat earth—unless some officious person has tried to muddle his wits by telling him the earth is round; amidst trees, animals, men, houses, engines, utensils, that are all capable of being good or naughty, all fond of nice things and hostile to nasty ones, all thumpable and perishable, and all conceivably esurient. And the child should know of Fairy Land. The beautiful fancy of the "Little People," even if you do not give it to him, he will very probably get for himself; they will lurk always just out of reach of his desiring, curious eyes, amidst the grass and flowers and behind the wainscot and in the shadows of the bedroom. He will come upon their traces; they will do him little kindnesses. Their affairs should interweave with the affairs of the child's dolls and brick castles and toy foundlings. Little boys like dolls—preferably masculine and with movable limbs—as much as little girls do, albeit they are more experimental and less maternal in their manipulation. At first the child will scarcely be in a world of sustained stories, but very eager for anecdotes and simple short tales. At five I suppose a child would be hearing brief fairy-tales read aloud. At five it is undesirable that the child should have heard horrifying things and he should not be afraid of the dark. It is, I am sorry to believe, very difficult to eliminate the horrors of fear absolutely from a child's life. Vulgarly illustrated toy-books should be guarded against. Pictures of ugly monsters will haunt imaginative children for years. An intelligent censorship may do much to ward off these sufferings until this passion of fear—so needless in the civilized life—begins that process of withering which is its destiny under our present and future security. Cowardly mothers and nurses who scuttle from cows and dogs and prancing horses may do infinite harm to a child by confirming this vestige of our animal past. The simple and obvious fearlessness of those about him should wean the child steadily from his instinctive dread of strangers and strange animals and strange unexpected objects and sudden loud noises. . . .

This is the hopeful foundation upon which at or about the fifth year the formal education of every child in a really civilized community ought to begin.

XXI

LIFE'S INTERCOURSE

"LANGUAGE AS THE INTERPRETER OF LIFE"

BY

BENJAMIN IDE WHEELER

PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

THE vast importance which the use of language assumes in early life is so obvious that it is usually overlooked. Man is so wholly a social animal that he forgets the fact. A grown person who has learned our life's elementary lessons may indeed abandon his kind and continue to exist, perhaps even to develop, in a hermit's solitude. But a six months' babe abandoned to "nature" must starve or be devoured. Even conceive of such a child as escaping and growing up alone amid the beasts. He would grow up a beast—or very little more. The acquisition of language is thus the first great step in our mental development. A deaf child learns, it is true, by imitations of actions, and so finally may have the world of language unlocked to it in books. But how slow is its advance compared to that which is first guided by the ear, that marvelous organism, that intricate triumph of mechanical construction.

Something of this immeasurable importance of language and the value of its systematic study has already been touched on by Mr. Wells in the previous address. It is here taken up and fully developed by President Wheeler, who ranks among our country's highest authorities upon this theme, he having been, in earlier days, professor of comparative philology and professor of Greek at Cornell. For the publication of the address thanks are due not only to President Wheeler himself but also to the Editors of the Atlantic Monthly, who first printed and copyrighted it and by whose kind permission it is used here.

Blood is thicker than water, but language is more than blood. Let any one debate with a modern Greek the question of old Greek pronunciation, and undertake to show him by the coolest of scientific demonstration that it differed in essential points from the modern, and he will find he has trespassed upon holy ground. Phonetic law is for these Greeks a pollution of the sacred temple grounds of patriotism. Belief in the essential identity of the modern language with the old stands as a fundamental article of the national faith. A Greek who would deny it is a high traitor. What wonder? It is the birthright of its tongue which gives his people its first claim, if not its only claim, to recognition as a nation.

When, on the evening of October 20, 1827, in the harbor of Navarino, the boom of the last cannon echoing back from the cliffs of old Sphakteria proclaimed the end of Turkish domination in the land of old time swayed by the Hellenes, there stood sponsorless and nameless before the nations of the world a population—not yet a people, but sundry scattered and ill-ordered groups of peoples whose habitations chanced to plant foundations on the sacred soil. It was the same old crumpled, sea-gnawed, sun-bathed Greece; but council-house and temple, palæstra and theatre, colonnade and college garden, were gone—all was gone that gave the ancient life of the dwellers in the land its outward form and semblance of a settled order, and made it a nation's life. Vague memories, half caricatured upon the traditions of a glorious past, floated in the air that hung over ruin and site; but where was the people to enter in to the inheritance, or who might claim "to know the manner of the god of the land"?

Neither the leading of goats to pasture over the slopes of Hymettus, the tilling of the battlefield of Mantinea, nor the sailing of fisher-boats through the blue waters of Salamis gave to men a claim on the traditions and name of the past, or provided a bond of union by virtue of which shepherds, peasants, traders, and sailors could be named a people and a nation. The population was of various blood—Greek, Albanian, Slavic, Frankish, Wallachian. But with all their diversity of blood, these men had been for once united in the sharing of a common risk and the performance of one common task —the expulsion of the Turk. The fact of this union in risking and achieving gave the impulse and the occasion to the formation of nationality; the conditions under which the union was inspired gave the bond its insignia and its form. From the hearths of the monasteries and from the lamps and altars of the chapels, the enthusiasm of revolt had gathered its sacred fire. The old Byzantine Christian Church was the one institution surviving in that wasted land, not only to remind men of a life higher than that of "bread alone," but to maintain, by even the slenderest thread, connection with a past that had meaning and body and purpose such as vindicate the existence of nationality.

The language of the Church, kept alive in the ritual of the chapels and in the decadent learning of the monasteries, was in substance the language in which Demosthenes spoke and Paul wrote. Feeble as it might seem in comparison with the old standards, it still kept its connection with the old, and was capable of receiving limitless refreshment from the sources of the old. The various Greek patois of the peasants and villagers, on the other hand, had long since passed beyond the bounds of literary or national expression. They were now mere vanishing, enfeebled remnants of greatness, suited to the chatterings of goatherds and children and the hagglings of petty traders, or the chantings mayhap of the folk, but incapable of giving an expression to the wants and aspirations of a nation or of a people that had part in the doings of the great outer world. The same was true of the Albanian patois spoken by large masses of the population, and especially by most of the sailor-folk whose prowess on the sea had carried no small part of the burden of war. So it fell out that the new national consciousness arising from the ashes of the Revolution clothed itself in the language of the Church which erstwhile had been the nation. The Greek patois were lifted through this higher type of the language into the channels of connection with the old Greek speech that once had been the vehicle of a world-civilization, and a modern Greek, in outward form at least, half ancient, half recent, arose as the standard language of the new nation, and became at once its educator, its voice, and its emblem. In form, in manner, in materials, it stands a living monument to the methods and the spirit in which the Greek nationality of the nineteenth century was requickened and reëstablished from the scanty remnants of the old. Even when it drapes the classical *himation* over the vulgate trousers and waistcoat of to-day in what seems fantastic masquerading, it pays thereby its tribute to the weirdly sentimental spirit of Philhellenism that has helped to make and maintain the state.

The lesson taught here in the small has, like so many of the products of this little land, its larger lesson in terms of greater things. Every standard language, as distinguished from local folk-speech and dialect, has been in the history of the world the exponent of some special movement in intercourse and civilization, the garb of some special type of human culture, the voice of some special form of instituted order among men—commercial, political, religious, or cultural. The very genius of a standard makes it something extended beyond its natural habitat to serve the conveniences of a wider intercourse. The standard divisions of time which deal in multiples like 12, 60, 360, hark back to the old Chaldean astronomers, from whom came the "60 minas make a talent," as well as the gross and the quire. Wherever 60 seconds make a minute the ancient empire of Mesopotamia has not utterly ceased to be. The conflict of the metre and the foot is still in substance a contest between the innovating Frenchman and the sturdy conservatism of English influence.

Latin, once the speech of a petty district by the Tiber, became the standard medium of intercourse for a mighty empire, absorbed into itself the spirit of the institution, became its outward embodiment, and survives to-day as a monument to the essential character of that institution better and truer than Colosseum or Forum. Its present place in education, in literature, in law, is determined by the place that Rome still holds in the organized life of Europe and in all organized life whose sources are in European civilization. A visible emblem is the place it still holds as the language of the Roman Church; for the Roman Church is in all reality the Roman Empire expressed in terms of the things of the soul. The schoolboy learns from his Latin, if he learns it well, more than words, rules, paradigms, maxims, bits of history, or scraps of mythology; he drinks in the life of old Rome and the spirit of its institutions,—law, order, organization, authority. There is nothing left us, now that the Romans are gone, so Roman as Latin.

What Latin is to the Roman Church Sanskrit is to the Brahmin. Two thousand years and more ago it parted company with the vernacular, and ever since has been maintained as a more or less artificial standard, serving to express and embody the culture which made the classical age and literature of India. What the Romanic languages are to Latin, the various Prakrits of India are to Sanskrit; and one of these in particular, the Pali, as the language of the earliest Buddhistic writings, has become a standard, lifted above time and habitat, and is the distinctive idiom of Buddhism.

When, with the emergence of a national spirit in the form of the Protestant Revolution, German speech in the sixteenth century pushed its way through the crust of Latin that had hitherto overspread the entire literary expression of the land, there *was* no German language; there was only a tangle of local dialects, none of which had been deemed worthy of conveying a message to Germany at large, few of aught else than the quick-vanishing message of the lips, and that in the common homely matters of every-day village life. In the fire and zeal of a great national uprising, of a struggle that was a battle of language standards as well as of creeds, the German language sprang into existence. It came in response to a need, but it was men, and the message of men to men struggling for expression, that made it. The idiom which carried the burden of the great controversy melted with the heat of conviction, and moulded itself into the form of a language that could voice the thought of a whole people.

The conquest of Italy made Latin, the crystallization of the Brahmin caste made Sanskrit, the preaching of Buddha made Pali, the dominance of Attic standard Greek over all the dialects of Greece is a reflection of Athens's fourth-century dominance in the sphere of thought and art, the modern Greek is daughter of the Revolution, German as a nation's speech is an outgrowth of Luther's Reformation. Most great standard languages will be found to have taken their rise in some movement of human interest that stirred the lives and thought of men toward a larger sympathy and a larger intercourse than the things of village, clan, or cult demanded. It is the same class of movements which have begotten nationalities, at least the nationalities of the modern type.

The ancient state was founded upon religion, and the bond of religion was in its genesis a bond of blood. The modern state tends to obscure the bonds and boundaries of blood and to substitute for them the ties of common interest and common conditions. Trade, intercourse, like customs, like forms of life, like forms of belief, like forms of thought, count more than blood. And so it comes about that more and more as the world grows riper the paths of nationality and of language unite. What levels the way for the one gives life and being to the other. The oldest state is the tribe, and its watchword is blood; the modern state is the nation, and the emblem which the course of history is choosing for it unmistakably is language. The toils and trials of a quasi-nation like Austria-Hungary, with its plurality of tongues, only prove the rule. What we have here is a refuge, not a nation.

But a national language is more than an emblem; more than a flag or a coat of arms; more than a monument to a great historic nation-making act, which may serve as a rallying point for patriotism and the sentiment of nationality. It is all that, but it is thousandfold more. A written creed or constitution which cannot be amended or reinterpreted may stand as a landmark and a sacred relic, and appeal to the reverence and even the affection of men; but a very different thing it is from a body of usage and precedent fashioned in historic testings, such as is the English constitution. That bears within itself at any given time a record of past experience in composite. A man's character at any given time is said to be the resultant of all the conscious choices of his life. Mistakes have left their scars, self-denials have toughened the fibre of the will, lies have left behind them perverted vision of the truth, deeds of mercy have made their deposit of mercifulness.

Language is of like sort with character. Every speaker in all the generations, in every word he has uttered, has helped to build it. Light-winged words, they sped through the barriers of the lips, but could not be lost. They either tended to strengthen the standing norm—and that either in hearer, speaker, or both—or they played their part in starting divergence and change or in loosening the foundations of the norm.

The crude methods of the new-born science of language are as yet but playing with the pebbles on the shore of a mighty deep. We read of etymologies, but they only tear away with cumbrous hand the silken warp from the cocoons of words, and miss the pattern and the motive of the weaving, and ignore the life within. Words are not words without context, motive, and life. Synonyms galore printed in Italics cannot compass a description of their life-values. The clumsy devices of letters cannot yield a vision of even their bodily form. To know them really one must know them warm—warm with the life-blood of actual living speech; one must have met them under every variety of life-conditions; one must have "summered and wintered" with them.

We arrange them in paradigms, and think we have compassed and measured them; but these paradigm pigeonholes only betray the limitations of our own petty logic. We try to cram words into compartments under our so-called rules of syntax, and the splendid failure which results offers the finest demonstration of the narrow range of reason as compared with the great background of soul-life, the vast reaches of the divine indefinite.

Grammar is to the average healthy human being the driest and deathliest of all the disciplines. Except as it serves a temporary practical purpose of offering a first approach to the acquisition of a language, or of presenting to maturer study a convenient tentative and artificial classification of certain facts, it brings spiritual atrophy and death to him who gives and him who takes. Treated as an end unto itself, it desiccates teacher and pupil alike. The fact requires neither demonstration nor illustration. The reason for it, too, is not far to seek. Grammar represents the application of a method that is lifeless to a subject-matter that is life, and the discrepancy between the method and the matter determines the spiritual revulsion against the former. It is a case of inevitable and eternal misfit. Grammar as we practise it is derived from the Sophists and the Stoics, and is still, however much we try to disguise the fact, based upon a confidence in logic, or something in the ordering faculties of the intellect close akin thereto. But language, which is the property of life and personality in the whole, will not yield its secret to the meagre analyses of reason and intellect, which are by their nature partial, which see as in a glass darkly, and not face to face. Language cannot be unlocked by logic; it can be unlocked only by sympathy.

It would not be my purpose to deny for a moment the possibility of a science of language or to question its utility; far from it. As little would I undertake to deny the possibility of a science of theology, merely because it fails, as it notably does, to cover and represent the facts of living faith. But what we must recognize, what we must in honesty confess, though it gives us pain to do it, is that the finest endeavors of the finest scientific grammar, like all other processes which apply the purely objective tests to the products of life, and preeminently of soul-life, can only serve at the best as correctives and stimulants of vision in detail; they cannot induct any human being into real understanding and appreciation of the life of the whole. Learn and know Meyer's Grammar and the Kühner-Blass from title-page to index, and what a pitiful travesty that by itself would yield upon a real sympathy with the magnificent idiom in which—not merely *through* which by its content of idea, but *in which* itself—Sophocles conveys the touch of the Hellenic fervors and unfolds the Hellenic attitude toward the universe of being: love, awe, joy, hope, regret, simplicity, harmony, beauty, temperance.

If language were a mass of conventional cipher, like a

Volapük or the price-marks of a secretive hardware shop; if the ordering faculties that haunt the superficies of mind had dominated it entire and formed it, as they have the price-marks, then would there be some hope for grammar. A grammar of Volapük is an eminently satisfactory thing. A code telegram can be translated by purely mechanical processes. The translation, however, of a literary masterpiece, in which language is at the highest flush of vitality, is one of the severest and most evasive tasks to which human endeavor can address itself. You can transfer patches of flesh and skin, and even infuse blood, but you cannot transfer life from one body to another. Words do not live in dictionaries any more than plants in herbariums. They live in the usage of living men. Every word, every phrase, has it subtle, unanalyzable coloring, derived from myriad associations in myriad sentences, as impossible of summary and final description as a personality.

A word has a personal character, and wherever it goes it carries like a human being its character with it; so that in every use of it there is implicit the power and the possibility of standing for vastly more than the special emergency seemed at first to demand. Jest and poetry depend for much of their flavor, as did old-fashioned town-meetings, upon this habit of taking along the entirety of individual character. Put language under the same severe restraints which depress personality and turn the town-meeting into a battalion of soldiers, and you have the prose of the law-code and the auctioneer's catalogue. But poetry, which always antedates prose, as the Vedic hymns antedate the Brahmanas, and Homer and the dramatic poets the orators, is far more in accord with the inner spirit and purpose of speech than is prose. Language is indeed, as Emerson said, only "fossil poetry."

Language is through and through a social product. Schleicher, the fine old botanist-philologist of Jena, tried his best in vain to apply to it the analogies of his flower-beds and kitchen-garden. Stammbaums and branches have gone the way of roots and stems. The laws of sound-change, instead of being like the laws of nature governing the growth of plants and the revolving of planets, prove to be founded on the tendency to social compromise, in the necessity which men are under of getting along together and understanding one another, and resemble, therefore, the laws which govern dress-coats, dinner-calls, the holding of forks, and the wording of wedding-cards.

Even in the outward characteristics of their structure, languages represent in the grand style of summary the dominant social conditions in the history of those peoples who speak them. Thus, at one end of the line stand the so-called agglutinative languages, at the other the monosyllabic. The agglutinative languages, of which the Bantu tongues of Africa and the Mongolian of Central Asia afford illustration, represent the experience of widely scattered populations which maintain over a vast extent of territory a desultory communication with one another. Corresponding to the necessities of the case which demand that every idea and phase of idea be explicitly indicated, these languages are perfectly transparent; that is, perfectly "regular" in structure. Like modifications of ideas are always expressed by like inflexional elements. Little or nothing is left to be inferred. Every division and subdivision of the thought is duly tagged and labelled.

The Chinese goes to the other extreme. Here almost everything is implicit. Far more is left to be inferred from context, word-order, and intonation than is really presented in bodily form. The monosyllabic dabs in which the Chinaman speaks are mere running hints—a shorthand of speech condensed to the uttermost. They are the natural products of a stable, long-established, densely-compacted civilization, in which unwritten precedent outweighs written statutes; in which multifold social compromise has finally made life artificial in place of natural, and its acts symbolic rather than presentive. The monosyllabic languages have been produced under tremendous social pressure. They represent, from the artistic as well as the historical point of view, the most finished type of human speech. The maximum of idea is *implicit* in their structure. They contain the minimum of mechanism for the maximum of expression.

We might multiply illustrations of the way in which language, sensitive as milk to its environment, takes upon it the impress of social conditions as they develop and pass. The modern rapid development of intercourse is, for instance, making itself slowly but irresistibly felt in dulling the colors which mark the linguistic areas on the map of the civilized world. Not only interchange of loan-words, but in far subtler form the acceptance of common syntactical moulds, is gradually lifting the great European culture-languages toward the levels of a common medium of communication. While the question whether English, French, Russian, is to become the universal language is awaiting the slow unfolding of political and commercial history, this deep and subtle drift into unity is steadily advancing toward a distant goal. It means no more than that the languages, in their chameleon habit, are taking on the colorings of internationalism.

Man is first and foremost a social being. Language is the social bond, and therefore man's badge of membership in the body social; but more than that, it is the embodiment of the nature and spirit of that social fabric to which the individual owns allegiance, and through which he becomes a man. If that social spirit is the *logos*, then language is the logos made flesh. Man as a member of society is assigned to his place and is made by the language he commands. More or less unconsciously we even locate men by the language they use. So fine and exacting are our tests, for instance, that one who is to command a hearing as representative of a type of the higher civilization of a nation must, on platform or in pulpit, speak in the recognized standard of that civilization. The dialectal colorings of province and district, much as they may delight us in other ways and for other purposes, carry insensibly with them the impression of limitation and provincialism. Through the language a man speaks, or the form of it he uses at any given time he betrays the scheme of human culture and the order of human society with which at the moment he is in sympathy.

These considerations concerning the place and meaning of language in human society determine what we believe is its place and meaning in the education of mankind. Through language nations in the modern sense are made and held together. Through language the individual is lifted into membership in the nation. The child comes into the world and finds a language awaiting him. The acquiring of that language constitutes his first education. Compared with this all other education is of entirely secondary importance. Observation of the processes by which a child acquires its mother tongue teaches that it is not the language which is drilled into the child's mind, but it is the child's mind which is fitted into and expanded into the language. Words and expressions come to the child, not as full and finished globules of thought, but as empty shells which he must fill with idea, as spools on which he must wind the warp of thought. Words are not defined for the child. If they were, he could not understand. He must learn their various uses from single experiences, and by slow and gradual processes arrange the concepts, which by associations, metaphors, and metonymies cling together in the mind and usage of the language community, into their compact place within the shell or about the spool. In doing this he is coming into possession of the folk-wisdom of the folk; he is coming into accord with the mind of the historic-social body of which he is to be a member; he is learning to estimate and quote the values of the world in terms of the standard coinage of his place and time; he is making himself standing ground in human society; he is forming and building a *pou sto* for the exercise and development of his free personality. Without school or school-master, text-book or pedagogue, the child and then the man are brought before the seat of the greatest and wisest teacher their lives are ever in all their scope to have, and this teacher is their mother tongue. It is a teacher whose learning they are never to exhaust, and whose stimulating influence toward mental growth is not likely soon to fail. Happy are they who are born into the inheritance of a speech developed and enriched by highest literary use and by long traditions of noble expression; for then it will be a teacher to age as well as to youth. Happy are they who, through the formal education of the schools, are brought into touch with the life attitude of other peoples as embodied in their languages, and especially of those peoples whose spiritual life has blended into the early currents of our own.

It is particularly, however, for the years of earlier mental development that language plays its chief involuntary part as educator. That which it does now without conscious direction provides the basis and guidance for use in formal and systematic education. It points the way to what is the prime consideration in education, even if it does not swallow up and include all others.

We educate a human being to the end that his personality may most nearly fulfil its inherent possibilities within the human society of which it is to be a part. We do not seek primarily, if we are wise, to fill the mind with various knowledge; for we know that the mind is not so much a reservoir as a mill-wheel, not so much a storehouse as a laboratory, not so much a receptacle as an instrument. We do not, if we are wise, rear the child in isolation from life or in untamed individualism; for we know that man is born to live in society, and that society is historically conditioned, and that the life man lives is part of a succession—a historical life.

What we really do first of all, if we are wise, is to take the budding bit of individuality in hand, and induce it, constrain it, persuade it, cajole it, overawe it, and, if need be, spank it, into recognition of the existing order. The first thing a child has to learn is to do as it is told to do. To become a historical being is its mission, and as soon as possible it must recognize the authority of the historically constituted order. The acceptance of the authority of society is the gate through which one passes into freedom. The stern law it is, like the rough hand of the *paidagogos*, that leads us unto Christ; it is through obedience and conformity to the spirit that dominates the world that we come to a realization of ourselves, and to our birthright of freedom as sons of God. In the isolation of selfhood we sit without the pale and yearn for the husks the swine eat, but once we have set our faces toward home and order there is enough and to spare. This is what is meant, alike in the statutes of society, in the constitution of the state, and in the oracles of God, by the "consent of the governed."

It is the mission of language and literature in education to bring young individual life into accord with the moulds of historical life. Through word and phrase and sentence, through tale and myth and verse, mind is quickened to enter in and occupy these nests and shells that have sheltered other human thought. Mind is expanded in the moulds of mind; not in the lifeless geometric cells of logic and reasoning, but in the life-cells shapen to contain the products of the soul—the whole, the living soul.

The practically logical mind is a healthy, well-nourished mind—nothing more or less. Such mind is produced by feeding it during the years of development upon healthy normal food, not upon the embalmed food of the logicians or the chemists. The Chinese mandarins, trained upon language and innocent of pure logic, are said to be the keenest practical logicians of the world. The forms of reasoning, indeed, to which a child is stimulated in catching the meanings of sentences of the mother speech, or which a boy uses in making out the meaning of a sentence in his Cæsar from the imperfect data of words and syntax, are the forms of contingent reasoning, the ones which are almost exclusively employed in the decisions and judgments of actual life. Men who pretend to regulate their lives according to well-constructed syllogisms—and it must be pretence or self-deception, for there are no such syllogisms in *life*—are generally regarded as impossible men. They are what are politely known as cranks.

The methods of thought which are based upon objective tests, and which, whether applied in the field of the humanities or of nature studies, we call scientific, have their place in education as well as those we have discussed; but in elementary education they are to be introduced gradually, and as correctives rather than as staples. Nature study need not be scientific any more than language study. We are not concerned here with any conflict between the study of nature and the study of the humanities, nor are we making protest against the scientific method of studying either; we are insisting merely upon the educational value that inheres in the *direct* study of language and of language as literature.

Literary training can never be disjoined from language study. There never was a suggestion more perverse than that which recommends the substitution of translations for originals, on the theory that all the great and choice ideas can thus be exploited as well as through the toil of learning the language. What, pray, are these ideas? Why not pick them out, arrange them alphabetically by initial words, and print them in double columns like market-lists? The reason straight and simple is that they are inseparable from the language. Language is no mere vehicle. It is itself in large part its own content.

The main educative purposes of literary study and of language study are, in the end, one and the same. They approach the mysteries of the folk-mind directly. They deal face to face with the soul and its expression. Contact and sympathy are their instruments; not the lens, the scalpel, and the syllogism. They throw wide open the window and look straight out into life and the day.

So long as intimations of the larger life, the life social and the life spiritual, have power to call man out of himself and his cell, these studies have their place in the schooling of mankind; for the reach of the soul is higher than the clutch of the hand.

THE BOY

"HIS PREPARATION FOR MANHOOD"

BY

DANIEL COIT GILMAN

FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY AND OF THE CARNEGIE INSTITUTION

THE name of Daniel Coit Gilman has long ranked among the very foremost of American educators and scholars. Five years ago he resigned his position at the head of the world-renowned university of Johns Hopkins, having assumed the presidency of the Carnegie Institution, which was then established in Washington for the advancement of scientific research. This distinguished office he resigned in 1904 at the approach of age; but he still remains an official connection with both institutions. Perhaps in all our land there is no man who has had such long, such wide, and such varied experience as Dr. Gilman with boys, and with young men just ceasing to be boys. Therefore his words upon this subject must have a permanent value and interest for us all.

Our previous address dealt with the child, the problems that surround his earliest days, the mists in which his emerging mental power is involved, and through which, seeking to guide him, we grope blindly. As he advances into boyhood his steps grow firmer, the enwrapping mist less dense. Something of vagueness must always intervene, hiding each human personality from all the rest, yet as the child learns to talk and to think he begins to bridge the gap which holds his mind secreted from older minds. He analyzes himself in some crude way, and so helps us to analyze *him. Moreover, as Dr. Gilman well points out, memory, each man's memory of his own boyhood, scarce reaching back below the age of five or ten, still further enables us to understand. Hence the chief problems which confront most boyhoods are well known. They can be faced and fought. Much help, very much help indeed, can be given to the lad in solving his own problems. And alas, so much is needed, so much more even than we can give! To start "right" upon one's manhood is no easy task. There are so many hampering habits easily acquired, so many pitfalls everywhere ensnaring, so many follies, so many vices.*

While the difficulties stand out clearer than those of childhood, the problems are more serious; they loom larger and seem far more doubtful of solution. The child yields to control, but with springing youth the hand of guidance is thrown aside. The fences are broken down, the young steer will to the meadow, the young blood will to the fray. Let us seek such knowledge on the subject, such assistance in handling our own, as one man's venerable thought and experience can offer.

I AM not sure that people are agreed upon the limits of boyhood. Shakespeare divides life into seven ages, of which the second is "the whining schoolboy, with his satchel and shining morning face, creeping like snail unwillingly to school," and other writers regard with a superstitious reverence the multiples of seven, as climacterics leading up to "the grand climacteric" of nine times seven; but I prefer to count the first twenty or twenty-one years as those of boyhood; then comes early manhood—another twenty years; the third score is that of middle age and maturity, and the fourth, of seniority. It is only centenarians who can truly be called old in these days which have so recently known a Gladstone, Manning, Ruskin, Tennyson, Bismarck, Moltke, and a Kaiser Wilhelm; octogenarians and nonagenarians are only in advancing years. At Commencements, gray-haired men who have grandsons in college allude to their classmates as "the boys," and appear to think that calling a man young makes him so. But the boys I am to speak of have not been to college; they are under their majority, and most of them less than eighteen years of age. I refer to the boys of Berkeley, of Exeter, of Andover, of St. Paul's, of Norwich, of Lawrenceville, and of hosts of other schools. I do not refer to the ghosts of boys, like one that went the rounds with Doctor Holmes when he returned, after fifty years or so, to the scenes of his youth and the academy in Andover. "The ghost of a boy was at my side," he says, "as I wandered among the places he knew so well." The ghost went with him even to the railroad station. "Give me two tickets to Boston," said the Autocrat of the Breakfast Table; but the little ghost replied, "When you leave this place you leave me behind you." "One ticket, then, to Boston," said the tale-teller; "and good-bye, little ghost."

But in reality do men ever say good-bye to "the little ghost"? Is he not with us night and day, summer and winter, all our lives through, and are we sure that even death will part us from him? Ask the older men of your acquaintance and see if the ghost of a boy is not always near by. Ask even Doctor Holmes—if only one could still ask him "over the tea-cups"—if the ghost of a boy whom he left at the Andover station did not fly through the air and meet him when he reached his house on Beacon Street. Ask him if the little ghost has never appeared in Cambridge or in Berkshire—yes, ask him if the ghost is not always with him, sometimes a recording angel, and sometimes a prophet of immortality.

Is it not worth while for us older people to tell the boys that a little ghost will always keep them company—that as they grow older he will remind them perpetually of the past; every peccadillo will be remembered, and all healthy, honest deeds will be treasured in the cells of memory "to be used as directed"?

During recent years there have been some very curious studies respecting the natural history of boys. Mr. Howells, the novelist, has written a book that he calls *A Boy's Town*, and in its pages he delineates with the realistic touch of a master the thoughts of a boy between his third and his eleventh year, who grew up in a country town on the Miami River. Literature is full of autobiographies, but here we have something quite unusual, something quite fresh in the literature of childhood. It is a picture drawn with accuracy by a writer while still young, of the environment in which he was brought up. Here we may learn what an American boy surmised, discovered, and believed in respect to the world in which he was placed.

By a curious coincidence, whether conscious or unconscious I cannot say, a celebrated French writer, whose *nom de plume* is Pierre Loti, has drawn a companion picture to that of Howells. In these two books we may compare the Huguenot and the American. The Frenchman, with a lively imagination and a love of adventure, was subjected to the depressing influences of a French country town. On the prairie all was freedom; in the province all was restraint. But we see how both natures rose above their belongings, how the self-determining power of the will made them both keen observers, graceful narrators, distinguished novelists.

One of the most remarkable studies of the inherent tendency of boys to organize society may be found in a paper entitled "Rudimentary Society among Boys," that was written some time ago by Mr. J. Hemsley Johnson, a connection of Reverdy Johnson, the Maryland statesman. In this paper we have the story of the life among the McDonogh school boys, in their country home a few miles from Baltimore. Several hundreds of acres, with predominant woodlands, belonged to the school, but the boys thought that the land and all that grew or was nourished upon it belonged to them; so they established their rights to the walnut trees and the birds' nests, and afterward to the portions of cultivated grounds. The germs of civilized society were soon developed. "No right without its duty, no duty without its rights." Authority, law, penalty, inheritance, trade, circulating medium, were all evolved by the boys.

Doctor Stanley Hall has published a kindred memoir, in which he has described the amusements of children. He calls his paper "The Story of a Sand Pile."

Perhaps we are coming to the time when the comparative biography of boys will take its place beside the comparative history of nations and the comparative geography of lands. We shall not only be able to distinguish how boys differ from men, and how their ways differ from those of girls; but we may learn how boys differ from boys, at different periods, in different families, with different talents and with different hopes and expectations.

THE BOY

Boys may be classified into genera and species, not according to what they know, but according to what they are. The school affords an easy method of placing them in forms, grades, classes—almost as exact as that of the tailor who places them in coats of different sizes—but what a boy has learned is only one element in an estimate of his worth. It is more important to discover what are his capacities, to what intellectual and moral group he belongs; what are his tendencies toward nodosities that must be counteracted; what are his aptitudes to be cultivated; what are the habits that must be regulated so that they shall be helps and not hinderances in the battle of life.

With all the accumulated experience of mankind it is still extremely difficult to foretell what a boy will become. It is possible to predict the speed that a thoroughbred colt will approximate, as Professor Brewer has shown, or to anticipate the quality of a terrier or a pointer, of an Ayrshire or a Durham; but who is wise enough to discover in the nursery the coming statesmen, poets, scholars, and divines, or even to foretell what qualities will be developed in any group of schoolboys? Who can estimate the power of the individual, the self, the ego, that dwells in each bodily frame, and asserts in the course of life its supreme authority? One of the most impressive sermons delivered by Charles Kingsley in Westminster Abbey was a sermon on the monosyllabic, the monogram, I.

No parent, no teacher, no physician, no philosopher is wise enough to speak infallibly upon such important questions. There are no logical formulas, no canons of criticism, no physiological tests by which conclusions may be reached. Nevertheless, there are signs and tokens which indicate the probabilities, and by these the wise instructor, the observing mother, the prudent father will be guided.

One way of arriving at a knowledge of boys is by reminiscence. Old men like to renew their youth by retrospection. They imagine themselves young because they recall so vividly the days of their childhood, but they are in danger both of Scylla and Charybdis. They may err by vanity and imagine that they were more excellent than they really were; or they may err by modesty, and blame themselves for faults which were not so personal as they were circumstantial. In rare cases we may get an introspective view of a boy's life, written while he was a boy, but I do not remember any masculine diary like that of Marie Bashkirtseff, the prodigy of egotism, the genius run wild, the morbid self-auscultator who could listen to the beatings of her own heart and register the sounds of her own respiration.

It is almost a fashion in these days for men who have acquired distinction to write the memoirs of their boyhood. Two of my colleagues at Johns Hopkins, Professor Gildersleeve, the Grecian, and Professor Newcomb, the astronomer, published accounts of the "formative influences" to which they were subjected. I learn that my successor, President Remsen, has this year done something similar in his reminiscences for the history of the New York City College, his Alma Mater. President Dwight and President A. D. White once wrote similar articles. Noteworthy Englishmen—Tyndall, Lecky, Farrar, and Frederic Harrison among the number—have written the story of their youth. Ruskin, poet, artist, naturalist, philosopher, revealed under such cryptogamic titles as the Springs of Wandel, Herne Hill, Almond Blossoms, and the Banks of Tay, the life of a boy as it appears to a septuagenarian. Franklin wrote his autobiography, so did Gibbon, so did Rousseau; and so we can go farther and farther back in history till we reach the Confessions of Saint Augustine. It is interesting to notice that among the writers of our own day many fall back on the term of the day, heredity, which seems to serve equally well as a scapegoat and as a mentor.

The sum of all that I have been able to discover from these and many other writings, and from innumerable opportunities to study boys, may be very briefly stated.

Every boy differs from every other boy in character as he does in appearance. Even twins, while they closely resemble one another in many respects, may differ essentially in fundamental tastes and talents. Mr. Galton says that extreme similarity and extreme dissimilarity are nearly as common between twins of the same sex as moderate resemblance. If this is confirmed, what becomes of heredity?

The corollary is obvious, that plans of education should as far as possible be adapted to individual requirements; but as every boy is preparing for life among his fellows, and as Providence has so ordered it that he is strongly influenced by other boys, it follows that to treat him alone, away from comrades, in the backwoods, in a cell, under exclusive instruction, is only justifiable under extraordinary circumstances. He comes into the world not only as an individual, with his own responsibilities and possibilities, but as one of a family, a neighborhood, a race, from which he cannot be extricated except by death. Isolation is therefore as unnatural as it is undesirable and difficult.

Every boy is influenced both by his inheritance and his environment. Yet the laws of heredity in the human species are not well enough known to give us any certain indications of what the child of any parents will become, while the conditions in which a person lives are as complex as the elements that nourish his body, the air he breathes, the water he drinks; as subtle and insinuating as the tones of the voice, the glance of the eye, the nod of the head, the pressure of the hand; as influential as religious faith, the forms of civil government, the habits of society, the lessons of antiquity, the examples of good men; and as trifling as a careless word, a thoughtless joke, a timely hint, a friendly warning or a loving smile.

Until he reaches maturity every boy requires positive guidance from those who have had a longer experience in the ways of the world. It is always cruel, and it may be criminal, to allow a youth to experiment for himself upon conduct—to say that he must sow his own wild oats, that experience is the best teacher, that he must choose his own course. Every boy is entitled to know what older persons have discovered of the laws of conduct, and to receive restraint, caution, and warning until his eyes have been opened and his powers of judgment developed. Nobody questions that he ought to be taught the laws of health, of diet, of poisons, of climate, or the laws that protect his person and property; and it is surprising that anybody should question his right to initiation, by stringent discipline, into the laws of intellectual and moral well-being. Every boy, whether he wishes it or not, should be trained. Yet the contrary doctrine is covertly held, if not openly avowed, by many a tender mother and by many a generous father. Note the autobiography of John Stuart Mill.

Neither precocity nor dulness is any certain index of the future of a boy. Only a wise man can tell the difference between the priggishness of conceit and the display of unusual talent, and it takes a superlatively wise man to devise right methods for exciting temperaments that are dull, or, on the other hand, to guide a genius. Abnormal brilliancy and abnormal slowness are usually the result of abnormal physical conditions, and physiologists are only just beginning to show to ordinary parents how these unusual conditions may be discovered and treated. When we see a man we cannot tell what sort of a boy he came from, and when we see a boy we cannot tell what sort of man he will make. The great Emperor Charles V, who grew old prematurely, was slow in his development, and was nearly twenty-one before his beard grew. The facts lately collected by Doctor Scripture in regard to mathematicians show how impossible it is to prophesy in respect to the development of hypothetical genius. Some who have risen to great distinction, like Gauss, Ampère, Safford, were precocious mathematicians in their youth; another boy of extraordinary parts, Thomas Fuller, the Virginia calculator, remained an idiot. Daniel Webster, greatest of New England orators, broke down, we are told, in his early speaking. Most boys that run away from home take the road to ruin; but the liberator of Greece, Sir Richard Church, who died a few years ago in Athens, honored by a public funeral and by a monument raised by the Greek nation to commemorate his services, was a boy of under size, of Quaker parentage, who, before he was sixteen years of age, ran away from home and "took the king's shilling."

The influence of modern psycho-physiological inquiries upon the coming generations is still undetermined. The good that is aimed at may perhaps surpass the evil that is done. Certainly, in these days, when morbid self-consciousness, extreme sensitiveness, bashfulness, shyness, and timidity are so frequently apparent, the wise parent, the wise teacher will hesitate before encouraging in his own family or his own school too intense and too prolonged introspection. Give the boys plenty of open air, and when they cannot have this, encourage within doors exercise in hand-craft, the use of tools, and knowledge of the book of sports—not to the exclusion of other studies, but as collateral security that the mind and the body shall be simultaneously developed. As an example, the stories that we have of Daniel Webster's boyhood are very instructive. You may find them in Morse's life of the great orator of New England. The infant was a rather sickly little being at its birth, and some cheerful neighbors predicted that it would not live long. For many years the boy was weak and delicate. Manual labor, the common lot of farmer's sons, was out of the question in his case. But now hear the other side of the story. "Young Webster was allowed to devote much of his time to play, to play of the best sort, in the woods and fields." The bar and the senate and the cabinet tell the conclusion of a career which began with such meagre hopes.

Healthy, out-of-door lives, directed toward objects of enjoyment, of observation, of sport, of acquisition, are better for boys than exclusive devotion to books, and especially than habits of introspection, self-examination, casuistry, journal-writing.

Of all the facts that the world has accumulated with respect to the art of training, but little has been reduced to intelligible terms respecting the methods of producing this or that variety of character. Certain general principles have indeed been established, like the vague laws of health: "eat nothing improper, drink nothing improper, do nothing improper, and you will be well"; but how shall we counteract the insidious microbe that may ruin all our expectations of health and thwart our incessant carefulness? "Go to school, learn your lessons, win your diplomas," are directions as good as they are simple; but how shall the bacteria be got rid of that appear in the forms of bad company, laziness, lack of interest in certain branches of study, inability to master the calculus or the Greek subjunctive, deceitful facility, corrosive vanity, excessive versatility, unusual obstinacy, or that incapacity to accept discipline which is the exact reverse of what George Eliot calls "genius"? Why is it that no school of painting can promise to make a great painter of any candidate, however promising; that no college can assure a parent that his son shall become a scholar; that no lessons in English composition will make an orator or a poet; that prolonged studies in history and politics do not produce statesmen? Is it not still more remarkable that the incessant care of the best and wisest parents and teachers is so often counteracted by the examples and the temptations of boyhood and manhood?

Schools are not restricted to boyhood. They are the arrangements of nature and Providence and society, by which, at every stage of our existence, we are prepared for something beyond. The cradle is a school, and so is the nursery. The kindergarten and the infant class are of a little higher grade. Grammar schools and colleges come next. Then come the high schools that we call universities, with their departments of law, medicine, theology, and the liberal arts. All along the course are supplementary schools, spreading out their tentacles for the capture of those who are not bound elsewhere. Sooner or later for us all begins the pedagogy of life—the school of practice, where the lessons of the books are applied to the affairs of men. So Milton sings:

"All is, if I have grace to use it so,
As ever in my great Task-master's eye."

Likewise George Herbert:

"Lord, with what care thou hast begirt us round!
Parents first season us, then schoolmasters
Deliver us to laws; they send us bound
To rules of reason, holy messengers."

From the cry of the infant to the last breath of the centenarian, life is one long school, without holidays or vacations. Each day has its lessons, each decade its reviews.

We often read in the newspapers that some prominent person was a self-made man. Francis Lieber used to ridicule this phrase by saying that he should like to stand by while a man was making himself. But the absurdity of such a phrase has never been more clearly stated than by Mr. Charles A. Dana, in his recent eulogy of Horace Greeley. Mr. Greeley is an example almost as striking as Benjamin Franklin or Abraham Lincoln, of what a man may become without scholastic discipline. The three were men of exceptional talent, exceptional vigor, and exceptional power of will. Mr. Dana says of Greeley: "He was a man of almost no education; indeed, of no education at all except what he had acquired for himself," and then he adds these sage words: "The worst school that a man can be sent to (and the worst of all it is for a man of genius) is what is called a self-education. There is no greater misfortune for a man of extraordinary talent than to be educated by himself, because he has of necessity a very poor schoolmaster. There is nothing more advantageous to an able youth than to be thrown into contact with other youths in the conflict of study and in the struggle for superiority in the school and in the college. That was denied to Mr. Greeley. He knew no language but his own; but of that he possessed the most extraordinary mastery."

And now I have a few words to add in respect to what is commonly called "the preparatory school," the place where boys are prepared for college. Not all its pupils will go to college, it is true, but all have chosen, or have been chosen, to follow a course of training which, by the common consent of educated men, leads up to a college course. "He was fitted for college" is a phrase that marks an epoch in education quite as distinctly as the phrase a "Bachelor of Arts." It means that a youth of fair parts, during his teens, has been taught the elements of mathematical science, and two or three languages in addition to his mother tongue; that he has been introduced to a knowledge of the natural world, and that he has some acquaintance with his own country and his own stock. It should also mean that he has learned the difficult art of study, and has acquired good habits of attention, memory, and simple accurate expression. In addition, the phrase is beginning to imply that the boy has begun the study of some branch of science, and has at least learned how to observe the phenomena of the animate life and of the inanimate forces by which he is surrounded. Side by side with these intellectual lessons moral discipline is also given.

Certainly one of the first requisites of a good preparatory school is bodily discipline. This is partly to be secured by watchfulness in respect to posture, diet, repose, gymnastics, within the school walls; it is to be still further promoted by abundant exercise in the open air. Manly sports with the bat and the oar, running, jumping, bowling, swimming, rowing, riding, fencing, boxing, and, if possible, sailing, are all to be encouraged. Nor is military training to be underrated. The systematic exercise of every limb and every muscle is desirable, not under rules too rigidly laid down by the higher authorities, but under regulations spontaneously developed by the youth. It is generally conceded that just now, in England and this country, there is danger of intemperance in sport. This may be less disastrous than intemperance in drink or meat; nevertheless there is such a thing as inebriety in athletic games. I do not refer to the danger of broken limbs and bruised faces, for they are rarely enduring injuries, but to the danger of unfair rivalries, of bad associations, of peculiar temptations in the anticipation and enjoyment of victory or in the depression of defeat, in the neglect of other and higher scholastic duties, in the waste of time and money on costly journeys, perhaps in extravagant hospitality. The boys themselves must be encouraged to correct these tendencies, but they have a right to expect that we older boys will remind them of their highest obligations and encourage their fulfilment. With the reasonable control which players, teachers, parents, can readily exercise, and which the young ladies and the newspapers might greatly encourage, the just medium can be secured, and athletics continue to be an essential factor in the training of American boys.

The importance of mental habits is sometimes forgotten in the eagerness to impart knowledge. Perhaps the colleges are more to blame for this than the schools; for the colleges receive their pupils on examination, and examinations are contrived so as to show sometimes what the freshman knows or sometimes what he does not know. Usually the examiners have not time, if they have the disposition, and if they have time and disposition they may not have the capacity, to put the candidate to any other test than his ability to answer certain questions.

Examinations are a great stumbling-block not only to the pupil, but also to the examiner, and I shall not now discuss this vexatious theme. However, this much may be said. That teacher fails who keeps the coming examination perpetually in sight. It is his business to think of the minds of his pupils, individually, to strengthen, prune, stimulate, train, the various qualities exhibited by each scholar. He should indeed impart knowledge, not forgetful that it is as true in the examination room as anywhere else, "if there be knowledge, it shall vanish away"; but he should also enforce the formation of habits—and especially at the schoolboy age—of close attention, tenacious memory, and accurate statement. These three mental virtues are not unworthy to be named after faith, hope, and charity, the trinal virtues of St. Paul—attention, memory, truth, and the greatest of these is truth.

The intellectual lessons that boys receive should be so imparted that they may promote the formation of moral habits. Accuracy, carefulness, truthfulness of statement, fidelity, thoroughness, courtesy, self-control, deference, consideration, respect, temperance, these are virtues that may readily be developed while the boy is crossing the *pons asinorum* or stumbling over a sentence of Tacitus.

"Refrain to-night," said Hamlet to the queen, "and that shall lend a kind of easiness to the next abstinence; the next more easy; for use almost can change the stamp of nature and master the devil or throw him out with wondrous potency."

The idea of the preparatory school has probably been more completely developed in England than in this country, and the names of Eton, Harrow, Rugby, Westminster, and Winchester are almost as famous as those of Oxford and Cambridge. Rugby is especially familiar to us, partly because of the remarkable character of Thomas Arnold, admirably portrayed by Dean Stanley, and partly because of the adventures of Tom Brown—known to every schoolboy and almost as real as the doctor himself. Worthy to be named with the story and the memoir are the verses of Matthew Arnold on Rugby chapel. "Through thee," the poet says of his father,

"I believe
In the noble and great who are gone;
Pure souls, honored and blest
By former ages . . .
Yes, I believe that there lived

Others like thee in the past;
Not like the men of the crowd

. . . .

But souls tempered with fire,
Fervent, heroic, and good—
Helpers and friends of mankind."

We know less about Mr. Edward Thring, the head-master of Uppington school, who died some years ago, but it is clear that he too was born to be a leader and teacher of boys. I have been acquainted in this country, intimately, with a kindred soul, an English schoolmaster, who, first in Trinity school of New York, then at Lake Mohegan, then in a college, and at length in a university, exercised over all the youth that knew him the strongest intellectual and moral influence. Long as they live his pupils will revere Charles d'Urban Morris. Such men are robust. Their virility is shown in bodily exercises, in scholarship, in politics, in religion. They quit themselves like men and are strong. Happy the land where they are engaged in the service of the boys!

Characters like those just mentioned have been developed in this country. I could name some who are living, beloved, honored, obeyed, and followed. Among the departed, Doctor Abbot of Exeter and Doctor Taylor of Andover are particularly worthy to be remembered. But on the whole, the tendency of our times is not toward the fostering of such teachers. Many of the brightest Americans are attracted by business. The three professions traditionally called learned, and the modern scientific pursuits, enlist great numbers. Of those who devote themselves to teaching, the most prefer to enter the service of the college or the university. Few only, so far as my acquaintance goes, seek permanent careers in the service of boys' schools; few declare that they will be satisfied with the opportunities and emoluments of a good and faithful teacher. Hence, one of the most delightful of intellectual pursuits, one of the most useful, one of the most honorable, one of the most sacred, is in danger of falling into the hands of inferior men. The only remedy that I can see is for the head-masters, trustees, and parents to be on the watch, and when a born teacher appears, engage him, reward him, encourage him, retain him. See that his path is free from stones, that he is not overworked or harassed, and that he is kept contented in his lot. Let him be sure that as much respect and as much income will be his as would fall to his fortune were he to enter the pulpit or be called to the bar. Let it never be forgotten that the teacher's gifts are as rare as the poet's. The methods of education can make scholars, pedants, specialists, and a very narrow man may live in his den and benefit the world by patient observation and minute researches. But no process has been discovered for making teachers. They are like gems, that must be found, for they cannot be produced. I would rather place a schoolboy under one "all-round man," whose manners, morals, and intellectual ways were exemplary and who was capable of teaching him Homer and Euclid, than under a group of specialists selected simply as mathematicians, physicists, and linguists. Later on, when the character of a boy is established, when his habits are formed, when he knows how to study, when he has learned the art of acquiring knowledge and the graces of expression, let the specialists take hold of him. Even then let it be provided that the specialists shall not be too narrow. If possible, choose scientific men from the school of Agassiz, Henry, Bache, and Dana; and linguists from the school of Woolsey, Felton, Whitney, Drisler, and Gildersleeve—men who know *multa et multum*.

As to the curriculum of a preparatory school, this is not the place to measure its limits or its requisites, as they are virtually determined by the college authorities, not by the schoolmasters. If the colleges say that they will not admit as scholars those who fail to show a knowledge of certain prescribed studies, the preparatory school must teach those studies or must close its doors; there is no middle course. Boys are fitted for college in a preparatory school, or they are not—that is the only question. Nevertheless, I believe that the day is coming when there will be a revision of our educational creed, when the colleges will not make their entrance examinations such rigid tests of memory as they are now, but will contrive to make them tests of power. Is a boy capable of carrying forward the studies of the college?—that must be found out. His capacity to retain and repeat what he has learned is one sign of his qualifications, but there are many others which a nicer analysis may employ. The qualitative test is quite as important as the quantitative. Not the size of the brain, but its structure, determines its worth. The possession of ten thousand facts may distinguish an idiot, but an idiot gives no proper emphasis; he does not perceive the difference between the trifling and the fundamental. Yet an extraordinary memory may also distinguish a scholar. Lord Macaulay, for example, was heard to say that if by some miracle of vandalism all copies of Paradise Lost and the Pilgrim's Progress were destroyed he would undertake to reproduce them both from recollection. A scholar holds his knowledge in well-arranged groups, under certain principles, under certain laws; he is constantly exercising his judgment, his discrimination, his reason. He knows where to lay the stress; he does not confound the essential with its accidents.

Whenever the time comes for a revision of the curriculum of the preparatory school, three subjects should receive much more attention than is now given to them. The study of science should be so pursued that the habit of close observation and of reasoning upon ascertained facts should at least be initiated. Nature should be approached by the schoolboy as a willing and ever-present teacher. Her lessons should be the delight of every adolescent. When we remember that in contemplating the heavens, in watching the life of plants and animals, in the observation of the modes of motion and in studying the inorganic world there are innumerable and infinitely varied opportunities to awaken curiosity, to train the eye and the hand, to exercise the judgment, to reward investigation—how strange that so little progress is made in the introduction of scientific studies in elementary education! Modern languages also, especially French and German, are nowadays indispensable in a liberal education; and they are much more readily acquired in childhood than in maturity. How are they to get just recognition in the preparatory schools? An acquaintance with the Bible should also be required of every schoolboy. College professors have lately been showing how ignorant the youth of America are of the history, the geography, the biography, and the literature of the sacred books. I do not now refer to its religious lessons, but I speak of the Bible as a basis of our social fabric, as the embodiment of the most instructive human experiences, as a collection of poems, histories, precepts, laws, and examples, priceless in importance to the human race. These Scriptures have pervaded our literature. All this inheritance we possess in a version which is unique. Its marvellous diction, secured by the revisions of many centuries, and its substantial accuracy, the care of many generations of scholars, are beyond our praise. But how little study does the schoolboy give to this book in secular or sacred hours; how ignorant may he really be of that which is supposed to be his daily counsellor! Science, modern languages, and the Bible have been so long neglected in preparatory schools that it is extremely hard nowadays to find effective teachers for these subjects. There is no consensus as to books, no tradition respecting methods. Perhaps we are waiting for the waters to be disturbed by the angel of deliverance, but we shall wait in vain unless we put forth efforts of our own to reach the true remedies. The day will come for better things; we can see its approaches.

Meanwhile, it is just as well to remember that there is nothing sacred in our present curriculum. It is a method which generally produces good results, but it is no catholicon. Its defects are perceived by this generation, and the next will provide the remedies. Thus slowly move the wheels.

HOW TO THINK

BY

EDWARD EVERETT HALE

CHAPLAIN OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE of the most difficult moments that a youth faces in life is that in which, having graduated from some elementary school, he suddenly finds himself no longer under control. Instead of having certain well-regulated bits of information poured into him, he is free to acquire what he will, or to reject it all. Thinking is no longer done for him by learned teachers, he must think for himself. And by the quality of that thinking all his future life must stand or fall. It is at that perilous moment that a word of guidance may prove of infinite value. It is then that he should be familiar with the following address.

The Reverend Edward Everett Hale, D.D., LL.D., is not only one of the most widely known of American literary masters, but has also for many years held official rank as the Chaplain of the United States Senate. He may thus more than any other man be regarded as the official speaker for the religious faith of our country. The words of counsel which he offers, not only to youth but to older minds as well, are here combined with a valuable scientific analysis of the processes of thought.

IN a playful little poem by William Barnard, who was Dean of Derry a hundred and nine years ago, in answer to a challenge from Dr. Johnson, who had bidden him improve himself after he was forty-eight years old, he selects his teachers. Three of them are Sir William Jones, Adam Smith, Edmund Burke, and the fourth, Beauclerk. The lines are:

> "Jones, teach me modesty and Greek;
> Smith, how to think; Burke, how to speak;
> And Beauclerk, to converse."

The man who should have Adam Smith as a teacher in the art of thinking would be fortunate, if the teacher could really bring his pupil near to his own level. And in the midst of the modern philosophizing, I will say to any quiet, intelligent person, who does not dislike common sense, that he will find the books of Jones to be good reading to-day.

Capel Lofft says, in his curious book on "Self-Formation," that the elder D'Israeli says that no person has ever written on the "Art of Meditation."

I have not been able to find the statement by D'Israeli; but Capel Lofft says that he has spent much time in verifying it, and he believes it to be true.[1]

He goes further and says that not one man in twenty ever does think; by which he means that very few men think to any purpose or with any system. I am afraid that this statement is true. Most of the people one meets in the world take their opinions ready-made from the newspapers or their neighbors or, in general, from the fashion.

There is indeed a habit, for which two causes could be found, of taking it for granted that men cannot control their thoughts. It is said squarely that the thoughts come or go wholly without the choice or power of the man. But this is not the theory of the great men, of the real leaders. They bid us control our thoughts, that is, to learn to think, just as we control any other appetites. Paul tells us what we are to think of,[1] and he goes on to the other matter, which is more dangerous, and tells us what we are not to think of. There are things which are not even to be spoken of, and with an allowable paradox, Paul tells what they are. It is only writers of a lower grade who seem to take for granted that you must let thoughts go or come at their reckless pleasure or by the mere chance of what may be the condition of the circulation of blood upon the brain. Such writers, if they were pressed, would have to say that you are not to undertake any control of bodily appetites, any more than you undertake the control of mental processes.

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[1] Capel Lofft's book which I have cited above is called "Self-Formation, by a Fellow of a College." It has been reprinted in America, and will be found in the large libraries. It is a gossiping, entertaining book, professing to describe the "history of an individual mind," and has a good many practical hints, useful to young students. He is always talking of his great discovery, which to most people seems almost a mare's nest. Two pages, one in the first volume, one in the second, contain the whole of it. It amounts to this,—that in reading you should stop at the end of each sentence and "re-flect," turn back on the sentence, to be sure that you possess its meaning. What follows will be, he says, that you must go through it *at one breath*, or if it be an unusually long one, that you give one breath to every member of it. On this business of our breathing, *in time*, he lays great stress, as a good teacher of swimming would bid you breathe in proper time with your strokes. When, in the second volume, we come to the great secret of the book, it proves that we cannot think unless we think in time with our breathing. "I have already stated my conviction that the management of the breath is very important in conversation, in studious reading, and in oratory. I am just as thoroughly persuaded that this is true of meditation, that it governs in great degree the thinking faculty. . . ." "I despatched every sentence," as he thought it, "in a breath, and then, doubling the

But the truth is that Man is master of mind, and master of body, if he WILL. This is the privilege of a child of God, and a true man asserts his empire and uses it. I do not say he can begin all of a sudden in such control, if he had never used it before. But he can learn how to gain such control. He can have more to-day than he had last Tuesday, and he can

blow,—a second idea having flowed into the interval of vacuity,—I applied myself to it in the same way, and so proceeded through the series."

It is evident that Lofft had never read Swedenborg. If he had, he would have cited the *Arcana Celestia.* "The reason," says Swedenborg, "why life is described in Genesis ii. 7, by *breathing* and *breath* is because the men of the most ancient church perceived states, of law and of faith by states of *respiration.* . . . Concerning this respiration nothing can yet be said, inasmuch as it is a subject at this day altogether unknown; nevertheless, the most ancient people (those before the flood) had a perfect knowledge of it"; and Swedenborg refers to the same subject in page 1, 119, in the tenth book, of the *Arcana.* I think that Swedenborg was here referring, consciously or unconsciously, to Abraham Tucker (Ned Search) where he describes the method of intercommunication of souls in their "spiritual bodies."

[1] Ephesians v. 3–12.

have more next Tuesday than he has to-day. This is what is meant by learning to think. Thus a man may train his memory to do better work for him this year than it did last year. True, when the body begins to fail, the memory may begin to fail in its mechanical processes, but none the less shall that man find that the eternal realities of past life are his. Thus it will happen that a man tells you that he cannot remember, when he has never taught himself to perceive, or to observe.

Mr. Ruskin goes so far as to say that all which we call genius for fine art is simply an admirable memory. He constantly recurs to this. Claude Lorraine and Turner paint the sky well; for they well remember what they have seen. It seems certain that the faculties even of the observation of color may be improved by exercise. Any foreman in a dry-goods shop will tell us how fast the boys improve in their study of color; and it is well known to oculists that women, because they have been trained for generations in matching colors, have become more precise in this business than men are. It occurs to me, as I write, that one of the most brilliant and successful colorists I know among American artists began life in a dry-goods shop. What drudgery he thought it then! And has he perhaps lived to think that drudgery a blessing?[1]

We begin then, as we always begin, by demanding determination; the will must act, and act imperiously. "I will think on this subject." This implies what the writers call concentration; just as we found that in putting himself to sleep a man must make sleep his whole business,—first, second, and last, he must devote himself to sleep,—so now he must devote himself to thinking on this one subject and on no other. There is a great advantage in the training of our public schools. Boys and girls learn to study without attending to the work of the school-room; or if they do not they throw away a great opportunity. You ought to be able early in life so to concentrate thought that in a railway carriage you can close your eyes, take up a subject of thought, and hold to it for a reasonable time, perhaps till you have done with it. At all events you ought to be able to lay by the subject for future reference, ticketed, so that you may know how far you have advanced with it and where you are to begin another time.

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[1] The reference is to Mr. Bradford, the painter of Arctic pictures.

You determine, for instance, to think about a protective tariff. How much do I know of it and where am I ignorant? What are the foundations of my knowledge? How sure are they, and where can I improve on them? Now what follows clearly and surely on the premises? What is more doubtful, and how can I solve such doubt?

I do not believe that it is well to hold on long at a time upon the same topic. I think it is better to take a subject to a certain point, then to ticket it, as I say, and lay it by prepared to take it up again. But when you take it up again do not begin at the old beginning and go over the old ground. Take what you have done for granted, and from the point where you are go forward.

In this matter, as in all other matters where will is involved, there comes in the necessity of energy. Capel Lofft, if you will look up his book, has a great deal to say about this, and goes back to the derivations of the Greek words. But it ought to be enough to say that you cannot think well unless you think with all your might. You cannot think lazily. You cannot think if you are half-hearted about it. You must somehow take interest enough in your work to follow it at the moment as if it were the only thing. Unless you work with your whole heart, the work cannot be wholly done.

Without going further into detail, I must say something as to the necessity of the business in hand, and I will take the three departments of mental activity which we call memory, imagination, and argument, or reasoning. Although as old age comes on the mechanical processes of memory may give way, a man who has trained his memory will feel himself sure all the same of the external realities of his life, though he may not be able to recall the letters of their names. So a man may train and enlarge his powers of imagination. Nay, he must, if he is to make any considerable advance in the larger life. Full one half of men's failures are due to their lack of imagination, or to their neglect to use imagination at the right time and in the right way. Once more, every man who is rightly and wisely to do his duty in the world among his fellows must train his power of argument. He must not stand by, helpless, when some wordy fool on a platform makes the worse appear the better reason. Memory, imagination, reasoning, then, are for us three good examples of the great necessity in which we must exercise our power. Of these three duties I will speak a little more in detail, not dwelling on what a man may do in training his perceptions, his power of concentration, his power of statement or of conversation, and a hundred other faculties which come under the general statement that the man is to be master of the mind.

First, then, as to memory.[1] Had one no other reason for training memory carefully, and keeping it in hand, here is the supreme reason: that one must keep ready at every instant of trial the determinations made in the moments of reflection. As I am always saying, Wordsworth defines the hero as he

"Who in the heat of conflict keeps the Law
In calmness made,—and sees what he foresaw."

The little child untrained comes to his mother in grief because he has done wrong, and makes, probably, the true excuse, as he sobs out that he did not remember. The trained man, trampling temptation under foot, does remember. He remembers his resolution, and this re-enforces will. There is an interesting thought in the mere etymology of our word "conscience." "Conscience" is a Latin word, which means the knowledge all at once of all the elements involved. If my conscience is quick and strong, I know at once, and that once is now, all that I can know of this temptation. I know to what ruin it brings me; I know by what methods I can quench its fire; I know how to put my foot upon its head and the point of my sword at its throat. I know all this now.

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[1] I have not dared go into the systems of what is called artificial memory. The best by far, I think, is in Gouraud's book, published with a good deal of fuss and feathers in New York over forty years ago. Gouraud remembered everything so perfectly that we used to call him "the Wandering Jew."

All these systems depend on using the stronger side of memory, whatever it is, to re-enforce the weaker.

"*Conscire*" is the Latin verb; to know at once the perceptions of the outward senses, the lessons of old experience, and the present verdict of the man within.

Charlotte Brontë refers to this necessity in that central passage, where she describes her heroine's conquest of immediate temptation.

"Laws and principles are not for the times when there is no temptation; they are for such moments as this, when body and soul rise in mutiny against their rigor. Stringent are they, inviolate they shall be. If, at my individual convenience I might break them, what would be their worth? They have a worth—so I have always believed; and if I cannot believe it now, it is because I am insane—quite insane; with my veins running fire, and my heart beating faster than I can count its throbs. Conscience and reason are turned traitors against me, and are charging me with crime. They speak as loud as feeling in its clamors. Preconceived opinions, foregone determinations are all I have at this hour to stand by."

But we need not go to poetry or fiction for our examples. The little child of whom I spoke comes to his mother, crying, and can only offer the apology that "he did not remember" that she had bidden him keep away from the stove. If his hand be not very badly burnt, she will not be very sorry; because she now knows that he will remember better another time. Indeed, what Mr. Ruskin says of fine art, we may say of life. That all the training by which God is gradually changing us from babies into archangels is but so much accumulation by memory, more or less completely educated.

But this training of memory and this knowledge at one and the same time of the cause and consequence of the present temptation involve the right use of the imagination. The larger life, indeed, which is the purpose and object for which we live every day, requires me to command and control my imagination, to use it on the right errands, and to refuse it when it would fain travel the wrong way. The world in which I live may be the cell of a wretched prison, cabined and confined as was the unfortunate dauphin, the son of Louis XVI., or as Kaspar Hauser was said to be, so that his prison walls touched him above, below, on the right hand and on the left, behind and before.

One is really almost as badly off as he is when he is in a crowded railway car after darkness has come on. I cannot talk to my next neighbor because he is a Moqui Indian, I can see nothing but the shadows from the smoking lamp, I can hear nothing but the clatter of the rail. This is hard circumstance. But what is circumstance to a trained child of God living by the divine order? I ought to be able to bid Shakespeare meet with Milton there. I may call Charles Dickens and Walter Scott into the interview. I may select the subject on which they shall talk, I may bid them say their say, and I may send them on their way. I may summon here all whom I have loved most in literature, be they people who have lived and breathed, or be they people who never had form or weight or visible body: such people as Jane Eyre or Di Vernon or Rosalind. I have them and they cannot leave me. The dead nausea of the disgusting car is forgotten, and in that prison cell I have enlarged my life to journey as I will.

I recall that Mme. de Genlis, in her gossiping and entertaining memoirs, goes at length into her habit of creating for herself an imaginary society. The passage is worth the search of enterprising readers, though I am afraid the book has neither index nor contents.[1]

Now for the same reason and for the larger life which all along we are seeking, you must train the faculty of reasoning, that you may have an opinion, and that opinion your own. To look on both sides and choose the better side, to dissect the rhetoric of a demagogue, to strip off his coat of many colors, and to show him for what he is, to decide between rival plans and to determine one's aim, for one's own purposes, by one's own abilities, —all this is the duty of a man. Without this he forfeits a man's privilege. He is a chip on the current, whirled down in this flood, whirled up in that eddy, or left stagnant in some standing pool. How often, alas, one meets a man who never knew the luxury of an opinion. He has taken his morning impression from one newspaper, his evening impression from another. Meanwhile he has been the tool and the fool of every person who chose to use him, or to tell him what to think and what to say. To keep clear of that vacancy of life, a true man cares diligently, lovingly, for the weapons which have been given him, weapons of defence—yes, and sometimes weapons of attack, if need may be. He learns how to reason, how to search for truth, how to question nature, how to interpret her answers. He learns how to arrange in right order such eternal truths and such visible facts as relate to the matter he has in hand. He clears and enlarges his power of reasoning.

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[1] All that is said on the cultivation of the imagination shows the importance of giving to children enough fairy-tales and enough poetry with which to amuse themselves.

The power of induction and deduction man has because he is a child of God. It is the faculty which distinguishes him from the brutes. A body of wolves in the Pyrenees may gather round the fire which a peasant has left, and will enjoy the warmth of the embers. A group of chattering monkeys on the rock of Gibraltar might gather so round the watchfire which an English sentinel had left burning. They can enjoy the heat; but they cannot renew the fire. They cannot work out the deduction which is necessary before one kicks back upon the glaring embers the black brand which has rolled away. Were it to save their lives, they must freeze before one of them can deduce from what he sees the law or the truth as to what he must do. Here is it that man differs from the brute. He can learn. He can follow a deduction. He can argue. He can rise, step by step, to higher life.

This he does when he takes the control of thought. He rises to a higher plane and lives in a larger life.[1]

There is no neater or better illustration of the way in which a wise teacher draws out the thinking faculty of a child than that which Warren Colburn borrowed, from Miss Edgeworth,

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[1] All that is said on the culture of the thinking faculty is to be remembered, seriously, by teachers who are in any danger of using text-books too much. The text-book, as an authority, injures the child's power to think. Make him work out the rule for himself,—if you can. That means, probably, if you know how to think yourself.

I believe, to place in the beginning of that matchless oral arithmetic which still holds its place in many well-regulated schools. The advantage which the thinking faculty gains from good training in mathematics cannot be overstated. A master in that business[1] used to say to me that, when you meet a man who says that he has no mathematical faculty, he is simply a man who was not well taught his "vulgar fractions" or his "rule of three" in childhood. I am inclined to think that this is true. A thousand writers have been eager to prove that good grammatical work does the same thing—and I believe that they are right. It is just the same mental process by which I build up a Latin verb, pronoun, and noun, so that they shall express the fact that "George Washington had taken off his own hat before he met Henry Knox," as the process by which I work out the truth that seventy-two apples costing nine cents a dozen may be exchanged for two pecks of walnuts costing three cents and three-eighths a quart. Why the parallel of the two studies of language and mathematics as mental gymnastics should have been so much belabored as it has been, I have never known.

This is certain, that no one learns to think without thinking. I believe we may say more. I believe he must make a business of thinking. He must take hold of the control of his thought intentionally, resolutely, and energetically. If he does this I believe he will think more clearly, and with better results next year than he does to-day.

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[1] Nathan Hale, Jr.

XXIV

THE GIRL

"THE THING TO DO"

BY

WHITELAW REID

UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO ENGLAND

AS girl and boy approach maturity their paths diverge. They can no longer be classed under a common name as "children" and dealt with under similar rules. As man and woman they become beings of differing aims, differing thoughts, and differing capacities. Hence come two sets of problems instead of one, and the complexity of modern life is doubled, the difficulty of grasping at its meaning and its outcome is immeasurably increased. To talk about the future of "the race" as a whole, as though men and women were a unit striving toward a common goal, is to ignore an entire group of antagonisms as obvious as life itself.

The more direct problems involved in the question of sex we have already treated; but now, looking along the line of youthful education, we reach the moment when it is finished—so far as schools can finish education—and the girl, the young woman approaching maturity, looks out upon a wider life. She asks herself, demands of her own intelligent and well-developed mind, the question, "What next?" "To what course of drifting or of effort shall I seriously devote myself until death ends the story?"

It is some sort of answer to this momentous question that Mr. Reid here offers. As one who has long ranked among the commanding journalists of our land, as a leader in educational advancement, and as a statesman known to all Europe as well as to his home, Mr. Reid has certainly earned the right to speak and to be heard with earnest thought. The present address, *delivered before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Vassar College at the time of the young ladies' graduation, is here published by his permission and with his approval.*

The brilliant President of a great California university has defined Wisdom as "Knowing What to do Next," and Virtue as "Doing it." Responding to the call with which the young ladies of the Phi Beta Kappa have honored me, I shall try to merit your attention by speaking to you for a little of "The Thing to Do." In proportion then to any success in saying the right word to you on this subject, that word must come, however unworthy the voice through which it speaks, as the counsel of Wisdom and the command of Virtue.

The universal inquiry in the graduating class on Commencement Day is, What next? The mere man has no monopoly of it. The girl graduate, too, is absorbed in questions about what shall she do. Misty visions float before her eyes. Now as always the vague outlines are apt to shape themselves to the first gaze, alike of the simplest and of the wisest, into happy homes and home responsibilities. But in these days of broader horizons, many another purpose in life comes in to enlarge or to confuse the picture. Whether with the home or without a home, comes the thought of a career worthy of the capacities here discovered, the training here given; perhaps a literary, or artistic, or scientific career, perhaps educational or professional, perhaps reformatory, perhaps social; but always a career, always the desire for a field in which to exercise the proper power of the trained abilities and enjoy their rightful influence, always the resolve to do something. Let us first see now if there is not one especial thing which, in any career and whatever else may or may not be done, it is the duty of every girl graduate to attempt, in her respective sphere and to the full measure of her capacity.

It was sixty-five years ago that a singularly acute French observer pronounced the legal profession the most conservative element in this country and the greatest safeguard against the excesses, as he called them, of democracy. But the intervening two-thirds of a century have shown many changes. We have seen no political craze, from secession to the payment of national debts in fiat money or in silver, no popular delusion, from spirit portraits to communism or to the right of some laborers to prohibit free labor, that has not been led by lawyers; and we have seen no depth of degradation to which, in pursuit of a fee, some members of this profession have not descended, and that, too often, without incurring the active repudiation of the majority.

Perhaps the dangerous tendencies in America of which De Tocqueville spoke are at the present time "the excesses of democracy"; though, perhaps again, they may be merely the general tendencies of the age, exhibited here a little earlier, or more freely, because of the liberty of faction democracy affords. At any rate, there has never been a day in the history of the country when such a restraining influence as he attributed to the lawyers was so much needed as at present. Meanwhile the legal profession, through a not inconsiderable number of its members, has developed into one of the active means, not for restraining, but for actually furthering the excesses; and, as a whole, it certainly exerts now a less conservative and restraining influence than was gratefully recognized in our earlier history.

When John Stuart Mill taught, in a little book less talked about now than his later publications, that women made contributions to the sum of human knowledge and consequent progress as important as those coming from men, though different in kind, being apt to be intuitional rather than logical, he may have furnished a hint as to the real safeguard against social disorders that in his time were hardly known. If the conservative influence which is hereafter to protect us from the excesses either of democracy or of the spirit of the age is no longer to be surely and always found in the old quarter, it may still prove that we can turn for it to a class with higher inspirations and keener moral perceptions, to a class with deeper interest in the outcome, and capable of unquestionably greater influence, whenever aroused to exercise it. It may prove, in fact, that we can look to the educated women of the country rather than to its lawyers for the true conservatism in principle, in methods, and in constant application that is to save us from many of the most dangerous tendencies of the time. Hope, then, will not be lost for the future of our triumphant democracy till their characteristic excellences are corrupted or destroyed.

The reasons for such an expectation lie in human nature itself, and in that female ability which Mr. Mill demonstrated for such contributions to human knowledge and progress. All the instincts of the educated woman are toward good order and good morals and good life; all her interests are against rash experiments and revolutionary changes; the character alike of her judgment, her feelings, and her needs gives promise of sound and sane views of life and of human conduct. Both by inherent qualities and by acquired relations the rightly educated woman is a natural and necessary conservative. With her mental alertness and vivid perceptions she can never be a drag upon the machinery of human progress, but, thanks to her special aptitudes, she may always be its moderator and its governor.

This at least is clear, that the twentieth-century woman has greater opportunities than were ever given to a human creature of her kind before, in the eighty centuries of the world's history of which we are supposed to have some records; that she has been better prepared to improve them, and that she is more peremptorily called to the work—this twentieth-century woman, to whom have been given the keys of knowledge which are becoming almost the keys of life and death. The ferment and amazing discovery and development of the nineteenth century did not end when it closed; they could be but the hot-bed for starting the prodigious, myriad-formed, almost infinite growths to be confidently expected in the twentieth. If, in the midst of these teeming and steaming activities, woman now possesses the real power which Mr. Mill attributed to her, then the imperative duty which her superior moral elevation, her nature, and her surroundings impose, for the whole term of her existence and throughout the whole course of our bewildering progress, is to furnish this conservative force in American life which two-thirds of a century ago De Tocqueville thought already necessary. Her wisdom will point it out as a thing to do next, her virtue will shine in doing it. Thus the subject to which I have ventured to invite your attention, "The Thing to Do," arises before you, attends your incoming and your outgoing, and henceforth forever entreats and commands you.

Of specific excesses toward which our democratic institutions seem to be tending perhaps we do not need to speak in any great detail. It may be enough to recognize that the American who colonized the Atlantic coast and the great Middle West, who framed the Constitution, started the Government, developed the country under it, and fought a gigantic Civil War to preserve it, is not the American who leads the popular movements of to-day. The type is changing; the beliefs are changing, and the aims.

He is neither Puritan any longer, nor Cavalier. He may outwardly deny the decay of faith, but he inwardly feels it. Nothing is more noticeable at the great centres of population and of national activity, or in any large section of what calls itself, and is often called, our best society, than this disappearance of the old foundation of character and action; this loss of profound, enduring, restful faith in anything. It is a *laissez-aller* age; an age of loosening anchors and drifting with the tide; of taking things as they are, with cordial readiness to take them hereafter as they come; of an easy indifference, whose universal attitude toward each startling departure from old standards is "What does it matter, anyway?"—an age, in short, marked by a refined, "up-to-date" adaptation of the old Epicurean idea that there is nothing in this world to do but to eat and drink and make merry, for to-morrow we die. As Omar, prime favorite of the flower of this new school, has sung:

> What boots it to repeat
> How time is slipping underneath our feet;
> Unborn Tomorrow, and dead Yesterday,
> Why fret about them if To-day be sweet!

The loss of faith brings us by a short cut straight to the loss of purpose in life—of any purpose at least beyond purely material ones. To those who need money, the duty of getting it first, and above anything else, becomes the gospel of life. To those who feel the need of position, whether in society, business, or elsewhere, their gospel drives them to all means within the law to attain them. To those who have both money and position comes the only remaining purpose in life, that of using them for an existence of amusement and enjoyment. Is it too much to say that never before in our history have such aspirations so completely dominated and limited such large classes?

But this craze for mere amusement and enjoyment, like other perverted appetites, grows by what it feeds on. The amusement soon becomes wearisome, the enjoyment soon palls unless constantly more and more spectacular and bizarre. Perpetual change and constantly increasing variety of extremes seem to be the ever rising price of keeping amused. One never is for long where one wants to be, or doing what one desires; there must be incessantly a rushing to and fro, and a change of pursuit, all under the glare of electric lights and the blare of brass bands. If in the country, one must hasten to the city where something is going on; if in the city, one must fly to the country where the crowd is not so mixed, and where pleasanter house-parties can be gathered; if in one's own land, one longs for the boulevards or the Alps; if abroad, one is eager to try the new steamer back; if at the seashore, one wants suddenly to know what the mountains are like, and can only find amusement in going to see when clothed in leather jackets, protected by masks and goggles, and powdered with dirt, rushing through the dusty air on the highways at forty or fifty miles an hour in a Red Devil, and leaving the luckless rustics in the way to go to a fiend of any color they like.

Even then this vehement vacuity is not amusing unless it is talked about. One must be forever before the footlights and, if possible, in the centre of the stage. Privacy is deadly dulness. Not to have your name every other day in the newspapers, and especially in the most hopelessly vulgar and inane of the newspaper columns, the so-called social ones, is to be out of the world, to be bored to death. Not to see every intimate fact about yourself or your friends thrust naked and shameless under the public eye is to feel that you are dropping out of the swim. If there is a steamer that has raced across the Atlantic in fifteen minutes less than any other, you suddenly realize that nothing is going on here, and you must immediately cross back on that steamer. If there is a White Ghost that has flitted over crowded country roads half a mile an hour faster than the last Red Devil, and has caused more runaways and killed one or two more people, you will be leading a very dull life till you have gone faster in that same, or in some better and uglier machine, and have left a wider swath of disaster and terror behind you. Even then the amusement is stale unless the papers tell you that you broke the record, if not somebody's neck also, print your portrait, and mention who your grandfather was, by way of showing how proud the presumably worthy old man ought to be of his hopeful, goggle-eyed descendant.

Gregariousness and glare are the irredeemably vulgar notes of it all. To seek enjoyment within yourself and your own circle, in resources of your own, and without a fresh flash-light picture every day, becomes unendurable. A country residence is impossible unless a dozen others, "of our own set, you know," are within five minutes' call; and even then it is slow without a thronged race-track at hand. Thus Newport, rather than Biltmore, becomes the veneered and shiny national type for those who can, at will, command either. As for the babes that must struggle through childhood into precocious maturity in such surroundings, why, they are to live in this world, aren't they—not in the happy Valley of Rasselas? Why shouldn't they get on, without rest and real country life, as well as their parents?

If loss of faith and loss of purpose have led to such changes from the decorous, albeit a little provincial, society of a hundred years ago, what transformations may not be expected from the same influences in our political life? Already we begin to note the same fever for variety and unreasoning change. We know now how Aristides was banished because the citizens were tired of hearing him called the just; we have more than once given in modern phrases the same old Greek reason for our own banishments. "Oh, well! they've been in long enough; let's try a change." The steady persistence in policy of the fathers and founders of the Republic seems disappearing; and the political characteristics displayed are becoming noticeably less English, and even less Northern. "You are as fickle as the French, and as fond of sudden excitements," is a criticism of overcandid observers from the north of Europe, which we hear with increasing frequency; and it must be confessed that of late we do show, oftener than could be desired, sudden and irresponsible popular movements which we are apt to look for in the Latin rather than the Northern races. A wave of excitement sweeps over the country and throughout whole communities the very best and most conscientious of our people are stampeded with sudden fear of European domination, and alarm about the Pope of Rome, if we do not hurriedly erect legislative dams against foreign invasions on our eastern shores. The Know Nothings had a close race with the Free Soilers for first place, and for a time were ahead—seeming actually about to succeed in making hostility to the foreigner rather than sympathy with the slave the shibboleth of the new national party. Within my own experience, a distinguished official and highly honored citizen of New York has vehemently arraigned me for neglect of duty, in my own modest sphere, in not trying to arouse people against the peril to our liberties and the alarming violation of the Constitution of the United States involved in the creation of a foreign prince in this country—in the person of Cardinal Gibbons! But presently the wind is blowing from exactly the opposite quarter; sympathy for the sweet Emerald Isle in turn overpowers us; we raise money by the hundred thousand dollars, are hardly dissuaded from raising volunteers also for the Fenian army, and shout ourselves hoarse in pecuniary and rhetorical efforts to force on a friendly nation an acceptance of the solution *we* think best for her most perplexing domestic problem. Next a sudden fear of Asiatic competition stampedes us; and we instantly abandon, as to Orientals at least, our old boast that our land is the home of the oppressed of every clime, the land of opportunity for all who would better their condition. Straightway Congress is busy building dams on our western coast to keep the wave of slant-eyed invaders out, while our people rush into excesses against those who are in, reaching sometimes to riot, but more often merely to such refinements of cruelty as cutting off their pigtails or burning down their joss-houses.

A cry that the money that was good enough for us should be good enough for our foreign debtors carries half the people captive; a great national convention comes near nominating the chief advocate of this notion for the presidency, and the country is on the verge of paying the national debt in greenbacks. A few years later, a rather cheap rhetorician catches the fancy of an excited assemblage by talking about crucifying the people on a cross of gold, and straightway there sweeps over the land like a prarie fire a wave of excitement for persuading water to flow uphill, and silver to be as good as gold without the advice or consent of any other nation on earth. Next we plunge into municipal affairs; give away priceless franchises because we are in such a hurry we can't take time to see what they are worth; borrow till we have exhausted the limit, and then mark up the value of our property in order to be able to borrow more upon it, and chuckle over every fresh million of debt incurred, as if this were the end of that trouble. We turn out a reform administration for not reforming fast enough, and instal Croker and Tammany to improve the job. We grumble that the town has been too straitlaced, rejoice that at last it is blissfully wide open, then wake up to find it intolerably wide open, and once more put in a reformer, finally threatening to turn him out again because everybody that voted for him hasn't in the first year got everything he wanted.

For a long time we itch to interfere in Spain's trouble with her colony, and at last in a white heat over the explosion of a naval vessel we do rush into war, but not before being caught in the ebb of the same tide and swept by it into the sentimental declaration that we will never, no, never, permit our country to reap from this expenditure of its money and its young life such security and advantage as every other nation which ventures on the solemn sacrifice of the treasure and blood of its people has felt bound to require from the beginning of time, and *was* bound to require. Next the whole country is up in arms in another gush of sentiment to protest that instantly, without safeguards of any sort, a little island off in the Atlantic, more than a fourth of the way over to Africa, must be given admission at once to all the rights and privileges of American citizenship. Presently the sentimental wave turns the other way, and another island, nearer, larger, vastly more important, with vastly greater claims, over which we have asserted a species of protectorate for three-quarters of a century, and which we profess to be tenderly guiding into the family of nations, is kept waiting for months and years for help, long since acknowledged to be our plain duty. Far from being a mother to this suffering orphan, whom we have ourselves dragged to our door and dropped helpless there, we are exhibiting a capacity, colossal as our strength, for being a stepmother.

Next we forget all about these burning issues, put them behind us as if they had never existed, and plunge pell-mell, clergy, editors, laity, and all classes and conditions of men, into a race with the politicians for the favor and the political influence of the downtrodden contract coal-miners, who were only getting three dollars a day, and had proclaimed against free labor in a so-called free country lest competition might require them to work a little more than five or six hours a day, and make coal cheaper for the multitude. Thus between our own meddling, and the dull inactivity of the employers, idly dreaming that it will soon blow over, we prolong the industrial paralysis till winter is at hand, and the President himself is forced to intervene in an unprecedented way to save us from a national calamity.

One day we go wild over a guest because he is the brother of an Emperor; the next we are in a pet because the same Emperor wants to collect money from an unwilling debtor, who doesn't pay his debts to us either. One day we proclaim Russia as our dearest friend, and fret with but half-concealed contempt at Chinese complaints about the massacre of their countrymen in Wyoming, or Italian complaints about similar atrocities in Louisiana, or foreign comment generally on our burning of negroes at the stake; and the next day we are demanding that our Government shall at once and officially serve peremptory notice on that same dearest friend at St. Petersburg that we won't stand *his* equally wicked persecution of Jews in Kishineff in the heart of Russia. We are bent on an isthmus canal at Nicaragua, and can hardly keep our hands off our ancient ally for attempting one at Panama; we laugh loud and long at the De Lesseps collapse as proof of all we have said about the utter impracticability of the Panama route, then suddenly turn around, buy up the bankrupt, abandon the Nicaragua concern, and set out to finish that same impracticable and preposterous Panama scheme ourselves.

Thus wave after wave of half-considered opinion sweeps over the country; we flash into flames of sudden excitement, which fortunately, for the most part, die out like heat-lightning; feel equally fit to flout all the world's experience, solve at sight all its problems, or fight all creation at the drop of a hat, and are always in danger of going off at half-cock into a new party or out of it, into some untried policy or out of it, into some monstrous injustice or out of it, into war or out of it.

A graver change, amounting to a distinct degeneration in the average American character, may be a further consequence, and is at any rate a further accompaniment of the tendency to loss of faith and loss of purpose. It is the extravagant notion, never held in the days of the Fathers, that this is a land of equality, and that one man is as good as another. It has never been a land of equality, and one man never has been as good as another, and never will be, in this country or any other, in this life or any other—till the just God turns unjust and the creature that does ill becomes in His eyes as the creature that does well.

What is true, and it is the shining glory of the Fathers to have established it, is that this is a land where all men are on a par just once in their lives, for they have an equal start. Each man is guaranteed certain fundamental essentials at the starting post—his life, his liberty, and the pursuit of happiness in his own way, so long as he respects the corresponding rights of others. Beyond that it is a fair field and no favor; and from the very moment of the equal start some draw ahead and others lag behind. The equality has disappeared like the morning mist; the inequality that lasts to the end, and is greater here than anywhere else in the world, is the inspiring fruitage of those blessed republican institutions under which no man can be too low to rise to the top, if he is fit for it.

But the delusion of equality remains and poisons. The laggard declares he is just as good as the man that has outstripped him, and that he is the victim of a monstrous injustice in being left behind. The spendthrift finds it iniquitous, since one man is as good as another, that he should be poor and needy, while the frugal and careful neighbor that started on an equal level with him is free from want. The idler swaggers up to his employer with the declaration that, since one man is as good as another, it is an imposition to pay him any less than the industrious workman at his side, and that he has a trades union at hand to prove and maintain it by a logic you can't resist. One man is as good as another, and therefore it is such an outrage to deprive a man of his vote merely because he has been a thief or a murderer that the governor must pardon him before the expiration of his term in the penitentiary, in order that the cloud on his free and independent American citizenship may be removed, and he may resume his rightful share in the business of governing the country.

This temper soon carries the false doctrine of equality one step further. It comes next that since one man is just as good as another, if the other doesn't think so he must be made to. In fact, if he does not agree with the devotees of the doctrine at a time when they have started out to enforce it on their employer, or on their associates, or on the community, he will do well to seek liberty to earn his living in some land of despotism—the home of the free is no place for him and is full of danger. The Walking Delegate is just about as obliging as the traditional foreman of the fire engine who said, "You may paint de machine any color you please, s'long's you paint it red." You may do as you like in this land of liberty, so long as you do what our Union tells you.

But let us be fair to the laboring-man, and even to his misrepresentative, the Walking Delegate. This American intolerance of dissent is not confined to the Trades Union. The powerful trust may be just as exacting and intolerant till its demands have once been successfully challenged; and it has not at times been bashful about making these demands on legislatures, on the courts, even on the highest departments of the Government, and on national candidates. It is thought to be not bashful at this moment in Wall Street about making them upon the inevitable candidates of the party in power. The party machine has been accused of the same intolerance of dissent; doctors and lawyers and bankers have small room for the inconsiderate man who dares differ from what for the moment are thought essentials by the temporary or local majority; the tolerance of dissent has even been said to have reached into the Church.

An acute observer has traced the turbulence of French history since the days of Mirabeau to a lop-sided belief in their Trinity, Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité. The controlling masses, he said, cared very little for Liberté and hardly more for Fraternité, but had a consuming, vitriolic appetite for Egalité. And so it came about that equality under the Emperor, First or Third, was better than liberty under the Citizen-King or under the Republic.

Our doctrine that one man is just as good as another is carried farther still by its devotees: he is more than as good, he is better; or as the emancipated negroes loved to declaim in those deplorable reconstruction days, "De bottom rail's on top, bress de Lawd." So now it sometimes appears that if any man has the admitted power to rule it is the ignorant man, the idle man, the vicious man. To him nearly every worldly wise person seems to think it prudent to kowtow; while the other kind must obey or else be clubbed or dynamited into submission.

In such circumstances as we have been describing, mere noise, clamor, tumult, vociferous demand, becomes a social and political force of the first magnitude. Under its impulse the soberest and best elements of the community are not infrequently swept into hasty conclusions which are afterward repented at leisure. Such, to take one single example out of many, was the sudden conversion of nearly everybody to the notion that arbitration is the most certain road to justice. Far be it from me to question or depreciate the admirable workings of this beneficent device, when both sides fairly enter into it, in fields to which it is adapted. But the sudden conversion I speak of is to the notion that it is in every sudden need always better than the courts and a cure-all for every ill. In consequence of the general unhesitating acceptance of this notion, if one side to a dispute is ready and eager for arbitration, the other is vehemently censured if it in turn hesitates for an instant at swallowing the nostrum.

The old machinery of justice must be set aside; the time-honored tribunals for the protection of individual rights and the adjustment of conflicting interests between man and man, gradually evolved through long centuries of Anglo-Saxon development, are pronounced too slow, and too costly, and too uncertain; the safe and sure thing is to compel—for nothing short of compulsion will satisfy these sudden converts—to compel both sides to appear before a new tribunal which can decide off-hand, unhampered by rules of procedure or technicalities of law, according to intuition and sense and feeling. And so the man that balks at arbitration has lost his case already before the bar of that Public Opinion which rules the country.

Who does not see, then, the special advantage this up-to-date contrivance for producing quick justice may often give the less deserving side? When the Walking Delegate, that new and powerful Peer of the Realm, hasn't been doing much for a week to convince his society that he is earning its pay, he has only to invent some new demand for shorter hours, or more frequent shifts, or fewer bricks in the hod, and when it is denied promptly calls for an arbitration. Now the essence of an arbitration, the only object of an arbitration, is to settle the thing, settle it quick, and make people contented again. But how can they be contented unless they get at least some part of what they claim? In ordinary disputes between individuals or classes an arbitration that didn't give something to both sides would be almost unheard of. An arbitration that doesn't more or less "split the difference" would be unusual. So the natural end of it is that the Walking Delegate gains the approval of his people and strengthens his position by showing that he has earned his salary; his society gains something out of the demand, where, till he invented it, nothing had been expected or wanted or thought of; and the employer gains—well, he gains a settlement for the time being any way, till the Walking Delegate thinks of something else.

Exactly the same results may be expected when an employer, being in the wrong in a dispute with his workmen, induces them to consent to an arbitration, excepting that then you have another influence coming in to modify the outcome—the instinctive sympathy all right-minded men feel for the weaker side in a controversy. Very nearly the same results may be expected when, among contending capitalists, the one who is getting and deserves the worst of it calls for an arbitration. Very nearly the same may be expected when a nation that sets up and adheres long enough to a preposterous boundary claim calls for an arbitration—unless, indeed, as in a recent case, the nation in the right is wise enough to get exactly half of the "arbitrators"! otherwise the unreasonable claimant can never be worse off than before, and the chances are in favor of his gaining at least something. No wonder arbitration, with all its recognized merits and its beneficent successes, has come to be held at a premium by the side that is in the wrong! Starting with nothing, that side must generally come out with something, anyway, to the good! For the side that is in the wrong, therefore, the game is worth trying.

Here I must bring to a close these too prolix illustrations of the changing temper and practice of our people, as we have been drifting out of sight of those old American safeguards of Faith and Purpose. But let no hearer for one moment forget that there is another side to the picture. Admitting all faults and inconsistencies and hysterical alternations of heat and cold, our people are still the freest, most generous, most capable, most active and daring; our country is still in our eyes the best the sun shines on. But we should be less its admirers, less loyal and less useful as its citizens, if we did not face the known facts with open eyes. Remember, too, that what we see is but in the dawn of our new century, and before our entire national existence has yet anywhere near reached the span the Psalmist assigned for two human lives. When we get a little nearer national maturity, and when the gigantic forces of the Twentieth Century are really under full headway, where is all that incessant, restless fever of change to lead? When the physical and moral whirl in which our national character is taking shape becomes still greater; when the marvels of the past half-century have become the commonplaces or even the rejected crudities of the next; when the forces of steam are obsolete and electricity is the slowest power we deal with; when our population instead of merely eighty millions approaches two hundred millions, as it surely must, long before the end of the century, as the scientific advances, which even such an age will count miraculous, burst upon us, what is the poor human American to do, in his present fever and with his present nerves, but with fivefold greater powers placed in his hands, and fivefold greater attention and capacity demanded for their control? If sixty years ago the free forces and rushing advance of the Republic urgently needed the regulation of a powerful and learned conservative body, who can overestimate the necessity for such service now?

When you ask how it is to be rendered, one cannot be mistaken in turning first to those priceless qualities in any sound national life, whose tendency to decay we noted at the outset. Give back to us our Faith. Give back to us a serious and worthy Purpose. Restore sane views of life, of our own relations to it, and of our relations to those who share it with us. Moderation in our conceit of our own almightiness will surely follow, moderation in the intolerant assertion of our own rights, moderation in meddling with the rights of others, some tendency to thought before action, some continuity of conduct personal and public, and some reference of policy to enduring principle.

Outside the immediate and inestimable effect on the family, the conservative power of educated women will naturally show its first and perhaps its chief influence in the next greatest among the forces that guide the world—that of social life. They will surely help to check its degradation. They may make it regain its soothing relaxation, and its benign stimulus for the best in every one. They may even give back to society the inspiration it once had for the leaders of the world's work. They will certainly correct the prevalent vicious conception of its real scope. They will reject the notion that it is a sort of trade to which a few devote themselves as most others do to the other pursuits of life; that thus there are, in the vulgar phrase of the day, society women, just as there are shop women, or cleaning women, and that each class must stick to its trade: that, in fact, what is called our best society is a strictly limited sort of trades union, unfriendly to the admission of apprentices not coming from its own ranks, and that it is an imperative necessity for outsiders with social aspirations to force their way into it by push and notoriety, trick and device, if they would avoid social extinction! From this degrading conception comes the constant craze for newspaper publicity, and every other form of publicity; from this paltry scheming, the vulgar push, the endless flattery and insincerity and loss of self-respect by foolish aspirants, who seem all the time to ignore or be unconscious of the blighting influence, in the glare and heat and dust of such an arena, upon all the finer qualities that make women adorable and human life attractive.

If the conduct of the so-called inner circles of society has sometimes seemed to justify this brazen uproar at their gates, so much greater the demand for the conservative influence and the real refinement that come from the higher training of superior women. When other ideals are cherished, when faith and purpose in life reassert their sway, society will look for its leaders even less than it really does to-day, to the embellished matrons still friskily playing tomboy, and noisily marshalling, for fresh extravagances of social demeanor and amusement, their collections of dashing young centaurs from the race-track and the hunting-field, and of handsome young cigarette-smoking experts from the bridge-table.

When these higher ideals do return, the powerful influence of educated women will surely array, as never before, the best of their sex in compact, resistless phalanx against a social evil, alarming, degrading, and demoralizing, which has suddenly become almost too common to provoke surprise—the transformation of marriage from a sacrament of God into a thoughtless and headlong business or social arrangement, to be dissolved almost at pleasure. Six hundred and fifty-four thousand persons divorced in this country in twenty years, and those not the last—such is the deplorable record on which Catholic and Protestant clergy are already appealing for a union of all moral agencies to retard this downward rush of the multitude.

The same influence should help resist the yet more common weakening of family ties and destruction of family life. It should correct at the origin of the evil the extraordinary development of nervous excitability that accounts for so much of our fickleness of view and instability of belief; for the frequent outbursts of general turbulence and lawlessness through whole zones of population; for the varied and incredible character of the crimes, for the amazing publicity which attends them, and the ready imitation which the wide knowledge of every new crime often stimulates.

Perhaps the same influence may even penetrate the citadels better intrenched, those of evils that come from the ill-judged excesses of the best of people. It may possibly infuse moderation into our new and admirable devotion to athletics, and rescue us from those vagaries of sport run mad that have made the football teacher more important in our universities than the professor of chemistry or of philosophy, and the record of the cinder-track the essential thing rather than the baccalaureate degree.

Harder task yet, it may restore sanity to our charity run mad; may teach us the infinite harm that lurks in our lazy way of ridding ourselves from each casual beggar with a careless quarter instead of a careful inquiry; and may even, after a time, stop the premium we put upon crime and crankiness when we build palaces for our lunatics and our criminals, and sustain them in these establishments in a comfort, and even luxury, far beyond the average of what the taxpayers who meet the bills can afford for themselves. Under your guidance the moderate conclusion may in fact be reached that, even for sweet Charity's sake, the upright, industrious New York farmer or mechanic or shopkeeper is not bound to house and feed the crank and the criminal better than he can the children of his loins and the wife of his bosom.

Are the burdens thus laid out for the conservative and moderating influence of the educated women of the land too weighty to be borne? I do not believe it. I am full of good hope for the future—more hopeful to-night than before I saw the late work of Vassar, more hopeful at every addition to the splendid array of its followers, Smith, Wellesley, Bryn Mawr, Barnard, Radcliffe, and the rest, with which our country now leads the world in the advanced education of women.

But that you may not fall short of the full measure of your high capacities and still higher calling, let me ask your attention to a fact, and put to you a question about it. It is a fact, almost a commonplace—at any rate, it is a fact which I venture to affirm, and believe to be beyond intelligent contradiction—that the young ladies here at eighteen average higher than any corresponding body of boys at the same age in any corresponding institution. My question is, How will it be at twenty-eight? On your answer to that question depends our hope that the educated women of the country may furnish the conservative force of our land which the English philosopher led us to expect, and the Frenchman to see that we needed.

Is it not the frequent experience that from the moment of entering society the girl almost stands still,—is at least surely and generally passed by the boy,—and that in maturity and middle life the relative positions are apt to be reversed? The question is not raised with any thought of suggesting competition. Among all the disagreeable things brought forward by the new school, the most hateful is this thought of rivalry between the sexes, or of any necessary or natural antagonism of interests. My closing suggestion, then, with reference to the opportunities before you, and the country's need of you is, not the duty of rivalry, but the duty of growth. For, never forget, it was merely of the body, not of the intellectual or the spiritual man, the declaration was made that you cannot by taking thought add one cubit to your stature. When a tree ceases to grow, your science teaches you that it should be harvested. When the sun ceases to rise, its shadows fall mournfully eastward and the day is surely drawing to its close. When you cease to grow you have already begun to decay. Grow then, while you live; grow to the full height of the duties we have seen. The land never needed you as it does to-day; you will never see a day in which it will not need you more and more.

XXV

MANHOOD

"THE SELECTION OF ONE'S LIFE WORK'

BY

E. BENJAMIN ANDREWS

PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

WE have dwelt long upon questions of youth, the early days, the period of preparation for the larger business of life. We have seen the grave mistakes which, in the opinion of our leaders, are apt to be made at every step. Turn now to the question of highest import. Childhood, the playtime, having been danced through somehow, to one tune or another, and being at last set aside, how shall we decide upon, how enter upon the career of manhood? What path should each one of us follow? And how shall each one know to select that path?

In this truly momentous issue we seek the advice of President Andrews of the University of Nebraska. The following address from his pen is here reprinted with his consent and by the courteous permission of Mr. E. Brisbane Walker, in whose Cosmopolitan Magazine *it was originally printed. President Andrews has himself been so successful in his career that he may well counsel others. He has been successively principal of the Connecticut Literary Institute, President of Denison University in Ohio, President of Brown University, and Superintendent of the Chicago public schools before occupying his present distinguished position.*

THE selection of the field in which one's life-work is to be done is a momentous act. A wise choice in the matter is in itself a fortune; an error in it can hardly ever be recalled, and nearly always involves losses and pain for which no good fortune afterward can make amends. In every community one meets victims of ill guidance in this all-important matter; men who, at the critical point in the journey of life, took the wrong road. Some of them succumb quickly and die. Others wander aimlessly and hopelessly about, hardly attempting to advance. Many another bravely struggles on, only to find, when all his strength is wasted, that the path is too rough, crooked, or long for him, or that it traverses country which he is constitutionally unable to love. Is it not inexpressibly sad that thousands of human lives should be rendered useless and unhappy in these ways? Cannot something be done to abate the evil?

At first glance it is surprising that comparatively little has been written on a subject so important. The explanation probably is that the choice of a life-rôle constitutes in each instance a highly personal affair, in which it seems folly for any but the man himself to take part. And, certainly, the choice must finally be made by each for himself. Outside advice or hints, the best saws of sages or philosophers, can never, in this weighty business, take the place of our own insight, discretion, and will.

Yet few solve the problem of a life-calling wholly without counsel. Consciously or otherwise we are, in our decision, helped by what we know of others' decisions. Reflections on the subject by students of human nature seeking the causes of success and of failure in life greatly aid many. It is believed that helpful direction of this kind may be extended further than it has yet been. There may also usefully be given some account of the special advantages and disadvantages of each several profession or calling, the rewards and amenities to be hoped for in it, and the temptations, hardships, and other infelicities which it devotees must brave. The present paper merely introduces the discussion of these topics, on which other writers, specialists, will enlarge.

Certain favored spirits are never under the necessity of choosing their path in life. Most geniuses are such. They are foreordained to this or that mission and somehow become aware of it in good time. From his earliest boyhood Robert E. Lee, like young Hannibal of old, felt called to the profession of arms. Before he was ten Thorwaldsen carved beautifully in wood, excelling his father, whose trade it was, and evoking from many observant ones the prophecy that the lad would make a great sculptor. Probably no artist ever becomes famous who is not moved in the direction of his destiny quite early. And many a man neither a genius nor an artist is so obviously fitted for some particular occupation that he need never worry or even deliberate over the question in what field he shall earn his bread. All these cases, however, are exceptional: the majority of human beings are not so fortunate.

A man may be far from sure what business he ought to adopt, yet really have a pronounced aptitude in some special direction. In such a case the proper precept is: Follow your bent. If the subject possesses various species of ability but is peculiarly brilliant in some one, this, his main forte, is the thing to give him his cue. Highly versatile people, mentally alert, interested in all the departments of science and of fact, and having considerable but nearly equal powers in various ways, are in much danger of vacillation between two or more forms of endeavor, dawdling a while over each, till all their richness of faculty is spent and success impossible. The man preaches, we will say, until some reverse overtakes him at that work. Cast down, and aware that he can teach, instead of redoubling his efforts to succeed in the activity first chosen, he throws it up and crosses over, a beginner, to the school-room. Sooner or later he becomes discouraged here as well. Having once yielded to depression he probably falls prey to it again, now exchanging the school for the law-office. How many potentially invaluable lives are wasted in such fatal meandering!

Your dull fellow, lacking all special mental interest and without any sense of function or of power, may quite possibly turn out much better than that. If, somehow, he once gets launched in a given enterprise, being single-minded and free from distraction, he is likely to develop triumphant concentration of attention and energy. But how is he to make the start? Perhaps arbitrarily, by a sort of flop, lunging for the first opportunity to work. Splendid results often wait upon such a choice. Better, however go bv friends' advice. President Francis

Wayland used strongly to insist that a man's friends are often, if not always, better judges of his qualifications for a given career than the man himself. Only, when he puts his hand to the craft picked out for him—this, too, formed part of Wayland's philosophy—he must determine to succeed and hence work like a demon. Interest in the undertaking, even devotion, will then come.

Still more important is the judgment of acquaintances when a candidate inclines to a profession through some whim and not from any kind of rational consideration. A pious lad may fancy that he is called to holy orders, when the church or the bishop knows better. It often sorely taxes wit to break up a reasonless preconception like this, the victim, dominated by his one idea, being incorrigible; but friendship cannot possibly be better employed. Once in many cases the notion of duty for which no reason can be assigned seems to prove justified, the subject, when he has become successful, turning back to laugh at those who would have brought him to a different mind. It is true, notwithstanding, that a man can rarely with safety give himself to a course of life unless his fitness therefor rests upon specific qualities and powers of his so obvious that his intimates easily recognize them.

Not seldom a victim of delusion in respect to his calling has been beguiled by doting parents. They devoutly wished their son to be, say, a minister; and therefore took it for granted, teaching him to do the same, that this was his appointed destiny. Parents can commit no greater indiscretion than that, nor can a child be subjected to a deeper unkindness. Among the bitterest disillusionments which the writer has ever witnessed were those of young men who, trained all through the ardor of boyhood to suppose as a matter of both filial and religious duty that they were to become ministers, yet, possessing no taste or aptitude for that, at last, broken-hearted, saw their error, heroically renounced ministerial study and struck into other paths. So painful a rupture of family and personal expectations requires immense courage, carrying with it correspondingly great danger of mean compromise. Youth should never needlessly be forced into so fiery a trial.

If there are some who deem themselves suited to a calling when they are not, a much larger number foolishly dread suggested callings out of a belief that they could not succeed in them. I am no speaker, a man says; I cannot make either the law or the ministry my orbit. But you have vocal organs, and they can be cultivated. You may also possess all the necessary logical powers. Perhaps all you lack is training, information, and hard work. The majority of men have greater versatility than they imagine. Within pretty large limits any fairly bright candidate can succeed reasonably well in any occupation to which he gives himself with sufficient preparation and energy. It cannot be too often or vehemently urged that in these days of desperate competition any man, a genius even, however perfectly adapted to his branch of activity, will fail unless he starts with a good outfit and then works hard early and late. On the other hand, in our era of specialization, every profession has a number of facets. It may be true that you would fail as a pleader, but you might succeed splendidly as counsel, and perhaps rise to be a judge. You might successfully argue civil cases yet find it well to avoid criminal cases. One clergyman does best as a preacher; another, not a star in the pulpit, accomplishes vast good as a pastor. Nearly every profession is thus cut up, making place for diverse tastes and talents.

Besides objections to the different spheres of professional enterprise based on fear of personal unfitness, numerous scruples connect themselves with the nature or circumstances of the callings themselves. To these we now attend. The observations offered are in each case simply suggestive, not exhaustive, indicating the scope and method of the inquiry, and leaving to other writers the larger and more special arguments constituting the case *in extenso* for and against each several profession.

In proceeding with this provisional and illustrative study, let us consider, first, the office of the religious teacher. Despite all the modifications which this office has undergone, it is still a most influential one, and is certain to continue so.

No doubt theology has greatly changed and is rapidly changing. Sacred books, once treated wholly as oracles, are more and more regarded as literature. Inspiration is ascribed to their spirit, not to their text. Actual faith is less and less based on philological or historical arguments. The great rubrics of the creeds are in process of rewriting, old language being altered considerably and old emphasis much more. Church and synagogue are not venerated as in former years. Not only do sceptics and infidels ignore them, but the same is done by an increasing company among believers, on the ground that both institutions have renounced their pristine ideals, forgetting the poor and lowly. Nor does it yet appear where the revolution thus hinted at is to end.

For all this, it would be folly to expect, as some seem to do, that the function of organized religion will be set aside. Religion is an integral element of human nature; you cannot annul it. Moreover, its normal working is social, producing a community, which must have organizers, teachers, and leaders. Let the form, profession, creed, and specific aims of ecclesiastical society change as they will, the society itself must remain, with most of its historic power; officers for it will be in demand; and their influence will continue immense. Newspapers and books can never supplant oral speech; nor will the desultory orator upon sacred topics ever take the place of the stated preacher, who knows the people personally and sympathizes with their needs. Private pastoral counsel, too, no less than public religious instruction and admonition, can be counted upon as among society's permanent resources for improvement.

A young man meditating entrance upon the sacred office may, therefore, be sure that if he does well in it he will never lack occupation or influence. The vocation, besides, possesses many elements of attractiveness. Incessant converse with the highest truths is a rare privilege, which religious teachers almost alone can enjoy. This, as well as the entire nature of their work, tends to evoke in sincere men of the cloth a certain beautiful refinement and spirituality of mind which few others can attain. Their manner of life moves them to self-denial, charity, and kindness, helping them to rate worldly fortune as not the highest good. Clergymen even the busiest, get opportunity for reading beyond most others, and in consequence the clergy probably average to be better informed than any other profession. Also, no other furnishes so large a proportion of good speakers.

Clerical work, of course, has certain infelicities, although several of these which are often and pre-eminently mentioned are much less forbidding than is commonly supposed.

As reported, Rev. Dr. Edward Everett Hale recently remarked: "Young men come to me asking what vocation they shall choose, and when I suggest the ministry they throw up their hands in dismay and respond that they cannot lead a life in which they are compelled to follow to the letter the dictates of another."

Such youth evidently judge that to secure ordination, or retention in the ministry after ordination, they must slavishly follow some creed. Formerly, and indeed not very long ago, there was reason for this solicitude even in the more enlightened communions; but the danger is rapidly lessening, being now rare, local, and ready to disappear. Religious people appraising a leader think much less of his creed than formerly, much more of his spirit and character. If they find him sensible, serious, thoughtful, eager to do men good, they are usually not unwilling to let him separate and preach as he pleases, even if he should vent a good deal of what they deem heresy.

Much is made of the fact that congregations sometimes dismiss their ministers on mere caprice, and that clergymen over fifty are less in demand than younger and less able competitors. That cases of such injustice and folly occur no observer can doubt; but we believe them relatively rare. Often the fault is emphatically not in the congregation but in the incumbent or candidate, who has remitted zeal and becomes selfish and unprogressive; no fit example, leader, or instructor. Suffering parishes do not publish their griefs so readily as displaced clergymen do.

We here face one of the real infelicities of the holy calling, the temptation which it offers to be indolent. In no other sphere of life is one so destitute as here of effective spur to hard and incessant toil. So far as the employment of his time is concerned, the clergyman is his own master. If he will, he can rise late and idle away the best hours nearly every day. He can gad about, attend parties, lounge at his club or sleep, with little fear that any parishioner will take him to task in time to do him any good. Many fall victims to this seduction, postponing work to pastime and contracting habits of idleness, at length losing all power of application and being deservedly cast aside for better men.

Another extremely real temptation besetting clergymen is that to insincerity, arising from the routine character of their ministrations. The very business which engages them being of a sacred nature, they come to consider their performance of it as of necessity proper in temper. But it need not be so. Good habits are highly dangerous to morality, more so than aught else save bad habits. Liturgical acts executed in a careless spirit cannot but result in hollow character.

More than any other servant of the public a pastor of a church is in peril from what we may term "coddling." If he is popular, and often when he is not so, many praise every utterance of his as "eloquent," "scholarly," "most edifying," or as noteworthy in some other aspect. Elderly ladies are a clergyman's worst enemies in this. Their habit of greeting him after each service with those stupidly laudatory estimates of his effort is not all. Foolishly tender inquiries about his health follow. He seems to them to look pale and to need rest. Will he not please be good to himself, remit his arduous spiritual labors for a few days, and go recuperate at yonder retreat? Some fear that this will not suffice; the reverend gentleman must take a tour in Europe. They raise the money for this purpose, and bundle the sturdy victim off upon the next Liverpool steamer. How often is not a clergyman's self-respect undermined in ways like these! Worse influence upon his character could hardly be imagined, unless it were being sent abroad at the expense of some one rich parishioner. Every offer of such a personal donation let the minister resolutely decline, unless he wishes terribly to impair his moral sensibility and his power to bless men. If it never thus mortgaged itself to Dives in the pew, the pulpit would have little reason to dread the danger of speaking out against social wrongs.

We hope it is made clear in the above that the clerical calling, if entered upon and pursued in the right spirit, is a useful and honorable one, and that more of those who possess the necessary qualifications for it ought to be encouraged to adopt it.

The lawyer, like the clergyman, is to continue with us, a necessary factor in social administration. The notion which seems to prevail that lawyers' work is unnecessary is untenable. Activity in the legal line is, in some form or other, indispensable. Civilization renders society complex. The complexity early becomes so dense that those not bred to the mystery, of course the great majority, are unable to understand the relations which society has come to hold toward its members or those which the members hold one toward another. Much legislation and legal procedure, many practices of judges and of lawyers, are certainly most wry and not at all necessary, and we may look for improvement in this respect; but law practice itself will not pass away. Moreover, the net result of lawyers' work is advantageous. With all their faults, lawyers probably settle out of court more cases than they litigate.

Prejudice against lawyers is very general and strong. Many believe that lawyers always act insincerely. Many consider every lawyer a liar, taking it to be the lawyer's express aim in pleading cases to try and make the worse appear the better reason. This misapprehension perhaps arises from the fact that even the most reputable attorneys are known at times to defend persons and cases secretly believed by them to be unworthy. Superficially this habit seems indefensible, and people naturally conclude that if the best attorneys are guilty of it the entire profession deserves ill repute.

But is it true that a bad case at law should not be defended, and that the lawyer championing such should in all instances be blamed? It is not true.

Perhaps one in a thousand real criminals would secure fair treatment if undefended; but the vast majority, were there no friendly scrutiny of the evidence against them, were they left to be dealt with, free from all check, by the average jury or judge, liable to prejudice, passion, or both, would inevitably receive sentences undeservedly severe. And taking a great many cases together, it is probably best that the guilty man's counsel should not only plead all palliating circumstances, but should go further and place the client in the most favorable light which can be thrown upon him. If in this way justice is sometimes foiled, it almost certainly gains on the whole.

There is, however, a practice somewhat analogous to that of defending criminals which we believe to be illegitimate, deserving of reprobation, and to this practice is largely due the popular harsh estimate of the legal profession. A wealthy corporation, let us suppose, wishes to carry through some scheme which is disadvantageous to the community. It retains as counsel for this purpose some legal gentleman who is eminent as a citizen. The gentleman permits himself to "appear" on behalf of the corporation, well knowing that what it is hoped to secure through him is, not the exhibition of his client's case in the best producible color (which would be proper and right), but the influence, on that side, of his personality as a citizen. Often the counsel "appears" and that is all; he does not utter a word. Although analogous to legitimate advocacy, no doubt an outgrowth from that and owing to that its life, this habit is not legitimate advocacy. It is a form of bartering one's name for money, a huckstering transaction in which the attorney treats his reputation as a commodity.

Clearly lawyers, like clergymen, have their special temptations. If the priest may become hollow-hearted in his way, the man of law may crawl to the same level by a path all his own. He comes in contact with men's meaner side. He is often rasped by clients, snubbed by the court, insulted by opposing counsel. At times he is as good as obliged to play a part, to seem to wish what he does not and not to wish what he actually does wish. Hypocrites may certainly result from this masquerade; yet they are no necessary product of it. Upon reflection it does not appear that a devotee of the law need find it on the whole at all harder to maintain a solid and upright character than a man in any other walk.

If now and then one calls doctors quacks, betraying a prejudice against medical men similar to that felt against lawyers, the sentiment in this case is certainly less general and powerful than in the other. Medicine nearly all deem a noble calling. The trained physician is a benefactor to the community; in the alleviation of men's immediate and most conscious ills, his work is beneficent beyond any other human mission. No other class of public servants, not even clergymen, exhibit greater unselfishness or perform a larger amount of unpaid service.

Disinclination to enter the medical profession is usually based on other objections. Many dislike a physician's life as involving constant contact with what is morbid, with disease, wounds, and death.

Certain young men of a fine mental type are repelled from the profession because of its alleged unscientific character. Such ought to specialize in surgery; for this, now that anæsthesia and asepsis are both in the field, is a science indeed, whose progress in recent years is nothing less than astounding, as delectable to the scientific sense as it is benign in view of the maladies which it heals.

It is hardly just any longer to speak of medicine itself as not scientific, if by medicine is meant the sum total of present knowledge on the subject. Confessedly the science of medicine to-day is far in advance of the practice. Right here, in fact, one would think, earnest youth might find a powerful motive for becoming physicians. By thorough preparation in the first place, followed by tact and persistence in practice, patients and their friends may be brought to submit to rational procedure in disease, letting it supplant those time-honored but pernicious methods to which such hordes now yearly succumb. Another consideration favoring choice of the medical profession ought to be found in the magnificent opportunity offered every practitioner to-day to substitute the prevention of disease, through inculcation of hygiene and sanitation, for the work of trying to remedy disease when it supervenes.

No one would object to entrance upon the teacher's mission on the ground of its being not useful or worthy. It is one of the distinctly and unequivocally honorable callings. Every grade of it from the highest down to the lowest offers opportunity for invaluable helpfulness to the public and to the race.

This vocation also, however, has its drawbacks. Teachers' remuneration is as a rule low in comparison with their exertions. The highest salaries which instructors of youth receive are far beneath those common among lawyers, physicians, and business men. If you become a pedagogue you resign expectation of acquiring wealth, unless from some source outside your occupation. Another and a much unhappier circumstance attending this line of life is its liability to make its devotee a recluse, out of touch with the active, earnest affairs of men. Unless on his guard, he becomes dried-up, crusty, misanthropic. This danger at first seems unaccountable, owing to the teacher's privilege of constantly standing face to face with children and youth, who are wide awake, ardent, and buoyant. But while he indeed confronts these, he can hardly mingle with them very much. The fact that the teacher is forever talking down, addressing those who know less than he, and never his equals, inclines him to pedantry also, the characteristic vice of the profession.

Journalism is the profession which one least likes to recommend a young man to undertake. Being approached for advice, you always hope that the applicant, if he tries newspaper work, will rise above the position of a mere drudge reporter, while you can rarely if ever be sure that he will climb high enough to be independent. The business of gathering news is respectable and very useful, and there is no reason why one engaged in it should not perfectly maintain his honor. The same is true of editorial or high-class journalistic writing, in which one is permitted to speak his mind. But between these two sorts of journalistic functionaries there is a third most unenviable type. We refer to the writers who, to retain their situations, must every now and then defend doings and policies which they abhor. In every occupation a subordination often painfully near to humiliation will at times be found necessary till you show yourself a master in the business and mount toward the top. But such servitude is believed to be nowhere else so complete as in the phase of journalism just referred to.

Drawing upon paragraphs in the writer's little book "Wealth and Moral Law," we next enter a plea in favor of "business" in the usual sense—the winning, or the effort to win, wealth. The existence of wealth is morally legitimate. Whatever is needful to the life and weal of man has a right to be. Wealth is certainly such. It is simply humanity's stock in trade, men's tools and machinery wherewith to get their living. Without a vast supply of such instrumentalities the very existence of our race in its present extent would be impossible. Comfort, culture, civilization, would be still further out of the question. So long as all must use each moment of time and ounce of strength in fighting hunger, savagery is the inevitable lot.

Wealth is necessary not as an evil but as a good. Confessedly, it is often hoarded with an evil intent, and often put to wrong uses; but we should be foolish to stigmatize it as an evil on this account. No one calls machinery an evil because of its friction, although, as far as man's present knowledge extends, the friction is inevitable. The ills attending wealth are much more likely than those of machinery to be some day eliminated.

The wealth, however large, of one man does not necessarily involve the poverty of any other man. It is a great error to suppose that the wealth of the world, or of any community, is a fixed, limited sum, like the shares in a bank, so that, if you should get a dollar more than you now have, I must put up with a dollar less than I now have. There are cases indeed where one's gain involves another's loss; where, that is, a man's gain is got through open or occult legal or illegal robbery. But wealth can increase, increase to any sum, without this or any injustice.

Hence—whatever may at some future time be the case—as things are, it is no sin to get rich. This is not the same as saying that wealth is legitimate, because vast wealth might be present without a single rich man—precisely what socialists wish and expect. Should their régime ever be launched and work as they predict, private riches would be wrong. But, under the prevalence of our present individualistic system, which, mark, no one and no group of us can change at will, the private massing and holding of wealth not only does not necessarily involve aught of injury to anyone, but may, and perhaps in most cases does, benefit all concerned.

It is often said that one cannot with any assurance of success engage in business as now pursued without resorting to immoral and dishonorable practices. Painfully much as such a statement has to go upon, it is too sweeping. Fraud and underhandedness are doubtless common in most businesses; yet we can see, looking in any direction, respectable competencies built up no dollar of which is any wise tainted. Without too great strain upon charity, we may suppose that many vicious business methods are resorted to out of ignorance, and will be disused when they are understood. And there is reason to hope that business men's consciences as well as their minds are receiving light. This is largely due to the fact that so many men of determined integrity have pursued business careers without ever descending from the plane of honor.

If there is a profession which more safely than any other can be recommended as peculiarly enticing in itself, vastly and directly useful to mankind and not as yet overcrowded, it is engineering in its various phases and branches—civil, chemical, mechanical, electrical, mining, sanitary, hydraulic. Engineers' work, the subjection of man's material environment to man's service, is only well begun. It must and will go on, and it will go far very soon. Probably no man living has more than the faintest foregleam of the development which even the next fifty years have in store for this feature of our civilization. The force working here will have to be vastly enlarged. Only, be it observed, numbers are here, as elsewhere, of much less consequence than quality. If thorough preparation for one's profession is always important, as is certainly true, it is specially vital to success in engineering, where so much depends on exact knowledge, where mathematics and acquaintance with physical laws figure so conspicuously. Besides being in a high degree both useful and intellectual, engineering is a form of activity in which, if you are thoroughly qualified for it and unremittingly industrious, excellent remuneration may be expected, and that without resort to doubtful devices.

At the risk of offending some readers and surprising more, we venture, lastly, to speak of politics as in itself a highly desirable profession. Good citizens who are so situated that they can compete for public office ought to be encouraged to do so. No more useful career is possible in this age than is presented by politics conscientiously prepared for and pursued. The common thought that it is mean to seek office or to accept an office unless it has sought the man, is wholly perverse. We need that hosts of thoroughly able and moral young men, well trained in political and social science, including ethics, should set politics before themselves as their life-work. Do not sneer at professional politics if only it is of the right kind. Politics ought to be a profession. Rightly followed, it would be a noble one.

To be a public servant after this fashion would require extraordinary grace. To succeed, one must religiously cultivate the hard side of his nature, never to face wicked men, kindly to endure lies, libels, and the whole contradiction of the public's enemies against him, to give blows as well as take them. Where are the men who will covet political careers with this spirit, preparing for, and if possible entering, public life with a determination to make it purer and more efficient, not waiting to be asked and urged to do this, but seeking places of trust, competing with selfish schemers for chances to exert great power in the capital affairs of men?

XXVI

THE COLLEGE GRADUATE

"COLLEGE TRAINING AND THE BUSINESS MAN"[1]

BY

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FOR a moment here we face the intensely practical. There is a cry throughout the business world that the college education must justify itself or must disappear from among men of business, that its acquisition is an ornament to the idle rich, a necessity perhaps to the lawyer and the doctor, but that it must be dispensed with by those who seek practical success in a wider field. Such a movement would be a reversal of the wheels of progress. Yet to dismiss the outcry as mere ignorance and narrowness is a folly possible only to the narrow and the ignorant. A thoughtful attempt is here made by Dr. Thwing to view the question from all sides, to see why and when the college man fails and why and when he succeeds beyond his less favored brethren.

As our author hints, the problem is really one dependent on the individual. No amount of education whatsoever can make brains. It can only develop them. To measure a peculiarly able and energetic young fellow who lacks a collegiate education against a weakling who has been given opportunities beyond his calibre, who possesses a sword he cannot wield, this is idle talk. Dr. Thwing measures the best against the best, points out frankly where the college seems to fail, and, though a college president himself, shows no partiality for his own side of the question. He quotes successful men from every point of view. His conclusion does not urge any promiscuous

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rush of all young men to educational institutions, but only points out the value of higher training for certain youth under certain clearly marked conditions.

THE world is becoming a vast industrial condition. The basis of society is changed from the military and the domestic to the economic and industrial. The conquest of the world by aggressive peoples is now made rather through the locomotive and the steel bridge than through the rifle. In this condition the United States is a leading power. But these industrial forces which spread themselves round the world are the strongest at home. The United States is both a vast machine-shop and a vast farm; and what lies between the shop and the farm is covered by equally vast systems of railroads. These conditions are formed into great combinations of individuals and of capital. From the individual to the partnership, from the partnership to the corporation, from the corporation to the combination of corporations commonly known as the trust, is the order of development.

This industrial process and also the unifying process in industry will undoubtedly continue. A great financier of New York has recently said that the uniting of banks and financial institutions would continue, if men could be found to manage the resulting combinations.

To this condition, therefore, in which the United States finds itself, as a manager of enormous business interests, what is the relation of the American college? What can the American college do to make these interests more worthy of humanity and more helpful to the noblest and richest life? What, too, can the American college do to make these business interests themselves more efficient and more remunerative?

The principal means which the American college can use in helping the industrial condition lies in the furnishing of well-equipped workers. But some affirm that the college does not equip, much less well equip, its graduates to be workers in the world's hard work. A leader in American industrial life says:

"I do not think that the college graduate has any advantages in entering business over the graduate of a high or grammar school. My preference has always been for boys to come to me direct from school and at the age of eighteen, because my experience has shown me that the four years spent in college are not worth as much to him, if he is to become a business man or manufacturer, as the same time in actual business experience. The average college graduate is apt to feel that he is so educated that he is disinclined to begin at the bottom; or, if the case is exceptional and the young man is willing to begin on the lowest round of the ladder, he often becomes discouraged by seeing younger fellows in positions several years in advance of him. There is a great deal to be gained by the discipline of daily life that comes with drudgery, such as the washing of ink-stands, cleaning windows, carrying bundles, and sweeping out the store, although, unfortunately for the boy's own good, the conditions are such at the present day that he is not called upon to do that work as was the custom a generation ago. I used to say that I did not care to hire a boy who owned a dress suit. Of course, there are exceptions; but, if one wants to succeed as a business man, he must begin by making sacrifices, and anything which shows a tendency toward extravagance is not a promising indication. I would advise a boy of eighteen who wants to become a merchant, a business man, or a distributor of products, to go into the business at that age and not go to college. I would not, however, underrate a college education. For a lawyer, a doctor, an engineer, or a successful member of any of the other learned professions, I believe the university education is almost a necessity. The primary object of all education should be to teach boys and girls how to provide for themselves food, clothing, and shelter."

The proposition which I desire to support is, that the graduate of the American college, other things or qualities being the same, is best fitted to administer the great industrial movement. He is the one who, on the whole, can most wisely lead and most effectively carry forward the business interests of the United States.

In order to get a fair field for our discussion, it may be just as well at once to clear away certain difficulties. Let me say at once that certain boys should not go to college. Boys who dislike study should not go, for they are in peril of becoming social rebels and pessimists. Boys who cannot bear freedom should not go, for they are in peril of becoming slaves to unworthy habits. Boys who are lazy should not go, for they are in peril of adopting a soft, luxurious life, which it is difficult to throw off and which ill becomes the hard worker in the workaday world of the new America. Of course, the number of boys of these three classes is not small. The going to a college is not a question touching the mass, it is a question touching the individual. Whether the son of a family should or should not go to college is a question as personal as was the question whether the parents of that son should in the first place become husband and wife.

It is also evident that certain business callings demand a technical training. This training may be given, in part at least, through a college of liberal learning, or it may be given through a technical or scientific school. The work of the engineer, civil, mechanical, electrical, demands such a training. This training is as necessary to the engineer as is the training in law to the lawyer, or in medicine to the physician. Whether the engineer, before taking his technical studies, should first have the advantage of a general college course is a question which does not immediately relate to the present discussion, although be it said in passing that opinion is coming to favor the view that the technical school is purely a professional school.

The present discussion, moreover, does not concern the general advantages of a college course. These advantages, in the form of making desirable friendships, promoting a high type of the gentleman, inspiring one to nobler service for society and the state, no one seeks to depreciate. They are great. Even were there no other results, they would make the college course worth while to most men. A graduate who entered the cattle business, in which, too, he was not successful, says of his college course:

"I think I am safe in saying that if I had the decision to make over again I should again take the college education. It may not make great returns on the investment, in actual money, but to the man who has the taste and determination it makes, I feel, adequate returns in the enlarged field he is given for the pursuits of his life with happiness to himself and with some benefit to those about him."

Now to the main proposition: The college man in business is worth more than the same man would be without a college education. The elements that go to make up the value of the business man to his business are many; and the elements which go to make up the value of the college to the student are also many.

First of them all is the intellectual element. The leader in a great business primarily needs, of all the intellectual parts, the power to think. "What do the men whom you employ," I asked the manager of one of the great industrial combinations, "need the most?" "Brains" was the prompt answer. "What do those men lack?" I said to a great manufacturer of steel and iron products. "Accuracy, the power to take a large view and to investigate thoroughly," was the reply. The merchant and the manufacturer are called on to analyze and synthesize phenomena, to relate fact to fact and truth to truth, to assess every fact or truth at its proper value, to determine the significance of the symbol, to reason logically, to relate principle to rule and rule to principle, to trace effect to cause, to distinguish the essential from the accidental, and to hold the necessary and essential under a large variety of conditions and circumstances.

These are the very intellectual qualities which the college is supposed to discipline. The knowledge which one gains in college is of no, or small, consequence. In fact, knowledge as an end is vastly overestimated in all educational judgments, and knowledge as a means to power is as vastly underestimated. Two friends of mine have recently said to me, in answer to my question regarding the good of a college course to them, that it consists in the cultivation of the primary intellectual quality of thinking. One says: "College training teaches one to go to work at any task with system and method, in the consciousness that one has acquired the ability to *think* through, quickly and logically, the questions which come up"; and another says: "College training has enabled me to appreciate more fully and to practise more diligently precision and system. Unless I am very much mistaken the close of my academic life finds me much stronger from the point of view both of synthesis and of analysis."

The men now at the head of great industrial corporations believe that this intellectual quality is of great value. Mr. W. F. Merrill, First Vice-President of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, says:

"It has been my experience that men with a college education make better help than men of about the same calibre who have not had that advantage, when they get to a point where their experience warrants putting them into advanced positions; and that it does not take them so long a time to get to a point where they can be safely promoted. A college education gives a young man habits of study and application which are invaluable. He learns how to use his brains to better advantage than one who has not had that training. You might just as well say that an apprenticeship is of no value to a man who is going to follow a particular trade as to say, in the case of a man who is going to use his brains, it is not an advantage to him that he should learn how to use them logically by study. Brains are capable of development the same as muscles, and there is nothing that I know of that will develop brains any faster than systematic study. A well-trained mind thinks more quickly and reaches results more speedily and more accurately," [1]

In the personality of the individual student the chief effect of the college is intellectual, and the chief element in this effect is the increase in what, in a comprehensive and general way, one calls the power of thinking. But this is not the only effect. Intellectual elements do not alone constitute the causes that promote the prosperity of the individual or of the community. Some would say that volitional, emotional, ethical elements constitute causes more important than the intellectual. It is certainly true that a strong will makes as much toward the advancement of one or of all as a clear intellect. For in a strong will are embodied ambition, diligence, persistence—qualities most valuable. Some would also say that an honest conscience is as important as either clear intellect or strong will.

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[1] "The Utility of an Academic Education: an Investigation," R. T. Crane, p. 27.

Now, the training of the will in the college is a thing much more difficult to accomplish than the training of the intellect. For the will is trained by doing, and doing is not the primary function of the college, though it is one of its functions. This inability of the college to train the will in adequate ways is the chief cause of the impression that a college education is of no advantage to the business man, the man whose life consists so largely in doing things. But let no one suppose that the college does nothing in the training of the will. Every effort of the student to master a scholastic problem is an act of the will. Every decision he makes for better or for worse is an act of the will. All co-operative endeavors of college men, and such endeavors are numerous and of great variety, represent the executive function. Not a few men in every college class get larger training for their will than for their intellect.

But now reverts the question of intellectual relations. Let it be granted that the modern business man does need the power of thinking. How does the college increase this power more effectively than business itself?

Thinking is an art. It is, of course, also, a science. But for the college man it is primarily an art. An art is learned by practising it. Thinking is, therefore, learned by thinking. It represents habits of intellectual accuracy, discrimination, comparison, concentration. Such habits are formed by being accurate, discriminating, and by the actual concentration of the mind. A course in education promotes such thinking better than a course in business. For education represents orderliness and system in intellectual effort. The effort proceeds by certain graduated steps, from the easy to the less easy, from the difficult to the more difficult. The purpose is to train in the valuation of principles, which underlie all service, and not in the worth of rules, which are of special and narrow application. The man trained only in business of one kind is not fitted to take up business of a different kind. The broadly trained man is prepared to learn business of any kind, and if business of one kind has been learned he is able to leave it to take up work of another kind without difficulty. The practice of any art should make the one who practises this art a better thinker in it; but this advantage relates in a large degree to one who has first approached the art through thinking.

I suppose it may be said that the man who is self-educated is usually very narrowly educated. He is educated along and in certain lines. He is educated, so to speak, tangentially. His thinking, too, is usually tangential. It lacks comprehensiveness and a sense of relations. It has force, and the endeavors which spring out of it are forceful; but breadth is sacrificed.

Many and of much variety are the methods adopted to relieve the individual of the necessity of educating himself. Schools of correspondence and evening schools have their place, and for not a few the place is large. So thoroughly worth while are these forms of education that they should be promoted, their weaknesses eliminated, and their points of strength conserved. But the peril against which one is to be on guard in these more or less informal methods is the peril of substituting knowledge for thinking, information for personal inspiration, formal content of learning for large power of achievement.

These perils inhere alike in the more popular and informal methods of education and in that technical and commercial education which the individual gets in business. The education of the college and university seeks to avoid these perils. The university offers opportunities for reasoning and for thinking of all kinds, degrees, orders. It sets forth the exact reasoning of the mathematical sciences—sciences in which things are as they are, as Bishop Butler says, and must be as they must be. It thus confirms the habit of intellectual conviction. It sets forth the general reasoning of language, literature, history, and philosophy, in which truth is to be separated from truth for seeing each more clearly, in which truth is to be united with truth for establishing both more firmly. It uses analysis and synthesis. It uses deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning. It recognizes the uncertainties attending intellectual judgments; a recognition which fixes a habit of intellectual humility. It seeks to assess each fact at its proper value, to use right methods of intellectual procedure, to maintain each faculty of man's whole being in the performance of its proper function, without interference from other faculties, and to bring forth a well-ordered character as the consummate result.

In this endeavor the content of knowledge plays a less important part than is commonly believed. Content of knowledge for intellectual processes is somewhat akin to content of food for physical processes; the purpose is not to retain the content but to convert the content into health and power. In the intellectual relation, too, as in the physical, one's appetite is a pretty good guide for the selection of content. Certainly no other guide is so good, or so little unworthy, unworthy as at times it may prove to be. To choose certain courses of study in college because one does *not* like them, on the ground that the dislike represents a certain lack of nature which these studies may help to fill, may have a certain degree, though small, of reasonableness. Such choices are medicines. Medicines are necessary, if one be sick. But the mind of the college man should be treated as if it were in a state of health. It, therefore, needs, not medicine, but food. To choose courses of study in college because one does like them represents the hygienic process of assimilation which results in strength, health, growth.

It will usually be found, too, that studies thus chosen are most directly preparatory to one's probable calling in life. For the desire which determines the choice of studies also determines the choice of a vocation. President Eliot writes of his son, Charles:

"He arrived at the end of his Senior year without having any distinct vision of the profession which awaited him, neither he nor his father having perceived his special gifts. Nevertheless, it turned out, after he had settled with joy on his profession, that, if he had known at the beginning of his Sophomore year what his profession was to be, he could not have selected his studies better than he did with only the guidance of his likings and natural interests. He took during his last three years in college all the courses in fine arts which were open to him; he subsequently found his French and German indispensable for wide reading in the best literature of his profession; his studies in science supplied both training and information appropriate to his calling; and history and political economy were useful to him as culture studies and for their social bearings."[1]

The college course which Charles Eliot took was on the whole a broad and a broadening one. It was not so broad that it became thin or a means of intellectual dissipation. The broad course is always in peril of becoming a little thin and the narrow course of becoming narrowing. A course can safely to a degree become narrow in case a man knows the channel in which his life is to flow. But most men do not so know. "I am to-day thirty years old, I graduate as a mechanical engineer. I now know I do not want to be a mechanical engineer. I want to be a lawyer." So said a student on the Commencement Day of his scientific school. Ignorance of one's abilities or desires or opportunities should lead one to a broad course of study in the college. Even many of the great manufacturing corporations prefer the liberally to the technically trained graduate. Said a member of a great corporation which builds steel mills round the world:

"The man of liberal education is, on the whole, worth more to us than the man of technical training. He is worth less for a year or two after coming to us, but he has a power for learning all branches of our business which is specially needed."

The peril of overeducation, for those who are to enter business, is a peril in the existence of which I find not a few "captains of industry" believe. By overeducation is meant an education of the intellect which fits the individual to do a higher work than is actually open to him, or a higher work than his other faculties fit him to do. The point at which this danger touches the college relates to the equilibrium of personal forces. The college may draw too heavily on the intellectual resources of the individual. Strength, which in the course of his college career he should have given to the will, the conscience, the heart, the body, may have been given to the intellect. As a result, the graduate may come forth from the college halls bearing a mind disciplined to think, but lacking the power of body or of will to use this disciplined mind. He is like an engine, perfect in every part, but without sufficient steam. Mr. S. R. Callaway, formerly President of the New York Central Railroad, writes me that a friend of the late Commodore Vanderbilt bore to him from Lord Palmerston a message that it was "a pity a man with so much talent had not the advantages which education gives." "You tell Lord Palmerston from me," said the Commodore, "that if I had learned education I would not have had time to learn anything else." It is a story beneath the humor of which, says Mr. Callaway, "lies more or less of reality." The peril of the overeducation of the intellect is simply the peril of the undereducation of the will, of the conscience, of the heart, of the body. This peril is to be avoided not so much by lessening the education of the intellect as by increasing the education of the body, the heart, conscience and will. The members of the British cabinets of the last twenty-five years illustrate the advantage of a well-proportioned education. All have been, with hardly an exception, graduates of either Oxford or Cambridge; not a few have been honor men. One never forgets Gladstone with his double first-class. But besides whatever intellectual power they possessed, they have been men of great strength of body and of distinct force of will. Unique strength of character has not segregated them from their fellows. They have been at once commanders and servants, men and gentlemen, golf-players and thinkers.

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[1] "Charles Eliot: Landscape Architect," pp. 28, 29.

Business of every sort requires men of power: power of intellect, to think; of will, to do; of conscience, to right; of heart, to appreciate, of body, to begin and to endure. Some men possess these manifold powers more largely without a liberal education than other men with a liberal education. But the purpose of the college is not to make men equal, but to develop each to his utmost capacity of development. As a rule, both the ablest men and the men not ablest by nature would become still more able by reason of a liberal education. This is the meaning, I take it, of Prof. Elihu Thompson, who writes saying·

"The boy who does not go to college enters business life earlier, gets an early start, and perhaps loses less of the power of adaptation to his surroundings. The older a man is, the less pliable he becomes; but men differ very widely in this particular—some crystallize very early, others only in advanced age. Nevertheless, I *do* think that in the great majority of cases whatever disadvantage is at first suffered is more than made up in the end. I can see no reason why higher education should prevent or lessen success in business affairs, which success depends upon good judgment and energy. In manufacturing, and I think to an increasing extent in most business undertakings, a training which leans toward the scientific and technical will, I believe, be of the greatest value. This involves mathematical proficiency in greater or less degree; not mathematics as an abstraction, but in relation to the concrete realities."

And another says:

"If a young man forms no bad habits during his college course, he can well afford to invest four years' time in return for the college friendships, and, more especially, the taste for reading, for study, and the higher and better things of life; and if he accomplishes no more than acquiring such tastes, his time will be well spent in the pleasure and satisfaction that he will receive throughout his life, and in his ability, when he is able to do so, to retire from active business, without feeling that he can enjoy nothing but business. A young man of ability, strong, tactful, determined to succeed, will succeed, with or without a college education; and if he has to work his own way through college so much the better for him, for he starts with a distinct advantage over his fellow-students. Such a young man as I have described will soon overtake those that started in business four years before he did, and his mental training should give him a marked advantage over those that have not received it."

This question of the value of a college training to the man entering business I have discussed simply on the narrow basis of the commercial service. Of course there is another basis, and one which some would call more important. One of my correspondents speaks of a college course as fitting one "to better discern and like all that is noble and beautiful in life"; and another· "College education ought to make him a more reasonable man, and to increase his capacity for enjoyment throughout life." These are values in themselves; and, if one were inclined to urge the point, one could show that these values have also commercial worth.

One also may be allowed to say that if civilization is to advance it is to advance not through the selfward tendency of the individual and of individual effort, be that tendency either material or intellectual or ethical, but also through altruistic movements. One likes to quote Burke's words: "Society is a partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection." It is a partnership including generations yet unborn. As one reflects on the condition of the present age, as one reflects on the life of the future centuries, one realizes that the higher life of the whole race has claims upon those who live in the first decade of the twentieth century. That chief claim is to make large men.

This discussion is made forceful by liberal extracts from the few of the many letters written to me by the heads of great business corporations touching the value of a college training. The first which I submit is from Mr. Hugh J. Chisholm, President of the International Paper Company:

"I regard a man equipped with a college education, two years' technical and two years' law-school training, as the best-equipped material to build upon, if he is entering into and expecting to follow a manufacturing, mercantile, or banking business; and, after a man trained in this way gets the practical knowledge of the business in which he engages, he has a better combination of qualities than the man possessing knowledge acquired from practical encountering or conducting of any of the above referred to lines of business, whose education is confined to that which he has received from the high school. The very serious objection, however, to acquiring such a college education as outlined above, is the time it consumes, assuming that it takes from four to six years as the shortest time possible to so equip a young man. The boy who leaves the high school and commences at once from that point to get practical knowledge of the business or commercial life has certainly an advantage later in life when he encounters the college graduate who is just commencing his business career, and by the lack of this practical technical knowledge the college graduate is handicapped when brought in competition with the young man who has devoted his time to the learning of the business into which he may have entered. But, assuming that they both possess equal mental and physical ability, in the four or six years following, the college graduate ought to excel the young man whose education has been confined to the high school. In my judgment, the college presidents of the present day have no more serious problem to intelligently and practically work out than that of properly establishing a course of studies in the great colleges of this country which will take into consideration how best to educate and equip that portion of their students who intend to follow a commercial calling rather than a profession, realizing, as every thinking man does to-day, the great demand that has been created for the highest type of intellectual ability, integrity, and executive ability, necessary to manage successfully and honestly the great amount of capital that has been and is being concentrated in the large industrial corporations of this country."

John W. Dunn, President of the International Steam Pump Company, says:

"Although I did not myself enjoy the benefits of a college education, having left school at an early age to go to work for my living, I do not share the prejudice against a college education which is expressed by some of our self-made men. I believe that the theoretical foundation which a young man receives at a well-conducted college can be of great use to him in after life, provided that on leaving college he is willing to begin at the bottom of the ladder to learn practically any business he may choose to enter upon, without bringing with him any false idea that the learning that he has acquired from his books and his professors absolves him from going through precisely the same course of practical training that he would have had to undergo if he had gone directly from school or high school to a shop or factory. We have in our various companies a number of young men who are graduates of the various technical institutes, and whom we are willing to assist in making their way, provided they are content to begin as common operatives, like any ordinary working-man who is to earn his living. To any young man who is content to take up his work in this frame of mind, I believe that a professional education will be of great value after he has thoroughly mastered the practical details of his work, and familiarized himself with those matters which can only be acquired by actual experience and by actual contact with business and with men. Any young man, however, who is imbued with a belief that because he has gone through college he has nothing further to learn, and is superior to the necessities which those who have had no such advantages are compelled to recognize, will find that his college education is not only of no benefit to him, but is a positive hindrance to his success in life. My observation of young men, in whom I have always taken a great deal of interest, has led me to believe that the main reason why so many college men are not as successful in business as others who have only had the very plainest rudiments of an education is that by reason of the species of conceit to which I have just referred their minds are closed to those sources of instruction and training which they would otherwise gladly avail themselves of, and to which the success of most of our self-made men is in a considerable measure due. I believe that all of our best colleges recognize the truth of what I have just said, and take pains to instil it into the minds of their students. That is to say, they impress upon them that when they leave college they have not learned everything there is to know, but are only on the threshold, and that the advantages they have had over other men will not avail them unless they apply themselves to their business with the same energy, fidelity, and perseverance that those other men habitually employ."

Mr. J. Ogden Armour, of Chicago, through his secretary states:

"That in his opinion, the solution of this question, as far as commercial success is concerned, is not so much one of the abstract value of advanced education, as compared with that obtained in the public schools, as it is of adaptability to the chosen pursuit of the student. He, of course, recognizes the very great value of a complete education, but he thinks it is to be largely measured, in relation to success in commercial affairs, by the trustworthiness, ambition, and perseverance that accompany it. With these fundamental qualifications, and others which naturally suggest themselves, opportunities for a successful career would unquestionably occur. Mr. Armour's action regarding employees in his own business is practically wholly independent of the possession by them of exceptional educational advantages. He does not, however, desire to underrate the desirability of the highest education possible, but thinks that commercial success is chiefly dependent upon qualifications which may or may not accompany exceptional scholastic attainment."

Mr. Wyerhaeuser, of Wyerhaeuser & Company, of St. Paul, writes:

"The disadvantages under which a college graduate labors when he enters business are that he is pretty well advanced toward manhood, is awkward, has no business training, and is apt to think that because he is a college graduate he ought not to be obliged to commence at the bottom of the ladder and work up, as the office boy does who enters the office when he is fourteen years of age. If he is a man of good sense and does not think too much of his college education, by the time he is forty years of age he has a great many advantages over the boy who left school at eighteen, and it must be a source of great satisfaction to him during his life that he has had the benefit of a college education. I, by all means, would recommend to a boy, who is inclined to study, a course in some good college. He certainly, in the course of time, will find that he is amply repaid for it. The boy who is bright and starts in business after graduating from the high school will, for the first ten years, get along much better and be happier than the man who has spent four or five years attending college, and may have made a good start toward laying the foundation for a profitable business long before the college man gets an insight into the business. Still, I think the college graduate, by the time he reaches seventy, would have had the most satisfactory life, and, perhaps, would be fully as successful as the man who has not been fortunate enough to possess a college education."

Mr. Powell Stackhouse, of the Cambria Steel Company, says:

"I hold that a young man of proper physical and mental balance cannot be overeducated. In the manufacture of steel (and the same is true of any modern manufacturing operations) a thorough technical education is an essential, as without it a limit of advancement will sooner or later be reached. In the commercial line it may not be so essential, but is a great advantage. It is true that there are many notable men who, without the advantages of a technical education, have risen to the top of their profession; these are the exceptions in many thousands, and are only such as have the natural ability, coupled with great perseverance and the self-denial afterward to educate themselves, and they cannot be raised as objections, but as an incentive to a thorough college education. It does not follow by any means that because a young man has passed a college life with credit, he will necessarily be a success in any line he may select. He has only been furnished with the mental tools to work with, and their after application depends upon his use and the opportunities thereby afforded. Any failure of a young man to secure the most advanced education he possibly can must in some time of his future life operate detrimentally."

Such testimonies I might call to great number and length. But enough has been said to prove that the managers of the great business undertakings of the present and of the future will receive large advantage from the college. To the merchant, the manufacturer, and the administrator the college offers an understanding more comprehensive, a sense of relationship more just, as well as a training of the will more adequate for large undertakings. The college helps to create the man of sobermindedness, of personal resolution, who is intent on things of the mind. It aids, let us believe, in nourishing the noblest type of the gentleman. But, while causing these richest personal results, it is also training great executives for the great affairs of the United States and of the world.

XXVII

SPORT

"THE MISSION OF SPORT AND OUTDOOR LIFE"

BY

GROVER CLEVELAND

FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

ONLY recently has the importance of sport been admitted in our philosophy of life. The old tendency was to regard outdoor exercise as a thing of childhood, to be put aside with other childish toys. Now, however, the need of recreation, of refreshment from the overmastering strain of modern effort, becomes increasingly apparent. Youth may easily be too ready to give itself, to expend its forces. It does not count the cost. Hence, in timely warning to young men, comes the following address from one whose devotion to outdoor sports still keeps him young at seventy. This discussion was first published by Mr. Cleveland in The Country Calendar, *now* Country Life in America, *and is here reprinted by permission.*

Our former President's own preference among sports is well known to be for fishing, but he is broad-minded enough to speak with equal enthusiasm of every form of exercise. Whatever brings a man outside himself and his own petty worries, whatever urges him to take a full deep breath of country air, that is so much capital to him; it enhances his powers mentally and morally as well as physically.

I AM sure that it is not necessary for me, at this late day, to dwell upon the fact that I am an enthusiast in my devotion to hunting and fishing, as well as every other kind of outdoor recreation. I am so proud of this devotion that, if my sporting proclivities have at times subjected me to criticism and petty forms of persecution, I do not harbor the shadow of a desire that my steadfastness shall be looked upon as manifesting the courage of martyrdom. On the contrary, I regard these criticisms and persecutions as nothing more serious than gnat stings suffered on the bank of a stream—vexations to be borne with patience and afterward easily submerged in the memory of abundant delightful accompaniments. Thus, when short fishing excursions, in which I have sought relief from the killing vexations and perplexities of official duty, have been denounced in a mendacious newspaper as dishonest devices to cover scandalous revelry, I have been able to enjoy a sort of pleasurable contempt for the author of this accusation, while congratulating myself on the mental and physical restoration I had derived from these excursions. So, also, when people more mistaken than malicious have wagged their heads in pitying fashion and deprecated my guiltiness of hunting and fishing frivolity in high public service, I have found it easy to lament the neglect of these amiable persons to accumulate for their delectation a fund of charming reminiscences of sport; while, at the same time, I have sadly reflected how their dispositions might have been sweetened and their lives made happier if they had yielded something to the particular type of frivolity which they deplored.

I hope it may not be amiss for me to supplement these personal observations by the direct confession that, so far as my attachment to outdoor sports may be considered as a fault, I am, as related to this especial predicament of guilt, utterly incorrigible and shameless. Not many years ago, while residing in a non-sporting but delightfully cultured and refined community, I found that considerable indignation had been aroused among certain good neighbors and friends, because it had been said of me that I was willing to associate in the field with any loafer who was the owner of a dog and gun. I am sure that I did not in the least undervalue the extreme friendliness of those inclined to intervene in my defence; and yet, at the risk of doing an apparently ungracious thing, I felt inexorably constrained to check their kindly efforts by promptly conceding that the charge was too nearly true to be denied.

SPORT

There can be no doubt that certain men are endowed with a sort of inherent and spontaneous instinct which leads them to hunting and fishing indulgence as the most alluring and satisfying of all recreations. In this view, I believe it may be safely said that the true hunter or fisherman is born, not made. I believe, too, that those who thus by instinct and birthright belong to the sporting fraternity and are actuated by a genuine sporting spirit, are neither cruel, nor greedy and wasteful of the game and fish they pursue; and I am convinced that there can be no better conservators of the sensible and provident protection of game and fish than those who are enthusiastic in their pursuit, but who, at the same time, are regulated and restrained by a sort of chivalric fairness and generosity, felt and recognized by every true sportsman.

While it is most agreeable thus to consider hunting and fishing as constituting, for those especially endowed for their enjoyment, the most tempting of outdoor sports, it is easily apparent that there is a practical value to these sports as well as all other outdoor recreations, which rests upon a broader foundation. Though the delightful and passionate love for outdoor sports and recreation is not bestowed upon every one as a natural gift, they are so palpably related to health and vigor, and so inseparably connected with the work of life and comfort of existence, that it is happily ordained that a desire or a willingness for their enjoyment may be cultivated to an extent sufficient to meet the requirements of health and self-care. In other words, all but the absolutely indifferent can be made to realize that outdoor air and activity, intimacy with nature and acquaintanceship with birds and animals and fish, are essential to physical and mental strength, under the exactions of an unescapable decree.

'For the good God who loveth us
He made and loveth all."

Men may accumulate wealth in neglect of this law; but how infinitely much they will forfeit, in the deprivation of wholesome vigor, in the loss of the placid fitness for the quiet joys and comforts of advancing years, and in the displacement of contented age by the demon of querulous and premature decrepitude!

A LAW NOT TO BE DISOBEYED

Men in disobedience of this law may achieve triumph in the world of science, education, and art; but how unsatisfying are the rewards thus gained if they hasten the night when no man can work, and if the later hours of life are haunted by futile regrets for what is still left undone, that might have been done if there had been closer communion with nature's visible forms!

In addition to the delight which outdoor recreations afford to those instinctively in harmony with their enjoyment, and after a recognition of the fact that a knowledge of their nerve and muscle-saving ministrations may be sensibly cultivated, there still remains another large item that should be placed to their credit. Every individual, as a unit in the scheme of civilized social life, owes to every man, woman, and child within such relationship an uninterrupted contribution to the fund of enlivening and pleasurable social intercourse. None of us can deny this obligation; and none of us can discharge it as we ought, if our contributions are made in the questionable coin of sordidness and nature's perversion. Our experience and observation supply abundant proof that those who contribute most generously to the exhilaration and charm of social intercourse will be found among the disciples of outdoor recreation, who are in touch with nature and have thus kept fresh and unperverted a simple love of humanity.

A CHANCE IN THE OPEN FOR ALL

It seems to me that thoughtful men should not be accused of exaggerated fears when they deprecate the wealth-mad rush and struggle of American life and the consequent neglect of outdoor recreation, which impair that mental and physical vigor absolutely essential to our national welfare, abundantly promised to those who gratefully recognize, in nature's adjustment to the wants of man, the care of "the good God" who "made and loveth all."

Manifestly, if outdoor recreations are important to the individual and to the nation, and if there is danger of their neglect, every instrumentality should be heartily encouraged which aims to create and stimulate their indulgence in every form.

Fortunately, the field is broad and furnishes a choice for all except those wilfully at fault. The sky and sun above the head, the soil beneath the feet, and outdoor air on every side are the indispensable requisites.

XXVIII

THE TOILERS

"LABOR ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES"

BY

CARROLL D. WRIGHT,

PRESIDENT OF CLARK COLLEGE

THE HON. CARROLL D. WRIGHT, who since 1902 *has been president of the newly founded Clark College in Worcester, Mass., held for nearly twenty years previously the high and arduous office of Labor Commissioner to the United States. Hence no other man could be so well fitted to tell us from an impartial standpoint what are the position and the prospects of the laborer in America.*

This is obviously one of the important problems of to-day and of the future. Of recent years labor has begun to reassert its ancient dignity. Not only in America but throughout Europe the system of labor organization has given the workingman such power that a future begins to seem possible in which his efforts will be required not to assert his own rights but only to restrain himself from trampling on those of others. Some keen eyes, however, begin to see, or believe they see, a coming amelioration of conditions, a practically working harmony between labor and capital, which shall recognize the rights of both. It is in this effort to understand the future of labor by the light of its recent developments that President Wright here lends us his aid.

THERE is little or no evidence of the existence of the modern trade union, so far as recorded facts are concerned, prior to the year 1700. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the principles of trade unionism developed in Great Britain until at the present time the unions are strong, numerous, well-equipped with funds, and generally recognized as important elements in industrial development. It is rare now to meet an employer in the old country who does not in some degree approve of organized labor. He may deprecate particular methods and insist that organizations encroach upon the rights and responsibilities of employers; but the underlying principle of labor organization is recognized.

A trade union is understood to be an association of wage earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their employment, and it is this form and for this purpose that the union has existed in England for at least two centuries. It did not spring full-grown into existence, but grew as industry developed. This has been the course, too, in the United States, although the development has not extended over such a range of time. Prior to the establishment of the factory system in the United States there was little labor organization. The factory system was not the cause of organization in England, nor was it particularly the cause of it in the United States; but with the factory system industry itself became more thoroughly organized, and by the concentration of workers helped largely to create the desire for their organization.

The Southern colonies, where the slave system existed prior to the Civil War, did not offer any fertile field for wage earners to agitate the question of organization. The Northern colonies, although having a different system of labor from the South, also offered but little field for labor agitation prior to the establishment of the factory system, because industry was primitive in its nature, land was plentiful, laborers were in demand, and habits and wants were simple. The two systems of labor, slave and free, naturally had their effect in various directions, both in the economics of production and in the relation of the laborer to society. As mechanical industries developed, free labor offered opportunities for movement; yet historically there is not revealed any concerted action of any consequence during the colonial period, except incidentally in the early days in Massachusetts, when the ship caulkers, who were politicians, organized what was known as the "Caulkers' Club," and it is from this name that the American term "caucus" was derived. This club existed in the early part of the eighteenth century, but in those days the elements of organization were wanting, for organization comes through the aggregation of laborers in industrial centres.

The domestic system of labor also stood in the way of extensive organization. Thus it was not until the opening of the nineteenth century that labor unions began to have any influence in industrial affairs, and their influence was very slight until after the first quarter of that century had passed. In 1806 the Tailors' Union was established, partly for trade purposes but largely on account of political interests, as the tailors had always been participants in political matters. This association grew from the influence exerted by members of the craft coming from England, who preserved their loyalty to the Journeymen Tailors' Unions of the old country. The hatters had an organization in 1819, and the shipwrights and caulkers established an order in 1822, under the name of the "Columbian Charitable Society of Shipwrights and Caulkers of Boston and Charlestown." This organization was chartered by the legislature of Massachusetts in 1823. An association called the "New York Society of Journeymen Shipwrights" was incorporated in the city of New York in 1803, while the house carpenters of the same city organized in 1806. It is probable that the compositors of New York were organized in the earliest years of the last century, for in 1817 they had a society known as the "New York Typographical Society," with Peter Force as its president.

With the year 1825, on account of new elements and purposes which appeared at that time, the development of the labor movement took on new force. No single cause for the spirit of that year can be assigned. There were many reasons for it, among which were the demand for shorter hours of labor and for higher wages, a desire to experiment in co-operation, and the spirit of association, which rapidly developed through the influence of the altruistic preachings of Robert Owen, who came to America in 1824. A wave of socialistic doctrines, which may well be called the transcendentalism of industry, swept over the country. Fourier and others helped to feed this spirit, and very many socialist experiments were inaugurated, more than two hundred communistic villages having been founded as the result of the doctrines taught by Charles Fourier. So the period from 1825 to 1850 may be called a period of reform movements, all having more or less influence on the spirit of organization, which spirit extended to the wage earners.

The rapidly developing factory system, the very essence of which is the principle of association, added economic force to the general reform movements, and after 1825 unions began to be formed everywhere in the Northern States, accompanied by an agitation for legislation for workingmen, Boston and New York being the most prominent centres of all the movements. Naturally, labor literature appeared, and in 1825 the *Working Man's Advocate* was published in the city of New York. This publication was followed by the *Daily Sentinel* and *Young America*, all published by two Englishmen, George Henry Evans and Frederick W. Evans, who came to America in 1820.

In 1830 a workingmen's convention was held at Syracuse, in the State of New York, which convention put up a candidate for Governor. The next year the movers, under the name of the "Working Men's Party," united with the Whigs, and succeeded in electing three or four members of the legislature. An important convention was held in Boston on the 16th of February, 1831, consisting of farmers, mechanics, and other workingmen. Out of this meeting grew a delegate convention, held in 1832, in September. This convention discussed land interests, taxation, and co-operative trading. Many of its demands were similar to those advanced by the Evans brothers. The Hon. Edward Everett, afterward Minister to the Court of St. James's, commended the organization of the Working Men's Party as represented in the convention of Boston. Other meetings were held in that city, at which it was recommended that the mechanics of all branches should hold meetings by themselves for the purpose of consulting together and of doing all possible things to enable them to come to a mutual agreement upon the system of working hours. The right of laborers to organize for the purpose of securing and protecting their interests and the question as to whether general trade unions would diminish strikes and lock-outs were also prominent in all the discussions. Following these meetings in the city of Boston in the years 1831 and 1832, the General Trades Unions of the City of New York were active in discussing the same questions, and this is the first attempt, so far as the history of the development of industry is concerned, to unite workingmen of different trades in one organization. In later years this attempt was repeated by the Knights of Labor.

The agitation for organization during the years following those just named took various forms, and in some cases the employers took part in the matter from their point of view. At a meeting held in the Exchange Coffee Rooms on the 15th of May, 1832, the merchants and shipowners voted to "discountenance and check the unlawful combination formed to control the freedom of individuals as to the hours of labor, and to thwart and embarrass those by whom they are employed and liberally paid." The meeting also pointed out what it considered to be "the pernicious and demoralizing tendency of these combinations and the unreasonableness of the attempt, in particular where mechanics are held in so high estimation and their skill in labor so liberally rewarded." The capitalists and other employers in their assembly at that time held that labor ought always to be left free to regulate itself, and that neither the employee nor the employer should have the power to control the other, and they looked with deep regret upon any course designed to coerce individuals and to prescribe the time and manner of labor. The employers announced that labor organizations would drive trade from the city, and they passed a resolution pledging themselves to "neither employ any journeyman who at the time belongs to such combinations, nor give work to any master mechanic who shall employ them while they continue thus pledged to each other." In this resolution 106 firms joined.

From this statement it will be seen that seventy-five years ago there was as much opposition to the organization of labor in America as existed in the old country, but as the country grew accustomed to labor organizations it learned to consider them as helpful in many ways, and that they were not antagonistic to proper development. The American people, like the English, realized that trade unionism represented a struggle for improvement, and that it ought not to be subjected to legal disabilities, nor considered with suspicion, nor brought under harsh investigation, nor subjected to persecution. A larger knowledge, a wider sympathy, caused the American people to realize that, in spite of antagonism, disabilities, and suspicion, the most intelligent and industrious artisans of the country were making great efforts to aid in the upward struggle, and to enable the workmen to meet the great exigencies resulting from sickness, accident, old age, disability, irregularity of employment, death, and the destitution of widows and orphans. Hostility ceased in a great measure. The courts became more friendly, and instead of declaring all organizations to be conspiracies, as was the habit in the earlier part of the century, they gradually took the ground that organizations were legitimate, and that the efforts to secure increased remuneration were not efforts to restrain trade; and the unions were therefore able, after a somewhat tedious contest covering more than a quarter of a century, to throw off legal disabilities and take their place among modern institutions as a recognized force in the public welfare, and there they remain.

The general understanding at the present time is that combinations, either of labor or of capital as such, are not essentially objects of distrust, evils to be throttled, or diseases to be eradicated from the economic system, and with this understanding comes the recognition of the truth that unregulated competition is the law of death and not of life; that it means everywhere the survival of the unfit—the unfit employer as well as the unfit employee, and the unfit type of industrial organization, whether of employees or employers. The people are learning that combination is the inevitable result of efforts to escape suicidal conditions of unregulated competition of all forms, whether it be the destructive competition of producers fighting each other in the dark for custom, or the hungry competition of workmen fighting each other in the dark for the custom of employers—the opportunity to earn a proper remuneration.

This brief historical view of labor organization in the United States shows that it constitutes an integral part of our industrial development and is really an influential feature of industrial achievement. Since 1825 the history of trade unionism is a progressive one. Out of the earlier combinations there have grown some great associations or organizations, developing power and bringing to the attention of the country conditions which need reform and relations which call for the highest ethical influence to secure their proper adjustment; and it is sufficient in this place to say that, no matter what the opposition of any particular period was or the character it assumed, no matter what antagonisms within disturbed the order of development, no matter how defections reduced the ranks of unionism at times, and jealousies prevented success, labor organizations have continued through success and failure, and their propaganda have extended first to all great interests and ultimately to all parts of the land.

Among trade unionists there are three types of unions recognized—the local, the national, and the international. The typical local union is made up entirely of members who live and work in one town or one restricted locality, and its business is conducted in the democratic way, by a vote of all the members meeting in one place. The national and international unions really constitute but a single type, though the formal distinction between them is carefully preserved in all trade-union literature. The typical national union aims at bringing under one control the workers in its trade in the United States, while the international union, so called, draws into its constituency the local unions of the United States, Canada, and sometimes Mexico. Local unions are the constituent elements of national and international unions, and the voting is done by delegates. Most of the national trade unions are affiliated to one great federal organization, known as the American Federation of Labor. The railway brotherhoods, so called, keep their separate organizations without affiliating to any other body. There are some independent unions, while the Knights of Labor are a body entirely distinct from all other organizations and have a different organic law.

It is difficult to ascertain the membership of unions. In Great Britain the law requiring registration enables the Government to state with fair accuracy the strength of unions in that country. According to the latest reports available, the English trade unions had a membership of 1,802,518, while in the United States, with double England's population, the estimated membership of labor organizations on July 1st last was 1,400,000. It is estimated at the present time that there are nearly 18,000,000 persons (men, women, and children) in the United States working as wage earners. The percentage embraced in the labor unions is not large, therefore, being not more than 8 per cent. of the whole body. It must be remembered, however, that in many trades the members are organized up to a large proportion, sometimes 90 per cent. of the total number engaged.

The American Federation of Labor probably represents at the present time 850,000 members, while it is claimed that the Knights of Labor have a membership of nearly 200,000. Some years ago this latter organization numbered nearly 1,000,000. The Order of Railway Conductors of America has nearly 25,000 members, the Brotherhod of Locomotive Engineers over 34,000, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen nearly 38,000, the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen about 44,000, while the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen, the Switchmen's Union of North America, the Order of Railroad Telegraphers, and the Brotherhood of Railway Trackmen, whose membership has not been recently reported, all constitute influential organizations. All these organizations, with some independent bodies, make up the total stated—about 1,400,000.

The objects of most trade unions are well represented in the declaration of the Federation of Labor, which demands eight hours as a day's work, favors the national and state incorporation of unions, urges the obligatory education of children and the prohibition of employment under the age of 14, calls for the enactment of uniform franchise laws, and opposes contract convict labor and the truck system of payment of wages. If favors the adoption of employers' liability acts, and generally indorses the claims of trade unionism everywhere.

Trade unionism represents the interests of specific trades.

The principles underlying the tenets of the Knights of Labor ignore specific vocations and seek to harmonize all individual or separate interests in the interests of the whole, the declared aim of the order being to secure to the workers of society the fullest enjoyment of the wealth they are supposed to create and leisure for the development of intellectual, moral, and social faculties. Many of the tenets of the Knights of Labor are similar to those of trade unionism, and they demand the incorporation of labor organizations, as do the unionists. All orders in America favor industrial arbitration and are practically opposed to compulsory arbitration.

The Order of the Knights of Labor is more socialistic than the American Federation of Labor, but both have made some declaration in the direction of government ownership. For many years there has been a contest for control by the socialistic members of the latter body, but so far the Federation has been conservative, and with one exception has resisted successfully all attempts to make a socialistic organization of it.

Some of the large unions have funds of considerable amount. One of the best representative orders in this respect is the Cigar-makers' International Union, with a membership of nearly 34,000. During twenty-one years this order paid in benefits $4,737,550.

The objects of all organizations are peaceful and moral and do not invite antagonism, but when it comes to action, then men differ not only as to the value of the work of organized labor but as to the legitimacy of its purpose. As a rule, trade unions are opposed to strikes, and they declare themselves not in sympathy with the strike method of enforcing demands. They, of course, insist upon the right to strike, and the courts sustain this right. It is the almost universal attitude of courts in the United States that if one man can leave his employment, two or more may do so, and that there can be no restriction upon this privilege. The courts hold, however, as they do in England, that intimidation and violence must not accompany strikes, and that the strikers themselves, in indulging in these things, are amenable to criminal law. Strikes are no longer considered as conspiracies, however.

During the twenty years closing December 31, 1900, there had occurred in the United States 22,793 strikes, involving 117,509 establishments. Of these strikes, 50.77 per cent. succeeded, 13.04 per cent. succeeded partly, and 36.19 per cent. failed. Labor organizations ordered 14,457, or 63 per cent. of all the strikes occurring during the period, and of those ordered by organizations 52.86 per cent. succeeded, 13.60 per cent. partially succeeded, and 33.54 per cent., or about one-third of all the strikes ordered by organizations, failed. From these data is seen the practical influence of labor organizations in their attitude toward strikes.

To-day the most prominent leaders of all labor organizations are joining hands with broad-minded employers everywhere in efforts to adopt the joint-committee method of settling disputes.

They are learning from the experience of the mother country that it is better to have such joint conciliation committees, before whom all grievances can be laid as soon as they arise and by whom they can be talked over in a friendly but interested way. Our most intelligent captains of industry are thoroughly alive to this view, and in connection with organized labor they have a grand opportunity to accomplish results that shall be beneficial to themselves and to the community.

Probably these efforts will be facilitated through the incorporation of trade unions. There is nothing in the laws of any of the States of the Union that prevents such incorporation; nevertheless but few organizations have taken advantage of the laws allowing incorporation. In the State of New York there are a few incorporated unions, but as a rule unionists are fearful of the results of incorporation. They fear that their funds may be attached whenever members of a union commit overt acts and thus subject them to suits for damages, and that whenever a decree of a court should be against a union, the result would be a loss of the charter and disintegration of the organization. In all probability they would stand better as incorporated bodies—entities in the eyes of the law—than they do as voluntary organizations.

The decisions of the American courts relative to the liability of strikers in what is known as picketing are similar in tenor to those which have been made by the courts of England. The real question is whether strikers should be enjoined against maintaining patrols or any form of picket to prevent non-union men from entering the works of an establishment under strike, or from preventing the employer from carrying on his business unless he shall do certain things which have been demanded of him. The courts have no hesitancy in declaring that where picketing is accompanied by intimidation or force the parties organizing or directing such force or intimidation are liable under criminal law. There are also some decisions declaring that picketing itself is a menace, and hence an intimidation, and therefore illegal. There has been no decision, however, as far reaching as that in the Taff Vale railway case, recently decided by the House of Lords. The doctrine laid down by the Law Lords, however—that any organization that can work an injury must be held responsible for the damages resulting therefrom—will undoubtedly receive attention in America.

Unions are very much opposed to the modern method of restraint through injunctions, and complain of the expansion of the injunction, under which strikers are warned to refrain from doing things which if done would be crimes under statutory law and punishable accordingly. They insist that, should they be accused of any violence, they should be allowed trial as criminals or breakers of the law by a jury in the ordinary way, when they can have, under the bills of rights as they exist in the United States, the privilege of facing accusers and bringing forward evidence in their defence. Many eminent jurists feel that the expanded use of injunctions in late years is not in accordance with the strictest equity, but the difficulty lies in modifying by legislation some of the principles involved at common law in the writ of injunction.

Trade unionists have undertaken to secure recognition through a system known as collective bargaining, the adoption of sliding scales being a feature of this work. Collective bargaining has also been indorsed in many cases by employers, but occasionally, as in the great Homestead strike in 1892 and some other labor conflicts, the scale has been a prominent cause of difficulty. Employers sometimes resent the idea of collective bargaining, because in carrying it out there must be a recognition of the union. Men like Mr. John Pierpont Morgan, however, prefer to deal with well organized and administered trade unions as the medium through which to arrange questions of wages and other conditions of employment, rather than to subject themselves to the chaotic and unreliable results which are found when workmen act as individuals.

The great organizations are growing more and more conservative, especially those represented in the American Federation of Labor, which was organized permanently in December, 1886, under its present name. The country at large owes a debt to this order which is not always or very generally recognized. At the time of the great strike in Chicago in 1894, when the American Railway Union, the order that organized the strike, demanded a general or sympathetic strike of all mechanics and artisans, the executive committee of the American Federation defeated this purpose, and no general strike occurred. Again, in the great steel strike of 1901, when the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers thought that by a general strike, sympathetic in its nature in a sense, they would be able to win against the powerful United States Steel Corporation, the executive committee of the American Federation of Labor declined to advise a general strike. In all probability this action had as much to do with bringing the strike to an end as any one element.

Of course, organized labor has received many very severe blows. The rapid decrease in membership and influence of the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers on account of the disorders at Homestead in 1892 is a very striking instance in this direction. The same association lost, in a way, again in 1901, but on the whole it has been progressive, and now, by wise management, its position since the strike is encouraging. Unions come and unions go, but the most powerful and influential have a long and honorable history, although conservatism and wise action have often been the result of radical, extreme, and dangerous methods.

Probably the best known, and in a popular sense the wisest, union in the country is the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. This organization has exerted a sure and steadying influence in various controversies. Its members are called by the members of other unions the aristocracy of labor, but they came to their present enviable position through some of the extremest efforts to carry their points that have been made in this country. Their wisdom is the wisdom of experience, and the managers of the brotherhood have been wise enough to recognize experience. Other organizations are benefiting by such experience, and as time goes on they will exert a still greater influence in the industrial field. Unions are, as a rule, friendly to machinery, studying practical, economic questions, and are not drags upon industry. The exceptions to this rule are now so few that they need not be considered.

When the greatest capitalists of the country are ready to recognize and deal with unions, and to advocate the advantages, through conciliatory methods, which can come only through organizations, and to meet the leaders of labor unions in great conferences, as they have done recently, for the discussion of vital economic and moral questions, there need not be much fear of antagonism. The old suspicious attitude toward trade unions in the United States is practically a thing of the past.

XXIX

THE SOIL

"LAND AND ITS OWNERSHIP IN THE PAST"

BY

ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE

PRESIDENT OF THE LAND NATURALIZATION SOCIETY

THAT the twentieth century will see radical changes in our social order every thoughtful man agrees. How these changes are to be accomplished, whether slowly and carefully under the guidance of accepted and far-seeing leaders, or suddenly and tumultuously under pressure of bursting bonds, that no man can say with surety. Powerful interests oppose themselves to hard necessities.

Close allied with the question of the future of labor is the question of the future of land. Henry George eloquently preached to us the "single tax" which should make the land, the soil itself, pay for everything. Somewhat in harmony with these views are those of Mr. Wallace, LL.D., F.R.S., whose age and whose high reputation as being, with Darwin, the codiscoverer of evolution, lend value to his every utterance. Such a man does not speak heedlessly, and when even Mr. Wallace declares that there is something radically wrong with our social order, that justice demands and will ultimately enforce a readjustment of all our conceptions of property, surely it is time that we take thought.

DURING many past centuries of oppression and wrong there has been an ever-present but rarely expressed cry for redress, for some small instalment of justice to the down-trodden workers. It has been the aspiration alike of the peasant and the philosopher, of the poet and the saint. But the rule of the lords of the soil has ever been so hard, and supported by power so overwhelming and punishment so severe, that the born thralls or serfs have rarely dared to do more than humbly petition for some partial relief; or, if roused to rebel by unbearable misery and wrongs, they have soon been crushed by the power of mailed knights and armed retainers. The peasant revolt at the end of the fourteenth century was to gain relief from the oppressive serfdom that was enforced after the black death had diminished the number of workers. John Ball then preached socialism for the first time.

"By what right," he said, "are they whom we call lords greater folk than we? Why do they hold us in serfage? . . . They are clothed in velvet, while we are covered with rags. They have wine and spices and fair bread; and we oat-cake and straw, and water to drink. They have leisure and fine houses; we have pain and labor, the rain and the wind in the fields. And yet it is of us and our toil that these men hold their state."

John Ball and Wat Tyler lived five hundred years too soon. To-day the very same claims are made by men who, having got political power, cannot be so easily suppressed.

A century passed, and the great martyr of freedom, Sir Thomas More, powerfully set forth the wrongs of the workers and the crimes of their rulers in his ever-memorable "Utopia." Near the end of this work he thus summarizes the governments of his time in words that will apply almost, if not quite, as accurately to-day:

"Is not that government both unjust and ungrateful that is so prodigal of its favors to those that are called gentlemen, or such others who are idle, or live either by flattery or by contriving the arts of vain pleasure, and, on the other hand, takes no care of those of a meaner sort, such as ploughmen, colliers, and smiths, without whom we could not subsist? But after the public has reaped all the advantage of their service and they come to be oppressed with age, sickness, and want, all their labors and the good they have done is forgotten, and all the recompense given them is that they are left to die in great misery. The richer sort are often endeavoring to bring the hire of laborers lower—not only by their fraudulent practices, but by the laws which they procure to be made to that effect; so that though it is a thing most unjust in itself to give such small rewards to those who deserve so well of the public, yet they have given those hardships the name and color of justice, by procuring laws to be made for regulating them.

"Therefore I must say that, as I hope for mercy, I can have no other notion of all the governments that I see or know than that they are a conspiracy of the rich, who, on pretence of managing the public, only pursue their private ends, and devise all the ways and arts they can find out; first, that they may, without danger, preserve all that they have so ill acquired, and then that they may engage the poor to toil and labor for them at as low rates as possible, and oppress them as much as they please."[1]

Here we have a stern demand for justice to the workers who produce all the wealth of the rich, as clearly and as forcibly expressed as by any of our modern socialists. Sir Thomas More might, in fact, be well taken as the hero and patron saint of socialism.

A century passed away before Bacon in England, and Campanelli in Italy, again set forth schemes of social regeneration. Bacon's "New Atalantis" supposed that the desired improvement would come from man's increased command over the powers of nature, which would give wealth enough for all. We have, however, obtained this command to a far greater extent than Bacon could possibly have anticipated; yet its chief social effect has been the increase of luxury and the widening of the gulf between rich and poor. Although material wealth, reckoned not in money but in things, has increased perhaps twenty or thirty fold in the last century, while the population has little more than doubled, yet millions of our people still live in the most wretched penury, the whole vast increase of wealth having gone to increase the luxury and waste of the rich and the comfort of the middle classes.

Campanelli, more far-sighted than Bacon, saw the need of social justice as well as increased knowledge, and proposed a system of refined communism. But all these ideas were but as dreams of a golden age, and had no influence whatever in ameliorating the condition of the workers, which, with minor fluctuations, and having due regard to the progress of material civilization, may be said to have remained practically unchanged for the last three centuries. When one-fourth of all the deaths in London occur in workhouses and hospitals, notwithstanding that four millions are spent there annually in public charity, while untold thousands die in their wretched cellars and attics from the direct or indirect effects of starvation, cold, and unhealthy surroundings; and while all these terrible facts are repeated proportionately in all our great manufacturing towns, it is simply impossible that, within the time I have mentioned, the condition of the workers as a whole can have been much, if any, worse than it is now.

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[1] Cassell's National Library, *Utopia*, p. 17

At the end of the seventeenth, and during the eighteenth century, a new school of reformers arose, of whom Locke, Rousseau, and Turgot were representatives. They saw the necessity of a fundamental justice, especially as regards land, the source of all wealth. Locke declared that labor gave the only just title to land; while Rousseau was the author of the maxim that the produce of the land belongs to all men, the land itself to no one. The first Englishman, however, who saw clearly the vast importance of the land question, and who laid down those principles with regard to it which are now becoming widely accepted, was an obscure Newcastle schoolmaster, Thomas Spence, who in 1775 gave a lecture before the Philosophical Society of that town, which was so much in advance of the age that when he printed his lecture the society expelled him, and he was soon afterward obliged to leave the town. He maintained the sound doctrine that the land of any country or district justly belongs to those who live upon it, not to any individuals to the exclusion of the rest; and he points out, as did Herbert Spencer at a later period, the logical result of admitting private property in land. He says:

"And any one of them (the landlords) still can, by laws of their own making, oblige every living creature to remove off his property (which, to the great distress of mankind, is too often put in execution); so, of consequence, were all the landholders to be of one mind, and determined to take their properties into their own hands, all the rest of mankind might go to heaven if they could, for there would be no place found for them here. Thus men may not live in any part of this world, not even where they are born, but as strangers, and by the permission of the pretender to the property thereof."

He maintained that every parish should have possession of its own land, to be let out to the inhabitants, and that each parish should govern itself and be interfered with as little as possible by the central government, thus anticipating the views as to local self-government which we are now beginning to put into practice.

A few years later, in 1782, Professor Ogilvie published anonymously "An Essay on the Right of Property in Land, with respect to its foundation in the Law of Nature, its present establishment by the Municipal Laws of Europe, and the Regulations by which it might be rendered more beneficial to the lower Ranks of Mankind." This small work contains an elaborate and well-reasoned exposition of the whole land question, anticipating the arguments of Herbert Spencer in "Social Statics," of Mill, and of the most advanced modern land reformers. But all these ideas were before their time, and produced little or no effect on public opinion. The workers were too ignorant, too much oppressed by the struggle for bare existence, while the middle classes were too short-sighted to be influenced by theoretical views which even to this day many of the most liberal thinkers seem unable fully to appreciate. But the chief cause that prevented the development of sound views on the vital problems of the land and of social justice was, undoubtedly, that men's minds were forcibly directed toward the great struggles for political freedom then in progress. The success of the American revolutionists and the establishment of a republic founded on a Declaration of the Rights of Man, followed by the great French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, entirly obscured all lesser questions, and also led to a temporary and fictitious prosperity, founded on a gigantic debt the burden of which still oppresses us. These great events irresistibly led to the discussion of questions of political and personal freedom rather than to those deeper problems of social justice of which we are now only beginning to perceive the full importance. The rapid growth of the use of steam power, the vast extension of our manufactures, and the rise of our factory system with its attendant horrors of woman and infant labor, crowded populations, spread of disease, and increase of mortality, loudly cried for palliation and restrictive legislation, and thus occupied much of the attention of philanthropists and politicians.

CHARACTER OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY LEGISLATION

Owing to this combination of events, the nineteenth century has been almost wholly devoted to two classes of legislation—the one directed to reform and popularize the machinery of government itself, the other to neutralize or palliate the evils arising from the unchecked powers of landlords and capitalists in their continual efforts to increase their wealth while almost wholly regardless of the life-shortening labor, the insanitary surroundings, and the hopeless misery of the great body of the workers. To the first class belong the successive Reform Bills, the adoption of the ballot in elections for members of Parliament, household and lodger suffrage, improved registration, and the repression of bribery. To the second, restriction of children's and women's labor in factories and mines, government inspection of these industries; attempts to diminish the dangers of unhealthy employments, and to check the ever-increasing pollution of rivers; the new poor law, casual wards, and other attempts to cope with pauperism; while various fiscal reforms, such as the abolition of the corn laws and the extension of free trade, though advocated in the supposed interest of the wage earners, were really carried by the efforts of great capitalists and manufacturers as a means of extending their foreign trade. Later on came the Elementary Education Act of 1870, which was thought by many to be the crowning of the edifice, and to complete all that could be done by legislation to bring about the well-being of the workers, and, through them, of the whole community.

THE SOIL

ITS OUTCOME

Now that we have had nearly a century of the two classes of legislation here referred to, it may be well briefly to take stock of its general outcome, and see how far it has secured—what all such legislation aims at securing—a fair share to all the workers of the mass of wealth they annually produce; a sufficiency of food, clothing, houseroom, and fuel; healthy surroundings; and some amount of leisure and surplus means for the lesser enjoyments of life. And it must be remembered that never in the whole course of human history has there been a century which has added so much to man's command over the forces of nature, and which has so enormously extended his power of creating and distributing all forms of wealth. Steam, gas, photography, and electricity, in all their endless applications, have given us almost unlimited power to obtain all necessaries, comforts, and luxuries that the world can supply us with. It has been calculated that the labor-saving machinery of all kinds now in use produces about a hundred times the result that could be produced if our workers had only the tools and appliances available a century ago. But even in the last century, not only was there produced a sufficiency of food, clothing, and houses for all workers, but an enormous surplus, which was appropriated by the landlords and other capitalists for their own consumption, while large numbers, then as now, were unprofitably employed in ministering to the luxury of the rich, or wastefully and wickedly employed in destroying life and property in civil or foreign wars.

Taking first the anti-capitalistic or social legislation, we find that, though the horrible destruction of the health, the happiness, and the very lives of factory children has been largely reduced, there has grown up in our great cities a system of child labor as cruel and destructive, if not quite so extensive. Infants of four years and upward are employed at matchbox making and similar employments to assist in supporting the family. A widow and two children, working all day and much of the night, can only earn a shilling or eighteenpence from which to pay rent and support life. Children of school age have thus often to work till midnight after having had five hours' schooling; and till quite recently a poor mother in this state of penury was fined if she did not send the children to school and pay a penny daily for each, meaning so much less bread for herself or for the children. Of course for the children this is physical and mental destruction. The number of women thus struggling for a most miserable living—often a mere prolonged starvation—is certainly greater than at any previous period of our history, and even if the proportion of the population thus employed is somewhat less—and this is doubtful—the fact that the actual mass of human misery and degradation of this kind is absolutely greater is a horrible result of a century's remedial legislation, together with an increase of national wealth altogether unprecedented.

Again if we turn to the amount of poverty and pauperism as a measure of the success of remedial legislation combined with a vast extension of private and systematized charity, we shall have cause for still more serious reflection. In 1888 the Registrar-General called attention to the fact that both throughout the country and to a still greater extent in London deaths in workhouses, hospitals, and other public charitable institutions had been steadily increasing since 1875. A reference to the Annual Summaries of deaths in London shows the increase to have been continuous from 1860 to 1895, the five-year periods giving the following results:

In 1860–65 of total deaths in London, 16.2 per cent. occurred in charitable institutions.

1866–70 (no material at hand).					
1871–75	of total deaths	in London,	17.4	"	"
1876–80	"	"	18.6	"	"
1881–85	"	"	21.1	"	"
1886–90	"	"	23.4	"	"
1891–95	"	"	26.7	"	"

When we add to this the admitted facts, that organized charity greatly increased during the same period, while the press still teems with records of the most terrible destitution, of suicides from the dread of starvation, and deaths directly caused or indirectly due to want, we are brought face to face with a mass of human wretchedness that is absolutely appalling in its magnitude. And all this time Royal and Parliamentary Commissions have been inquiring and reporting, Mansion House and other committees have been collecting funds and relieving distress at every exceptional period of trouble, emigration has been actively at work, improved dwellings have been provided, and education has been systematically urged on, with the final result that one-fourth of all the deaths in the richest city in the world occur in workhouses, hospitals, etc., and, in addition, unknown thousands die in their miserable garrets and cellars from various forms of slow or rapid starvation.

Can a state of society which leads to this result be called civilization? Can a government which, after a century of continuous reforms and gigantic labors and struggles, is unable to organize society so that every willing worker may earn a decent living be called a successful government? Is it beyond the wit of man to save a large proportion of one of the most industrious peoples in the world, inhabiting a rich and fertile country, from grinding poverty or absolute starvation? Is it impossible so to arrange matters that a sufficient portion of the wealth they create may be retained by the workers, even if the idle rich have a little less of profuse and wasteful luxury?

THE IMPOTENCE OF OUR LEGISLATORS

Our legislators, our economists, our religious teachers, almost with one voice tell the people that any better organization of society than that which we now possess is impossible. That we must go on as we have been going on, patching here, altering there, now mitigating the severity of a distressing symptom, now slightly clipping the wings of the landlord, the capitalist, or the sweater; but never going down to the root of the evil; never interfering with vested interests in ancestral wrong; never daring to do anything which shall diminish rent and interest and profit, and to the same extent increase the reward of labor; never seek out the fundamental injustice which deprives men of their birthright in their native land, and enables a small number of landlords to tax the rest of the community to the amount of hundreds of millions for permission to cultivate and live upon the soil in the country of their birth. Can we, then, wonder that both workers and thinkers are getting tired of all this hopeless incapacity in their rulers? That, possessing education which has made them acquainted with the works of great writers on these matters, from Sir Thomas More to Robert Owen, from Henry George to Edward Bellamy, from Karl Marx to Carlyle and Ruskin; and possessing as they do ability, and honesty, and determination, fully equal to that of the coterie of landlords and capitalists which has hitherto governed them, they are determined, as soon as may be, to govern themselves.

THE WORK OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Now, I believe that the great work of the past century, that which is the true preparation for the work to be done in the twentieth century, is not its well-meant and temporarily useful but petty and tentative social legislation, but rather that gradual reform of the political machine—to be completed, it is to be hoped, within the next few years—which will enable the most thoughtful and able and honest among the manual workers to at once turn the balance of political power, and, at no distant period, to become the real and permanent rulers of the country. The very idea of such a government will excite a smile of derision or a groan of horror among the classes who have hitherto blundered and plundered at their will, and have thought they were Heaven-inspired rulers. But I feel sure that the workers will do very much better; and, forming as they do the great majority of the people, it is only bare justice that, after centuries of misgovernment by the idle and wealthy, they should have their turn. The larger part of the invention that has enriched the country has come from the workers; much of scientific discovery has also come from their ranks; and it is certain that, given equality of opportunity, they would fully equal, in every high mental and moral characteristic, the bluest blood in the nation. In the organization of their trades unions and co-operative societies, no less than in their choice of the small body of their fellow-workers who represent them in Parliament, they show that they are in no way inferior in judgment and in organizing power to the commercial, the literary, or the wealthy classes. The way in which, during the past few years, they have forced their very moderate claims upon the notice of the public, have secured advocates in the press and in Parliament, and have led both political economists and politicians to accept measures which were not long before scouted as utterly beyond the sphere of practical politics, shows that they have already become a power in the state. Looking forward, then, to a government by workers and largely in the interest of workers, at a not distant date, I propose to set forth a few principles and suggestions as to the course of legislation calculated to abolish pauperism, poverty, and enforced idleness, and thus lay the foundation for a true civilization which will be beneficial to all.

SUGGESTIONS FOR REAL REFORMS

That the ownership of large estates in land by private individuals is an injustice to the workers and the source of much of their poverty and misery, is held by all the great writers I have alluded to, and has been fully demonstrated in many volumes. It has led directly to the depopulation of the rural districts, the abnormal growth of great cities, the diminished cultivation of the soil and reduced food supply, and is thus at once a social evil and a national danger. Some petty attempts are now making to restore the people to the land, but in a very imperfect manner. The first and highest use of our land is to provide healthy and happy homes, where all who desire it may live in permanent security and produce a considerable portion of the food required by their families. Every other consideration must give way to this one, and all restrictions on its realization must be abolished. Hence, the first work of the people's Parliament should be to give to the Parish and District Councils unrestricted power to take all land necessary for this purpose, so as to afford every citizen the freest possible choice of a home in which he can live absolutely secure (so long as he pays the very moderate ground rent) and reap the full reward of his labor. Every man, in his turn, should be able to choose both where he will live and how much land he desires to have, since each one is the best judge of how much he can enjoy and make profitable. Our object is that all workingmen should succeed in life, should be able to live well and happily, and provide for an old age of comfort and repose. Every such landholder is a gain and a safety instead of a loss and a danger to the community, and no outcry, either of existing landlords or of tenants of large farms, must be allowed to stand in their way. The well-being of the community is the highest law, and no private interests can be permitted to prevent its realization. When land can be thus obtained, co-operative communities, on the plan so clearly laid down by Mr. Herbert V. Mills in his work on "Poverty and the State" may also be established, and various forms of co-operative manufacture can be tried.

THE INVIOLABILITY OF THE HOME

But until this great reform can be effected there is a smaller and less radical measure of relief to all tenants, which should at once be advocated and adopted by the Liberal party. It is an old boast that the Englishman's house is his castle, but never was a boast less justified by facts. In a large number of cases a workingman's house might be better described as an instrument of torture, by means of which he can be forced to comply with his landlord's demands, and both in religion and politics submit himself entirely to the landlord's will. So long as the agricultural laborer, the village mechanic, and the village shopkeeper are the tenants of the landowner, the parson, or the farmer, religious freedom or political independence is impossible. And when those employed in factories or workshops are obliged to live, as they so often are, in houses which are the property of their employers, that employer can force his will upon them by the double threat of loss of employment and loss of a home. Under such conditions a man possesses neither freedom nor safety, nor the possibility of happiness, except so far as his landlord and employer thinks proper. A secure Home is the very first essential alike of political freedom, of personal security, and of social well-being.

Now that every worker, even to the hitherto despised and down-trodden agricultural laborer, has been given a share in local self-government, it is time that, so far as affects the inviolability of the home, the landlord's power should be at once taken away from him. This is the logical sequence of the creation of Parish Councils. For to declare that it is for the public benefit that every inhabitant of a parish shall be free to vote and to be chosen as a representative by his fellow-parishioners, and at the same time to leave him at the mercy of the individual who owns his house to punish him in a most cruel manner for using the privileges thus granted him, is surely the height of unreason and injustice. It is giving a stone in place of bread; the shadow rather than the substance of political enfranchisement.

There is, however, a very simple and effectual way of rendering tenants secure, and that is by a short Act of Parliament declaring all evictions, or seizure of household goods, other than for non-payment of rent, to be illegal. And to prevent the landlord from driving away a tenant by raising his rent to an impossible amount, all alterations of rent must be approved of as reasonable by a committee of the Parish or District Council, and be determined on the application of either the tenant or the landlord. Of course, at the first letting of a house the landlord could ask what rent he pleased, and if it was exorbitant he would get no tenant. But, having once let it, the tenant should be secure as long as he wished to occupy it, and the rent should not be raised except as allowed by some competent tribunal. No doubt a claim will be made on behalf of the landlords for a compulsory, not voluntary, tenancy on the part of the tenant; that is, that if the tenant has security of occupation, the landlord should have equal security of having a tenant. But the two cases are totally different. Eviction from his home may be, and often is, ruinous loss and misery to the tenant, who is therefore, to avoid such loss, often compelled to submit to the landlord's will. But who ever heard of a tenant, by the threat of giving notice to quit, compelling his landlord to vote against his conscience, or to go to chapel instead of to church? The tenant needs protection, the landlord does not.

The same result might perhaps be gained by giving the Parish and District Councils power to take over all houses whose tenants are threatened with eviction, or with an unfair increase of rent; but this would involve so many complications and would so burden these Councils with new and responsible work, that there is no chance of its being enacted for many years. But the plan of giving a legal permanent tenure to every tenant is so simple, so obviously reasonable, and so free from all interference with the fair money value of the landlord's property, that, with a little energy and persistent agitation, it might possibly be carried in two or three years. Such an Act might be more or less in the following form:

"Whereas the security and inviolability of the HOME is an essential condition of political freedom and social well-being, it is hereby enacted that no tenant shall hereafter be evicted from his house or homestead, or have his household goods seized, for any other cause than non-payment of rent, and every heir or successor of such tenant shall be equally secure so long as the rent is paid."

A second clause would provide for a permanently fair rent.

Now, will not some advanced Liberal bring in such a bill annually till it is carried? It is, I think, one that would receive the support of a large number of reformers, because it is absolutely essential to the free and fair operation of the Parish and District Councils, and is equally necessary for the well-being of the farmer and the tradesman, as well as for the mechanic and laborer. The annual discussion of the subject in Parliament would be of inestimable value, since it would afford the opportunity of bringing prominently before the voters the numerous cases of gross tyranny and cruel injustice which are yearly occurring, but which now receive little consideration.

THE UNBORN NOT TO INHERIT PROPERTY

The next great guiding principle, and one that will enable us to carry out the resumption of the land without real injury to any individual, is that we should recognize no rights to property in the unborn, or even in persons under legal age, except so far as to provide for their education and give them a suitable but moderate provision against want. This may be justified on two grounds. First, the law allows to individuals the right to will away their property as they please, so that not even the eldest son has any vested interest, as against the power of the actual owner of the property to leave it to whom or for what purpose he likes. Now, what an individual is permitted to do for individual reasons which may be good or bad, the State may do if it considers it necessary for the good of the community. If an individual may justly disinherit other individuals who have not already a vested interest in property, however just may be their expectations of succeeding to it, *a fortiori* the State may, partially, disinherit them for good and important reasons. In the second place, it is almost universally admitted by moralists and advanced thinkers that to be the heir to a great estate from birth is generally injurious to the individual, and is necessarily unjust to the community. It enables the individual to live a life of idleness and pleasure, which often becomes one of luxury and vice; while the community suffers from the bad example, and by the vicious standard of happiness which is set up by the spectacle of so much idleness and luxury. The working part of the community, on the other hand, suffers directly in having to provide the whole of the wealth thus injuriously wasted. Many people think that if such a rich man *pays* for everything he purchases and wastes, the workers do do not suffer because they receive an equivalent for their labor; but such persons overlook the fact that every pound spent by the idle is first provided *by* the workers. If the income thus spent is derived from land, it is *they* who really pay the rents to the landlord, inasmuch as if the landlord did not receive them they would go in reduction of taxation. If it comes from the funds or from railway shares, *they* equally provide it, in the taxes, in high railway fares, and increased price of goods due to exorbitant railway charges. Even if *all* taxes were raised by an income tax paid by rich men only, the workers would be the real payers, because there is no other possible source of annual income in the country but productive labor. If any one doubts this, let him consider what would happen were the people to resume the land as their right, and thenceforth apply the rents, locally, to establish the various factories and other machinery needful to supply all the wants of the community. Gradually all workers would be employed on the land, or in the various co-operative or municipal industries, and would themselves receive the full product of their labors. To facilitate their exchanges they might establish a token or paper currency, and they would then have little use for gold or silver. How, then, could idlers live, if these workers, in the Parliament of the country, simply declined to pay the interest on debts contracted before they were born? What good would be their much vaunted "capital," consisting as it mostly does of mere legal power to take from the workers a portion of the product of their labors, which power would then have ceased; while their real capital—buildings, machinery, etc.—would bring them not one penny, since the workers would all possess their own, purchased by their own labor and the rents of their own land? Let but the workers resume possession of the soil, which was first obtained by private holders by force or fraud, or by the gift of successive kings who had no right to give it, and capitalists as a distinct class from workers must soon cease to exist.

NO RIGHT TO TAX FUTURE GENERATIONS

Another principle of equal importance is to refuse to recognize the right of any bygone rulers to tax future generations. Thus, all grants of land by kings or nobles, all "perpetual" pensions, and all war debts of the past, should be declared to be legally and equitably invalid, and henceforth dealt with in such a way as to relieve the workers of the burden of their payment as speedily as is consistent with due consideration for those whose chief support is derived from such sources. Just as we are now coming to recognize that a "living wage" is due to all workers, so we should recognize a "maximum income" determined by the standard of comfort of the various classes of fund holders and State or family pensioners. As a rule, these persons might be left to enjoy whatever they now possess during their lives, and when they had relatives dependent on them the income might be continued to these, either for their lives or for a limited period, according to the circumstances of each case. There would be no necessity, and I trust no inclination, to cause the slightest real privation, or even inconvenience, to those who are but the product of a vicious system; but on every principle of justice and equity it is impossible to recognize the rights of deceased kings—most of them the worst and most contemptible of men—to burden the workers for all time in order to keep large bodies of their fellow-citizens in idleness and luxury.

HOW TO DEAL WITH ACCUMULATED WEALTH

By means of the principles now laid down, we can see how to deal fairly with the present possessors of great estates, and with millionaires, whose vast wealth confers no real benefit on themselves, while it necessarily robs the workers, since, as we have seen, it has all to be provided by the workers. It will, I think, be admitted that, if a man has an income, say, of ten thousand a year, that is sufficient to supply him with every possible necessary, comfort, and rational luxury, and that the possession of one or more additional ten thousands of income would not really add to his enjoyment. But all such excessive incomes necessarily produce evil results, in the large number of idle dependants they support, and in keeping up habits of gambling and excessive luxury. Further, in the case of landed estates, the management of which is necessarily left to agents and bailiffs, it leads to injurious interference with agriculture and with the political and religious freedom of tenants, to oppression of laborers, to the depopulation of villages, and other well-known evils. It will therefore be for the public benefit to fix on a maximum income to be owned by any citizen; and, thereupon, to arrange a progressive income tax, beginning with a very small tax on a minimum income from land or realized property of, say, £500, the tax progressively rising, at first slowly, afterward more rapidly, so as to absorb all above the fixed maximum.

When a landed estate was taken over for the use of the community, the net income which had been derived from it would be paid the late holder for his life, and might be continued for the lives of such of his direct heirs as were of age at the time of passing the Act, or it might even be extended to all direct heirs living at that time. In the case of a person owning many landed estates in different counties, he might be given the option of retaining any one or more of them up to the maximum income, and that income would be secured to him (and his direct heirs as above stated) in case any of the land were taken for public use. In the case of fund-holders, all above the maximum income would be extinguished, and thus reduce taxation.

The process here sketched out—by which the continuous robbery of the people through the systems of land and fund holding may be at first greatly reduced and in the course of one or two generations completely stopped, without, as I maintain, real injury to any living person and for the great benefit both of existing workers and of the whole nation in the future—will, of course, be denounced as confiscation and robbery. That is the point of view of those who now benefit by the acts of former robbers and confiscators. From another, and I maintain a truer point of view, it may be described as an act of just and merciful restitution. Let us, therefore, consider the case a little more closely.

ORIGIN OF GREAT ESTATES.

Taking the inherited estates of the great landed proprietors of England, almost all can be traced back to some act of confiscation of former owners or to gifts from kings, often as the reward for what we now consider to be disgraceful services or great crimes. The whole of the property of the abbeys and monasteries, stolen by Henry VIII. and mostly given to the worst characters among the nobles of his court, was really a robbery of the people, who obtained relief and protection from the former owners. The successive steps by which the landlords got rid of the duties attached to landholding under the feudal system, and threw the main burden of defence and of the cost of government on non-landholders, was another direct robbery of the people. Then in later times, and down to the present century, we have that barefaced robbery by form of law, the enclosure of the commons, leading, perhaps more than anything else, to the misery and destruction of the rural population. Much of this enclosure was made by means of false pretences. The general Enclosure Acts declare that the purpose of enclosure is to facilitate "the productive employment of labor" in the improvement of the land. Yet hundreds of thousands of acres in all parts of the country, especially in Surrey, Hampshire, Dorsetshire, and other southern counties, were simply taken from the people and divided among the surrounding landlords, and then only used for sport, not a single pound being spent in cultivating it. Now, however, during the last twenty years, much of this land is being sold for building at high building prices, a purpose never contemplated when the Enclosure Acts were obtained. During the last two centuries more than seven millions of acres have been thus taken from the poor by men who were already rich, and the more land they already possessed the larger share of the commons was allotted to them. Even a Royal Commission, in 1869, declared that these enclosures were often made "without any compensation to the smaller commoners, deprived agricultural laborers of ancient rights over the waste, and disabled the occupants of new cottages from acquiring new rights."

Now, in this long series of acts of plunder of the people's land, we have every circumstance tending to aggravate the crime. It was robbery of the poor by the rich. It was robbery of the weak and helpless by the strong. And it had that worst feature which distinguishes robbery from mere confiscation—the plunder was divided among the individual robbers. Yet, again, it was a form of robbery specially forbidden by the religion of the robbers, a religion for which they professed the deepest reverence, and of which they considered themselves the special defenders. They read in what they call *the Word of God*, "Woe unto them that join house to house, that lay field to field, till there is no place, that they may be placed alone in the midst of the earth," yet this is what they are constantly striving for, not by purchase only, but by robbery. Again they are told, "The land shall not be sold for ever, for the land is

Mine"; and at every fiftieth year all land was to return to the family that had sold it, so that no one could keep land beyond the year of jubilee; and the reason was that no man or family should remain permanently impoverished.

Both in law and in morality the receiver of stolen goods is as bad as the thief; and even if he has purchased a stolen article unknowingly an honorable man will, when he discovers the fact, restore it to the rightful owner. Now, our great hereditary landlords know very well that they are the legal possessors of much stolen property, and, moreover, property which their religion forbids them to hold in great quantities. Yet we have never heard of a single landlord making restitution to the robbed nation. On the contrary, they take every opportunity of adding to their vast possessions, not only by purchase, but by that meanest form of robbery—the enclosing of every scrap of roadside grass they can lay their hands on, so that the wayfarer or the tourist may have nothing but dust or gravel to walk upon, and the last bit of food for the cottager's donkey or goose is taken away from him.

This all-embracing system of land robbery, for which nothing is too great and nothing too little; which has absorbed meadow and forest, moor and mountain; which has secured most of our rivers and lakes, and the fish which inhabit them; which often claims the very seashore and rocky coast line of our island home, making the peasant pay for his seaweed manure and the fisherman for his bait of shellfish; which has desolated whole counties to replace men by sheep or cattle, and has destroyed fields and cottages to make a wilderness for deer; which has stolen the commons and filched the roadside wastes; which has driven the laboring poor into the cities, and has thus been the primary and chief cause of the lifelong misery, disease, and early death of thousands who might have lived lives of honest toil and comparative comfort had they been permitted free access to land in their native villages;—it is the advocates and beneficiaries of this inhuman system, the members of this "cruel organization," who, when a partial restitution of their unholy gains is proposed, are the loudest in their cries of "robbery!" But all the robbery, all the spoliation, all the legal and illegal filching has been on *their* side, and they still hold the stolen property. *They* make laws to justify their actions, and *we* propose equally to make laws which will really justify ours, because, unlike their laws which always took from the poor to give to the rich, ours will take only from the superfluity of the rich, not to give to the poor individually, but to enable the poor to live by honest work, to restore to the whole people their birthright in their native soil, and to relieve all alike from a heavy burden of unnecessary taxation. This will be the true statesmanship of the future, and will be justified alike by equity, by ethics, and by religion.

And now, in conclusion, I will give one or two extracts from a book written by a self-taught worker for workers, to show how workers feel on the questions we have touched upon.

"At present the working people of this country live under conditions altogether monstrous. Their labor is much too heavy, their pleasures are too few; and in their close streets and crowded houses decency and health and cleanliness are wellnigh impossible. It is not only the wrong of this that I resent, it is the *waste.* Look through the slums, and see what childhood, girlhood, womanhood, and manhood have there become. Think what a waste of beauty, of virtue, of strength, and of all the power and goodness that go to make a nation great, is being consummated there by ignorance and by injustice. For, depend upon it, every one of our brothers or sisters ruined or slain by poverty or vice is a loss to the nation of so much bone and sinew, of so much courage and skill, of so much glory and delight. Cast your eyes, then, over the Registrar-General's returns, and imagine, if you can, how many gentle nurses, good mothers, sweet singers, brave soldiers, clever artists, inventors and thinkers, are swallowed up every year in that ocean of crime and sorrow which is known to the official mind as 'the high death rate of the wage-earning classes.' Alas! the pity of it."

And again, from the same writer:

"A short time ago a certain writer, much esteemed for his graceful style of saying silly things, informed us that the poor remained poor because they show no efficient desire to be anything else. Is that true? Are only the idle poor? Come with me, and I will show you where men and women work from morning till night, from week to week, from year to year, at the full stretch of their powers, in dim and fetid dens, and yet are poor, ay, destitute—have for their wages a crust of bread and rags. I will show you where men work in dirt and heat, using the strength of brutes, for a dozen hours a day, and sleep at night in styes, until brain and muscle are exhausted; and fresh slaves are yoked to the golden car of commerce, and the broken drudges filter through the union or the prison, to a felon's or a pauper's grave! And I will show you how men and women thus work and suffer, and faint and die, generation after generation, and I will show you how the longer and harder these wretches toil the worse their lot becomes; and I will show you the graves and find witnesses to the histories of brave and noble industrious poor men, whose lives were lives of toil *and* poverty, and whose deaths were tragedies. And all these things are due to *sin;* but it is to the sin of the smug hypocrites who grow rich upon the robbery and the ruin of their fellow-creatures."

These extracts are from a small but weighty book called "Merrie England," by Nunquam. In the form of a series of letters on socialism to a workingman, it contains more important facts, more acute reasoning, more conclusive argument, and more good writing, than are to be found in any English work on the subject I am acquainted with. When such men—and there are many of them—are returned to Parliament, and are able to influence the government of the country, the dawn of a new era, bright with hope for the long-suffering workers, will be at hand.

XXX

ANARCHISM

"THOU SHALT NOT KILL"

BY

COUNT LEO TOLSTOI

AND

GEORGE J. HOLYOAKE

SOCIALISM with all its various shades of speculation has powerful advocates among our leaders of intellect, but anarchism has no friends except among the rebels of extremely rabid type. Even Tolstoi, of all our philosophers perhaps the most "advanced," the keenest of insight and least fettered of convention, even he cries out against anarchism, not for its savagery, which he denies, but for its mistaken folly. Anarchism is a disease; and its cause, as in all diseases, must lie in some unhealthy condition of the body politic. Perhaps we need only to suppress the outbreak of the evil; perhaps a wiser effort might be made to cure it by discovering and eradicating its cause. Hence we supplement here the views of the Russian, Tolstoi, with those of Mr. Holyoake, a well-known Member of Parliament in England. Between them they point out for us very fully the sources, the dangers, and the probable results of this wholly unsatisfactory product of our civilization.

"Thou shalt do no murder."— Ex. xx. 13.

"The disciple is not above his master: but every one when he is perfected shall be as his master."—LUKE vi. 40.

"For all they that take up the sword shall perish with the sword."—MATT. xxvi. 52.

"All things therefore whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them."—MATT. vii. 12.

WHEN kings are tried and executed like Charles I., Louis XVI., and Maximilian of Mexico; or killed in a palace conspiracy like Peter III., Paul, and all kinds of Sultans, Shahs, and Khans, the event is generally passed over in silence. But when one of them is killed without a trial, and not by a palace conspiracy; like Henry IV., Alexander II., Carnot, the Empress of Austria, the Shah of Persia, and, recently, King Humbert of Italy, then such murder causes great surprise and indignation among Kings and Emperors, and those attached to them, as if they were the great enemies of murder, as if they never profited by murder, never took part in it, and never gave orders to commit it. And yet the kindest of these murdered Kings, such as Alexander II., or Humbert, were guilty of the murder of tens of thousands of persons killed on the battlefield, not to mention those executed at home; while hundreds of thousands, and even millions, of people have been killed, hanged, beaten to death, or shot, by the more cruel Kings and Emperors.

Christ's teaching cancels the law "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth"; but those men who have kept to the older law and still keep to it, who act upon it by punishing and carrying on wars, and who not only act on the law "an eye for an eye," but give orders to kill thousands without any provocation, by declaring war—*they* have no right to be indignant when the same law is applied to themselves in so infinitesimal a measure that hardly one King or Emperor gets killed to a hundred thousand, or perhaps to a million, ordinary people killed by the order or with the consent of Kings and Emperors.

Kings and Emperors should not be indignant when such murders as that of Alexander II. or Humbert occur, but should, on the contrary, be surprised that such murders are so rare, considering the continual and universal example of committing murders they themselves set the people.

Kings and Emperors are surprised and horrified when one of themselves is murdered, and yet the whole of their activity consists in managing murder and preparing for murder. The keeping up, the teaching and exercising, of armies with which Kings and Emperors are always so much occupied, and of which they are the organizers—what is it but preparation for murder?

The masses are so hypnotized that, though they see what is continually going on around them, they do not understand what it means. They see the unceasing care Kings, Emperors, and Presidents bestow on disciplined armies, see the parades, reviews, and manœuvres they hold, and of which they boast to one another, and the people eagerly crowd to see how their own brothers, dressed up in bright-colored, glittering clothes, are turned into machines to the sound of drums and trumpets, and, obedient to the shouting of one man, all make the same movements; and they do not understand the meaning of it all.

Yet the meaning of such drilling is very clear and simple. It is preparing for murder. It means the stupefying of men in order to convert them into instruments for murdering.

And it is just Kings and Emperors and Presidents who do it, and organize it, and pride themselves on it. And it is these same people whose special employment is murder organizing, who have made murder their profession, who dress in military uniforms, and carry weapons (swords at their side), who are horror-struck and indignant when one of themselves is killed.

It is not because such murders as the recent murder of Humbert are exceptionally cruel that they are so terrible. Things done by the order of Kings and Emperors, not only in the days of old, such as the massacre of St. Bartholomew, persecutions for faith, terrible ways of putting down peasant riots, but also the present executions, the torture of solitary cells and disciplinary battalions, hanging, decapitation, shooting, and slaughter at the wars, are incomparably more cruel than the murders committed by anarchists.

Nor is it on account of their injustice that these murders are terrible. If Alexander and Humbert did not deserve death, the thousands of Russians who perished at Plevna, and of Italians who perished in Abyssinia, deserved it still less. No, it is not because of their cruelty and injustice these murders are terrible, but because of the want of reason in those who perpetrate them.

If the regicides commit murder under the influence of feelings of indignation, evoked by witnessing the sufferings of the enslaved people, for which sufferings they hold Alexander II., Carnot, or Humbert responsible, or because they are influenced by personal desire for revenge—however immoral such conduct may be, still it is comprehensible; but how can an organized body of anarchists such as those by whom, it is said, Bréssi was sent out, and by whom another Emperor was threatened, how can it, quietly considering means of improving the condition of the people, find nothing better to do than to murder people, the killing of whom is as useful as cutting off one of the Hydra's heads?

Kings and Emperors have long established a system resembling the mechanism of a magazine rifle, *i.e.*, as soon as one bullet flies out another takes its place. "*Le roi est mort—vive le roi!*" Then what is the use of killing them? It is only from a most superficial point of view that the murder of such persons can seem a means of saving the people from oppression and wars, which destroy their lives.

We need only remember that the same kind of oppression and war went on no matter who stood at the head of the Government: Nicholas or Alexander, Louis or Napoleon, Frederic or William, Palmerston or Gladstone, McKinley or any one else, in order to see that it is not some definite person who causes the oppression and the wars from which people suffer.

The misery of the people is not caused by individuals, but by an order of Society by which they are bound together in a way that puts them in the power of a few, or, more often, of one man: a man so depraved by his unnatural position—having the fate and lives of millions of people in his power—that he is always in an unhealthy state and suffering more or less from a mania of self-aggrandizement, which is not noticed in him only because of his exceptional position.

Apart from the fact that such men are surrounded, from the cradle to the grave, by the most insane luxury and its usual accompaniment of flattery and servility, the whole of their education, and all their occupations, are centred on the one object of murder, the study of murder in the past, the best means of murdering in the present, the best ways of preparing for murder in the future. From their earliest years they learn the art of murder in all possible forms, always carry about with them instruments of murder, dress in different uniforms, attend parades, manœuvres, and reviews, visit each other, present orders and the command of regiments to each other. And yet not only does nobody tell them the real name of their actions, not only does nobody tell them that preparing for murder is revolting and criminal, but they hear nothing but praise and words of admiration from all around them for these actions.

The only part of the Press that reaches them, and which seems to them to be the expression of the feelings of the best of the people or their best representatives, exalts all their words and deeds, however silly and wicked they may be, in the most servile manner. All who surround them, men and women, cleric or lay, all these people who do not value human dignity, vie with each other in flattering them in the most refined manner, agree with them in everything, and deceive them continually, making it impossible for them to know life as it is. These men might live to be a hundred and never see a real, free man, and never hear the truth.

We are sometimes appalled by the words and deeds of these men, but if we only consider their state we cannot but see that any man would act in the same way in such a position. A reasonable man can do but one thing in such a position, *i.e.*, leave it. Every one who remains in such a position will act in the same manner.

What, indeed, must be going on in the head of some William of Germany, a man of limited understanding, little education, and with a great deal of ambition, whose ideals are like those of a German "junker," when any silly or horrid thing he may say is always met with an enthusiastic "*Hoch!*" and commented on, as if it were something very important, by the Press of the whole world? He says that the soldiers should be prepared to kill their own fathers in obedience to his command. The answer is "Hurrah!" He says the Gospels must be introduced with a fist of iron. "Hurrah!" He says that the Army must not take any prisoners in China, but kill all, and he is not placed in a lunatic asylum, but they cry "Hurrah!" and set sail for China to execute his orders.

Or Nicholas, who, though naturally modest, begins his reign by declaring to venerable old men, in answer to the desire they express of being allowed to discuss their own affairs, that their hope for self-government is a senseless dream. And the organs of the Press that reach him, and the people whom he meets, praise him for it. He proposes a childish, silly, and untruthful project of universal peace at the same time that he is ordering an increase of the Army, and even then there are no limits to the laudations of his wisdom and his virtue. Without any reason, he senselessly and pitilessly offends the whole of the Finnish nation, and again hears nothing but praise. At last he enters upon the Chinese slaughter, terrible by its injustice, cruelty, and its contrast with his project of peace; and he gets applauded simultaneously from all sides, both for his own conquests and for his adherence to his father's policy of peace. What must indeed be going on in the heads and hearts of such men?

So that it is not Alexanders and Humberts, Williams, Nicholases, and Chamberlains, who are the cause of oppression and war, even though they do organize them, but it is those who have placed them in, and support them in, a position in which they have power over the life and death of men.

Therefore it is not necessary to kill Alexanders and Nicholases, Williams and Humberts, but only to leave off supporting the social condition of which they are the product. It is the selfishness and stupefaction of the people who sell their freedom and their honor for insignificant material advantages which supports the present state of society.

Those who stand on the lowest rung of the ladder, partly as a consequence of being stupefied by a patriotic and pseudo-religious education, partly for the sake of personal advantages, give up their freedom and their feeling of human dignity to those who stand higher, and who offer them material advantages. In a like position are those standing a little higher. They, too, through being stupefied, and especially for material advantages, give up their freedom and sense of human dignity. The same is true of those standing still higher; and so it continues up to the highest rungs, up to the person or persons who, standing on the very summit of the social cone, have no one to submit to, nor anywhere to rise to, and have no motive for action except ambition and love of power. These are generally so depraved and stupefied by their insane power over life and death, and by the flattery and servility of those around them, which is connected with such power, that while doing evil they feel convinced they are the benefactors of the human race. It is the people themselves who, by sacrificing their human dignity for material profits, produce these men, and are afterwards angry with them for their stupid and cruel acts; murdering such people is like whipping children after spoiling them.

Very little seems needed to stop oppression and useless war, and to prevent any one from being indignant with those who seem to be the cause of such oppression and war.

Only that things should be called by their right names and seen as they are; that it should be understood that an army is an instrument of murder, that the recruiting and drilling of armies which Kings, Emperors, and Presidents carry on with so much self-assurance are preparations for murder.

If only every King, Emperor, and President would understand that his work of organizing armies is not an honorable and important duty, as his flatterers persuade him it is, but a most abominable business, *i.e.*, the preparing for, and the managing of, murder. If only every private individual understood that the payment of taxes which helps to equip soldiers, and, above all, military service, are not immaterial but highly immoral actions, by which he not only permits murder, but takes part in it himself—then this power of the Kings and Emperors which arouses indignation, and causes them to be killed, would come to an end of itself.

And so the Alexanders, Carnots, Humberts, and others should not be killed, but it ought to be shown them that they are murderers; and, above all, they should not be allowed to kill men; their orders to murder should not be obeyed.

If men do not yet act in this manner, it is only because Governments, to maintain themselves, diligently exercise a hypnotic influence upon the people. Therefore we can help to prevent people killing Kings and each other, not by murder—murders only strengthen this hypnotic state—but by arousing men from the delusion in which they are held.

And it is this that I have tried to do in these remarks.

BY

GEORGE JACOB HOLYOAKE

Anarchism arises from the despair of the good and the malevolence of the bad. There are two kinds of anarchists, just as there are two kinds of Tories. The social kind seek power, that they may control public affairs for the good of the people, which they believe they can better manage than the people themselves. The political Tories seek paramountcy and authority for pride or interest, and are indifferent or hostile to the welfare of the people—not counting them of consequence. In like manner there are anarchists who seek by reason to supersede public government by self-government—a slow, long-lasting task. There is another and brutal class of anarchists who are animated by resentment and the baser sort by vengeance. They seek to destroy the most conspicuous representatives of order or government. They have that purpose, but no plan. Their future is only a day or a week. Their motive, so far as they can be said to have one, is to bring about a change. They think any change must be for the better—which shows their credulity. They are under the impression that were authority destroyed things would right themselves—which they never do. The prospect that they will is so hopeless that persons on this sane side of madness can never accept this wild and blind solution of societarian wrongs, whatever they may be. Whoever puts this dismal doctrine into practice must be arrested, and the repetition of the offence made impossible or improbable. Society must vindicate itself against irresponsible subjection. Yet it may temper the expression of public wrath to remember that the awful belief that murder is a mode of progress is not peculiar to anarchists. Charles the Second gave a colonelcy to Silas Titus, who wrote inciting the assassination of the Lord Protector Cromwell. English Tories favored the assassination of Napoleon, and he in his turn pensioned the man who sought the assassination of Wellington. All the monarchs of Europe praised the knife of Charlotte Corday. Froude has shown that Catholics and Protestants have alike approved tyrannicide and used it. Did not Lord Beaconsfield "bless the hand that wields the regicidal steel"? We all know how the French Revolutionists ruined their cause and perished by the hands of their own adherents, and led to a worse despotism than that which they subverted, and established it or strengthened it all over Europe. If the anarchists of the dagger or the bullet had their way, they would all be destroyed by their own disciples of more "advanced views," who would find their existence an obstacle to further progress. Therefore let the doctrine that murder is a mode of progress be execrated wherever it shows itself in high place or low, in the yellow press or in the streets. Carlyle, by his dangerous gospel of force, has done more than all the anarchists to demoralize our national policy and to inspire political assassination with a sense of rectitude, as I learned from Madame Pulsky. It caused Canon Kingsley, just-minded as he was, and Lord Tennyson, who had as many virtues as gifts, to support, to applaud Governor Eyre's murders in Jamaica. I sat by Governor Eyre in the House of Commons when Mr. Cardwell (afterwards Lord Cardwell) admitted that there had been unnecessary "executions," which is the parliamentary name for murder. I hate anarchy alike in military or civil life, and all that leads to it or incites revenge by death, as does the new doctrine—that "leniency is a mistake"—that it is weakness or cowardice. Can there be any wonder that some people, for the ends of their hatred, better these perilous instructions? And so incited, the pitiless sentiment acts equally in republics and monarchies.

Anarchism is not a modern invention—is not a foreign device—it is a disease of impatience in politics, and many have it. But it is without excuse in countries where reasonable freedom exists. If with a free press, free speech, and a free Parliament, agitators cannot advance just objects, they do not understand their business.

Nameless incidents to outrage everybody is willing to see forbidden. Those who are invited to act upon the advice of the writer have a right to know upon whose authority they are to place themselves in jeopardy. When a publisher, I exacted this condition in respect of any pamphlet of perilous tendency brought to me. Authors of deadly counsel against the state could not, or should not, object, when called upon, to explain their intent. It was Bakunin who first in modern days proposed to end government by the knife. He was listened to because he was a Russian and belonged to a land where reason was not tolerated and irresponsible ferocity ruled. Wiser and nobler men than Bakunin, men of unrivalled learning, such as Elisée Reclus, his brother Elie, and others, are philosophical anarchists.

Elie Reclus came to me to solicit a scarce engraving of Robert Owen, a famous advocate of progress by reason. The philosophical anarchists adopt, or accept, the name, but have no anarchy in them. They are against conventional government—not from malice, but because they think self-government nobler. What they seek is unlimited freedom, which, if set going to-morrow, would not last a month. They hold that free association will be the ultimate form of society. There is no disquietude in that—but the distance to it is distressing. They are for voluntary, not compulsory society. Their passion is for absolute individual freedom. It may be described as individuality run mad—as men and things go. Yet it is not a bad theory that a man should be a law unto himself. Others have thought that who are not counted as anarchists. But he who is to be a law unto himself should have a perfect self. And society has reared very few of that kind. True, Shakespeare says, "To thine own self be true." But if a man who was a rascal by nature, or policy, or interest, were true to himself, he would be a very undesirable person to know. However, this theory of anarchy has no bullet in it and its discussion no harm in it.

Society would be silly not to distinguish between the anarchy of reason and the anarchy of violence. To the anarchy of assassination there can be but one answer: whether the motive be good or ill, benevolent or hostile, its hand must be arrested and its further use be provided against. But in a manner firm and self-regarding. Because some anarchist goes mad that is no reason why society should. One man's insanity is not cured by another becoming insane. The Indian Thug was far more dangerous than any enemies of order abroad now. The cord has gone in India, and the knife will follow in Europe. Public perturbation only inflates the assassin with self-importance, and incites the emulation of the obscure. Furious epithets increase partisans by affording a species of spurious reason for serious retaliation. When Dynamitards arose, their operations were confined to futile alarms producing injury to unimportant persons only, when a young lord in the House of Commons accused them of want of courage to attack persons in high places. Everybody knows the response to that incautious jeer. We have seen a European emperor describe, in a telegram, the assailant of President McKinley as a "dastardly person." A dastard is a coward who is afraid of danger. Unhappily these assailants are not all cowards and these epithets incite them to show that they are not. They may be fiends—they may be execrable—but he who takes his life in his hands is not a dastard. This assailant was atrocious. He shot the President who extended the hand of courtesy and amity to him. A man who throws bombs, which bring death to the innocent also, from which he seeks to escape, is a dastard.

Nevertheless, let the ministers of repression have discriminating eyes. I have known men of real tenderness, of generosity and humanity, who had, notwithstanding, a sanguinary strain in their principles. Many in high places have it, as all who watch them, or read their utterances by speech or pen, well know. If they bring their sentiment into operation, they should be made to answer for it as well as the vulgar brute whose mind is murderous. There is a foolish praise of "thoroughness" (the fruitful source of many outrages) by persons who do not know that all principles have their limits. Thoroughness means the extermination of all obstacles in the way of a theory. Even thoroughness in good has its perils. It is a maxim of experience that it takes half the time of the wise to correct and protect themselves from the errors of the good.

Some years ago, when our Government were asked to enter into a European concert to repress anarchism, Mr. Gladstone asked me what I thought of such a step, saying his disinclination to it was that the modes of procedure in some countries were such as would revolt the English people, and England, if it entered into the concert, would be committed to the approval and be understood to sanction whatever occurred. It was impossible not to agree in this view. Every country has means of dealing with the evil in question if it has prudence and patience. Every anarchist is known to the police and in every group there is a spy or a fool. What more can the police want? The extinction of this evil lies in higher hands and other manners than theirs.

The objection to government and lawful order is simply a reversion to the savage state. Mr. Auberon Herbert and the philosophers of absolute freedom cannot make anything else of it. The savage life is bold, brave, defiant, and full of original activities—but very inconvenient to others. Its ceaseless watchfulness, vicissitudes, and tragedies contain no time for progress. The irreconcilable philosopher who is out of it thinks he would be better in it. Let him try it. The opportunity is open to him. There are savages of the purest type who will be glad to receive him—and eat him when meals run short. We always have persons among us devoid of appreciation of the advantages into which they were born—not knowing what their forefathers suffered for want of them, or what it cost to obtain them. The philosophers who are against government do not realize what life is without it. Men may be too much governed—they often are; but the remedy does not lie in the extreme of no government. Anarchic outrage is born of this impetuous oversight. The best of life does not consist of defiance. There is dignity in just obedience. There is noble pleasure in grateful or useful service. It is this sense which philosophical and proletarian anarchy alike lack.

XXXI

WAR

"A DEMONSTRATION OF ITS FUTILITY"

BY

DAVID STARR JORDAN

PRESIDENT OF LELAND STANFORD UNIVERSITY

AND

CARL SCHURZ

FORMER UNITED STATES SENATOR

IN our last address the celebrated Tolstoi insisted that war was murder. This, alas, comes so near to being terribly true that there have been few wars indeed where it can be urged that both sides fought under pressure of necessity. In private life most of us, even if causelessly attacked, would go to great lengths of yielding and avoidance rather than assume the tremendous and tragic responsibility of destroying the life of the assailant. Yet the same one of us who thus recognizes the sanctity of human existence in the individual will cry out for war, for death in uncounted thousands, as heedlessly as if it were some childish game to be played for tops or kisses. We clamor that we will show the foe they "can't bluff us," that we will "give them a good hiding, sir, and teach them who we are!" Silly vanity and idle bluster! Are these the inspiring thoughts which sanctify a thousand murders and make each glorious? Is this the spirit in which to raise the curtain upon a national tragedy?

Yet there are not wanting those among us who seriously believe in war. It teaches courage, they say; and moreover, good as our own nation may be, other nations are so wicked we are forced to keep prepared and on guard. It is with these thoughts in view that many of us, unconsciously perhaps, have come to look on war as a vague, far-off necessity, not likely to affect us personally. Hence we neglect to meditate upon *its moral turpitude. War is only "hell" to those who have lived and thought amid its horrors. And while many of us may turn from it with vague distaste, there has been lacking in most minds the active motive for antagonism against it, which is here supplied by two of our most eminent citizens.*

David Starr Jordan, LL.D., the honored president of a great university, has long been one of the most powerful and impassioned of our pleaders against all war. This present address he delivered last spring at the Franklin centennial celebration in Philadelphia, and it is here printed with his approval. The name of Carl Schurz is too well known to need explanation. As editor of Harper's Weekly he wrote the accompanying celebrated appeal in the days of popular excitement which preceded our Spanish war. This brilliant address has been often quoted in part. It is here reprinted in full by permission of Messrs. Harper and Brothers. Both articles deal with the subject calmly and practically, examining it by a method scientific rather than emotional.

THE HUMAN HARVEST

BY

David Starr Jordan

SCIENCE is wisdom set in order. It is known as science by its orderly arrangement, but above and beyond all matters of arrangement the wisdom itself must take rank. Wisdom is the essence of human experience, the contact of mind with the order of nature. Of all men of his time, Benjamin Franklin was preëminently a man of wisdom. By the same token the first leader in science in America, he still takes rank with the greatest.

So in this time of heroic recognition, it is proper that a speaker of to-day should find his message in the words of Benjamin Franklin, and the message I choose is one for which this city of Philadelphia has always stood and from which it has taken its Greek name, the name which in classical phrase says with a single word that men are brothers worthy of our love. It is a message for which the State of Pennsylvania has always stood, for the same principle was embodied in the life of William Penn. This has always been a Quaker City, and the Quakers, the Friends, have been our best apostles of the gospel of "peace on earth, good will towards men," the culmination of social and political wisdom.

Benjamin Franklin once said, "All war is bad; some wars worse than others." Then, once again, in more explicit terms, referring to the dark shadow of war cast over scenes of peace, the evil of the standing army, Franklin said to Baynes:

"If one power singly were to reduce its standing army it would be instantly overrun by other nations. Yet I think there is one effect of a standing army which must in time be felt so as to bring about the abolition of the system. A standing army not only diminishes the population of a country, but even the size and breed of the human species. For an army is the flower of the nation. All the most vigorous, stout, and well-made men in a kingdom are to be found in the army, and these men in general cannot marry."[1]

What is true of standing armies is far more true of armies that fight and fall; for, as Franklin said again, "Wars are not paid for in war times: the bill comes later."

In the discussion of the principles involved in Franklin's words, I must lay before you four fragments of history, three stories told because they are true, and one parable not true, but told for the lesson it teaches. And this is the first: Once there was a man, strong, wealthy, and patient, who dreamed of a finer type of horse than had ever yet existed. This horse should be handsome, clean limbed, intelligent, docile, strong, and swift. These traits were to be not those of one horse alone, a member of a favored equine aristocracy; they were to be "bred in the bone" so that they would continue from generation to generation, the attributes of a special common type of horse. And with this dream ever before his waking eyes, he invoked for his aid the four twin genii of organic life, the four by which all the magic of transformism of species has been accomplished either in nature or in art. And these forces once in his service, he left to their control all the plans included in his great ambition. These four genii or fates are not strangers to us, nor were they new to the human race. Being so great and so strong, they are invisible to all save those who seek them. Men who deal with them after the fashion of science give them commonplace names: variation, heredity, segregation, selection.

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[1] Parton's "Life of Franklin," II, p. 572.

Because not all horses are alike, because in fact no two were ever quite the same, the first appeal was made to the genius of Variation. Looking over the world of horses, he found to his hand Kentucky race-horses, clean limbed, handsome, and fleet, some more so and others less. So those which had the most of the virtues of the horse which was to be were chosen to be blended in new creation. Then again, he found thoroughbred horses of Arabian stock, hardy and strong and intelligent. These virtues were needed in the production of the perfect horse. And here came the need of the second genius, who is called Heredity. With the crossing of the racer with the thoroughbred, all qualities of both were blended in the progeny. The next generation partook of all desirable traits and again of undesirable ones as well. Some the one, and some the other, for sire and dam alike had given the stamp of its own kind and for the most part in equal degree. But again never in a degree quite equal, and in some measure these matters varied with each sire and each dam, and with each colt of all their progeny. It was found that the progeny of the mare called Beautiful Bells excelled all others in retaining all that was good in fine horses and in rejecting all that a noble horse should not have. And like virtues were attached to the sires called Palo Alto, Electricity, and Electioneer.

But there were horses and horses; horses not of the chosen breed, and should these enter the fold with their common blood, it would endanger all that had been already accomplished. For the ideal horse mating with the common horse controls at the best but half the traits of the progeny. If the strain were to be established, the vulgar horseflesh must be kept away, and only the best remain in association with the best. Thus Segregation, the third of the genii, was called into service lest the successes of this herd be lost in the failure of some other.

Under the spell of Heredity all the horses partook of the charm of Beautiful Bells and of Electricity and of Palo Alto, for firmly and persistently all others were banished from their presence. There were some who were not strong, some who were not sleek, some who were not fleet, some who were not clean-limbed, nor docile, nor intelligent. At least, they were not so to the degree which the dream of fair horses demanded. By the force of Selection, all such were sent away. Variation was always at work making one colt unlike another; Heredity made each colt a blend or mosaic of traits of sire and of grandsires and granddams; Selection left only good traits to form this mosaic, and the grandsire and granddam, sire and dam, and the rest of the ancestry lived their lives again in the expanding circle of descent.

Thus in the final result, the horses who were left were the horses of their owner's dream. The future of the breed was fixed, and fixed at the beginning by the very framing of the conditions under which it lived. It is variation which gives better as well as worse. It is heredity which saves all that has been attained—for better or for worse. It is selection by which better triumphs over worse, and it is segregation which protects the final result from falling again into the grasp of the general average. In all this, selection is the vital, moving, changing force. It throws the shaping of the future on the individual chosen by the present. The horse who is left marks the future of his kind. The history of the steed is an elongation of the history of those who are chosen for parentage. And with the best of the best chosen for parentage, the best of the best appears in the progeny. The horse-harvest is good in each generation. As the seed we sow, so shall we reap.

And this story is true, known to thousands of men. And it will be true again just as often as men may try to carry it into experiment. And it will be true not of horses alone, for the four fates which guide and guard life have no partiality for horses but work just as persistently for cattle or sheep, or plums or roses, or calla or cactus, as they do for horses or for men. From the very beginning of life they have wrought untiringly—and in your life and in mine—in the grass of the field, the trees of the forest—in bird and beast, everywhere we find the traces of their energy.

And this brings me to my second story, which is not true as history, but only in its way as parable.

There was once a man—strenuous no doubt, but not wise, for he did not give heed to the real nature of things and so he set himself to do by his own unaided hand the work which only the genii can accomplish. And this man possessed also a stud of horses. They were docile, clean-limbed, fleet, and strong, and he would make them still more strong and swift. So he rode them swiftly with all his might—day and night, always on the course, always pushed to the utmost, leaving only the dull and sluggish to remain in the stalls. For it was his dream to fill these horses with the spirit of action, with the glory of swift motion, that this glory might be carried on and on to the last generation of horses. There were some who could not keep the pace, and to these and these alone he assigned the burden of bearing colts. And the feeble and the broken, the dull of wit, the coarse of limb, became each year the mothers of the colts. The horses who were chosen for the race-course he trained with every care, and every stroke of discipline showed itself in the flashing eyes and straining muscles—such were the best horses. But the other horses were the horses who were left. From their loins came the next generation and with these then was less fire and less speed than the first horses possessed in such large measure. But still the rush went on—whip and spur made good the lack of native movement. The racers still pushed on the course, while in the stall and paddocks at home the dull and common horses bore their dull and common colts. Variation was still at work with these as patiently as ever. Heredity followed, repeating faithfully whatever was left to her. Segregation, always conservative, guarded her own, but could not make good the deficiencies. Selection, forced to act perversely, chose for the future the worst and not the best, as was her usual fashion. So the current of life ran steadily downward. The herd was degenerating because it was each year an inferior herd which bred. Each generation yielded weaker colts, rougher, duller, clumsier colts, and no amount of training or lash or whip or spur made any permanent difference for the better. The *horse harvest* was bad. Thoroughbred and race-horse gave place to common beasts, for in the removal of the noble the ignoble always finds its opportunity. It is always the horse that remains which determines the future of the stud.

In like fashion from the man who is left flows the current of human history.

This tale then is a parable, a story of what never was, but which is always trying to become true.

Once there was a great king—and the nation over which he bore rule lay on the flanks of a mountain range, spreading across fair hills and valleys green and fertile, across to the Mediterranean Sea. And the men of his race, fair and strong, self-reliant and self-confident, men of courage and men of action, were men "who knew no want they could not fill for themselves." They knew none on whom they looked down, and none to whom they regarded themselves inferior. And for all things which men could accomplish these ploughmen of the Tiber and the Apennines felt themselves fully competent and adequate. "Vir," they called themselves in their own tongue, and *virile*, virilis, men like them are called to this day. It was the weakling and the slave who was crowded to the wall; the man of courage begat descendants. In each generation and from generation to generation the human harvest was good. And the great wise king who ruled them—but here my story halts, for there was no king. There could be none. For it was written, men fit to be called men, men who are *Vires*, "are too self-willed, too independent, and too self-cultured to be ruled by anybody but themselves." Kings are for weaklings, not for men. Men free-born control their own destinies. "The fault is not in our stars, but in ourselves that we are underlings." For it was later said of these same days: "there was a Brutus once, who would have brooked the Eternal Devil to take his seat in Rome, as easily as a king" And so there was no king to cherish and control these men and his subjects. The spirit of freedom was the only ruler they knew, and this spirit being herself metaphoric called to her aid the four great genii which create and recreate nations. Variation was ever at work, while heredity held fast all that she developed. Segregation in her mountain fastnesses held the world away, and selection chose the best and for the best purposes, casting aside the weakly, and the slave, holding the man for the man's work, and ever the man's work was at home, building the cities, subduing the forests, draining the marshes, adjusting the customs and statutes, preparing for the new generations. So the men begat sons of men after their own fashion, and the men of strength and courage were ever dominant. The Spirit of Freedom was a wise master, cares wisely for all that he controls.

So in the early days, when Romans were men, when Rome was small, without glory, without riches, without colonies and without slaves, these were the days of Roman greatness.

Then the Spirit of Freedom little by little gave way to the Spirit of Domination. Conscious of power, men sought to exercise it, not on themselves but on one another. Little by little, this meant banding together, aggression, suppression, plunder, struggle, glory, and all that goes with the pomp and circumstance of war. The individuality of men was lost in the aggrandizement of the few. Independence was swallowed up in ambition, patriotism came to have a new meaning. It was transferred from the hearth and home to the trail of the army.

It does not matter to us now what were the details of the subsequent history of Rome. We have now to consider only a single factor In science, this factor is known as "reversal of selection." "Send forth the best ye breed!" That was the word of the Roman war-call. And the Spirit of Domination took these words literally, and the best were sent forth. In the conquests of Rome, *Vir*, the real man, went forth to battle and to the work of foreign invasion; *Homo*, the human being, remained in the farm and the workshop and begat the new generations. Thus "Vir gave place to Homo." The sons of real men gave place to the sons of scullions, stable-boys, slaves, camp followers, and the riff-raff of those the great victorious army does not want.

The fall of Rome was not due to luxury, effeminacy, corruption, the wickedness of Nero and Caligula, the weakness of the train of Constantine's worthless descendants. It was fixed at Philippi, when the spirit of domination was victorious over the spirit of freedom. It was fixed still earlier, in the rise of consuls and triumvirates and the fall of the simple, sturdy, self-sufficient race who would brook no arbitrary ruler. When the real men fell in war, or were left in far-away colonies, the life of Rome still went on. But it was a different type of Roman which continued it, and this new type repeated in Roman history its weakling parentage.

"It is puerile," says Charles Ferguson, "to suppose that kingdoms are made by kings. The kings could do nothing if the mob did not throw up its cap when the king rides by. The king is consented to by the mob, because of that in him which is mob-like. The mob loves glory and prizes, so does the king. If he loved beauty and justice, the mob would shout for him while the fine words were sounding in the air, but he could never celebrate a jubilee or establish a dynasty. When the crowd gets ready to demand justice and beauty, it becomes a democracy and has done with kings."

Thus we read in Roman history the rise of the mob and of the emperor who is the mob's exponent. It is not the presence of the emperor which makes imperialism. It is the absence of the people, the want of men. Babies in their day have been emperors. A wooden image would serve the same purpose. More than once it has served it. The decline of a people can have but one cause, the decline in the type from which it draws its sires. A herd of cattle can degenerate in no other way than this, and a race of men is under the same laws. By the rise in absolute power, as a sort of historical barometer, we may mark the decline in the breed of the people. We see this in the history of Rome. The conditional power of Julius Cæsar, resting on his own tremendous personality, showed that the days were past of Cincinnatus and of Junius Brutus. The power of Augustus showed the same. But the decline went on. It is written that "the little finger of Constantine was thicker than the loins of Augustus." The emperor in the time of Claudius and Caligula was not the strong man who held in check all lesser men and organizations. He was the creature of the mob, and the mob, intoxicated with its own work, worshipped him as divine. Doubtless the last emperor, Augustulus Romulus, before he was thrown into the scrap heap of history, was regarded in the mob's eyes and his own as the most godlike of them all.

What have the historians to say of these matters? Very few have grasped the full significance of their own words, for very few have looked on men as organisms, and on nations as dependent on the specific character of the organisms destined for their reproduction.

So far as I know, Benjamin Franklin was the first to think of man thus as an inhabitant, a species in nature among other species and dependent on nature's forces as other animals and other inhabitants must be.

In Otto Seeck's great history of "The Downfall of the Ancient World" (Der Untergang der Antiken Welt), he finds this downfall due solely to the rooting out of the best ("Die Ausrottung der Besten"). The historian of the "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire" or any other empire is engaged solely with the details of the process by which the best men are exterminated. Speaking of Greece, Dr. Seeck says, "A wealth of force of spirit went down in the suicidal wars." "In Rome, Marius and Cinna slew the aristocrats by hundreds and thousands. Sulla destroyed the democrats, and not less thoroughly. Whatever of strong blood survived, fell as an offering to the proscription of the Triumvirate." "The Romans had less of spontaneous force to lose than the Greeks. Thus desolation came to them sooner. Whoever was bold enough to rise politically in Rome was almost without exception thrown to the ground. *Only cowards remained and from their brood came forward the new generations.* Cowardice showed itself in lack of originality and in slavish following of masters and traditions."

The Romans of the republic could not have made the history of the Roman empire. In their hands it would have been still a republic. Could they have held aloof from world-conquering schemes, Rome might have remained a republic, enduring even to our own day. The seeds of destruction lie not in the race nor in the form of government, but in the influences by which the best men are cut off from the work of parenthood.

"The Roman empire," says Seeley, "perished for want of men." The dire scarcity of men is noted even by Julius Cæsar. And at the same time it is noted that there are men enough. Rome was filling up like an overflowing marsh. Men of a certain type were plenty, "people with guano in their composition," to use Emerson's striking phrase, but the self-reliant farmers, the hardy dwellers on the flanks of the Apennines, the Roman men of the early Roman days, these were fast going, and with the change in the breed came the change in Roman history.

"The mainspring of the Roman army for centuries had been the patient strength and courage, capacity for enduring hardships, instinctive submission to military discipline of the population that lined the Apennines."

With the Antonines came "a period of sterility and barrenness in human beings." "*The human harvest was bad.*" Bounties were offered for marriage. Penalties were devised against race suicide. "Marriage," says Metellus, "is a duty which, however painful, every citizen ought manfully to discharge." Wars were conducted in the face of a declining birth rate, and this decline in quality and quantity of the human harvest engaged very early the attention of the wise men of Rome.

"The effect of the wars was that the ranks of the small farmers were decimated, while the number of slaves who did not serve in the army multiplied" (Bury).

Thus "*Vir* gave place to *Homo*," real men to mere human beings. There were always men enough, such as they were. "A hencoop will be filled, whatever the (original) number of hens," said Benjamin Franklin. And thus the mob filled Rome. No wonder the mob leader, the mob hero rose in relative importance. No wonder "the little finger of Constantine was thicker than the loins of Augustus." No wonder that "if Tiberius chastised his subjects with whips, Valentinian chastised them with scorpions."

"Government, having assumed godhead, took at the same time the appurtenances of it. Officials multiplied. Subjects lost their rights. Abject fear paralyzed the people and those that ruled were intoxicated with insolence and cruelty." "The worst government is that which is most worshipped as divine." The emperor possessed in the army an overwhelming force over which citizens had no influence, which was totally deaf to reason or eloquence, which had no patriotism because it had no country, which had no humanity because it had no domestic ties." "There runs through Roman literature a brigand's and barbarian's contempt for honest industry." "Roman civilization was not a creative kind, it was military; that is, destructive." What was the end of it all? The nation bred real men no more. To cultivate the Roman fields "whole tribes were borrowed." The man of the quick eye and the strong arm gave place to the slave, the scullion, the pariah, the man with the hoe, the man whose lot does not change because in him there lies no power to change it. "Slaves have wrongs, but freemen alone have rights." So at the end the Roman world yielded to the barbaric, because it was weaker in force. "The barbarians settled and peopled the barbaric rather than conquered it." And the process is recorded in history as the fall of Rome.

"Out of every hundred thousand strong men, eighty thousand were slain. Out of every hundred thousand weaklings, ninety to ninety-five thousand were left to survive." This is Dr. Seeck's calculation, and the biological significance of such mathematics must be evident at once. Dr. Seeck speaks with scorn of the idea that Rome fell from the decay of old age, from the corruption of luxury, from neglect of military tactics or from the over-diffusion of culture.

"It is inconceivable that the mass of Romans suffered from over-culture." "In condemning the sinful luxury of wealthy Romans, we forget that the trade lords of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were scarcely inferior in this regard to Lucullus and Apicius, their waste and luxury not constituting the slightest check to the advance of the nations to which these men belonged. The people who lived in luxury in Rome were scattered more thinly than in any modern state of Europe. The masses lived at all times more poorly and frugally because they could do nothing else. Can we conceive that a war force of untold millions of people is rendered effeminate by the luxury of a few hundreds?"

"Too long have historians looked on the rich and noble as marking the fate of the world. Half the Roman empire was made up of rough barbarians untouched by Greek or Roman culture."

"Whatever the remote and ultimate cause may have been, the immediate cause to which the fall of the empire can be traced is a physical, not a moral, decay. In valor, discipline, and science the Roman armies remained what they had always been and the peasant emperors of Illyricum were worthy successors of Cincinnatus and Caius Marius. But the problem was, how to replenish those armies. Men were wanting. The empire perished for want of men" (Seeley).

Does history ever repeat itself? It always does if it is true history. If it does not we are dealing not with history but with mere succession of incidents. Like causes produce like effects, just as often as man may choose to test them. Whenever men use a nation for the test, poor seed yields a poor fruition. Where the weakling and the coward survives in human history, there "the human harvest is bad," and it can never be otherwise.

The finest Roman province, a leader in the Roman world, was her colony of Hispania. What of Spain in history? What of Spain to-day? "This is Castile," said a Spanish writer, "she makes men and wastes them." "This sublime and terrible phrase," says another writer, "sums up Spanish history."

In 1630, according to Captain Calkins, the Augustinian friar, La Puente, thus summed up the fate of Spain:

"Against the credit for redeemed souls, I set the cost of armadas and the sacrifice of soldiers and friars sent to the Philippines. And this I count the chief loss: for mines give silver and forests give timber, but only Spain gives Spaniards, and she may give so many that she may be left desolate and constrained to bring up strangers' children instead of her own."

Another of the noblest of Roman provinces was Gallia, the favored land, in which the best of the Romans, the Franks, and the Northmen have mingled their blood to produce a nation of men, hopefully leaders in the arts of peace, fatally leaders also in the arts of war.

To-day we are told by Frenchmen that France is a decadent nation. This is a confession of judgment, not an accusation of hostile rivals. It does not mean that the slums of Paris are destructive of human life. That we know elsewhere. Each great city has its great burdens, and these fall hard on those at the bottom of the layers of society. There is degradation in all great cities, but the great cities are not the whole of France. It is claimed that the decadence is deep-seated, not individual. It is said that the birth rate is steadily falling, that the average stature of men is lower by two inches at least than it was a century ago, that the physical force is less among the peasants at their homes. Legoyt tells us that "it will take long periods of peace and plenty before France can recover the tall statures mowed down in the wars of the republic and the first empire." What is the cause of all this? Intemperance, vice, misdirected education, bureaucracy, and the rush toward ready-made careers? These may be symptoms. They are not causes. Demolins asks in that clever volume of his: "In what constitutes the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon?" Before we answer this, let us inquire in what constitutes the inferiority of the Latin races. If we admit this inferiority exists in any degree, and if we answer it in any degree, we find in the background the causes of the fall of Greece, the fall of Rome, the fall of Spain. We find the spirit of domination, the spirit of glory, the spirit of war, the final survival of subserviency, of cowardice, and of sterility. The man who is left holds in his grasp the history of the future. The evolution of a race is always selective, never collective. Collective evolution among men or beasts, the movement upward or downward of the whole as a whole, irrespective of training or selection does not exist. As Lepouge has said, "It exists in rhetoric, not in truth nor in history."

The survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence is the primal moving cause of race progress and of race changes.

In the red stress of human history, this natural process of selection is sometimes reversed. A reversal of selection is the beginning of degradation. It is degradation itself. Can we see the fall of Rome in the downfall of France? Let us look again at the history. A single short part of it will be enough. It will give us the clew to the rest.

In the Wiertz gallery in Brussels is a wonderful painting, dating from the time of Waterloo, called Napoleon in Hell. It represents the great marshal with folded arms and face unmoved descending slowly to the land of the shades. Before him, filling all the background of the picture with every expression of countenance, are the men sent before him by the unbridled ambition of Napoleon. Three millions and seventy thousand there were in all—so history tells us, more than half of them Frenchmen. They are not all shown in one picture. They are only hinted at. And behind the millions shown or hinted at are the millions on millions of men who might have been and are not—the huge widening human wedge of the possible descendants of the men who fell in battle. These men of Napoleon's armies were the youth without blemish, "the best that the nation could bring," chosen as "food for powder," "ere evening to be trampled like the grass," in the rush of Napoleon's great battles. These men came from the plough, from the work shop, from the school, the best there were—those from eighteen to thirty-five years of age at first, but afterward the older and the younger. "A boy will stop a bullet as well as a man"; this maxim is accredited to Napoleon. "The more vigorous and well born a young man is," says Novicow, "the more normally constituted, the greater his chance to be slain by musket or magazine, the rifled cannon and other similar engines of civilization." Among those destroyed by Napoleon were "the élite of Europe." "Napoleon," says Otto Seeck, "in a series of years seized all the youth of high stature and left them scattered over many battlefields, so that the French people who followed them are mostly men of smaller stature. More than once in France since Napoleon's time has the military limit been lowered."

I need not tell again the story of Napoleon's campaigns. It began with the United States, the justice and helpfulness of the Code Napoléon, the prowess of the brave lieutenant whose military skill and intrepidity had caused him to deserve well of his nation.

The spirit of freedom gave way to the spirit of domination. The path of glory is one which descends easily. Campaign followed campaign, against enemies, against neutrals, against friends. The trail of glory crossed the Alps to Italy and to Egypt, crossed Switzerland to Austria, crossed Germany to Russia. Conscription followed victory, and victory and conscription debased the human species. "*The human harvest was bad.*" The First Consul became the Emperor. The servant of the people became the founder of the dynasty. Again conscription after conscription. "Let them die with arms in their hands. Their death is glorious, and it will be avenged. You can always fill the places of soldiers." These were Napoleon's words when Dupont surrendered his army in Spain to save the lives of a doomed battalion.

More conscription. After the battle of Wagram, we are told, the French began to feel their weakness; the Grand Army was not the army which fought at Ulm and Jena. "Raw conscripts raised before their time and hurriedly drafted into the line had impaired its steadiness."

On to Moscow,[1] "amidst ever-deepening misery they struggled on, until of the 600,000 men who had proudly crossed the Niemen for the conquest of Russia, only 20,000 famished, frost-bitten, unarmed spectres staggered across the bridge of Korno in the middle of December."

"Despite the loss of the most splendid army marshalled by man, Napoleon abated no whit of his resolve to dominate Germany and discipline Russia." ". . . He strained every effort to call the youth of the empire to arms . . . and 350,000 conscripts were promised by the Senate. The mighty swirl of the Moscow campaign sucked in 150,000 lads of under twenty years of age into the devouring vortex." "The peasantry gave up their sons as food for cannon." But "many were appalled at the frightful drain on the nation's strength." "In less than half a year after the loss of half a million men a new army nearly as numerous was marshalled under the imperial eagles. But the majority were young, untrained troops, and it was remarked that the conscripts born in the year of Terror had not the stamina of the earlier levies. Brave they were, superbly brave, and the Emperor sought by every means to breathe into them his indomitable spirit." "Truly the Emperor could make boys heroes, but he could never repair the losses of 1812." "Soldiers were wanting, youths were dragged forth." The human harvest was at its very worst.

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[1] These quotations are from the "History of Napoleon I," by J. H. Rose.

And the sequel of it all is the decadence of France. In the presence of war—of war on such a mighty, ruthless, and ruinous scale—one does not have to look far to find in what constitutes the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon. And we see the truth in Franklin's words, the deeper truth of their deeper wisdom: "Men do not pay for war in war time; the bill comes later."

Another wise man, Ralph Waldo Emerson, has used these words: "Man has but one future, and that is predetermined in his lobes." "All the privilege and all the legislation in the world cannot meddle or help. How shall a man escape from his ancestors or draw off from his veins the black drop?"

It is related that Guizot once asked this question of James Russell Lowell: "How long will the republic endure?" "So long as the ideas of its founders remain dominant," was the answer. But again we have the question: "How long will the ideas of its founders remain dominant?" Just so long as the blood of the founders remains dominant in the blood of its people. Not necessarily the blood of the Puritans and the Virginians alone, the original creators of the land of free states. We must not read our history so narrowly as that. It is the blood of free-born men, be they Roman, Frank, Saxon, Norman, Dane, Goth, or Samurai. It is a free stock which creates a free nation. Our republic shall endure so long as the human harvest is good, so long as the movement of history, the progress of peace and industry leaves for the future not the worst but the best of each generation. The republic of Rome lasted so long as there were Romans, the republic of America will last so long as its people, in blood and in spirit, remain what we have learned to call Americans.

By the law of probabilities as developed by Quetelet, there will appear in each generation the same number of potential poets, artists, investigators, patriots, athletes, and superior men of each degree.

But this law involves the theory of continuity of paternity, that in each generation a percentage practically equal of men of superior force or superior mentality should survive to take the responsibilities of parenthood. Otherwise Quetelet's law becomes subject to the operation of another law, the operation of reversed selection, or the biological "law of diminishing returns." In other words, breeding from an inferior stock is the sole agency in race degeneration, as selection, natural or artificial along one line or another, is the sole agency in race progress.

And all laws of probabilities and of averages are subject to a still higher law, the primal law of biology, which no cross-current of life can overrule or modify: ***Like the seed is the harvest.***

ABOUT WAR

BY

Carl Schurz

LET us imagine the first news of the destruction of the "Maine" in the harbor of Havana had been accompanied by clear proof that the catastrophe was caused by a torpedo or a mine —what would have been the duty of our Government? Would it have been to rush forthwith into a war with Spain upon the assumption that Spanish officials and, with them, the Spanish Government were responsible for the calamity? Or would it not rather have been to inquire whether Spanish officials were really responsible, and, if they were found to be, whether the Spanish Government were willing or not to make due atonement for the acts of its agents? What man of good sense and of sound moral instincts would wish that war be resorted to while an honorable adjustment seems attainable? And yet a resort to war is on every possible occasion spoken of, not only by the miscreants with whom the stirring up of a war excitement is a mere business speculation, but even by otherwise rational and respectable persons, with a flippancy as if war were nothing more serious than an international yacht race or a football-match.

That war has in the history of mankind sometimes served good purposes in forming nations, in repressing barbarism, in enforcing justice, in removing obstructions to the spread of civilization, will hardly be denied by anybody. How much of such work is still to be done, and how far the instrumentality of war may still be required to that end, it is needless to discuss here. In any event, it will be admitted that whatever object is to be accomplished, war is to be regarded as the last expedient to be resorted to, and not the first.

What does civilization mean if not the progress from the arbitrament of brute force to the arbitrament of reason and the maintenance of justice by peaceable methods in the righting of wrongs, and in the settlement of conflicting opinions or interests? If it were proposed to abolish our courts, and to remand the decision of difficulties between man and man to trial by single combat, or by street fight between armed bands enlisted by the contending parties, it would be called a relapse into barbarism too absurd as well as too dreadful to be thought of. We denounce the application of lynch law as a practice utterly repugnant to the fundamental principles of civilized life, and as a blot upon the character of a civilized people. What a strange anachronism it is that, while we abhor the arbitrary resort to brute force in private life as a crime against human society, the same arbitrary resort to brute force in deciding differences between nation and nation, although infinitely more horrible in its effects, has still remained the custom of the civilized world, and is surrounded with a halo of heroic romance! It may, indeed, be said that it is far more difficult to find and institute practical methods for the peaceable adjustment of some kinds of disputes between nations than between individuals, so that occasionally war remains the only expedient. This is true, just as it is true that occasionally the social order may become so disturbed that the individual man has no refuge for the protection of his rights except in self-help outside of the rule of law. But in each case this should be regarded only as the very last extremity when everything else fails.

General Sherman once said: "You would know what war is? War is hell." He knew what he was speaking of, and he meant it. Was it an exaggeration? When the news of the destruction of the "Maine" arrived we threw up our hands in horror. Two hundred and fifty men killed by the explosion! What a frightful calamity! Thus we feel, and thus we speak, in a state of peace. How in time of war? Two hundred and fifty men killed? Only a skirmish, a slight brush with the enemy. Nothing of importance. A pitched battle comes. Five thousand killed and fifteen thousand wounded on our side; the loss of the enemy believed to be greater. A hard fight, but, perhaps, not decisive. Then more battles; more thousands of killed, more tens of thousands of wounded; the hospitals crowded with countless multitudes of sick. Naval fights also; of those mysterious monsters called battleships some go to the bottom of the sea, some of our own as well as some of the enemy's. How many men perish with them? Two hundred and fifty? A mere trifle. It must be many times two hundred and fifty to make a sensation. What is then our first thought? The gaps must be filled, and more of our young men are sent to the front and upon the ships. And the crowds of parents made childless, and of widows and orphans! "Well, very sad, but war is war. Let us take care of them the best way we can to keep them from starving." But more than this. Wherever the armies operate, devastation, ravage, and ruin; wherever the warships sail, destruction of commerce and mutual havoc —the fruit of years of patient industry and exertion ruthlessly wiped out; and those agencies of intercourse and mutual advancement by which modern civilization has made the nations of the world dependent upon one another disastrously interrupted, and loss, desolation, and misery spread broadcast. Was General Sherman wrong when he said that "war is hell"?

But we are told that a nation needs a war from time to time to prevent it from becoming effeminate, to shake it up from demoralizing materialism, and to elevate the popular heart by awakening heroic emotions and the spirit of patriotic self-sacrifice. This has a captivating sound. But is there not something intensely ludicrous in the idea that the American people, while the rugged work of subduing this vast continent to civilization is yet unfinished, need wars to save them from effeminacy? Were we more effeminate before our Civil War than we have been since? As to the demoralizing materialism, was the pursuit of money, the greed of material possession and enjoyment, less prevalent after the Civil War than before it? Did not the war itself stimulate that "materialism" to a degree not known among us before? As to heroic emotions and the spirit of patriotic self-sacrifice, it is true that war is apt to call forth splendid manifestations of them. But does war *create* those noble impulses? Could it bring out the manifestations of them if they did not, although unmanifested, already exist? And is, after all, the readiness to die for one's country the sum of all bravery? Is there no call for heroic emotions and patriotic self-sacrifice in a state of peace? Is not a patient and faithful struggle for the truth against the fanaticism of prejudice, and for justice against arrogant power, as brave a feat as the storming of a battery? And is not that civic virtue more rare than the physical courage of the soldier, and, on the whole, more needful to the republic? On the other hand, while war calls forth demonstrations of heroic spirit, does it not also stimulate the baser passions of a larger number? Have we ever heard of a war which, whatever great objects it may otherwise have served, improved private or public morals or stimulated the cultivation of those quiet and unostentatious civic virtues which are most needful to the vitality of free government?

But we are told that there are things worse than war. No doubt. Loss of honor and self-respect, for instance. Surely we should not tamely accept a deliberate insult; but neither should we by offensive bluster provoke one. We should preserve our self-respect, but also respect the self-respect of others. We should not submit to manifest wrong, but we should not forget that others too have rights; and we must not see a wrong irremediable, except by war, in every difference of opinion or clash of interest. Whenever the question of redress or remedy is to be settled, we should not forget that "war is hell," and that a war honorably averted is a nobler achievement than a battle won.

But will not this horror of war at last make cringing cowards of us all? No danger of that. Whatever our love of peace, when the republic needs defenders, hundreds of thousands of her sons will eagerly rush to arms, and the people will pour forth their wealth without stint, no matter if "war is hell." Of this there will never be doubt. No peace feeling can emasculate our patriotism. The danger lies in the opposite direction. It is that the popular mind may too easily forget that war is justifiable only when all resources of statesmanship to avert it have been exhausted, and when the true value of the object to be accomplished through it outweighs the blood and loss of wealth and human misery and demoralization it will cost. This being the temper of a high-spirited people, so much more do the fiends who seek to drive the nation into unnecessary war by false reports or by unscrupulous appeals to prejudice and passion deserve to be execrated by all good men, and so much more gratitude is due to those in power who, firmly resisting the screams of a reckless demagogy, know no higher duty than to spare the people the scourge of war so long as the blessing of peace can honorably be preserved.

XXXII

ARBITRATION

"A LEAGUE OF PEACE"

BY

ANDREW CARNEGIE, LL.D.

LORD RECTOR OF ST. ANDREW'S UNIVERSITY

IF war be indeed, as both President Jordan and Mr. Schurz have urged upon us, an economic blunder as well as a crime, a costly folly at its best, and brutal murder at its worst, what chance is there that we may escape it wholly, that some day it may become, as slavery and darker nameless evils have become, a crudity of the barbaric past, the last outgrown relic of the ape-man, whose very existence depended on the fierceness of tooth and claw? We have all heard more or less doubtfully and dubiously of recent peace congresses, most of us with little hope of their achieving practical results. No busy man has read or heard all the eloquent speeches delivered at all the sessions of this kind. But let us take one only of these, the practical outlook of an eminently practical man. When recently the University of St. Andrew's in his native Scotland conferred on Mr. Carnegie the high honor of re-electing him its Rector, he chose the occasion of his inaugural, when he knew that all the world would be listening and intent, he chose that occasion to explain fully the practical outlook of what he hoped might be achieved toward universal peace. We deal here, therefore, with no vague theories, no flights of poetic fancy, but with earnest, simple truth. For all who would know what peace congresses really mean, the address is worth studying.

ARBITRATION

Principal and Students of St. Andrew's: My first words must be words of thanks, very grateful thanks, to those who have so kindly re-elected me their Rector without a contest. The honor is deeply appreciated, I assure you. There is one feature, at least, connected with your choice upon which I may venture to congratulate you, and also the university—the continuance of the services of my able and zealous assessor, Dr. Ross of Dunfermline, which I learn are highly valued.

My young constituents, you are busily preparing to play your parts in the drama of life, resolved, I trust, to oppose and attack what is evil, to defend and strengthen what is good, and, if possible, to leave your part of the world a little better than you found it. You are already pondering over the career you will pursue, what problems you will study, upon what, and how, your powers can be most profitably exerted; and apart from the choice of a career I trust you ask yourself what are the evils of this life, in which all our duties lie, which you should most strenuously endeavor to eradicate or at least to lessen,—what causes you will espouse, giving preference to these beyond all other public questions, for the student of St. Andrew's is expected to devote both time and labor to his duties as a citizen, whatever his professional career. You will find the world much better than your forefathers did. There is profound satisfaction in this, that all grows better; but there is still one evil in our day, so far exceeding any other in extent and effect, that I venture to bring it to your notice.

Polygamy and slavery have been abolished by civilized nations. Duelling no longer exists where English is spoken. The right of private war and of privateering have passed away. Many other beneficent abolitions have been made in various fields; but there still remains the foulest blot that has ever disgraced the earth, the killing of civilized men by men like wild beasts as a permissible mode of settling international disputes, although in Rousseau's words, "War is the foulest fiend ever vomited forth from the mouth of hell." As such, it has received from the earliest times, in each successive age till now, the fiercest denunciations of the holiest, wisest, and best of men.

Homer, about eight hundred and fifty years before Christ, tells us it is by no means fit for a man stained with blood and gore to pray to the gods, and that "Religious, social, and domestic ties alike he violates, who willingly would court the honors of internal strife." ("Illiad," IX., 63.)

He makes Zeus, the Cloud-Gatherer, look sternly at Ares, the God of War, saying: "Nay, thou renegade, sit not by me and whine. Most hateful art thou to me of all the gods that dwell in Olympus; thou ever lovest strife, and wars, and battles." ("Iliad," V., line 891.)

Euripides, 480–406 B.C., cries: "Hapless mortals, why do ye get your spears and deal out death to fellow-men? Stay! from such work forbear!" . . . "Oh fools all ye who try to win the meed of valor through war, seeking thus to still this mortal coil, for, if bloody contests are to decide, strife will never cease!"

Thucydides, who wrote his great work sometime between 423 B.C. and 403 B.C., asserts that "Wars spring from unseen and generally insignificant causes, the first outbreak being often but an explosion of anger." And he gives us the needed lesson for our day which should be accepted as an axiom: "It is wicked to proceed against him as a wrongdoer who is ready to refer the question to arbitration." Aristides praised Pericles, because, to avoid war, "he is willing to accept arbitration."

Andocides, about 440–388 B.C., says: "Then this is the distinction, Athenians, which I draw between the two: peace means security for the people, war inevitable downfall."

Isocrates, 436–338 B.C., teaches that "Peace should be made with all mankind. It should be our care not only to make peace, but to maintain it. But this will never be until we are persuaded that quiet is better than disturbance, justice than injustice, the care of our own than grasping at what belongs to others." ("Oration on Peace.")

The sacred books of the east make peace their chief concern. "Thus does he (Buddha) live as a binder together of those who are divided, an encourager of those who are friends, a peacemaker, a lover of peace, impassioned for peace, a speaker of words that make for peace." ("Buddhist Suttas," fifth century B.C.) "Now, wherein is his conduct good? Herein, that putting away the murder of that which lives, he abstains from destroying life. The cudgel and the sword he lays aside, and, full of modesty and pity, he is compassionate and kind to all creatures that have life." ("Buddhist Suttas.")

"Truly is the King our sovereign Lord! He has regulated the position of the princes; he has called in shields and spears; he has returned to their cases bows and arrows." ("The Shik King," Decade I., Ode 10.)

Many hundred years before Christ the Zendavesta pronounces "Opposition to peace is a sin."

The Buddhist commandment, six hundred years before our era, is "Love all mankind equally."

"To those of a noble disposition, the whole world is but one family," says the Hindu.

Coming to the Romans, Cicero (106–43 B.C.) says: "War should only be undertaken by a highly civilized state to preserve either its religion or its existence." "There are two ways of ending a dispute—discussion and force: the latter manner is simply that of the brute beasts; the former is proper to beings gifted with reason." He also reminds the Senate, "For in this assembly, before the matter was decided, I said many things in favor of peace, and even while war was going on I retained the same opinions, even at the risk of my own life." No better proof of the true patriot and leader can be given than this—a lesson much needed in our day.

Sallust (86–34 B.C.) recounts: "But after the Senate learned of the war between them, three young men were chosen to go out to Africa to both Kings, and in the words of the Senate, and of the people, announce to them that it was their will and advice that they lay down their arms and 'settle their disputes by arbitration rather than by the sword; since to act thus would be to the honor both of the Romans and themselves.'" ("Jugurtha," XXI., 4.)

Virgil (70–19 B.C.) laments that "The love of arms and the mad wickedness of war are raging. . . . As for me, just come from war and reeking with fresh slaughter, it would be criminal for me to touch the gods till I shall have washed the pollution in the running stream."

From Seneca (4 B.C.–65 A.D.) we have this outburst: "We punish murders and massacres among private persons; what do we respecting wars, and the glorious crime of murdering whole nations?" . . . "The love of a conquest is a murderess. Conquerers are scourges not less harmful to humanity than floods and earthquakes."

Tacitus shrewdly observes: "To be sure every wicked man has the greatest power in stirring up tumult and discord; peace and quiet need the qualities of good men." ("Historiæ," IV., I.) This is why the demagogue comes to the surface, to inflame the passions of the multitude, that he may ride to power upon them. Beware of the man who leads you into war.

Josephus, born only thirty-eight years after Christ, writes: "David said, 'I was willing to build God a temple myself, but he prohibited me, because I was polluted with blood and wars.'"

Plutarch, born 46 A.D., holds that "There is no war among men not born of wickedness; some are aroused by desire of pleasures, others by too great eagerness for influence and power."

Such are a few examples from the testimony of the ancients.

I now solicit your attention to the views held and expressed by the early Christian fathers, which cannot but be of special importance to such of you as are theological students.

Justin Martyr, who died about 165 A.D., proclaims: "That the prophecy is fulfilled we have good reason to believe, for we (Christians), who in the past killed one another, do not now fight our enemies."

St. Irenæus, about 140–202 A.D., boasts that "The Christians have changed their swords and their lances into instruments of peace, and they know not how to fight."

Clement of Alexandria, whose works were composed in the end of the second century and beginning of the third, writes: "The followers of Christ use none of the implements of war."

Tertullian, about 150–230 A.D., asks: "How shall a Christian go to war, how shall he carry arms in time of peace, when the Lord has forbidden the sword to us? . . . Jesus Christ, in disarming St. Peter, disarmed all soldiers." ("De Idololatr.," 19.) "The military oath and the baptismal vow are inconsistent with each other, the one being the sign of Christ, the other of the Devil." . . . "Shall it be held lawful to make an occupation of the sword, when the Lord proclaims that he who uses the sword shall perish by the sword?"

Origen, 185–254 A.D., says: "The angels wonder that peace is come through Jesus to earth, for it is a place ridden with wars." "This is called peace, where none is at variance, nothing is out of harmony, where there is nothing hostile, nothing barbarian." "For no longer do we (Christians) take arms against any race, or learn to wage war, inasmuch as we have been made sons of peace through Jesus, whom we follow as our leader." ("Patrologia Græca," XIV., pp. 46, 988, 1231.)

St. Cyprian, about 200–257 A.D., boasts that "Christians do not in turn assail their assailants, since it is not lawful for the innocent even to kill the guilty; but they readily deliver up their lives and blood." (Epistle 56, to Cornelius, section 2.)

Arnobius, who wrote about 295 A.D., says: "Certainly, if all who look upon themselves as men would listen a while unto Christ's wholesome and peaceable decrees, the whole world long ago, turning the use of iron to milder works, should have lived in most quiet tranquillity, and have met together in a firm and indissoluble league of most safe concord." ("Adversus Gentes," Lib. I., page 6.)

Lactantius, who wrote in the beginning of the fourth century, insists that "It can never be lawful for a righteous man to go to war, for his warfare is unrighteous itself." "It is not murder that God rebukes; the civil laws punish that. God's prohibition is intended for those acts which men considered lawful. Therefore it is not permitted for a Christian to bear arms; justice is his armor. The divine command admits no exceptions; man is sacred and it is always a crime to take his life." ("Div. Inst.," VI., 20.) Thus does he declaim against men-slayers: "This, then, is your road to immortality. To destroy cities, devastate territories, exterminate or enslave free peoples! The more you have ruined, robbed, and murdered men, the more you think yourselves noble and illustrious." ("Div. Inst.," I., 48.)

Athanasius, 296–373 A.D., states that when people "hear the teaching of Christ, straightway instead of fighting they turn to husbandry, and instead of arming their hands with weapons they raise them in prayer." ("Incarnation of the Word," section 52.)

St. Gregory of Nyssa, 335–395 A.D., preaches that "He who promises you profit, if you abstain from the ills of war, bestows on you two gifts—one the remission from the train of evils attendant on the strife, the other the strife itself." ("Patrologia Græca," XLIV., p. 1282.)

St. Augustine, 354–430 A.D., declares that "Not to keep peace is to spurn Christ." ("Migne's Patrologia Latina," XXXIII., p. 186.) He holds that "defensive wars are the only just and lawful ones; it is in these alone that the soldier may be allowed to kill, when he cannot otherwise protect his city and his brethren." (Letter 47.)

Isidore of Pelusium, 370–450 A.D., is no less outspoken: "I say, although the slaughter of enemies in war may seem legitimate, although the columns to the victors are erected, telling of their illustrious crimes, yet if account be taken of the undeniable and supreme brotherhood of man, not even these are free from evil." ("Patrologia Græca," LXXVIII., p. 1287.)

We have also the undisputed historical record of Maximilian, the centurion, who, having embraced Christianity, resigned his position and refused to fight. For this he was put to death.

Celsus, the great opponent of Christianity, who wrote about 176 A.D., reproaches the Christians for refusing to bear arms, and states that in one part of the Roman army, including one-third of the whole, "Not a Christian could be found."

Martin replied to Julian the Apostate, "I am a Christian, and I cannot fight."

If we turn to the Popes, who were then supreme:

St. Gregory the Great, 540–604 A.D., writes the King of the Lombards, "By choosing peace you have shown yourself a lover of God, who is its author."

Pope Innocent III., to the King of France, in protest against the wars between Philip Augustus and Richard of England, writes: "At the moment when Jesus Christ is about to complete the mystery of redemption, He gives peace as a heritage to His disciples; He wills that they observe it among themselves and make it observed by others. What He says at His death, He confirms after His resurrection. 'Peace be with you.' These are the first words which He addressed to His Apostles. Peace is the expression of that love which is the fulfilling of the law. What is more contrary to love than the quarrels of men? Born of hate, they destroy every bond of affection; and shall he who loves not his neighbor love God?"

Erasmus declares: "If there is in the affairs of mortal men any one thing which it is proper to explode, and incumbent upon every man by every lawful means to avoid, to deprecate, to oppose, that one thing is doubtless war."

Luther declares: "Cannons and firearms are cruel and damnable machines. I believe them to have been the direct suggestion of the devil. If Adam had seen in vision the horrible instruments his children were to invent, he would have died of grief."

Nothing can be clearer than that the leaders of Christianity immediately succeeding Christ, from whom authentic expressions of doctrines have come down to us, were well assured that their Master had forbidden to the Christian the killing of men in war or enlisting in the legions. One of the chief differences which separated Roman non-Christians and Christians was the refusal of the latter to enlist in the legions and be thus bound to kill their fellows in war as directed. We may well ponder over the change, and wonder that Christian priests accompany the armies of our day, and even dare to approach the Unknown, beseeching his protection and favor for soldiers in their heinous work. When the warring hosts are Christian nations, worshipping the one God, which, alas, is not seldom, as in the last gigantic orgy of human slaughter in Europe, we had the spectacle of the rival priests, praying in the name of the Prince of Peace, to the God of Battles for favor. Similar prayers were offered in the churches, where in some instances battleflags, the emblems of carnage, were displayed. Future ages are to pronounce all this blasphemous. There are those of to-day who deplore it deeply. Even the pagan, before Christ, direct from human butchery, refrained from appealing to his gods without first cleansing himself of the accruing pollution.

It is a truism that the doctrines of all founders of religions have undergone modifications in practice, but it is strange indeed that the doctrine of Christ regarding war and warriors, as held by his immediate followers, should have been so completely discarded and reversed in the later centuries, and is so still.

Bentham's words cannot be overlooked: "Nothing can be worse than the general feeling on the subject of war. The church, the state, the ruling few, the subject man, all seem in this case to have combined to patronize vice and crime in their widest sphere of evil. Dress a man in particular garments, call him by a particular name, and he shall have authority, on divers occasions, to commit every species of offence—to pillage, to murder, to destroy human felicity; and for so doing he shall be rewarded. The period will surely arrive when better instructed generations will require all the evidence of history to credit that, in times deeming themselves enlightened, human beings should have been honored with public approval in the very proportion of the misery they caused."

Bacon's words come to mind: "I am of opinion that, except you bray Christianity in a mortar and mould it into new paste, there is no possibility of a holy war."

Apparently in no field of its work in our times does the Christian church throughout the whole world, with outstanding individual exceptions of course, so conspicuously fail as in its attitude to war—judged by the standard maintained by the early Christian fathers nearest in time to Christ. Its silence when outspoken speech might avert war, its silence during war's sway, its failure even during calm days of peace to proclaim the true Christian doctrine regarding the killing of men made in God's image, and the prostitution of its holy offices to unholy warlike ends, give point to the recent arraignment of Prime Minister Balfour, who declared that the church to-day busies itself with questions which do not weigh even as dust in the balance compared with the vital problems with which it is called upon to deal.

Volumes could be filled with the denunciations of war by the great moderns. Only a few can be given.

Lord Clarendon, 1608–1674, says: "We cannot make a more lively representation and emblem to ourselves of hell than by the view of a kingdom in war."

Hume says: "The rage and violence of public war, what is it but a suspension of justice among the warring parties?"

Gibbon writes: "A single robber or a few associates are branded with their genuine name; but the exploits of a numerous band assume the character of lawful and honorable war."

"In every battlefield we see an inglorious arena of human degradation," says Conway.

A strong voice from a St. Andrew's principal is heard. Sir David Brewster, 1781–1868, says: "Nothing in the history of the species appears more inexplicable than that war, the child of barbarism, should exist in an age enlightened and civilized. But it is more inexplicable still that war should exist where Christianity has for nearly two thousand years been shedding its gentle light, and should be defended by arguments drawn from the Scriptures themselves."

One of the greatest American secretaries of state, Col. John Hay, who has lately passed away, denounced war as "the most futile and ferocious of human follies."

Much has man accomplished in his upward march from savagery. Much that was evil and disgraceful has been banished from life; but the indelible mark of war still remains to stain the earth and discredit our claim to civilization. After all our progress, human slaughter is still with us; but I ask your attention for a few minutes to many bright rays, piercing the dark cloud, which encourage us. Consider for a moment what war was in days past. It knew no laws, had no restrictions. Poison and assassination of opposing rulers and generals arranged by private bargain, and deceptive agreements, were legitimate weapons. Prisoners were massacred or enslaved. No quarter was given. Enemies were tortured and mutilated.

Women, children, and non-combatants were not spared. Wells were poisoned. Private property was not respected. Pillage was the rule. Privateering and private war were allowed. Neutral rights at sea were almost unknown.

Permit me briefly to trace the history of the reforms in war which have been achieved, from which we draw encouragement to labor for its abolition, strong in the faith that the days of man-slaying are numbered.

The first action against the savage custom of war is found in the rules of the Amphictyonic Council of the Greeks, some three hundred years before Christ. Hellenes were "to quarrel as those who intend some day to be reconciled." They were to "use friendly correction, and not to devastate Hellas or burn houses, or think that the whole population of a city, men, women, and children, were equally their enemies and therefore to be destroyed."

We owe chiefly to Grotius the modern movement to subject hitherto lawless war on land and sea to the humane restraints of law. His first book, "Mare Liberum," appeared in 1609. It soon attracted such attention that Britain had to employ her greatest legal authority, Lord Selden, to make reply. Up to this time Spain, Portugal, and Britain had maintained that the surrounding seas were closed to all countries except those upon their shores, a doctrine not formally abandoned by Britain until 1803.

Grotius's second and epoch-making work, "The Rights of War and Peace," appeared in 1625, and immediately arrested the attention of Gustavus Adolphus, the greatest warrior of his time. A copy was found in his tent when he died on the field of Lützen. He stood constantly for mercy, even in those barbarous days. Three years after its appearance, Cardinal Richelieu, to the amazement of Europe, spared the Huguenot garrison and protected the city of Rochelle, when he was expected to follow the usual practice of massacring the defenders and giving the town and inhabitants over to massacre and pillage. It was then holy work to slay heretics, sparing not one. He was denounced for this merciful act by his own party and hailed as "Cardinal of Satan" and "Pope of the Atheists."

The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, three years after the death of Grotius, closed the Thirty Years' War in Germany, the Eighty Years' War in the Netherlands, and a long era of savagery in many parts of the globe. It shows clearly the influence of Grotius's advanced ideas, being founded upon his doctrine of the essential independence and equality of all sovereign states, and the laws of justice and mercy. In the progress of man from war lawless and savage, to war restricted and obedient to international law, no name is entitled to rank with his. He is the father of modern international law, so far as it deals with the rights of peace and war. He has had several eminent successors, especially Puffendorf, Bynkershoek, and Vattel. These four are called by Phillimore "The Umpires of International Disputes." They are followed closely by a second quartette, the British judge—Stowell, and the American judges—Marshall, Story, and Field.

International law is unique in one respect. It has no material force behind it. It is a proof of the supreme force of gentleness—the irresistible pressure and final triumph of what is just and merciful. To the few who have contributed conspicuously to its growth in the past, and to those laboring therein to-day, civilization owes an unpayable debt. Private individuals have created it, and yet the nations have been glad to accept. British judges have repeatedly declared that "International law is in full force in Britain." It is so in America and other countries. We have in this self-created, self-developing, and self-forcing agency one of the two most powerful and beneficial instruments for the peace and progress of the world.

The most important recent reforms effected in the laws of war are those of the Treaty of Paris (1856), the Treaty of Washington (1871), which settled the Alabama claims, and the Brussels Declaration of 1874.

The Treaty of Paris marks an era as having enshrined certain principles. First, it abolished privateering. Henceforth, war on the sea is confined to national warships, organized and manned by officers and men in the service of the state. Commerce is no longer subject to attack by private adventurers seeking spoil. Second, it ruled that a blockade to be recognized must be effective. Third, it established the doctrine that an enemy's goods in a neutral ship are free, except contraband. These are great steps forward.

America declined to accept the first (in which, however, she has now concurred) unless private property was totally exempt on sea as on land, for which she has long contended, and which the powers, except Britain, have generally favored. So strongly has the current set recently in its favor that hopes are entertained that the forthcoming conference at The Hague may reach this desirable result. It is the final important advance in this direction that remains to be made, and means that peaceful commerce has been rescued from the demon war. Should it be made, the trenchers of St. Andrew's students may well whirl in the air with cheers.

The Treaty of Washington is probably to rank in history as Mr. Gladstone's greatest service, because it settled by arbitration the Alabama claims, a question fraught with danger and which, if left open, would probably have driven apart and kept hostile to each other for a long period the two branches of the English-speaking race. A statesman less powerful with the great masses of his countrymen could not have carried the healing measure, for much had to be conceded by Britain, for which it deserves infinite credit. Three propositions were insisted upon by America as a basis for arbitration, and although all were reasonable and should have been part of international law, still they were not. Their fairness being recognized, Mr. Gladstone boldly and magnanimously agreed that the arbiters should be guided by them. These defined very clearly the duties of neutrals respecting the fitting out of ships of war in their ports, or the use of their ports as a naval base. This they must now use "due diligence" to prevent.

Morley says, in his Life of Gladstone: "The Treaty of Washington and the Geneva arbitration stand out as the most noble victory in the nineteenth century of the noble art of preventive diplomacy, and the most signal exhibition in their history of self-command in two of three chief democratic powers of the Western World."

The Brussels Convention met in 1874.

Even as late as the earlier half of last century the giving up of towns and their inhabitants to the fury of the troops which stormed them was permitted by the usages of war. Defending his conduct in Spain, Wellington says: "I believe it has always been understood that defenders of a fortress stormed have no right to quarter." After the storming of San Sebastian, as to plunder, he says: "It has fallen to my lot to take many towns by storm, and I am concerned to add that I never saw nor heard of one so taken by any troops that it was not plundered."

Shakespeare's description of the stormed city can never be forgotten:

> "The gates of mercy shall be all shut up,
> And the flushed soldier rough and hard
> In liberty of bloody hand shall range
> With conscience wide as hell."

This inhuman practice was formally abolished by the Brussels Declaration—that "a town taken by storm shall not be given up to the victorious troops to plunder." To-day to put a garrison to the sword would be breach of the law of quarter, as well as a violation of the Brussels Declaration. We may rest assured the civilized world has seen the last of that atrocity.

We look back from the pinnacle of our high civilization with surprise and horror to find that even in Wellington's time, scarcely one hundred years ago, such savagery was the rule; but so shall our descendants after a like interval look back from a still higher pinnacle upon our slaying of man in war as equally atrocious, equally unnecessary, and equally indefensible.

Let me summarize what has been gained so far in mitigating the atrocities of war in our march onward to the reign of peace. Non-combatants are now spared, women and children are no longer massacred, quarter is given, and prisoners are well cared for. Towns are not given over to pillage, private property on land is exempt, or if taken is paid or receipted for. Poisoned wells, assassination of rulers and commanders by private bargain, and deceptive agreements, are infamies of the past. On the sea, privateering has been abolished, neutral rights greatly extended and property protected, and the right of search narrowly restricted. So much is to be credited to the pacific power of international law. There is great cause for congratulation. If man has not been striking at the heart of the monster war, he has at least been busily engaged drawing some of its poisonous fangs.

Thus even throughout the savage reign of man-slaying we see the blessed law of evolution unceasingly at work performing its divine mission, making that which is better than what has been and ever leading us on toward perfection.

We have only touched the fringe of the crime so far, however, the essence of which is the slaughter of human beings, the failure to hold human life sacred, as the early Christians did.

One deplorable exception exists to the march of improvement. A new stain has recently crept into the rules of war as foul as any that war has been forced by public sentiment to discard. It is the growth of recent years. Gentilis, Grotius, and all the great publicists before Bynkershoek, dominated by the spirit of Roman law, by chivalry and long established practice, insist upon the necessity of a formal declaration of war, "that he be not taken unawares under friendly guise." Not until the beginning of the last century did the opposite view begin to find favor. To-day it is held that a formal declaration is not indispensable and that war may begin without it. Here is the only step backward to be met with in the steady progress of reforming the rules of war. It is no longer held to be contrary to these for a power to surprise and destroy while yet in friendly conference with its adversary, endeavoring to effect a peaceful settlement. It belongs to the infernal armory of assassins hired to kill or poison opposing generals, of forged despatches, poisoned wells, agreements made to be broken, and all the diabolic weapons which, for very shame, men have been forced to abandon as too infamous even for the trade of man-slaying. It proclaims that any party to a dispute can first in his right hand carry gentle peace, sitting in friendly conference, ostensibly engaged in finding a peaceful solution of differences, while with the left he grasps, concealed, the assassin's dagger. The parallel between duel and war runs very close through history. The challenger to a duel gave the other party notice. In 1187, the German Diet at Nuremberg enacted: "We decree and enact by this edict that he who intends to damage another or to injure him shall give him notice three days before." It is to be hoped that the coming conference will stamp this treachery as contrary to the rules of war, and thus return to the ancient and more chivalrous idea of attack only after notice.

We come now to the consideration of the other commanding force in the campaign against war—peaceful arbitration.

The originator of the world-wide arbitration idea was Emeric Cruce, born at Paris about 1590. Of his small book of two hundred and twenty-six pages upon the subject only one copy exists. Gerloius had propounded the idea in the twelfth century, but it failed to attract attention. Balch says: "Cruce presented what was probably the first real proposal of substituting international arbitration for war as the court of last resort of nations." It has a quaint preface: "This book would gladly make the tour of the inhabited world so as to be seen by all the kings, and it would not fear any disgrace, having truth for its escort and the merit of its subject, which must serve as letters of recommendation and credit."

Henry IV., in 1603, produced his scheme for consolidating Europe in order to abolish war; but as its fundamental idea was armed force and involved the overthrow of the Hapsburgs, it can not be considered as in the line with the system of peaceful arbitration.

St. Pierre, the Duc de Lorraine, William Penn, the Quaker founder of Pennsylvania, Bentham, Kant, Mill, and others have labored to substitute the reign of law for war by producing schemes much alike in character, so that we have many proofs of the irrepressible longing of man for release from the scourge.

I beg now to direct your attention to the most fruitful of all conferences that have ever taken place. Other conferences have been held, but always at the end of war, and their first duty was to restore peace between the belligerents. The Hague Conference was the first ever called to discuss the means of establishing peace without reference to any particular war.

Twenty-six nations were represented, including all the leading powers.

The Conference was called by the present Emperor of Russia, August 24, 1898, and is destined to be forever memorable from having realized Cruce's ideal, and given to the world its first permanent court for the settlement of international disputes. The last century is in future ages to remain famous as having given birth to this high court of humanity. The conference opened upon the birthday of the Emperor, May 18, 1899. The day may yet become one of the world's holidays in the coming day of peace, as that upon which humanity took one of its longest and highest steps in its history, onward and upward. As Ambassador White says, "The Conference marks the first stage in the abolition of the scourge of war." Such an achievement was scarcely expected, even by the most sanguine. Its accomplishment surprised most of the members of the Conference themselves; but so deeply and generally had they been appalled by the ravages of war, and its enormous cost, by its inevitable progeny of future wars, and above all by its failure to ensure lasting peace, that the idea of a world-court captivated the assembly, which has been pronounced the most distinguished that ever met. A less sweeping proposal would probably not have touched their imagination and aroused their enthusiasm. The prompt acceptance of the international court by public sentiment in all countries was no less surprising. Every one of the powers represented promptly ratified the treaty, the United States Senate voting unanimously—a rare event. We may justly accept this far-reaching and rapid success as evidence of a deep, general, and earnest desire in all lands to depose war and enthrone peace through the judicial settlement of disputes by courts.

At last there is no excuse for war. A tribunal is now at hand to judge wisely and deliver righteous judgment between nations. It has made an auspicious start. A number of disputes have already been settled by it. First, it settled a difference between the United States and Mexico. Then President Roosevelt, when asked to act as arbiter, nobly led Britain, Germany, France, Italy, America, and Venezuela to it for settlement of their differences.

Britain had recently a narrow escape from war with Russia, arising from the unfortunate incident upon the Dogger Bank, when fishing boats were struck by shots from Russian warships. There was intense excitement. The Hague Treaty provides that when such difficulties arise international commissions of inquiry be formed. This was the course pursued by two governments, parties to the treaty, which happily preserved the peace.

It was under another provision of the Hague Conference that the President of the United States addressed his recent note to Japan and Russia suggesting a conference looking to peace, and offering his services to bring it about. His success was thus made possible by the Hague Treaty. The world is fast awakening to its far-reaching consequences and to the fact that the greatest advance man has ever made by one act is the creation of a world-court to settle international disputes.

As I write, report comes that to-morrow the august tribunal is to begin hearing France and Britain upon their differences regarding Muscat. There sits the divinest conclave that ever graced the earth, judged by its mission, which is the fulfilment of the prophecy, "Men shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

Thus the world-court goes marching on, to the dethronement of savage war and the enthronement of peaceful arbitration.

The Hague tribunal has nothing compulsory about it; all members are left in perfect freedom as to whether they submit questions to it or not. This has sometimes been regarded as its weakness, but it is, from another point of view, its strongest feature. Like international law, it depends upon its merits to win its way, and, as we have seen, it is succeeding; but so anxious are many to hasten the abolition of war that suggestions are made toward obtaining the consent of the powers to agree to submit to it certain classes of questions. In this it may be well to make haste slowly and refrain from exerting pressure. This will all come in good time. Peace wins her way not by force; her appeal is to the reason and the conscience of man.

In all treaties hitherto the great powers have retained power to withhold submission of questions affecting "their honor or vital interests." This was only natural at first, and time is required gradually to widen the range of subjects to be submitted. The tendency to do this is evident, and it only needs patience to reach the desired end. The greatest step forward in this direction is that Denmark and the Netherlands and Chili and Argentina have just concluded treaties agreeing to submit to arbitration all disputes, making no exception whatever. To crown this noble work, the latter two have erected a statue to the Prince of Peace on the highest peak of the Andes, which marks the long-disputed boundary between them.

Another splendid advance in this direction has been made in the agreement to arbitrate all questions between Sweden and Norway. Questions affecting "independence, integrity, or vital interests" are excepted; but should any difference arise as to what to do, that question is to be submitted. In other words, either nation can claim that a question does so, and, if the Hague tribunal agrees, it is not arbitrated. But if the tribunal decides the difference does not concern the "independence, integrity, or vital interests of either country," then it is submitted to arbitration. This is certainly a step forward; and you will please note that intangible thing—"honor"—is omitted.

These nations are to be cordially congratulated on taking the initial step in this splendid advance. We grudge not the honor and glory that have fallen to them therefrom, though in our hearts we may feel that this might more appropriately have been the work of the race that abolished slavery, both branches participating, and also abolished the duel. What our race should now do is to follow the example set and conclude such a treaty, operative within the wide boundaries of English-speakers, empire and republic. Less than this were derogatory to our past as pioneers of progress. We cannot long permit these small nations to march in advance. We should at least get abreast of them.

We have noted that honor or vital interests have hitherto been excepted from submission by arbitration treaties. We exclaim, "Oh, Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name!"—but these are trifling compared with those committed in the name of "honor," the most dishonored word in our language. Never did man or nation dishonor another man or nation. This is impossible. All honor's wounds are self-inflicted. All stains upon honor come from within, never from without. Innocence seeks no revenge; there is nothing to be revenged—guilt can never be. Man or nation whose honor needs vindication beyond a statement of the truth, which puts calumny to shame, is to be pitied. Innocence rests with that, truth has a quiet breast, for the guiltless find that

> "So dear to Heaven is saintly Innocence,
> A thousand liveried angels lackey her
> To keep her from all sense of sin and shame."

Innocent honor, assailed, discards bloody revenge and seeks the halls of justice and of arbitration. It has been held in the past that, a man's honor assailed, vindication lay only through the sword. To-day it is sometimes still held that a nation's honor, assailed, can in like manner be vindicated only through war; but it is not open to a member of our race to hold this doctrine, for within its wide boundaries no dispute between men can be lawfully adjusted outside the courts of law. Instead of vindicating his honor, the English-speaking man who violated the law by seeking redress by personal violence would dishonor himself. Under our law, no wrong against man can be committed that justifies the crime of private vengeance after its commission.

The man of our race who holds that his country would be dishonored by agreeing to unrestricted arbitration forgets that according to this standard he is personally dishonored by doing that very thing. Individually he has become civilized, nationally he remains barbaric, refusing peaceful settlement and insisting upon national revenge—all for injured honor.

Which of us would not rejoice to have Britain and America share with Denmark and Holland, Chili and Argentina, the "dishonor" they have recently incurred, and esteem it a proud possession?

Nations are only aggregates of the individual. The parallel between war and the duel is complete; and as society within our race already relies upon courts of justice to protect its members from all wrongs, so shall the nations finally rely upon international courts.

Objection has been made that unreasonable, dishonoring, or baseless claims might be made under arbitration. That any member of the family of nations would present a claim wholly without basis, or that the court would not decide against it if made, is a danger purely hypothetical. The agreement between nations when made will undoubtedly be framed in accordance with the ideas of Grotius, and the independence and equality of all members and their existing territories recognized. These could not be assailed.

Three incidents have occurred since the court was organized which have caused much pain to the friends of peace throughout the world.

America refused the offer of the Filipinos to adjust their quarrel by arbitration. Britain refused the offer of the Transvaal Republic to arbitrate, although three of the court proposed by the republic were to be British judges, and the other two judges of Holland—the most remarkable offer ever made, highly creditable to the maker and a great tribute to British judges. Neither Russia nor Japan suggested submission to The Hague. Since the Hague court is the result of the Russian Emperor's initiative, this caused equal surprise and pain. The explanation has been suggested that peaceful conferences were being held when Japan attacked at Port Arthur without notice, rendering arbitration impossible.

We must recognize these discouraging incidents, but we have the consolation left us of believing that, had either of the three nations seen, at the beginning, the consequences of ignoring arbitration, as clearly as they did later, they would have accepted arbitration and had reason to congratulate themselves upon the award of the court, whatever it was. They will learn by experience. Notwithstanding these regrettable failures to refer disputes to the Hague court as peaceful umpire, we have abundant reason for satisfaction in the number of instances in which the court's award has already brought peace without the sacrifice of one human life—the victories which bring no tears.

Signs of action in favor of universal peace abound. Among these may be mentioned that the Inter-Parliamentary Union assembled at St. Louis in 1904 requested the governments of the world to send representatives to an international conference to consider: *First*, the questions for the consideration of which the Conference at the Hague expressed a wish that a future Conference be called. *Second*, the negotiation of arbitration treaties between the nations represented. *Third*, the advisability of establishing an international congress to be convened periodically for the discussion of international questions.

President Roosevelt invited the nations to call the Conference, but has recently deferred to the Emperor of Russia as the proper party to call the nations together again.

Should the proposed periodic congress be established, we shall have the germ of the council of nations, which is coming to keep the peace of the world, judging between nations, as the Supreme Court of the United States judges to-day between states embracing an area larger than Europe. It will be no novelty, but merely an extension of an agency already proved upon a smaller scale. As we dwell upon the rapid strides toward peace which man is making, the thought arises that there may be those now present who will live to see this world-council established, through which is sure to come in the course of time the banishment of man-slaying among civilized nations.

I hope my hearers will follow closely the proceedings of the Hague Conference, for upon its ever-extending sway largely depends the coming of the reign of peace. Its next meeting will be important, perhaps epoch-making. Its creation and speedy success prepare us for surprisingly rapid progress. Even the smallest further step taken in any peaceful direction would soon lead to succcessive steps thereafter. The tide has set in at last, and is flowing as never before for the principle of arbitration as against war.

So much for the temple of peace at The Hague. Permit me a few words upon arbitration in general.

The statesmen who first foresaw and proved the benefits of modern arbitration were Washington, Franklin, Hamilton, Jay, and Grenville.

As early as 1780 Franklin writes: "We make daily great improvements in Natural, there is one I wish to see in Moral, Philosophy—the discovery of a plan that would induce and oblige nations to settle their disputes without first cutting each other's throats." His wish was realized in the Jay Treaty of 1794, from which modern arbitration dates. It is noteworthy that this treaty was the child of our race, and that the most important questions which arbitration has settled so far have been those between its two branches.

It may surprise you to learn that from the date of the Jay Treaty, one hundred and eleven years ago, no less than five hundred and seventy-one international disputes have been settled by arbitration. Not in any case has an award been questioned or disregarded, except, I believe, in one case, where the arbiters misunderstood their powers. If in every ten of these differences so quietly adjusted without a wound there lurked one war, it follows that peaceful settlement has prevented fifty-seven wars—one every two years. More than this, had the fifty-seven wars, assumed as prevented by arbitration, developed, they would have sown the seeds of many future wars, for there is no such prolific mother of wars as war itself. Hate breeds hate, quarrel breeds quarrels, war breeds war—a hateful progeny. It is the poorest of all remedies. It poisons as it cures. No truer line was ever penned than this of Milton's, "For what can war but endless war still breed?"

No less than twenty-three international treaties of arbitration have been made within the past two years. The United States made ten with the principal powers, which only failed to be formally executed because the Senate, which shares with our Executive the treaty-making power to the extent that its approval is necessary, thought it advisable to change one word only—"treaty" for "agreement"—which proved unsatisfactory to the Executive. The vote of the Senate was almost unanimous, showing an overwhelming sentiment for arbitration. The internal difference will no doubt be adjusted.

You will judge from these facts how rapidly arbitration is spreading. Once tried, there is no backward step. It produces peace and leaves no bitterness. The parties to it become better friends than before; war makes them enemies.

Much has been written upon the fearful cost of war in our day, the ever-increasing blood tax of nations, which threatens soon to approach the point of exhaustion in several European lands. To-day France leads with an expenditure of £3 14s. and a debt of £31 3s. 8d. per head. Britain follows with an annual expenditure of £3 8s. 8d. and a debt of £18 10s. 5d. per head. Germany's expenditure is in great contrast—only £1 15s. 4d., not much more than one-third; her debt, £2 12s. 2d. not one-sixth that of Britain. Russia's expenditure is £1 14s. 6d., about the same as the German; her debt £5 9s. 9d. per head.

The military and naval expenditure of Britain is fully half of her total expenditure; that of the other great powers, though less, is rapidly increasing.

All the great national debts, with trifling exceptions—Britain's eight hundred millions, France's twelve hundred millions sterling—are the legacies of war.

This drain, with the economic loss of life added, is forcing itself upon the nations concerned as never before. It threatens soon to become dangerous unless the rapid increase of recent years be stopped; but it is to be feared that not till after the financial catastrophe occurs will nations devote themselves seriously to apply the cure.

The futility of war as a means of producing peace between nations has often been dwelt upon. It is really the most futile of all remedies, because it embitters contestants and sows the seeds of future struggles. Generations are sometimes required to eradicate the hostility engendered by one conflict. War sows dragons' teeth, and seldom gives to either party what it fought for. When it does, the spoil generally proves Dead Sea fruit. The terrible war just concluded is another case in point. Neither contestant obtained what he fought for, the reputed victor being most of all disappointed at last with the terms of peace. Had Japan, a very poor country, known that the result would be a debt of two hundred millions sterling loading her down, or had Russia known the result, differences would have been peacefully arbitrated. Such considerations find no place, however, in the fiery furnace of popular clamor; as little do those of cost or loss of life. Only if the moral wrong, the sin in itself, of man-slaying is brought home to the conscience of the masses may we hope speedily to banish war. There will, we fear, always be demagogues in our day to inflame their brutal passions and urge men to fight, as a point of honor and patriotism, scouting arbitration as a cowardly refuge. All thoughts of cost or loss of human life vanish when the brute in man, thus aroused, gains sway.

It is the crime of destroying human life by war and the duty to offer or accept peaceful arbitration as a substitute which need to be established, and which, as we think, those of the church, the universities, and of the professions are called upon to strongly emphasize.

If the principal European nations were not free through conscription from the problem which now disturbs the military authorities of Britain, the lack of sufficient numbers willing to enter the man-slaying profession, we should soon hear the demand formulated for a league of peace among the nations. The subject of war can never be studied without recalling this simplest of all modes for its abolition. Five nations co-operated in quelling the recent Chinese disorders and rescuing their representatives in Pekin. It is perfectly clear that these five nations could banish war. Suppose even three of them formed a league of peace—inviting all other nations to join—and agreed that since war in any part of the civilized world affects all nations, and often seriously, no nation shall go to war, but shall refer international disputes to the Hague Conference or other arbitral body for peaceful settlement, the league agreeing to declare non-intercourse with any nation refusing compliance. Imagine a nation cut off to-day from the world. The league also might reserve to itself the right, where non-intercourse is likely to fail or has failed to prevent war, to use the necessary force to maintain peace, each member of the league agreeing to provide the needed forces, or money in lieu thereof, in proportion to her population or wealth. Being experimental and upon trial, it might be deemed advisable, if necessary, at first to agree that any member could withdraw after giving five years' notice, and that the league should dissolve five years after a majority vote of all the members. Further provisions, and perhaps some adaptations, would be found requisite, but the main idea is here.

The Emperor of Russia called the Hague Conference, which gave us an international tribunal. Were King Edward or the Emperor of Germany or the President of France, acting for their governments, to invite the nations to send representatives to consider the wisdom of forming such a league, the invitation would no doubt be responded to and probably prove successful.

The number that would gladly join such a league would be great, for the smaller nations would welcome the opportunity.

The relations between Britain, France, and the United States to-day are so close, their aims so similar, their territories and fields of operation so clearly defined and so different, that these powers might properly unite in inviting other nations to consider the question of such a league as has been sketched. It is a subject well worthy the attention of their rulers, for of all the modes of hastening the end of war this appears the easiest and the best. We have no reason to doubt that arbitration in its present optional form will continue its rapid progress, and that it in itself contains the elements required finally to lead us to peace, for it conquers wherever it is tried; but it is none the less gratifying to know that there is in reserve a drastic mode of enforcement, if needed, which would promptly banish war.

Notwithstanding all the cheering signs of the growth of arbitration, we should delude ourselves if we assumed that war is immediately to cease, for it is scarcely to be hoped that the future has not to witness more than one great holocaust of men to be offered up before the reign of peace blesses the earth. The scoria from the smouldering mass of the fiery past, the seeds that great wars have sown, may be expected to burst out at intervals more and more remote, until the poison of the past is exhausted. That there is to be perfect unbroken peace in our progress to this end we are not so unduly sanguine as to imagine. We are prepared for more than one outbreak of madness and folly in the future as in the past; but that peace is to come at last, and that sooner, much sooner, than the majority of my hearers can probably credit, I for one entertain not one particle of doubt.

We sometimes hear, in defence of war, that it develops the manly virtue of courage. This means only physical courage, which some animals and the lower order of savage men possess in the highest degree. According to this idea, the more man resembles the bulldog the higher he is developed as man. The Zulus, armed with spears, rush upon repeating rifles, not because unduly endowed with true courage, but because they lack common sense. One session or less at St. Andrew's University would cure them of their folly. In our scientific day, beyond any that has preceded, discretion is by far the better part of valor. Officers and men, brave to a fault, expose themselves needlessly and die for the country they would have better served by sheltering themselves and living for. Physical courage is far too common to be specially extolled. Japanese, Russian and Turk, Zulu and Achenese are all famous for it. It is often allied with moral cowardice. Hotspur is an ideal physical-courage hero when he exclaims—

"By heaven, methinks it were an easy leap,
To pluck bright honor from the pale-faced moon,
Or dive into the bottom of the deep,
Where fathom line could never touch the ground,
And pluck up drowned honor by the locks;
So that he that doth redeem her thence might wear
Without corrival all her dignities."

Vain peacock, unless he could reap the glory and strut bespangled with glittering decorations, he cared not to achieve. All for himself, nothing for the cause, nothing for his country.

Achilles, sulking in his tent, incensed upon the question of loot and praying the gods to defeat his own countrymen, is another example of a physically courageous military hero. Fortunately our modern military men are generally of a different type. It is not the individual who conforms to the standard of his age, but the bad standard of the age that is to be condemned. Men are to be judged only by the standard of their time, and though our standard of to-day may be low indeed, the men conforming to it are not to be decried.

If you would be lifted up and inspired by worshipping at the shrine of the much nobler and rarer virtue, moral courage, stand before the Martyrs' Monument yonder. The martyrs cared nothing for earthly glory and honor or reward; their duty was to stand for a noble cause, and for that, not for their own selfish exaltation, they marched through fire and fagot to death unflinchingly, chanting as they marched.

There is one very encouraging indication of progress within our race, as showing, it is to be hoped, the influence of education upon the masses in evolving clearer ideas of responsibility for their actions. The attention of Parliament was recently called to the difficulty of obtaining recruits for the army. The shortage of officers in the auxiliary forces (volunteers and militia) is no less than twenty-five per cent.—one-fourth of the whole. The militia has 32,000 men less than before. The regular army lacks 242 officers, and the British army for India is short 12,000 British recruits. The Government pronounces this "the most serious problem which confronts the military authorities." Some of the highest military authorities see the final remedy only in conscription. I rejoice to inform you that your kin beyond sea in America have on hand the very same problem for their navy. Their army, being so small, is not yet affected. All their warships cannot be manned—3,500 men are lacking. From this shortage of recruits we are justified in concluding that there is no longer a general desire in our race to enter the services. This is specially significant, as we are informed that increase of pay would not greatly increase recruiting, as recruits are obtained chiefly from a certain class. We hear of a like trouble in another profession, a scarcity of young, educated, conscientious men desirous of entering the ministry, thought to be owing to the theological tenets to which they are required to subscribe. Both branches of the church in Scotland have accordingly endeavored to meet this problem by substituting less objectionable terms.

Perhaps from the public library young men have taken Carlyle and read how he describes the artisans of Britain and France: "Thirty stand fronting thirty, each with a gun in his hand. Straightway the word 'fire' is given, and they blow the souls out of one another; and in place of sixty brisk, useful craftsmen, the world has sixty dead carcases, which it must bury and anew shed tears for. Had these men any quarrel? Busy as the devil is, not the smallest! They lived far enough apart, were the entirest strangers; nay, in so wide a universe there was even, unconsciously, by commerce, some mutual helpfulness between them. How then? Simpleton! Their governors had fallen out, and, instead of shooting one another, had the cunning to make these poor blockheads shoot."

Those who decline the advances of the decorated recruiting officer may have stumbled upon Professor MacMichael's address to the Peace Congress at Edinburgh, 1853, when he said: "The military profession is inconsistent with Christianity. The higher the rank and the greater the intellect, the more desperate the criminality. Here is a person upon whom God has conferred the rare gift of mathematical genius. If properly directed, what an abundant source of benefit to mankind! It might be employed in the construction of railways, by which the most distant parts of the world are brought into communication with each other. It might be employed in flashing the trembling lightning across the wires, making them the medium of intercourse between loving hearts thousands of miles apart; in increasing the wonderful powers of the steam engine, relieving man from his exhausting toils; in application to the printing press, sending light and knowledge to the farthest extremities of the earth. It might be employed in draining marshes, in supplying our towns and cities with water, and in adding to the health and happiness of men. It might lay down rules derived from the starry heavens, by which the mariner is guided through the wild wastes of waters in the darkest night. How noble is science when thus directed, but in the same proportion how debasing does it become when directed to human destruction! It is as if a chemist were to make use of his knowledge not to cure the diseases of which humanity is suffering, but to poison the springs of existence. The scientific soldier cultivates his endowments for what purpose? That he may determine the precise direction at which these batteries may vomit forth their fire so as to destroy most property and most lives; that he may calculate the precise angles and force with which these shells may be sent up into the air that they may fall upon that particular spot which is thronged with men, and, exploding there, send havoc among them. Great God! am I at liberty to devote my faculties to the infernal work?"

That is a voice from Dunfermline of weighty import. I found it recently and rejoiced that, when a child, I had often seen the man who wrote these words.

Wyclif's opinion may have arrested the young men's attention: "What honor falls to a knight that kills many men? The hangman killeth many more and with a better title. Better were it for men to be butchers of beasts than butchers of their brethren!"

Or John Wesley's wail may have struck deep in the hearts of some fit for recruits: "You may pour out your soul and bemoan the loss of true, genuine love in the earth. Lost indeed! These *Christian* kingdoms that are tearing out each other's bowels, desolating one another with fire and sword! These Christian armies that are sending each other by thousands, by tens of thousands, quick to hell!"

It may be from eminent soldiers that young men have received the most discouraging accounts of the profession. Napoleon declared it "the trade of barbarians." Wellington writes Lord Shaftesbury: "War is a most detestable thing. If you had seen but one day of war, you would pray God you might never see another." General Grant, offered a military review by the Duke of Cambridge, declined, saying he never wished to look upon a regiment of soldiers again. General Sherman writes he was "tired and sick of the war. Its glory is all moonshine. It is only those who have neither fired a shot, nor heard the shrieks and groans of the wounded, who cry aloud for more blood, more vengeance, more desolation. War is hell."

Perhaps some have pondered over Sir John Sinclair's opinion that "the profession of a soldier is a damnable profession."

The professional soldier is primarily required for purposes of aggression, it being clear that if there were none to attack, none to defend would be needed. The volunteer, who arms only to be better able to defend his home and country, occupies a very different position from the recruit who enlists unconditionally as a profession and binds himself to go forth and slay his fellows as directed. The defence of home and country may possibly become necessary, although no man living in Britain or America has ever seen invasion or is at all likely to see it. Still, the elements of patriotism and duty enter here. That it is every man's duty to defend home and country goes without saying. *We should never forget, however, that which makes it a holy duty to defend one's home and country also makes it a holy duty not to invade the country and home of others*, a truth which has not hitherto been kept in mind. The more's the pity, for in our time it is one incumbent upon the thoughtful, peace-loving man to remember. The professional career is an affair of hire and salary. No duty calls any man to adopt the naval or military profession and engage to go forth and kill other men when and where ordered, without reference to the right or wrong of the quarrel. It is a serious engagement involving, as we lookers-on see it, a complete surrender of the power most precious to man—the right of private judgment and appeal to conscience. Jay, the father of the first treaty between Britain and America, has not failed to point out that "our country, right or wrong, is rebellion against God and treason to the cause of civil and religious liberty, of justice and humanity."

Just in proportion as man becomes truly intelligent, we must expect him to realize more and more that he himself alone is responsible for his selection of an occupation, and that neither pope, priest, nor king can relieve him from this responsibility.

It was all very well for the untaught, illiterate hind, pressed into King Henry's service, to argue: "Now, if these men do not die well, it will be a black matter for the King that led them to it, whom to disobey were against all proportion of subjection." The schoolmaster has been abroad since then. The divine right of kings has gone. The mass of English-speaking men now make and unmake their kings, scout infallibility of power of pope or priest, and in extreme cases sometimes venture to argue a point even with their own minister. The "Judge within" begins to rule. Whether a young man decides to devote his powers to making of himself an efficient instrument for injuring or destroying, or for saving and serving his fellows, rests with himself to decide after serious consideration.

To meet the scarcity of officers, the Government stated that it was considering the policy of looking to the universities for the needed supply, and that steps might be taken to encourage the study of war with a view to enlistment; but if university students are so far advanced ethically as to decline pledging themselves to preach "creeds outworn"—rightfully most careful to heed the "Judge within," their own conscience—universities will probably be found poor recruiting ground for men required to pledge themselves to go forth and slay their fellow-men at another's bidding. The day of humiliation will have come upon universities when their graduates, upon whom have been spent years of careful education in all that is highest and best, find themselves at the end good for nothing better than "food for powder." I think I hear the response of the son of St. Andrew's to the recruiting officer, "Is thy servant a dog that he should do this thing?"

From one point of view, the scarcity of officers and recruits in Britain and America, where men are free to choose, and the refusal of university students to compromise themselves by pledges upon entering the ministry, are most cheering, evincing as they do a keener sense of personal responsibility, a stronger appeal to conscience—the "Judge within"—more tender and sympathetic natures, a higher standard of human action, and altogether a higher type of man.

If war requires a surrender of all these by its recruits, much better we should face the alternative and let Britain and America depend upon the patriotism of citizens to defend their countries if attacked, in which duty I for one strongly believe they will never be found inefficient. Colonel Henderson, in his "Science of War," states "that the American Volunteers were superior to the conscript levies of Europe—that the morale of conscript armies has always been their weakest point. The morale of the volunteer is of a higher type." This stands to reason.

Should Britain ever be invaded, the whole male population able to march would volunteer, and from many parts of the world thousands would rush to the defence of the old home. Those who invade the land of Shakespeare and Burns will find they have to face forces they never reckoned upon. The hearts and consciences of all would be in the work; and "Thrice is he armed who hath his quarrel just."

Students of St. Andrew's, my effort has been to give you a correct idea of the movement now stirring the world for the abolition of war, and what it has already accomplished. It never was so widespread or so vigorous, nor at any stage of the campaign have its triumphs been so numerous and important as those of the last few years, beginning with the Hague Conference, which in itself marks an epoch. The foundation stone of the structure to come was then laid. The absolute surrender by four nations of all future differences to arbitration, and Norway and Sweden's agreement, mark another stage. Thus the civilized world at last moves steadily to the reign of peace through arbitration.

The question has no doubt arisen in your minds, what is your duty and how can you best coöperate in this holy work and hasten the end of war? I advise you to adopt Washington's words as your own: "My first wish is to see this plague of mankind, war, banished from the earth." Leagues of peace might be formed over the world with these words as their motto and basis of action. How are we to realize this pious wish of Washington's? may be asked. Here is the answer. Whenever an international dispute arises, no matter what party is in power, demand at once that your Government offer to refer it to arbitration, and if necessary break with your party. Peace is above party. Should the adversary have forestalled your Government in offering arbitration, which for the sake of our race I trust will never occur, then insist upon its acceptance and listen to nothing until it is accepted. Drop all other public questions, concentrate your efforts upon the one question which carries in its bosom the issue of peace or of war. Lay aside your politics until this war issue is settled. This is the time to be effective. And what should the ministers of the churches be doing? Very different from what they have done in the past. They should cease to take shelter from the storm, hiding themselves in the recital of the usual formulas pertaining to a future life in which men in this life have no duties, when the nation is stirred upon one supreme moral issue, and its Government, asserting the right to sit in judgment upon its own cause, is on the brink of committing the nation to unholy war—for unholy it must be if peaceful settlement offered by an adversary be refused. Refusal to arbitrate makes war, even for a good cause, unholy; an offer to arbitrate lends dignity and importance to a poor one. Should all efforts fail, and your country, rejecting the appeal to judicial arbitration, plunge into war, your duty does not end. Calmly resolute in adherence to your convictions, stating them when called upon, though never violently intruding them, you await the result, which cannot fail to prove that those who stood for peaceful arbitration chose the right path and have been wise counsellors of their country. It is a melancholy fact that nations looking back have usually to confess that their wars have been blunders, which means they have been crimes.

And the women of the land, and the women students of St. Andrew's—what shall they do? Not wait as usual until war has begun, and then, their sympathies aroused, organize innumerable societies for making and sending necessaries and even luxuries to the front, or join Red Cross societies and go themselves to the field, nursing the wounded that these may the sooner be able to return to the ranks to wound others or be again wounded, or to kill or be killed. The tender chords of sympathy for the injured, which grace women, and are so easily stirred, are always to be cherished; but it may be suggested that were their united voices raised in stern opposition to war before it was declared, urging the offer of arbitration, or in earnest remonstrance against refusing it, one day of effort would then prove more effective than months of it after war has begun.

It is certain that if the good people of all parties and creeds, sinking for the time other political questions whenever the issue of war arises, were to demand arbitration, no government dare refuse. They have it in their power in every emergency to save their country from war and ensure unbroken peace.

If in every constituency there were organized an arbitration league, consisting of members who agree that arbitration of international disputes must be offered, or accepted by the government if offered by the adversary, pledging themselves to vote in support of, or in opposition to, political parties according to their action upon this question, it would be surprising how soon both parties would accept arbitration as a policy. I know of no work that would prove more fruitful for your country and for the world than this. It is by concentrating upon one issue that great causes are won.

In this holy work of insisting upon arbitration, surely we may expect the men and women of St. Andrew's, of all universities and other educational institutions, of all the churches and of all the professions to unite and take a prominent part. I quoted the words of Washington at the beginning of this appeal. Let me close by quoting the words of Lincoln. When a young man, employed upon a trading boat, he made a voyage of some weeks' duration upon the Mississippi. He visited a slave market, where men, women, and children were not slaughtered, as formerly in war, but were separated and sold from the auction block. His companion tells that after standing for some time Lincoln turned and walked silently away. Lifting his clenched hand, his first words were, "If ever I get a chance, I shall hit this accursed thing hard." Many years passed, during which he never failed to stand forth as the bitter foe of slavery and the champion of the slave. This was for him the paramount issue. He was true to his resolve throughout life, and in the course of events his time came at last. This poor, young, toiling boatman became President of the United States, and was privileged with a stroke of his pen to emancipate the slaves last remaining in the civilized world, four millions in number. He kept the faith, and gave the lesson for all of us in our day, who have still with us war in all its enormity, many of us more or less responsible for it, because we have not hitherto placed it above all other evils and concentrated our efforts sufficiently upon its extinction. Let us resolve like Lincoln, and select man-slaying as our foe, as he did man-selling. Let us, as he did, subordinate all other public questions to the one overshadowing question, and, as he did, stand forth upon all suitable occasions to champion the cause. Let us, like him, keep the faith, and as his time came, so to us our time will come, and, as it does, let us hit accursed war hard until we drive it from the civilized world, as he did slavery.

XXXIII

HISTORY

"VALUE OF HISTORY IN THE FORMATION OF CHARACTER"

BY

CAROLINE HAZARD

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IN view of the appeal to history made in support of their views by both President Jordan and Mr. Carnegie, the following address by Miss Hazard acquires special emphasis. Caroline Hazard, M.A., Litt.D., is one of the only two women holding the rank of president of a great college. Vassar, Smith, and Barnard have each of them male rulers. Hence President Hazard may well speak with authority as representing woman in the realms of higher education, and the value of a knowledge of history assumes under her urgency a peculiar force.

How dearly we all love a story! From the time a child can listen at all he rejoices in some simple tale. Over and over the same thing is demanded, with no variation allowed to the narrator; it must be just the same day after day, or something is lacking to the childish mind. And what is history but the tale of the world? The story of our race, "Geschichte" the Germans call it frankly, the story, the tale which includes all tales. It is strange that the word story has a double significance. It may be a true or a false story. Something has grown into the word of the diverse personalities of the tellers of tales. The story is told in part only by each narrator; one may contradict the other; one may present a false picture, a distorted report, and another the unvarnished truth. It is no wonder that many writers of history fell into disrepute, that fables and stories were supposed to constitute the whole of history. The tale depends so much upon the teller. Is he fair? Is he clear in his perceptions? Is he unbiassed in his judgments, having no theory to maintain, simply zealous for the truth? These are moral questions we ask, these are the questions which are more important to the value of historical work than any learning. "It was well noted by that worthy gentleman Sir Philip Sydney," says Raleigh, "that historians do borrow of poets, not only much of their ornament but somewhat of their substance."[1] And Lord Bacon defines the office of the historian. "It is," he says, "to represent the events themselves together with the counsels, and to leave the observations and conclusions thereupon to the liberty and faculty of every man's judgment."[2] Bacon thus throws the moral responsibility directly upon the readers, not the writers, of history.

But the old reproach, that historians wrote entirely from their own point of view, is rapidly passing away. One may be recommended to read Macaulay more for the style than for the history. But the method pursued in Guizot's "History of Civilization" has obtained a larger and larger following, and the modern historian, basing his work on actual documents and certified records, while he makes perhaps less brilliant reading, certainly gives a more unbiassed version of facts. More and more the science of history is developing, as people go to the sources and foundations rather than rely on tradition and picturesque statement. Great tendencies are coming to be looked for, more than isolated facts. History is no longer a list of names and an array of dates, but a series of living principles, a moral tendency running through events which are strung upon one main string like the beads on a rosary. More and more our historians are becoming profound moralists. This, indeed, is almost inevitable, for any deeper search into the facts of history is an inquiry into the meaning of things. The facts spring from the inner necessity of the time of their being, and the philosophical inquirer must look deeper than the surface appearance.

We have lately lost a very distinguished example of the teacher not only of history but of morals, and of the vital connection existing between the two. Eminent as were Mr. John Fiske's qualifications as a historian—painstaking and accurate in his research, brilliant and lucid in his presentation—it was yet his profound moral convictions which illuminated his work and gave it its great value. What a splendid monument he has left—beginning with the "Discovery of America," tracing the influence of "Old Virginia" and her neighbors, and the "Beginnings of New England," through the "American Revolution" and the "Critical Period of American History," taking in as a side-light the "Dutch Contribution to the Development of America," and finally ending with the "Growth of the Mississippi"—what a great and continuous work he has left! The very enumeration of the titles of his books shows the grasp that he had on the subject. But greater even than these are some of the books he wrote showing his profound appreciation of the destiny of man. It was this "Destiny of Man," viewed in the light of his origin, which enabled him to set forth these great world movements. It was his profound conviction of the worth of man's life which gave the work of man's life its supreme value in his eyes. Through Nature to God was his constant theme. His important philosophical books are brief, and the bulk of his philosophical writings not so great as his historical work, but its influence upon his day and generation has been most profound.

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[1] Raleigh, *The History of the World.*

[2] Bacon, *Advancement of Learning.*

I was in England at the time of his death, and was much interested to see the English comments. The great dailies, of course, had some adequate idea of his work, at least as far as the enumeration of the titles of his books. But one of the most appreciative of the notices was in a nonconformist weekly of large and influential circulation in Great Britain. This spoke of his "Destiny of Man" and of his work as a devout Darwinist with the greatest respect, dwelling upon him as a profound philosopher, and ending with some such sentence as this: "He is said to have written historical books, but we have not seen them." It made one smile to think what fame is in another country, because to us certainly the bulk of John Fiske's work is his historical work rather than his philosophical.

But the point I want to make is that the true historian must be a philosopher, and, if a philosopher, then an inquirer into moral tendencies, into the great drift and trend of national life. This principle must run through all the work of any genuine historian. We are a little in danger in this country of exalting our own history, which is after all local, of forgetting that we are part of the whole. Of course it is necessary to teach our young people American history, and the great events which have led to our being what we are. But we are only one link in the chain of events. We have only advanced freedom and liberty to its highest degree along the line which was prepared for us as early as the Reformation. To teach a child anything like the proper place of America in the history of the world seems to me one of the great tasks which our schools should try to fulfil. Of course this cannot be done quickly. The idea of continuity, however, is an idea which can be given at the very beginning of any historical study. We are too apt to take up the study of history in mosaic fashion, here a bit and there a bit, quite carefully worked over and prepared, but without any idea of how it fits together. The study of Roman history has become one of the requirements, lately, for entrance examinations, and it seems to me a most valuable addition to college-entrance requirements. Roman law, after all, is the foundation of all our jurisprudence, and though the real historian may say that in choosing Rome as a starting-point we are making an arbitrary choice, and that we should go back into the Far East and into the dim recesses of time, yet, after all, the Roman civilization is the first civilization of which we can have much definite knowledge, and, therefore, is a convenient and a safe starting-point for all subsequent historical work.

This is not the time to consider the relations of national character to national history. The history has grown out of the development of character, and character, conversely, has been moulded by the history of the nation. We think of Switzerland as a synonym for freedom, and the Swiss have been nurtured on the recital of the deeds of their forefathers. The Scottish people, too, with their devotion of loyalty, their keenness and shrewdness learned in many a border warfare and many a fight for a losing cause, are an example of what the history of their nation has made them. Who that hears "Bonnie Charlie" sung as it can be sung in Scotland, but is touched by that longing for the unattainable which is the blessing and the despair of the idealist?

> Will you no' come back again?
> Better lo'ed ye canna be,
> Will ye no' come back again?

The whole episode is summed up in a few verses of a song, perhaps the most potent result of that ill-starred attempt. For in this all the highest emotions of a patriot find play. It was the literal Prince Charlie to whom the people looked as their best good; it is now all devotion and loyalty to all good things that speaks in the touching refrain of a song universally beloved.

But the special theme for this evening is the "Relation of the Study of History to the Formation of Character," and it seems to me, in a country such as our own, with a population made up of diverse elements, where the force of tradition is of necessity limited—where, indeed, in many parts of the country we are making traditions, so far as civilization is concerned—that the study of history as a contribution to the formation of a sound and useful character is of the utmost importance. We are in danger of exalting the new unduly. There are countries bound by custom, where "as it was, is now, and ever shall be" is the height of man's ambition. Of Infinite Perfection alone can this be said, and in our haste for improvement we rush to the other extreme, often thinking that because a thing is new it must be better than what went before. Here historical study comes in as a corrective. Often we find the thing that we thought new only an old project under a slightly different aspect. As an instance of what I mean, I mention a paper of 1780, which in its own neighborhood had some effect in the agitation for the establishment of the gold standard in 1893 and 1894. All through the closing years of the eighteenth century Rhode Island was plunged in financial difficulties by the successive issues of paper money which it had no means of redeeming. The declaration to which I refer records on oath that a certain Colonel Segar made a tender of $2,100 to Mr. William Knowles, of South Kingstown, to discharge two bonds and a note, but that "Knowles refused to take the same, saying that he would not take such trash as that was, but if said Samuel Segar would pay him in the same sort of money the said Segar had of said Knowles, he would take it." With this declaration the paper money tendered in payment was found, the whole making an impressive lesson in the evils of an inflated currency. One is apt to exclaim with Solomon that there is no new thing under the sun, in spite of our eager quest, and to believe that the past, if duly searched, could always furnish analogies and precedents for the present. We must know the past as a guide to the future, for not only does the study of history give a firm foundation for growth, but it furnishes actual instances, full of helpful suggestion.

There is no virtue we need to cultivate more than that of patriotism. America is a fair new world, and she welcomes many sons. What does she do with them? We are learning to our bitter grief it is not enough to receive them, to give them free air to breathe; they must be trained. The seeds of oppression and wrong sown in Poland and Russia may bear their bitter fruit fostered by our genial sun. The whole nation has been stirred to its very heart to see that this is possible. Given light and air, we had fondly supposed that anarchy and revenge would hide their heads and quickly die. And they will; the forces of good are sure to win in the end; and the costly sacrifice which has been laid on the altar of freedom will hasten that end. But have we no responsibility? Should not the schools redouble their efforts? Should not the teachers of history especially draw lessons from the lives of patriots and leaders of the people which shall inspire a love of country, a pride in our native land, and a cheerful acquiescence in her laws? We are led by example rather than precept; and hero-worship is a safe channel for the youthful imagination. Cannot our best men be made to live again before the minds of school children to stimulate and incite them to the practice of their virtues?

You remember Browning's account of the chairs and tables his father piled together for the siege of Troy, set him atop for Priam,

> . . . called our cat
> Helen, enticed away from home he said
> By wicked Paris, who crouched somewhere close
> Under the footstool, being cowardly,
> But whom—since she was worth the pains, poor puss—
> Towzer and Tray, our dogs, the Atreidai, sought,
> By taking Troy to get possession of.
>
> This taught me who was who and what was what.
> So far I rightly understood the case
> At five years old; a huge delight it proved
> And still proves, thanks to that instructor sage,
> My father, who knew better than turn straight
> Learning's full flare on weak-eyed ignorance.

This, indeed, is the ideal method, to capture the young imagination, to give it noble and fine pictures to dwell upon, to lead the child's mind to the perception of truth and beauty. With the whole story of the world to choose from, there can hardly be any lack of material. A wise teacher must select and present to his scholars what arouses his own enthusiasm. One fine spirit can literally inspire many others.

And if patriotism can be inculcated by a study of history, no less so can personal honor. Who can say how great an effect the romances of Sir Walter Scott have had in holding up pure and true characters to admiration, and in exposing the futility as well as the evils of a career of duplicity and deceit? The modern historical novel, with its quicker movement and more terse style, fulfils its object in presenting a living picture of the time no better than the more leisurely tales of the great northern writer. Our own American historians have told their stories without the adventitious aids of romance, and yet have given us fascinating books, full of the deepest interest. The pages of Parkman need no embellishment of fiction to hold the closest attention. Scholarship and beauty of style are both exemplified by Motley, and John Fiske presents us one leader after another in clearly defined and exquisite portraiture. Surely from these storehouses our young people have treasures the value of which they have not fully appreciated; examples of right living and high thinking which should become part of the mental furniture of each scholar.

But to come to a more particular consideration of the effect of historical study upon character, I should say in the first place that it demands absolute accuracy. Even if historical study is pursued in the old dry-as-dust fashion, this mental habit must be fostered. There are still some people who regard long lists of the kings of England and a string of dates as being the sum of historical study. Partial as this view is, it has an element of truth, for the dates are pegs to hang our hats on—are very necessary for all subsequent and wider study. And learning them is good mental discipline. This accuracy lies at the foundation of character. Truth, exact truth, in so far as it can be learned, becomes the aim of the scholar. The accuracy which historical study teaches is of especial value in such a community as ours, where the ordinary forms of speech run to humorous exaggeration. Who has not seen a child puzzled by some fanciful speech of an older person, not knowing whether to take it seriously or not? Such surprising things are true, one cannot wonder that the youthful imagination will accept the wildest statements. We are as a people careless in our ordinary conversation, loving hyperbole and suggestion. This gives piquancy and flavor to our intercourse with each other, and is delightful as a play of fancy, giving a shining and pleasant surface to society, but there must be a depth of current underneath these sparkling waves of thought, or the shallows become painfully apparent. A sound and accurate basis of fact is the first and foremost contribution which historical study makes to the cultivated man.

To the accuracy which such study teaches, perseverance must be added. All study, no matter how delightful, has its drudgery. We must pursue for the sake of the end in view very often, not for the pleasure of the immediate moment. This is hard to make a child realize. He must simply do the work assigned him obediently, leaving the end to be gained out of sight; an end which his parents and teachers can appreciate, but which he cannot yet see. Accuracy and perseverance must enter into all study, but without them historical study is impossible. These two are certainly moral qualities most desirable to foster, most essential to the growth of a strong character. And with these two comes the use of the imagination. In childhood the imagination is particularly strong. A little child often has no idea of what we call truth. The external world has not yet become real. Its own thoughts, its own fancies, are quite as real to it. The distinction between "I did" and "I thought" does not yet exist. The external world takes hold slowly. This power of imagination which a child has can be trained and developed, and there are few better ways to do it than by historical reading. Here a basis is given for the play of the imagination. The child is not allowed to dissipate his fancies; there is some solid foundation; his thought, like a falcon, is held in leash and sent after its quarry.

These qualities of accuracy, perseverance, and proper control of the imagination all come into play at a little later period of historical work from that of which I have just been speaking, when a student is able to take up a problem for himself. It seems to me a most valuable thing to have a young student see for himself the sources of history. This can be done in most of our New England towns by an actual visit to the town record office. Dry and musty papers which are so dear to the heart of a historian may seem very prosaic and trivial to the young student; but give him a problem to work out, and let him find the real uses of the papers, and they quickly acquire a charm, and open the recesses of the past to him with an enchanter's wand. In one school I know distinct problems have been set in local history—as to the existence of slavery, for instance, in that particular township; an inquiry as to the methods of apprenticeship, or the export of certain crops could be made, of which records can be obtained in the office of the town clerk. The records that I am most familiar with are in the keeping of a town clerk elected to that office for many years, so that he has a personal pride and delight in the work. Nothing is more interesting to the young student than to be allowed to take down a volume of records of the eighteenth century kept in the fine clerical hand of the period, and under the legal phraseology and cumbersome repetition of names to discover the truth for which he is seeking. In this particular record office there are deeds of gift from Samuel Sewall to the town, and I never shall forget the delight with which the discovery was finally made of the actual site and the actual conditions under which the meeting-house lot was presented to the town.

In all such study the qualities which I have spoken of, unfailing accuracy never passing beyond the bounds of truth; steady perseverance to pursue the end sought; and then a trained imagination enabling the student from bare facts to reconstruct the past, to form some rational theory as to why the man who made the deed did so, what his motives must have been, and how the final act was accepted by his neighbors; all this involves and implies high capacity, and moral as well as intellectual power.

The traveller in foreign countries notices this pride of locality. What Scotchman will not tell you the story of a border warfare or some midnight raid? How the Rhine teems with legends and tales of barons and knights! How replete is the storied land of Italy with interest and tales that appeal to the imagination! Our own history, so far as it concerns the occupation of America by the Caucasian race, is brief, but it has its heroic episodes, and one of the great missions of the history teacher is to gather from this story. Unfortunately, where there is short continuity of family life, tradition, and legend, the penumbra of historic fact is sadly interrupted. It is this which gives poetry and charm to the life of a people. We, in New England, are far richer in this respect than any of our neighbors, with the possible exception of the Virginians. Here the bond to the old country is strongest; here the very names of our towns recall the counties of England: Gloucester, and Plymouth, and the west country names appear on our barren east shore. By no great stretch of the imagination we find our places in our English homes as well as in our homes of New England, and I would caution our teachers of local history to try to make this connection. Without this we are in danger of regarding ourselves too much from an isolated point of view; we become excrescences on the growth of the world rather than an integral part of it; an island set in the world's current, rather than a contributing stream. And in magnifying our own history let us not forget the general history of our country. While the Revolution was being fought on the eastern coast, a peaceful revolution was going on in the west, on the slopes of the Pacific, where the olive and the orange and the vine were being planted by pious hands, and a peaceful and mighty revolution in the old order of nature was taking place. When the Pilgrim fathers were landed in the East, already Spanish missionaries had penetrated beyond our present southern border, and were scattering the seeds of Spanish civilization in what was to be our great western country. A little later the French came down from the North, meeting the civilization creeping up the great river, the artery of the new world, so that from many and diverse sources our present civilization has grown. New England was an important factor in this, but it becomes us New Englanders to be modest and recognize the origin of the other streams which have poured their life blood into our present commonwealth.

In addition to the mental training to which the study of history should contribute, there are other great moral lessons which it should teach. First, I would mention that the study of history inculcates the rule of law. Any wise student of history cannot fail to bring out in bold relief the necessity and wisdom of submitting to law, and the inexorability of the law itself. Consequences follow unerringly upon the breaking of any of the great laws. Marie Antoinette was beheaded. This in itself is an isolated fact without special significance to the young student's mind. Let him inquire into the causes of this event; let him understand something of the condition of the French people before the Revolution—of their rights trampled upon, of the arrogant assumption of power by the nobles—and he will see that some such fact as this was the logical outcome of the conditions; that the great law of the sovereignty of the people must assert itself; that it could not be kept under. There have been triumphs of injustice, there have been times of terrible misrule, but the reign of law has been vindicated, the results of anarchy have been overthrown.

And in a country like ours reverence is another virtue which history teaches us, and which we are in especial need of learning.

We are apt to see the humorous side of things too clearly. The typical American hides his feelings under some light and flippant exclamation. We are hardly old enough yet to dare to be as reverent as we truly are. It takes poise and security of one's own position to be absolutely simple, for simplicity, far from being the simple thing that seems, often comes to us through complexity. It is history and historical study which should teach us reverence. For is not reverence at the foundation of all respect? To respect the right of others which lies at the foundation of all true democracy, one must have a reverent spirit, a spirit which can see and revere all that is good and right, though presented in very varying conditions, and with no adventitious aids of outward circumstances. "A man's a man for a' that" lies at the root of free institutions. In respect for the life of men, in reverence for the aims of the spirit of man, history is best qualified to instruct us. It is the life of the great men who have gone before us which is our greatest inspiration. Their life and their character still live in the world. We who have come after can only accept what is good in them with devout thankfulness, and try to imitate their virtues.

And the highest and best of all the teachings of history should be reverence for truth. Truth is so many-sided; she veils her face behind so many veils. But what can be more inspiring than the search for truth? As we see a little further, as we redouble our efforts to find her, do we not receive the highest reward and the highest incentive to our study? The whole of life is so closely woven together that what seems an isolated event is of vital importance and connection with what goes before and what comes after. To see a little farther, to trace some unknown connection, what greater reward can any study offer, what higher satisfaction? As the painter before his landscape sees more and more of beauty, as to his trained eye the shadows become full of living color, and his subject glows with more than the light of day, as exquisite relations and unseen beauties reveal themselves, so with the historical student. The period of his study becomes vital with living interest. Facts group themselves about the central events, side lights are thrown by contemporary documents, truth becomes more lovely and more alluring as the ultimate foundations recede before the eager search, and hide themselves in the mysterious recesses of the human will. But to gain one little point, to establish one small link in the great chain of the growth of the world, what delight can be keener, what quest more honorable? For "what has been ever shall be," better, larger, more inclusive. Good in bygone days may not be just our good, but its quality cannot change, though we spell it differently. We must be saved because we cling

> "To the same, same self, same love,
> Same God; ay, what was shall be."

It is the passion for truth which is the scholar's passion, and the promise of truth which is the scholar's highest reward. If we look for truth in times that have gone by; if we look for it in the history of our own place and our own local habitation, shall we not reverence it more and more in our own lives? Shall we not appreciate that we too are making history, and that we must make it on the side of righteousness?

Is this too much to expect of the study of history? It should give a background for the whole of life, it should furnish a working theory of the advance of the world. It is not a fixed science; constant contributions are made to it by research and by philosophy. New schools are constantly arising among its votaries, but its basis is on fact, and its growth is the growth of the life of man. It teaches us great lessons, lessons at the foundation of right thinking and right living, the immutability of law, reverence, and the love of truth. These are lessons worth the learning, lessons which carry their reward with them in the promise of future growth and achievement. These are lessons woven into the very texture of freedom, without which there can be no stability. "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."

XXXIV

THE POWER OF RELIGION

"RELIGION STILL THE KEY TO HISTORY"

BY

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THE thought of peace is ever closely associated in our minds with the thought of religion. If peace and good will to man are ever really to rule the earth, it must be largely by the force of religion, that is, by faith and aspiration, that the mighty triumph shall be accomplished. To many men, looking back on the days of an imperious, iron-clad church, summoning the force of armies and inquisitions to impose her will upon emperors and nations, the power of religion has seemed to be grown faint. It has even become common to cry out against our age as one of doubt and little faith. Yet if we will read beneath the surface, if we will accept here the guidance of a specialist in the field of both law and history, we shall learn of other views, of subtler, deeper truths as to what religion does and yet shall do in moulding life.

Professor Baldwin is not only the late retiring President of the American Historical Association, before whose most recent annual meeting this address was delivered. He is also Professor of Constitutional Law at Yale University, and a Judge of the Supreme Court of Connecticut. Such a man is to be led astray neither by sentiment nor by superficial analysis; and when he declares the power and influence of religion to be of such *weight as he here asserts, those of us who have dismissed the subject as an obsolete or dying one must revise our judgments—or defend them against the Judge.*

There are three men in the world whose daily doings and sayings especially interest it—the Emperor William, President Roosevelt, and the Pope of Rome. Two command public attention by the union of great official powers with strong native faculties of mind and will. The third commands it almost purely from his official character. He governs no territory, although his authority is daily felt in the remotest quarters of the globe, and he holds a court to which great nations send ambassadors. In the sphere where he does bear rule, he has evinced no faculty of individual initiative. He has no force of speech, no power of the pen. The son of a simple peasant, his greatness consists in his headship of a venerable and world-wide church, and in his thus standing, more than any other man, as the representative of a great religion.

Lamprecht tells us that history is "an sich nichts als angewandte Psychologie." To this extent certainly the epigram rings true that history can never neglect to take into account whatever psychological forces move peoples or actuate leaders of peoples. Such a force has always been found, is still found, in religion. It is one of those—vague, impulsive, constant in play, inconstant in intensity—which deny to the historical student the power of scientific prediction.

Ours is an age of more reverence for human reason and less reverence for human authority. But as reverence for human authority becomes less, a conviction deepens that men are subject to a power greater than themselves. We may call it Nature, or call it God. What we know is that it speaks by laws—invariable laws. What we feel is that it is a thing of mystery—too great to be measured from earth; too far from man, near though it be at every step, to be so much as seen in all its outline by his philosophy.

The relation of history to religion has been greatly changed during the last two centuries. What we call modern history, and distant times may deem to be that of the Middle Ages, had its real beginning when modern government arose, and that was when the peoples of France and the United States, as they gathered in the fruits of their revolutions, pronounced that absolute religious liberty was one. Civil liberty and popular government were no new things in the world. A state without a church was. Guizot has said that Democracy was introduced into Europe by a foreign missionary named Paul. If this be so, it was a democracy whose motive and sphere were religious. Political democracy dissevered from religion was to come seventeen centuries later.

It was to take from religion its legal authority, but only to strengthen its moral power. Until the "ideas of 1789" took formal shape, history had been the record of what the few did with the help of the many. It has since been the record of what the many do, with the help of the few. It may well be that at some time the leaders—the few who are in authority in any nation—may be careless of religion. The many—or, at the least, the whole people—never will be. If a majority should be indifferentists or irreligious, the minority will be all the more devoted to the cause to which they attribute a sacred character.

Religion offers in statecraft a means of resting policy upon principle. It is, as Talleyrand has said, only when rested upon principle that a policy can endure.[1] The principles sanctioned by the religion of the time are incontestable. Later times may discard them. But to each generation of any people the principles instilled by ministers of religion under the sanction of the church will permeate society and become a part of its being—of what in the truest sense is its political constitution.

I use religion to signify something real, and not less real because to one set of men it is one thing, to another set another thing. It does not seem to me that Renan was right when he said that "Les religions, comme les philosophies, sont toutes vaines; mais la religion, pas plus que la philosophie, n'est vaine."[1] No religion is wholly vain. Each is true to its disciples, and in its truth to them inspires their lives. History has to do with all religions, because it has to do with all men.

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[1] *Memoirs*, Putnam's edition, II. 124.

Every great religion has come at the beginning with a resistless power. It comes as the expression by some clear-sighted, high-strung leader of men of what has long lain confusedly in the minds of many of his fellow countrymen, now first really disclosed to them and clothed with a light and power that is wholly new. There is a truth in it, or it would not be great; and truth endures.

Such a religion has a beginning, but it will have no end until the national ideas of the peoples to whom it has presented a new conception of life are radically changed. It worked a social revolution when it first appeared, but the shock of it then, however great, was less of a world force than the trembling, far-diffused, which in after years and ages has marked its continued life. It is a permanent addition to the energies of civilization.

As a key to history, religion has changed its form since the overthrow of the ancient order of things that marked the close of the eighteenth century; but its strength remains the same.

Once that strength was largely found in the power of an established church, or of a sentiment of opposition to an established church. Now it is coming more from the force of the principles for which, at bottom, churches stand, in influencing general public opinion.

Once it received large expression in the fine arts, brought to the service of ecclesiasticism. The pyramids, the Greek temple no less than the Gothic cathedral, the paintings of the masters of former days, in Asia as well as Europe, the great music of the past, were all its offspring. To-day these arts turn for the most part elsewhere for their inspiration and ideals.

The artist is tired of the anthropomorphism by which his predecessors degraded the divine. The architect is planning, the decorator is adorning, museums, libraries, lecture halls, statehouses, more than churches. The composer meets every mood. But there is here, too, a line that never can be passed. A school of art may be non-religious. It cannot be irreligious, and endure.

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[1] *Histoire du Peuple d'Israël*, I. xxviii.

Once religion led to alliances of nations for no other cause than that they shared the same form of it, and wished, perhaps, to secure it a wider spread. Against such connections the Peace of Westphalia, with its rule of *cujus regio, ejus religio*, shut one door, and the futile outcome of the Holy Alliance closed another. In international affairs the distinction between Christian and infidel has passed away as fully as that between Greek and barbarian; but that which is vital to all religions and common to all religions is but the more clearly seen and strongly felt.

History has a place in "the literature of power." It has it only by right of the human motive that controls events and the imagination that can see and paint it.

There was a half-truth in what Sir Edward Burne-Jones once said, that there were but four English historians: Shakespeare, Scott, Dickens, and Thackeray. There is no historian who is not an artist. He must tell his story in a large way. He is concerned with what is in essence part of a long process. Facts, as Macaulay puts it, are the dross of history. Their relations to us are what is to be fined out, and when these are found in religion something great has at once come in to dignify the work.

Herbert Spencer has said that in the fine arts "a work . . . which is full of small contrasts and without any great contrasts sins against the fundamental principles of beauty."[1] The thought may be extended to historical literature. There must be great contrasts to make any particular history effective. But more than this, it is only so far as it presents great contrasts that any history, be it particular or universal, is true. They are its soul. They are the moving cause of the trivial events and common course of things which conceal them from general observation.

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[1] *Autobiography*, II. 408.

Such contrasts, in those states of society with which the historian has to deal, enter into each human life. They come from those two things which, as Kant said, fill every man with a certain awe—the starry heavens and the still, small voice of his own conscience. This conscience may be largely a product of human evolution. It means little or nothing to the savage. The starry heavens mean little to him. But he is impressed by the inborn or from birth intrained conviction that there are higher and unseen powers, one or many, from whom something is to be feared or gained. Man enters organized society without losing this conviction. He feels himself bound to something higher and stronger. The bond may easily become a fetter, but on the whole it makes life larger and less selfish.

What is natural to man is inherited from generation to generation. Whatever he has acquired—be it of thought or knowledge—must be taught over again by each generation to the next, if it is to endure. Religion is part of his nature—a spiritual possession which education does not give, except in form, and seldom takes away.

That the religion of every race has, down to recent times, gone far to shape its history, few will dispute. Does its controlling influence on national conditions pass away before a higher civilization and a wider knowledge? May it be a key to the life of a tribe of savages, but only as an incident of immaturity and ignorance? Does the key grow rusty, as time goes on? Or is the religious motive one of the inherent, universal, and eternal forces that must, in all ages, deeply affect, if not vitally control, the doings of men, as massed in nations, in matters of national concern?

Perhaps the answer hangs on what the religious motive is. If it be to secure some personal good, whether here or hereafter, for one's self or one's family, it will be inevitably weakened by advances in civilization. All those advances are toward altruism. Altruism proceeds trom the spirit of self-sacrifice, and that is the highest spring of religion. "Selfish and interested individualism," says John Morley, "has been truly called non-historic. Sacrifice has been the law—sacrifice for creeds, for churches, for dynasties, for kings, for adored teachers, for native land."[1]

It is this spirit which gives all its nobility to the story of our race. As it brought all Christendom together in the Crusades, so it brought the civilized world together in the Conference of Peace at The Hague in 1899. In each of these great movements it was distinctly associated with religion—blindly in the one, truly in the other. That the ancient distinction between Christian and infidel found no place in the rescript of the Czar, which led to the Hague Conference, was of itself some proof of its essentially religious motive.[2]

Thus far in the history of the earth, the mass of mankind have ever sought to regulate their conduct by their desires. Civilization has somewhat modified their desires. It has given them new forms, inspired them by new influences, turned them in new directions, subjected them to certain conventions; but individual desires are still what press forward as the natural motive forces in and of organized society.

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[1] "Democracy and Reaction," *Nineteenth Century*, April, 1905 (vol. 57, p. 547).

[2] At a critical moment in the proceedings of the Hague Conference of 1899, there came into the hands of the president of the American delegation a letter sent out by the Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Texas to the clergy of his diocese with a form of prayer to be used in all the churches, asking the blessing of God on the work of the Conference in the interests of peace. The Emperor of Germany had instructed his representatives to oppose the institution of any court of arbitration. Mr. White was at the time preparing a despatch to the German Prime Minister urging him to use his influence to secure a reconsideration of the question. He referred to the letter of the Bishop as an important utterance of a widely prevailing Christian sentiment, which could not be disregarded, and also handed it to the bearer of the despatch, his associate, the late Dr. Holls, to use as he might think best. Dr. Holls showed it to the Chancellor, Prince Hohenlohe, who—a strong religionist—was evidently affected by it. Not long afterward, the German delegation took a position favorable to the treaty of arbitration, and Mr. White refers to the incident as "perhaps an interesting example of an indirect 'answer to prayer.'" *Autobiography of Andrew D. White*, II. 311, 322.

We have his authority also for the statement that religion in a curious way dictated the original call for the Hague Conference. The Czar acted in the matter on the advice of Pobedonostseff. Pobedonostseff desired a reduction of armaments as the only means which he could see to give Russia the means to increase her grants for the benefit of the state church. *Ibid.*, 269–270.

Nevertheless, they have seldom for any long period ruled the course of society. There has been a minority of the people, actuated by counterforces of an intensive character and power, sufficient to make it stronger than the majority in so far as to beat down mere desire and replace it by some theory which all recognize as more noble and worthy. Philosophers have led one wing of this minority; religionists the other. And which has proved the stronger force, religion or philosophy? Which appeals to the most minds? Which appeals to the most hearts? To the heart, religion alone. The morals, the ideals of the philosopher, are powerless with the multitude unless touched by the fire of emotion and quickened by that faith in the unseen which turns human things into divine things.

The philosophic thought of Eastern literature is also religious. The effect of this literature on the Western mind has become, during the last half-century, quite considerable. It has reinforced the Emersonian school and given new recognition to reverence for the mysterious in the order of the universe.

Religion, being man's conception of what is fit for a superhuman or divine order of things, must vary in form to correspond with differences in human insight and knowledge. Following the general law for all that lives, formulated by Spencer and Darwin, it everywhere proceeds in its manifestations from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, and must continue in this course. It is not that the ultimate object of search changes. The attitudes and capacities of the observers change. If any particular religion ever overspreads the earth and gains universal acceptance, it will gain it everywhere by taking its color, like the chameleon, from the soil, or perhaps, as to-day with the Christian religion, assuming many colors on the same soil. Only the motive and the general moral product will be cosmic.

Men owe to their mothers their first introduction to the world of the mind and the spirit. Women are, by their inherent nature, religious beings. Equality of civil rights before the law will never disturb the poise of that nature. It is never satisfied to be ensphered within itself. It seeks to ally itself with something stronger. It responds readily to the mysterious. In a sense it is true that the life of every man turns on what is to be his relation to some woman. In a much deeper sense is it true that the life of every woman turns on what is to be her relation to some man. If happiness of home be denied to a man, he may find, or fancy that he finds, the void filled in the busy world. If it be denied to a woman, she cannot. She feels the void too deep to fill, unless it be by a peace that the world can neither give nor take away. And if happiness of home be given to a woman, she is more apt than man to think it but a gift from some higher power.

These sentiments that from childhood imbue half the human race, that half instils in childhood into the whole. The first knowledge that comes to the babe in arms is that there is a protecting and supporting power, from which he receives everything, and to which he renders nothing but confidence and love. He grows into a child. Other forms rise up around him with which he finds himself in close relation. Motives of conduct are put before him; duty to parents among the first. There are few to whom a mother's voice does not suggest a reason for this duty in a divine command. The very oaths the boy will hear uttered upon the street will bear the same message in a different dress.

A race, as Renan said, lives forever on its recollections of childhood. Impressions of religion then gained are never absolutely effaced. Like the secret despatch written in lemon juice, they reappear at the touch of fire—in moments of deep feeling and supreme effort. It is by what is done at such moments that battles are won, parliamentary majorities change, dynasties fall.

The most uncompromising materialist is seldom without his obligations to early impressions for his contentment with his surroundings. There will be still, though he be not conscious of it, some lingering subjection to their power. As Dr. Barry in his sketch of Renan has said, "the sceptic lives on a capital stored up during the days when he believed. He is a philosopher on half-pay."

Religion is a large word. Matthew Arnold's epigram expresses but a half-truth. Religion is morality—the morality of the time and of the race—touched with emotion—the emotion of the human heart. But as emotion is not self-contained, neither is it self-produced. It is a feeling of one toward another or with another, or else it is a feeling inspired by a memory of another or a conception of the ideal. The one is the more passionate: the other is the more profound. Either is a strong spring of action. But one is of the earth: the other transcends the earth. Each has often turned the course of history. It has been suddenly and sharply turned by emotions that belong to the present, that awoke or were awakened by like emotion in another. It has seldom been permanently turned or permanently guided by these. That is the work of the emotions fed by the unseen; emotions for which we owe nothing to our senses, nothing to ourselves. For if man is the measure of the universe, it is only because he sees that it is immeasurable, and feels that there is something immeasurable within himself which is a part of the immeasurable beyond himself. This feeling, this emotion of the heart, passing into a conviction of the mind, is the quickening spirit that makes our customs or morals flower into religion.

Theologians, speaking for their realm of science, call it, as it appears there, faith—or perhaps faith in those who profess the doctrines to which they adhere; superstition, in other men. Historians, as it appears in their realm of science, all see it in loyalty to national ideals, reverence for national institutions, veneration for the heroes of the past. All of them, I think it may be fairly said, have not been as ready to acknowledge its rightful power over a people when it turns their thoughts toward that transcendent energy which those call divine who feel that it brings them into a personal relation with the unseen and the unknowable.

It may take the shape of pure theism. It may find divinity shining through a human form. It may find it in every man.

The modern world, so far as the leaders of its thought can speak for it, is less confident than the world of a thousand or ten thousand years ago that there exists a being detached from all else so like ourselves that we can name it like one of us, a person, and presume to define its attributes in terms of human speech. It is more confident that there is a power in the universe that so controls or constitutes it in a settled order of relations and causation that all may safely trust in the continuance of that order without a break. It is more confident also that it is a power that, in the sum of things, makes for what is good as well as true and is worthy the highest name we can invent for it—the name of God.

If there be anything in the theory of the monist; if there be but one actuality in the universe, and that motion, or a force expressed in motion, the manner of that motion is, or seems to us, ruled by attraction. Attraction draws little things to great things: earths to suns; men—for their bodies—to the earth; but for their thinking selves it is still the dominating faith that these are in like manner, if insensibly, yet surely, drawn toward a greater thinking self, as source and end.

Ruskin said of Sainte-Beuve that he never for a moment admitted to himself the possibility of a True as well as an Ideal Spirit, or God.[1] It is precisely this which threw Sainte-Beuve out of touch with the people about him, and shut him out of the public heart. Spencer built on better foundations. His own conceptions might differ widely from those of English people. He might declare that "that which persists, unchanging in quantity but ever changing in form, under these sensible appearances which the Universe presents to us, transcends human knowledge and conception—is an unknown and unknowable Power, which we are obliged to recognize as without limit in space and without beginning or end in time."[2] But if unknowable to him, this Power was not one with which he would lightly reckon as respects its influence on others. As Frederic Harrison said—and said rightfully—Spencer "looked to the unknowable environment behind the world of sense and knowledge as the sphere and object of religion." To the positivist, the unknowable environment is no less an admitted fact, but—to use Harrison's language again—"the only intelligible sphere of religion must be the knowable," and "the elements of the unknowable are immutably set in the canons of experience."

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[1] *Letters to Charles Eliot Norton*, II. 13.

[2] *Autobiography*, I. 652.

The church of the world stands nearer to Spencer. It disdains the dogma that the knowable is immutably measured by any form of human experience. The world in general rejects it. It is unscientific. Who would have said, a century ago, that the voice of a friend speaking in Denver could be heard in New York, and recognized in every intonation as easily as if he were in the same room with him who is addressed? Who would have said, twenty years ago, that a ray of light could be so framed and directed as to light up the interior of the human body and show the skeleton within it? Who would have said, ten years ago, that there was a heat-producing mineral that never cooled? What canons of scientific experience brought within the range of probable assumption marvels like these? Surely it is but reasonable to expect that the common people will look at each new discovery of such a kind as fresh proof of an intelligent creator, and another step nearer to knowledge of what He is.

The full power of such a belief is seldom felt by those who are themselves unaffected by it. For this cause, if for no other, the historian whose judgments will be accepted by future generations must write in a religious spirit. He cannot use a key too large for him to grasp. I mean here by religion a reverent consciousness of a power (be it law or spirit) manifest in nature, which is stronger than man, and a sense of obligation to answer its demands. Its common fruits, ripened by human association, have through all historic times been what in those times passed for collective virtue and self-sacrifice. The historian must respect these qualities. He must share in them, so far at least as to recognize them in others, and recognize their controlling force.

George Sand makes her Marquis de Villemer declare that "Jamais une conscience troublée, jamais un esprit faussé n'entendront l'histoire." It will be always inclining to search out or invent some unworthy motive, some low design, in the greatest acts. It cannot comprehend that in which it has no part. Nor can the man whose conscience is untroubled and spirit true, but to whom himself the religious motive is a stranger, appreciate what may be its mastery of others. Particularly is this true where behind the religious motive is the conviction of the personality of God. He to whom the divine stands as a being detached from all beside, will go farther and dare more for the love of God or fear of God than the man to whom the divine transcends all personality and permeates whatever the universe contains. The very conception of such an immanence of God in the world is at once too vast and too subtle for the ordinary mind. It diffuses a power which the other conception concentrates. It turns a guide into a theory.

If mankind is always craving heroes to worship, much more it craves a King of Kings, eternal in the heavens. The thought of unity in nature—of a single purpose or power to which all that we see or know or feel is related—is common to most of the great religions. It is also a vital part of them. To those who are possessed by it, it seems a clew by which to trace back every event of history to its farthest source. It is distinctly a religious clew.

It naturally associates itself with the thought of unity in human authority.

To the Mahometan, religion is still the centralizing force in government that it was for a thousand years to the Christian world. Mediæval Europe could conceive only of one spiritual head and of one imperial head on earth. It was this sentiment that kept the Holy Roman Empire in life centuries after, as Voltaire declared, it was no longer Holy, nor Roman, nor an Empire.

Convince the mass of any people that a change of custom or of law or no change of custom or law, that a war or no war, the maintenance of an ancient policy or the substitution of another, the support of an existing government or its overthrow, is demanded by duty to God, and you have a motive of action that is likely to prove irresistible. It is a motive easy to apprehend, and there are always those who are ready to suggest it. Not only are they ready, but they have a vantage ground which gives to what they say peculiar weight. It is that of the church.

Between man and religion stands everywhere something in the nature of ecclesiastical authority, either self-asserted or governmentally affirmed. The formalism in religion which naturally results from an established church makes for conservatism in politics. In proportion to the hold which such a church has on the community it saps the springs of popular enthusiasm and makes against business activity. Time which would otherwise be spent in labor is consumed in feast-days or fast-days. Leisure is gained, but at high cost and under circumstances unfriendly to its best use. In public educational institutions studies of more importance are apt to be put aside for instruction in the symbols and liturgies of the church.

The same tendencies proceed in all countries from churches to which a large majority of the people belong, though not established by law, if they are ceremonial in their institutions. This cause has colored the life of the people and vitally affected the course of industry in Spanish America [1] and British India.

There are twenty American republics. Two of them, Cuba and San Domingo, are bound to us by political ties of a peculiar character. The rest shun us. We want their trade, but it goes to Europe. We want their sympathy, but what we receive is rather apprehension and suspicion. We meet them in Pan-American Congresses, but while projects are framed few are consummated. Why is it that, with their political institutions so largely copied from us, they are foreign to us in spirit? Race and language, I believe, have been less the cause than religion. Religion counts more with them in influencing habits of thought and measures of social order. The church, as such, is a greater power.

In South America and Central America the church was so long the only fountain of education that public sentiment deemed it a sufficient source. There are countries in which the state has assumed this function, where churches have been found to promote its efforts for their own sake. In Finland, for instance, in the Lutheran denomination, which there prevails, confirmation is refused to those who cannot read, and the consequence is that illiteracy is rare. So in a conquered country, if an established church survives, it may prove a nursery of patriotism. Modern Greece as an independent kingdom owes its existence to the Greek Church. This kept alive the national feeling and tongue during the long years of Turkish occupation.[1]

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[1] A striking, and not inaccurate, forecast of its probable history was made in a letter from Jefferson to Lafayette, of May 14, 1817. *Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, Memorial edition, XV. 116.

The church appeals to what is poetic in our nature, and as our associate President [2] Woodrow Wilson has finely said: "We live by Poetry; and not by Prose."

But the only true establishment of a church is in the hearts of those who belong to it. If they have faith in its principles, these will have a large influence in guiding their action as citizens in public affairs. Fear of its discipline, be it established or unestablished, will not.

The attitude of every important church toward socialism is antagonistic. If it become official antagonism, it loses power. Why is socialism steadily growing in political weight throughout Europe? Why in France did its friends cast nearly half a million more votes at the elections of this year than in any previous one? It is a sign of the decadence there of the power of the Vatican, pushed unwisely to the front in its encyclicals. It was a natural incident of the struggle which was separating church and state. As Professor Blondel has said of it: "Le peuple français est sans doute moins irréligieux qu'on ne le prétend quelquefois, mais il est très défiant à l'égard de tout ce qui lui apparaît comme une ingérence cléricale, et n'accorde pas volontiers sa confiance à ceux qu'il soupçonne de sympathie à l'égard du 'gouvernement des curés.' "[3]

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[1] *Autobiography of Andrew D. White*, II. 439.

[2] Associate President of the American Historical Association.

[3] *Blätter für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre*, July, 1906, p. 178.

The jealousy of clerical government on the part of the French people, however, is largely because they have learned to look on it as a government inspired from Rome, subject to Rome.

One of last year's books bears the title "Les Deux Frances." They are the France of the Blacks and the France of the Reds; of the party of King and Church, and that of Revolution. A party standing for old institutions cannot easily be displaced by a party standing for new institutions, unless these rise up as the outcome and expression of a spirit of individualism, native to the soil. If each party rests for its support on corporate influences, the struggle will be long and doubtful. There are still therefore *les deux Frances*, ever in conflict. The King—the thought of a restored monarchy—has almost disappeared as a constitutive force. But so has the Revolution. To that the corporate influences of the Republic have succeeded, and to-day it is the France of the Church contending with the France of the Republic. If the church should learn to encourage the individual initiative of its followers—to let Frenchmen direct the course in France of the Roman Church—the France of the Blacks may yet prevail.

The history of any people will be largely governed by its means of education. How far shall it extend? By whom shall it be furnished and controlled? "Educate your masters" is the command of political philosophy to the modern state. No education can be deemed complete which does not treat to some extent of religion. Yet if it be given at public expense, the cost will be borne by some who scout at all religion, and many who disagree with the prevailing forms of it.

The position which the world is gradually taking on this subject rests on principles foreshadowed in colonial Maryland and Rhode Island; first formally asserted by any government on purely humanitarian grounds in 1786 by Jefferson's statute of religious liberty in Virginia, and spread over a wider field by the Constitution of the United States.

The utmost point that had been previously reached was that religious liberty should be as great as the safety of the state permitted. Now it was declared that no limitations were required by the safety of the state. Yet here more than almost anywhere else is seen the difficulty of reconciling it with religious sentiment.

The King of Bavaria, in a state paper early in the last century, declared that in public education religion was not to be taught at the cost of learning, nor yet learning at the cost of religion. There are still many, however, who believe it to be to the cost of learning for the state to assume to teach that, without making religion a part of it.

More than a million children are being educated in the United States every year in the various schools of the Roman Catholic Church. The cost of this can hardly be less than twenty-five or thirty million dollars. Those who pay it are also required by the state to contribute as much as any other taxpaying citizens to the support of the public schools. It is no small force which leads these men to assume such burdens. It is the conviction that education is incomplete unless religion be taught as part of it, added to the belief that the best form of religion, or we might say perhaps the only form of true religion, is that of which their own church is the expression.

Holland has profited by our experience, and since 1857 has forbidden religious instruction in her public schools. The Catholics were not content to have it given by Calvinists, nor Calvinists to let it come from Catholics. Similar considerations, fortified by an influence substantially unfelt in Holland, that of socialism, have now thoroughly secularized education in France, but only after the most bitter contests. In both English and Canadian politics the same question is now the dominating one.

The position of Russia in this respect has been one of the circumstances weakening her as a great power as well as leading directly to revolutionary change. The church has had the full direction of the public schools. For the first three years it kept the children simply learning prayers by rote, except for a little drill toward the close in mental arithmetic. No instruction in reading was required. The product of such a system is not simply popular unintelligence. It is an unreal quietude, easily passing into a blind fury, under the influences of a century like ours.

Religious tests for ordinary offices have been largely abolished, even in monarchical governments, but whenever in these there is a state church the monarch, as its head, remains bound to it by vows so solemn as to prove the conviction of the people that nothing can safely be yielded there. The coronation oath of King Edward stood for the same dogmatic rigidity in its reference to the papacy as did that of an opposite kind imposed on his niece, the Princess Ena, before she could be Queen of Spain.[1]

There is no civilized nation in recent years where the state supports the church in which there has not been so much dissatisfaction with that policy as to inspire public opposition. In many, the opposition has already triumphed: in all, it will. The disestablishment of the church in Ireland, in the face of the solemn provision to the contrary in the Act of Union, will some day be followed by the disestablishment of the Church of England, whose numbers have recently sunk to a minority of the English people. In France, the separation of the state from the churches, first in regard to education, and then at all points, has been the great political issue for a quarter of a century. The French Revolution could not accomplish it. Though in the Constitution of 1791 it was asserted that all the property of the church belonged to the nation, and the Concordat ten years later confirmed it, it was only in this present year that France ventured seriously to stand upon her title.

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[1] This was: "I, recognizing as true the Catholic and apostolic faith, do hereby publicly anathematize every heresy, especially that to which I have had the misfortune to belong. I agree with the Holy Roman Church, and profess with mouth and heart my belief in the Apostolic See, and my adhesion to that faith which the Holy Roman Church, by evangelical and apostolical authority, delivers to be held. Swearing this by the sacred Homoousion, or trinity of the same substance, and by the holy gospels of Christ, I do pronounce those worthy of eternal anathema who oppose this faith with their dogmas and their followers, and should I myself at any time presume to approve or proclaim anything contrary hereto, I will subject myself to the severity of the canon law. So help me God, and these his holy gospels."

A church to which the mass of any people belongs will exert a stronger influence on them than on their leaders in civil affairs. These leaders will be better fitted to exercise an independent judgment. They will be more moved by motives of personal ambition. Religion will not be to them the one thing to elevate their thoughts beyond the narrow round of domestic life.

But of those who direct affairs in any nation in which government formally avows and teaches in its schools the existence of a higher spiritual power few will escape the conviction that in this at least there is truth. A belief in God leads to a trust in God in great emergencies, and to an inspiring identification of God and country. In war, this motive is as strong to-day as it was a thousand years ago. The "Cambridge Modern History," after giving one volume to the Reformation, devotes another to what it styles the Wars of Religion. The Wars of Religion did not end in the seventeenth century, nor in the nineteenth. France is still sore from her losses by the last.

The influences of an ecclesiastical establishment and of the simple religious motive were curiously intertwined in what led to the fall of Napoleon III. The relations of Germany to the papacy had an important influence in bringing on first the war between Austria and Prussia in 1866 and then that between France and Prussia in 1870, both fomented from Rome, as events likely to prove a check to the Protestant interest in Europe.[1] The proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles was the unexpected fruit—unexpected but not unnatural. The German fought for God and fatherland. The French were permeated by the godless philosophy of the first republic.

The German is taught religion in the school. He is reminded of it from the throne. The Emperor William, as fully as the Czar, seizes every opportunity to claim a divine sanction for his authority.[1] He has thrust France aside as the universal protector of Catholic missions in the East, and found his profit in it by large territorial acquisitions in China, seized in retaliation for outrages on German missionaries. He has made his pilgrimage to Jerusalem.

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[1] See *Autobiography of Andrew D. White*, II. 350.

France, too, of late, in the same way, has so shaped her Chinese policy that the flag has followed the missionary. The republic has clung to the ecclesiastical prerogatives of the monarchy, though with the abrogation of the Concordat it is difficult to see how its protectorate over Eastern missions can hereafter be asserted.

A religious motive in foreign affairs can only be seriously advanced when a religious motive is recognized in home affairs. The loss of that in the French Revolution was one of the first things of the consequence of which, after the restoration, Talleyrand warned Louis XVIII. when consulting with him over the best assurances with which to surround his throne. You have, said he, to deal with a people "accustomed to found their rights on their pretensions, and their pretensions on their power." "Formerly, religious influence could support royal authority; it can do so no longer, now that religious indifference has pervaded all classes, and become almost universal." "Royal authority can therefore only derive support from public opinion; and to obtain this it must be in accord with that opinion." [2]

It may be doubted whether religious indifference was so widespread in the France of 1815, when this was written. If so, it was because of a torrent of revolution which for the time had swept before it the good and the bad alike. That torrent has left to public opinion a lasting place of power over human governments, but it has also, I believe, left religion in its old place as the main foundation of public opinion.

Early in 1905 the Emperor of Germany, in a public address,[3] declared that the defeats of Russia in her war with Japan were due to the deplorable condition of Russian Christianity. It was deplorable because directed by a state church which failed to respond to the spirit of the times. None of its members could abandon it for another without forfeiting all civil rights, including that of holding property. Its principal functionary, M. Pobedonostseff, was a conservative of the conservatives, to whom the Orthodox Greek Church seemed the only thing that bound the many peoples of Russia into the Russian people.[1] The creed of this church is mediæval: of its teachings and influence Tolstoi has told, and the world believes him.

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[1] See particularly his speech at Coblentz, August 31, 1897, quoted in Reinsch, *World Politics*, p. 301.

[2] *Memoirs of Talleyrand*, Putnam's edition, III. 130, 147.

[3] On March 9, 1905, in an address before the naval recruits at Wilhelmshaven.

The very month after the sharp words of the German Emperor, the Czar, against the protest of Pobedonostseff, decreed religious liberty; and his subsequent convocation of the Douma was closely followed by directions to the Metropolitan who is president of the Holy Synod to call a general council of the Orthodox Greek Church. No such council had met since 1654. It can hardly fail to give a new direction to the religious life of the mass of the Russian people.[2] Already they have shown a new interest in what it stands for, by a general inquiry for copies of the Bible. More parts of Bibles and Testaments were sold in Russia last year than in any year before, over half a million in European Russia alone. The fruits have not thus far made for peace, but they may be worth more than peace.

A department of the Holy Synod until recently, as a bureau of "Spiritual Censure," held control of all publications on ecclesiastical history, theology, or philosophy. Nothing could be published or sold on these topics without its permission. It is worth noting that from 1863 this bureau forbade the circulation of any part of the Old Testament, except the Psalms, in the languages of the people. There was too much in the other books that breathed the spirit of revolution.

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[1] *Autobiography of Andrew D. White*, II. chap. 36.

[2] Before these changes, Pobedonostseff and his school had relied on the popular reverence for religion as the main support of autocracy. If there be such a thing as a religious stage of development for nations, Russia was still in it. The events of 1906 would indicate that reverence, for her state church at least, had been seriously weakened.

It may indeed be safely said that no single cause for the spread of religious liberty and, by consequence, of civil liberty in modern times has been so powerful as the circulation of the Bible in all languages. It is to-day pronounced by publishers to be the best-selling book in the world.[1] The market for it has steadily broadened with and because of the new latitude of interpretation and criticism countenanced by modern churches.

The last sixty or seventy years has indeed given to Christendom a new Bible. It is not that so very much has been discovered by archæologists or worked out by critical research, which was unknown before, but because the attitude of Christian people and Christian ministers toward biblical study has become gradually revolutionized. Textual homiletics, textual theology, unscientific theories of interpretation, have become generally discredited. The spirit of free inquiry, which not long ago characterized but a few men like Strauss and Renan, has now begun to characterize all real Christian scholarship in the United States and most of it in the world at large. Here, from the absence of religious establishments and the presence of universal education at public charge, it has naturally had free scope. It has given a prominence before unknown in modern times, outside of China, to character and conduct as the foundations of a true life. It has brought the general Christian world to look upon them as about the only evidence worth having that in any man earth has been brought close to heaven, while still maintaining that character and conduct are the fruits of the ideal, the children of faith in the invisible and eternal. It has brought the wider world of civilized mankind in all continents to care little for a man's theological beliefs, everything for his beliefs, his real beliefs, as to what is the true, the good, and the beautiful.

Panislamism has gained a fresh inspiration from this source.

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[1] The North India Bible Society, which is sixty years old, published and circulated, between 1890 and 1900, a yearly average of 87,000 copies of Bibles, New Testaments, and selected portions of them. Since 1900 this annual output has been nearly doubled, and the number rose in 1905 to 195,879.

The Young Turkish Party, already recognized as an important political force, founds itself on treating the Koran with the same free hand with which Christians treat the Bible, and so bringing its teachings into harmony with the new thought of a new time.

During the last few years the American people have insisted, to a marked degree, on the observance of higher ethical standards on the part of their public and of their business men. The movement in this direction has been a steady one for more than half a century. In 1843 the foremost English novelist, fresh from a visit to the United States, could speak of it as "that Republic, but yesterday let loose upon her noble course, and but to-day so maimed and lame, so full of sores and ulcers, foul to the eye and almost hopeless to the sense, that her best friends turn from the loathsome creature with disgust."[1] So severe an arraignment was unjustified in 1843. It would have been impossible and unthinkable at any time since, let us say, the Civil War. But it was not the Civil War that elevated the moral standards of the people. War is a salvation to some souls, a damnation to many more. "Treasons, stratagems, and spoils"—the spoils of the field and the spoils of the army contractor—make a poor soil for the growth of public morals. The American people have grown to a purer life, or at least to a demand for a purer life on the part of those who lead their fortunes, mainly by force of a world movement, which has simply found here the freest play.

The better relations between Jew and Christian that now generally exist are attributable, in no small degree, to the growth of this ethical spirit; not so much because ethics make for fraternity, as that this growth proceeds from a tendency on the part of Christians toward acceptance of the same fundamental religious principles. The Jew has never troubled himself very much with the question of personal immortality, and all that goes with it of responsibility and retribution. His aim has been to make the best of earth; his hope that of a Messianic era here. Christian theology has looked more to a future world as the real home of men, in an abode or state that, happy or miserable, was to endure forever.

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[1] Dickens in *Martin Chuzzlewit*, chap. xxii.

Christendom, during the last few years, has been approaching the Judaic view, as best expressive of the immediate objects to be pursued in human life. Hence among those peoples which have gone farthest in this direction, the political and social condition of the Jews is more favorable than among those—like Russia, Roumania, and Austria—which have made no substantial change of position. If his life on this earth be the great thing for a man to regulate and plan for, why complain if the Jew wins the prizes of trade and wealth, though it be by concentrating his attention on material gains? "Go thou and do likewise" is becoming, perhaps too fast and with too little qualification, the general motto of the business world.

Christian theology anticipated evolution in endeavoring to account for what is base in human nature. It set it to the account of original sin. To raise up a being infected with that not simply from his birth, but through an inheritance from ancestors infected with it for countless generations, was a task which God only could accomplish. To Him it was the work of a moment; and they called it salvation.

It was a theory well calculated to have a profound effect on the human mind. It gave an immense power to a priesthood believed to have the power of speaking for God and declaring to any man that his salvation had been accomplished. It put them by the side of kings and above kings.

A time has come when the leaders of the church are beginning to say with John Fiske that "original sin is neither more nor less than the brute inheritance which every man carries with him, and the process of evolution is an advance toward true salvation."

The church is changing—has changed—its ground. It is not losing—has not lost—its power. It makes use of the old truth in a new way. It was right at bottom.

The unfolding of the law of evolution from the first, for those who accepted it, unquestionably tended to narrow the order of things in which man has his being. As the bond be tween him and the lowest forms of life became visibly stronger, that between him and any form of life higher than himself became visibly weaker. He was of less importance in the world. Wallace could open the gates to the new vision of the past; he could not shut them. He could not lead men to any new standpoint from which they could look on the earth as the centre of the intellectual or moral universe.

The church, at first, everywhere disinclined—still much of it disinclined—to accept the theory of evolution with all that it implies, has begun to readjust itself to its new environment. If, she says, this new evolution can produce from some single torpid cell a being with the intellectual and moral force of man, why may not man contain the torpid cell out of which in some at least may be evolving and ultimately, in some other stage of being, may be evolved what for want of a better word we call a Spirit—something with an energy akin to what we name divine? Force is persistent. That it is we know. What it is we do not know. If persistent in what is material, why not persistent in what is immaterial? If persistent in what we call time and space, why not persistent in something which we do not dare to call time or space and vaguely name eternity?

But questions like these do not much concern the mass of humankind. The leaders of intellectual life are few. They are followed at a long interval. They know this well. It is their office, in every generation, to set the goal, but to moderate rather than to speed the pace of the people as they turn in the new direction.

The leaders of intellectual life who are in positions of ecclesiastical authority, under the influence of these forces, have everywhere begun to preach a new theology. It is a theology of the present. It might almost be called a theology of the earth, earthy. Its foundation is still the existence of a great first cause, which men call God. Its aim is still to set forth the whole duty of man, and to found it on his duty toward this almighty and eternal source of his being. But it sets forth with less assumption of a knowledge of the unseen. No Nicene creed, no creed professing to define the genesis and nature and attributes of God, could ever be the product of the twentieth century.

The modern pulpit and council are content to say with St. Paul that "the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." The churches of every faith, in some degree—of all in proportion to their share in the time-spirit of their generation—are pointing to Man as the only real revelation of the nature of God, and to the opportunities of the present life as what chiefly concerns him, in his highest as well as his lowest desires and activities. One hears little in churches led by an educated clergy of a future heaven, and less of a future hell. It is this pressing, immediate world about us, that is their theme. "One world at a time" is more and more becoming the practical doctrine of the modern pulpit. Do your duty to-day, and be not anxious about to-morrow, whether it be the morrow of the next sunrise or of a million ages.

What has been, what is to be, the effect of this change in the attitude of the church on the course of human history? It will not remove the power of theistic appeal. If it should spread over all nations, and all faiths, it will leave unimpaired the motives of duty to God and country. A war to maintain the honor of fatherland and of the fathers from whom it was inherited will always enlist the sympathies of the people with double force, if they are quickened by religious convictions.

Recent events have shown that soldiers who believe they are fighting God's battles may yield before those not superior in numbers or arms who believe that in fighting they are honoring the first ancestors of the sovereign, whose spirit in an ancestor world holds sway over those of their own ancestors. The double character of the Mikado of Japan as spiritual leader and earthly sovereign, impressed by the institution of ancestor worship upon every Japanese from infancy, moves him far more deeply than the Russian muzhik is affected by his reverence for the Czar as head of his country's church. Admiral Togo's message to the Mikado last year, attributing to his superhuman influence the annihilation of the Russian fleet, spoke the real conviction of a great man and a great people.

We must never forget that not only were the founders of all the great religions of Asiatic origin, but that religion is now a more vital force in Asia than on any other continent. The deep, if dreamy, spiritual insight, the brooding intellectual habit, the strength of antecedents, that belong to the East, put religion there in a position as lofty as it is unique.

Hegel observed that there are two natural steps in human life, that of subjectivity and objectivity. The youth bends his thoughts toward the correspondence that he is to establish between himself and the universe. He proceeds from himself outward. He joins his life to the ideal, in hope and faith. Years pass and he has found his place. There is a round of daily duties and perhaps of pleasures, on which his attention centres. His thoughts now turn not to the ideal but to what life in fact has brought him, and to how that shall be best accomplished.

The race of man pursues the same stages. In the East they are still in the first. Even in Japan, so largely occidentalized, they are constructing for themselves a new ideal of Christianity. Except for Japan, they are what they were. Subjectivity still holds them captive.

China has recently abolished the requirement of familiarity with the Confucian classics on the part of those desiring official appointment or promotion. The first examination under the new system took place this fall, and the nine receiving the highest marks were men educated in the United States or Europe—the first of them a doctor of philosophy and the next a doctor of civil law of an American university.

A change like this involves, as a necessary consequence, the rise of new national ideals. The calm and restful tone of the Confucian philosophy of life will be replaced by something less smooth and more deep, more religious. The spirit of the West has burst upon the silent sea of self-satisfied seclusion on which China has been idly floating for two thousand years. It has troubled the waters. It may turn them into a river that will run far.

As respects Mahometanism, the fundamental precepts of that faith are such as necessarily to give them a strong political effect.[1] Its adherents stand together, like the members of a secret order. In Europe they cling to their religion as closely as in Asia. In 1900 seven thousand Mahometan Servians suddenly left the country, because one Mahometan had been received into a Christian church.[1]

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[1] Only by force of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 has religious toleration been anything but an empty word at Constantinople.

The strongest assurance of the power of the Sublime Porte is the general recognition by the Mahometan world, and the King of Great Britain as Emperor of India, of the Sultan of Turkey as the true Caliph or Commander of the Faithful. The strongest menace of the British Empire in the East is the utter foreignness there of Western Christianity. The European sent to Asia or Africa to govern a subject race finds himself separated from it by an aloofness which he cannot conquer. It does not proceed from him. He is often anxious to overcome it in the native. But it is the inevitable fruit of antipathetic relations, springing from religious differences.

The religions of the West rule the religionist. The religion of Islam rules every Mahometan, be he saint or sinner; and in case of war all are faithful to the commander of the faithful. Lord Cromer, a few months ago, received a warning letter from one professing to write in the name of his people of Egypt, and whose stately periods remind one of the Hebrew prophets. It was addressed to "the Reformer of Egypt."

"He must be blind [said the writer], who sees not what the English have wrought in Egypt: the gates of justice stand open to the poor; the streams flow through the land and are not stopped at the order of the strong; the poor man is lifted up and the rich man pulled down; the hand of the oppressor and the briber is struck when outstretched to do evil. Our eyes see these things and we know from whom they come. You will say, 'Be thankful, O, men of Egypt! and bless those who benefit you'; and very many of us—those who preserve a free mind and are not ruled by flattery and guile—are thankful. But thanks lie on the surface of the heart, and beneath is a deep well.

"While peace is in the land the spirit of Islam sleeps. We hear the imam cry out in the mosque against the unbelievers, but his words pass by like wind and are lost. Children hear them for the first time and do not understand them; old men have heard them from childhood and pay no heed.

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[1] Francis H. E. Palmer, *Austro-Hungarian Life* (New York, 1903), p. 88.

"But it is said, 'There is war between England and Abdul-Hamid Khan.' If that be so, a change must come. The words of the imam are echoed in every heart, and every Moslem hears only the cry of the faith. As men we do not love the sons of Osman; the children at the breast know their words, and that they have trodden down the Egyptians like dry reeds. But as Moslems they are our brethren; the Khalif holds the sacred places and the noble relics. Though the Khalif were hapless as Bajazid, cruel as Murad, or mad as Ibrahim, he is the shadow of God, and every Moslem must leap up at his call as the willing servant to his master, though the wolf may devour his child while he does his master's work. The call of the Sultan is the call of the faith; it carries with it the command of the Prophet, blessings, etc. I and many more trust that all may yet be peace; but if it be war, be sure that he who has a sword will draw it, he who has a club will strike with it. The women will cry from the housetops, 'God give victory to Islam!'

"You will say: 'The Egyptian is more ungrateful than a dog, which remembers the hand which fed him. He is foolish as the madman who pulls down the rooftree of his house upon himself.' It may be so to worldly eyes, but in the time of danger to Islam the Moslem turns away from the things of this world and thirsts only for the service of his faith, even though he looks in the face of death. May God (His name be glorified) avert the evil."

It is the existence of this spirit which makes the punishments often inflicted on insurgents by the British in their Eastern possessions sharp up to the point of barbarism. Nothing less tells there.

It is the mosque that guards the palace of the Sultan.

Sir William Marriott, when in company with Ismail Pasha, the first Khedive of Egypt, happened to meet in Boulogne a procession of young girls on their way to their first communion. The Pasha saluted it with a low reverence. "Your Highness is more Catholic than the Catholics," said Sir William. "Ah," was the reply, "you see I have ruled, and no man can rule without religion."[1]

On this point East and West can both agree. Napoleon said in reference to the Concordat of 1801, that he saw in the church not the mystery of the incarnation but the mystery of social order. Later, at the height of his power, speaking in the same vein, he intimated his belief that Christianity was an illusion, but a very useful one. It assured the tranquillity of the state in reconciling man with himself and giving him a philosophy to live by. The age of illusions was for nations, as for individuals, the age of happiness.[2]

It is not for history to pronounce whether any religion or all religions be founded on mere illusions. She must leave that to theologians and psychologists. But in her field of inductive sociology, she owns still the continuing force of the religious motive.

In modern politics it takes on a new importance. They are expressed in terms of representative government. It may be representation by a legislature or by a ministry. In either case it will assume to represent the people by representing a party. Representative government implies and involves party organization. Party organization is unfavorable to the expression of candid, impartial public opinion. But let any religious question be involved, and public opinion will find a way to express itself, which no party machinery can seriously obstruct.

So in world politics, now so largely governed by a public opinion of the world, the pressure that can be brought upon any one power by others—that is brought upon each by other peoples through the press—will be immensely strengthened if it be impelled by an ethical or religious motive; ethical or religious, for an ethical impulse common to many nations belongs to the religion of humanity.

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[1] *Memoirs of Grant Duff*, II. 18.

[2] *Memoirs of Talleyrand*, Putnam's edition, I. 339.

That grows as ecclesiasticism declines. The Christian church has been gradually reduced, to use the phrase of Gardiner, "from the exercise of power to the employment of influence." Its tendencies of thought run, more than those fostered by any other of the great religions, toward loyalty to humanity, rather than to race. It is the only one that makes any serious effort to preach its gospel "to every creature." "We recognize," said Tertullian, "one commonwealth, the world." It does not hesitate to put its own rules above those assumed for political science or economy. From the churches of England came the last great impulse that carried through the Corn Laws, and made free trade her policy to-day. There are signs of a movement in the churches of the United States in the same direction. Should it gather force, statesmen must reckon seriously with it.

Renan, in his "Life of Jesus,"[1] remarks that he was the first of men to conceive, or at all events to put life into that thought, that liberty was something independent of politics; that one's country is not everything; and that the man is anterior and superior to the citizen.

The share of government in human society becomes less obtrusive as time goes on. Show of force declines as the sentiment of obedience to law becomes more prevalent. Public authority is more and more localized in small political communities, there to be administered by representatives of the inhabitants. These social principles go to diminish the weight of national governments, and make the individual man feel that he is a citizen first of his own local community and then of the world. They also strongly reinforce the general trend of the Christian religion (which we may fairly say is to-day the strongest of any in its influence upon human history) toward insistence on universal brotherhood as the ultimate criterion of international obligations.

[1] Chapter vii.

XXXV

CHRISTIANITY AND CIVILIZATION

"SOCIAL CULTURE IN EDUCATION AND RELIGION"

BY

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ACCEPTING on the high authority of Professor Baldwin the vast importance of the influence of religion upon modern life, the obverse of that same question, the meaning of religion, its outlook, its historical development, becomes equally important. It is this problem of the growth of religious thought, its educational influence upon man and upon his educational institutions, which is here taken up by Mr. William T. Harris, for many years, and until his recent retirement, the United States Commissioner of Education. This address was first delivered by Mr. Harris before the International Congress of Arts and Sciences at the St. Louis exhibition. It has since appeared in the Educational Review, *and is here published under Mr. Harris's revision.*

I SHALL announce as my thesis that: Social Culture is the training of the individual for social institutions.

Man by his social institutions secures the adjustment of the individual to the social whole—the social unit. The person, or individual, comes into such harmony and co-operation with human society as a whole that he may receive a share of all the production of his fellow-men; be protected against violence by their united strength; given the privilege of accumulating property and of enjoying it in peace and security, in such a manner as to escape from sudden approaches of famine and penury by reason of seasonal extremes or by reason of the vicissitudes of infancy, old age, disease, or of the perturbations affecting the community. And finally, there is participation in the wisdom of the race—the opportunity of sharing in the knowledge that comes from the scientific inventory of nature in all its kingdoms, and of human life on the globe in all its varied experiments, successful and unsuccessful; the opportunity of gaining an insight into the higher results of science in the field of discovery of laws and principles—the permanent forms of existence under the variable conditions of time and place. Finally, we may share, through our membership in the social unity, in the moral insights that have resulted from the discipline of pain, the defeats and discomfitures arising from the choice of mistaken careers on the part of individuals and entire communities. The sin and error of men have vicariously helped the race by great object lessons which have taught mankind through all the ages, and now teach the present generation of men—all the more effectively because of the devices of our civilization which not only make the records of the past accessible to each and every individual, but institute a present means of intercommunication by and through which each people—each individual—may see from day to day the unfolding of the drama of human history.

The good of this unity of the individual with the social whole by means of institutions may be summed up by saying that it re-enforces the individual by the labor of all, the thought of all, and the good fortune of all. It takes from him only his trifling contribution from his trade or vocation, and gives in return a share in the gigantic aggregate of productions of all mankind. It receives from him the experience of his little life and gives him in return the experience of the race, a myriad of myriads strong, and working through millenniums.

What Thomas Hobbes said of the blessings of the political whole, the State, is true when applied to civilization as an international combination of States.

"Outside of the State," said he, "is found only the dominion of the passions—war, fear, poverty, filth, isolation, barbarism, ignorance, and savagery; while in the State is found the dominion of reason—peace, security, riches, ornament, sociability, elegance, science, and good-will."

With this point of view we see at a glance the potency of the arts of social culture, fitting as they do the individual for a co-operative life with his fellow-men in the institutions of civilization.

My thesis proceeds from this insight to lay down the doctrine that the first social culture is religion and that religion is the foundation of social life in so far as that social life belongs to the history of civilization. Religion in the first place is not merely the process of an individual mind, but it is a great social process of intellect and will and heart. Its ideas are not the unaided thoughts of individual scholars, but the aggregate results of a social activity of intellect, so to speak; each thought of the individual being modified by the thought of his community so that it comes to the individual with the substantial impress of authority.

There is a religious social process, the most serious of all social activity. In it the religious view of the world is shaped and delivered to the individual by authority such as cannot be resisted by him except with martyrdom. Each modification in the body of religious doctrine has come through individual innovation, but at the expense of disaster to his life. He had to sacrifice his life so far as his ordinary prosperity was concerned, and his doctrine had to be taken up by his fellow-men acting as a social whole, and translated into their mode of viewing divine revelation before it effected a modification in the popular faith. It was a process of social assimilation of the product of the individual comparable to the physiologic process by which the organs of the body take up a portion of food and convert it into a blood corpuscle before adding it to the bodily structure.

So in the living church of a people goes on forever the great process of receiving new views from its members, and its members include not only the Saint Bernards, but also the Voltaires.

The Church receives the new views, but does not by any means adopt them until it has submitted them to the negative process of criticism and elimination, and finally to the transforming process that selects the available portions for assimilation and nutriment. This is certainly the slowest and most conservative spiritual process that goes on in civilization. But it is by all means the most salutary. The individuals that suggest the most radical modifications are swiftly set aside, and their result is scarcely visible in the body of faith transmitted to the next generation.

It is clear this conservatism is necessary. Any new modification of doctrine gets adopted only by the readjustment of individuals within the communion or church. All the inertia of the institution is against it. Again, it is not only necessary but desirable, because it is a purification process, the transmutation of what is individual and tainted with idiosyncrasy, into what is universal and well adapted for all members within the communion. The Church must prove all things and hold fast to that which can stand the test. The test is furnished by what is old, by what is already firmly fixed in the body of religious faith. If its foundations could be uprooted so that religion gave up the body of its faith, all authority would go at once to the ground, and with it the relation of the institutional whole to the individuals within it. Such an event can scarcely be conceived in a realizing sense, but a study of the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution aids one to gain a point of view. When a citizen finds himself in a social whole in which all the principles that have governed the community have become shaky, he gets to be unable to count on any particular set of social reactions in his neighbors from day to day, or to calculate what motives they may entertain in their minds in the presence of any practical situation. He is forced into an attitude of universal suspicion of the intentions of his fellow-men, and he is in his turn a general object of suspicion himself. The solution forced on the community is the adoption, by the Committee of Safety, of death for all suspected ones. But the more deaths the more suspicion. For the relatives of the slain—those who yesterday were with us, but who endeavored to dissuade us from guillotining their parents, brothers, or cousins—as to those we are warranted in suspecting that they to-day are planning a new revolution and to-morrow may put us to death.

We may by this, after a sort, realize the situation when the foundations of religious belief are utterly broken up.

Fortunately for us our civilization carries with it, even under varying creeds, sects, and denominations, the great body of religious belief unquestioned. Only the Nihilists offer a radical denial to this body of Christian doctrine, and we can see how easily we might come to a Reign of Terror if it were possible to spread this Nihilistic doctrine widely among any considerable class of our people. For the Nihilistic view would extend its death remedy, after the destruction of its enemies, to its own ranks, and guillotine its own Robespierres by reason of suspicion and distrust entertained toward one's accomplices.

The substantiality of the view of religion is the basis of civilization. It holds conservatively to elementary notions of an affirmative character such as the monogamic marriage, the protection of helpless infancy in certain fundamental rights, the protection of women; the care for the aged and the weaklings of society; private ownership of property, including under property land and franchises as well as movable chattels. The Church includes in its fundamentals the security of life against violence, and makes murder the most heinous of crimes. It insists on respect for established law and for the magistrates themselves. It even goes so far as to protect the heretic and to insure the private right of the individual to dissent from the established or prevalent religious creeds so far as church worship or dogmas of theology are concerned. It is obvious that the community as a social whole would be obliged to limit its toleration of private creeds were there a great extension of Nihilism possible or were there to arise sects that attacked the sacredness of the family institution—by polygamy, for example, or by the abolition of marriage; or sects that attacked civil society by attempting practically to abolish the ownership of property (Proudhon said, "All property is robbery"); or by the denial of the right of laborers to contract with employers for their labor.

When we study these fundamental ideas common to the different confessions of our composite church, we see at once how powerful is the established doctrine of the prevailing religious ideal in our civilization in exerting an authoritative control over individuals as to belief and practice.

Many people have come to believe, in this age of greatly extended religious toleration, that the Church as an institution is moribund, and that its authority is about to disappear wholly from the earth in an age of science, of the ballot box, and of universal secular education at public expense. It would seem to them that public opinion is sufficient or about to become sufficient, by means of the newspaper and the book, to secure life, personal liberty, and the peaceful pursuit of happiness, without the necessity for a religious provision for social culture. Only the culture that comes from the secular school is adjudged to be necessary for all.

For the proper consideration of this question it is necessary to take up more fundamentally the origin and real function of religion. We shall find two fundamental views of nature and man the foundation of two opposite religious movements in the world history—the Christian and the Oriental. According to one of these views our free secular life, our science and the arts, our literature and our productive industry and our commerce, are utterly perverse and not to be tolerated on any terms.

A year ago or more there was published a letter written by an Arab Sheik of Bagdad to the editor of a Paris newspaper (*La Revue* for March, 1902), in which he expressed admiration for certain external characteristics of European civilization, but found no words bitter enough for his detestation of the Christian religion professed by all European nations. To him it was all a horrible blasphemy. The pure One as preached in the Koran is sovereign and transcendent, and to speak of it as divine-human, or as triune in the Christian sense, is to the Mahometan an act of unspeakable sacrilege. Therefore if our triumphs in science and art flow from our religion the worshipper of Islam must regard them as his mortal foe.[1] And yet the Arab Sheik is much nearer to the Christian view than is the Buddhist or the Brahmin. The East Indian view holds a first principle that repudiates or shuts out from its attributes consciousness and will and feeling—all the elements of personality. But the Allah of the Koran is personal and in an important sense ethical, having the attributes of righteousness and goodness borrowed from the Old Testament by the Hanyf preachers of the Ebionitic sect of Old Testament Christians who proselyted Mahomet, as shown by Sprenger.[1] But Brahma is above the ethical distinctions of good and evil, and goodness and righteousness are as naught to him and to the Yogi who seeks by mortification to get rid of his selfhood.

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[1] *Le Dernier Mot de l'Islam à l'Europe.* Par le Sheikh Abdul Hagk de Bagdad; Paris, *La Revue* No. 5 (1st March, 1902). Passage translated from the beginning:

"Christian Peoples: The hatred of Islam against Europe is implacable. After ages of effort to effect a reconciliation between us, the only result to-day is that we detest you more than ever. This civilization of yours and its marvels of progress which have rendered you so rich and so powerful, be it known to you that we hate them and we spurn them with our very souls . . . the Mohammedan religion is to-day in open hostility against your world of progress. . . . We explain how it is that we spurn with horror not only your religious doctrines but all your science, all your arts, and everything that comes from Christian Europe . . . I the humble Sheik Abdul Hagk, member of the holy Panislamistic league, come with a special mission to explain clearly how this comes to be. . . . Our creed is this: There is in the universe one sole being, God, source of all power, of all light, of all truth, of all justice, and of all goodness; He has not been generated; He has not generated any one. He is single, infinite, eternal; Alone, He wished to be known; He made the universe, He created man. He surrounded man with the splendors of creation and imposed on him the sacred duty of worshipping Him alone. To worship continually this only God is man's only mission on earth. Man's soul is immortal; his life on earth only a probation . . . the supreme duty of man to worship the only God and to sacrifice himself to Him without reserve; the sum of all iniquity to renounce the only God and to worship a false God . . . for us Mussulmans there is a world containing only two kinds of human beings, believers and infidèls (mécréants); love, charity, brotherhood to the believers; contempt, disgust, hatred, and war for the infidels. Among the infidels the most hated and the most criminal are those who worship God but ascribe to Him earthly parents, or fatherhood, or a human mother. Such monstrous blindness seems to us to surpass all measure of iniquity: the presence among us of infidels of this kind is the plague of our life; their doctrine is a direct menace to the purity of our faith; contact with them is defilement, and any relation with them whatever a torment to our souls."

Let us endeavor to find, by the well-known road taken by the philosophy of history, the twofold root of all human experience which gives rise to the religious insights which in their first form of external authority govern human life before the advent of the stage of reflection and individual free thought —religion before secular education.

Examine life and human experience as we may, we find our attention drawn to two aspects or opposite poles, so to speak, of each object presented to us.

The first aspect includes all that is directly perceivable by the five senses—sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch. This is the aspect of immediate existence.

But experience begins at once to go beyond the immediate aspect and to find that it is a product or effect of outlying causes. We are not satisfied with it as an immediate existence; it now comes to be for us an effect or mediated existence.

If we call the first aspect an effect, we shall call this second aspect a causal process.

Each immediate object, whether it be thing or event, is an effect, and beyond it we seek the causes that explain it. The first pole of existence is therefore immediate existence, and the second is the causal chain in which the object, whether it be considered as thing or as event, is found.

Since the causal process contains the explanation of immediate existence, the knowledge which is of most importance is that knowledge which includes the completest chain of causation. It is the knowledge of primal cause which contains the fulness of explanation. And the mind of the human race has devoted itself chiefly to the question of first cause.

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[1] *Das Leben und die Lehre des Mohammed;* Berlin 1869. Chapter I., pp. 16-27, 37-47, 60, 69, 70-77, 101-107.

In this search, as already suggested, it has been the mind of the social whole of a people that has done the thinking, rather than the minds of mere individuals. Even the most enlightened individuals and the most original and capable ones have borrowed the main body of their ideas from the religious tradition of their people, and their success in effecting modifications and new features in the existing creed has been due to the co-operation of like-minded contemporaries which assisted the utterance of the new idea so far as to make it prevail. Again, the collisions of peoples settled by war and conquest have brought about new syntheses of religious doctrine which have resulted in deeper religious insight and more consistent views of the divine nature.

It has been the long-continued process of pondering on the second aspect of things and events, the second pole of experience, that has reached the religious dogmas of the greater and greatest religions of human history—a process of social units in which whole peoples have merged.

This process has been a study of the question how the perfect One can be conceived as making a world of imperfect beings. For imperfect or derivative beings demand another order of being, an originating source, as a logical condition of existence. But this source must explain not only the efficient cause of the imperfect, but also the motive or purpose, the final cause or end, of the creation of the imperfect being.

There are two great steps which religion takes after it leaves ancestor worship and other forms of animism, in which disembodied individuals as good or evil demons reign as personal causes in an order above the natural order of things and events which are immediately present to our senses.

As the intellect of man became developed, socially and individually, the great step was taken above all secondary causes to a first cause transcending nature and also transcending time and space—the logical conditions of finitude and multiplicity.

The transcendent unity, in which all things and events lost their individual being and mingled in one chaotic confusion, is conceived as a great void into which all things and events are resolved when traced to their first principle.

Transcendence was in the first stage of religious contemplation the important attribute to be kept in mind when thinking of the First Cause.

To halt in this thought of mere transcendence of the world meant pantheism in the sense that the One is conceived to possess all being and to be devoid of finitude. It exists apart in an order above all finitude, as found in our experience. To deny all relation to finitude comes as a result from this abstract thought of the infinite. It is the nothing of the world of experience and is to be thought of as its dissolution. The philosophy of Kapila in the Sankhya Karika, the religion of both the Yoga doctrines, the Yoga of complete asceticism (of Patanjali) as well as the Karma Yoga expounded in the Bhagavad Gita, reach a One not only above things and events and above a world order, but also elevated even above creatorship—and above intellect and will—a pure being that is as empty as it is pure, having no distinctions within itself nor for others—light and darkness, the widest distinction in nature, are all the same to Brahma, and so also are good and evil, sin and virtue, "shame and fame," as Emerson names these ethical distinctions in his poem of Brahma—they are all one to Brahma.

When the social mind had reached this insight of the transcendence of the Great First Cause we see that it lost the world of things and events and had annulled one of the two poles of experience which it was attempting to explain. And it had left in its thought only a great negative abstraction, pure being or pure naught, with no positive distinctions, not even consciousness, nor the moral idea of ethics, goodness and righteousness or mercy and justice. It was obliged to deny the creation altogether and conceive the world as a vast dream, a maya.

Asia's chief thought is this idea of transcendence of the One First Cause, above the world and above creation and creative activity. But in the Old Testament we have the last word of Asia; it reveals an insight which reacts against the thought of this abstract oneness as transcendental Being, and sets in its place the idea of a creator.

God as creator makes the world, but does not lose his sovereignty by this act. He also retains consciousness, inward distinction; he is personal, having intellect and will and also feeling.

The pantheistic idea which conceived God only as transcendent One, followed its thought out to the denial of all creative activity and even to the denial of all inward distinction of subject and object. It ended its search for a first cause (following out the causal line which it began with) by denying causality altogether and finding only a quiet, empty being devoid of finitude within itself and annihilating objective finitude altogether. Hence its search ended with the denial of true being to the world and to man.

But this self-contradiction was corrected by the Israelitic people, who felt an inward necessity—a logical necessity—of conceiving the First Cause as active, both as intellect making internal distinctions of subject and object, and also as a free will creating a world of finite reality in which it could reveal itself as goodness. The essence of goodness, in the Old Testament sense of the idea, consists in imparting true being to that which has it not—God creates real beings. Goodness not only makes others, but gives them rights; that is to say, gives them claims on its consideration.

While Orientalism with the single idea of transcendence or sovereignty arrived at the idea of a One without the many, and at a consequent destruction of what it set out to explain, Theism found a First Cause that could explain the world as created by an ethical being, a personal One that possessed what we call "character," namely a fixed self-determination of will—of which the two elements were goodness and righteousness. This doctrine conceived ethics as a fundamental element in the character of the Absolute, a primordial form of being belonging to the First Cause.

Time and space according to the first form of religion—

that is to say, according to the first completed thought arrived at by the social intelligence of the race—are illusions and the producer of illusions. All illusions arise in the primordial distinction of subject and object which constitutes the lapse into consciousness out of primeval unity which is not subject and object.[1] This thought of Kapila becomes the basis of the religion of Buddhism, the religion founded on the simple idea of transcendence of the One First Cause above all causality. This is opposite to the religion of the Bible, which reveals the divine as a One that is goodness. Goodness is so gracious as to create and give independent reality to nature and man—in short, to make man able to sin and to defy the First Cause his Creator. Here emerges for the first time the idea of sin. Man, as maya or illusion, is not created nor is he a creator of things or events—his deeds are only seeming, for he does not possess true reality himself. But with the doctrine of theism man has an eternal selfhood given him and is responsible for the acts of his will; he can sin and repent.

He can choose the ethical and form in himself the image of God, or on the other hand he can resist the divine and create an Inferno.

While theism commands man to renounce selfishness, pantheism commands to renounce selfhood.

Theism contains in it as a special prerogative the possibility of meeting difficulties insoluble to pantheism. It has solved the great difficulty of conceiving a first cause so transcendent that it is no cause of the world and man. For theism sees the necessity of goodness and righteousness in the first cause and hence finds the world and man in the divine mind. But it, too, sees divine sovereignty and does not lose that thought in its theory of man and nature. Nature is full of beings that perish, notwithstanding the fact that they come from a perfect Creator. The history of man is full of sin and rebellion against goodness and righteousness. But our theistic insight knows that God is holy; that he possesses perfect goodness and righteousness. The exclusive contemplation of the imperfections of man and even of his best works leads to the pantheistic denial of the world and to despair as to man's salvation before the sovereign first cause. The religion of theism often lapses toward Orientalism in its condemnation of nature and history as empty of all good. Whenever it has gone so far that it blasphemes the First Cause by limiting divine goodness, the Church has given a check to this tendency and ushered in an epoch of missionary effort, wherein the true believer leaves off his excessive practice of self-mortification and devotes himself like St. Francis to the work of carrying salvation to the lost. It goes out like St. Dominic to save the intellect and to have not only pious hearts but pious intellects that devote their lives to the study of the creation, trying to see how God works in his goodness, giving true being to his creatures, and lifting them up into rational souls able to see the vision of God.[1]

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[1] Memorial verses of the Sankhya Karika, Nos. XXI, XXII, XXIV, LXII, LXIV.

The piety of the intellect contains in it also another possibility of lapse into impiety of intellect, namely through lack of power to hold to the sovereignty of God. It may go astray from the search of the first cause and set up secondary causes in place of a first cause. This is the opposite danger to pantheism, which gets so much intoxicated with the divine unity that it neglects nature and history, and discourages intellectual piety, and loses the insight into the revelation of God's goodness and righteousness in the creation of the world.

There are two kinds of intellectual impiety, one kind that goes astray after a secondary cause in place of a First Cause, and the other that passes by secondary causes as something unworthy of the True First Cause; not seeing that the true First Cause makes the world with three orders of being: the lower ministering to the higher and the higher to the lower: an inorganic below an organic realm; and within the organic realm creating the animal below the man, and among the races of man making savages below civilized peoples. It does not see that in all these divine goodness has its own great purpose—to make the world of time and space an infinite cradle for the development of spiritual individuality. The Christian God is not an abstract One delighting only in abstract ones, but a Creator delighting in creators—commanding true believers to engage in the eternal work of the First Cause, namely by multiplying his creative and educative work.

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[1] See Goethe's *Faust*, "Scene in Heaven" (Part II, Act V, scene 7), Pater Profundus and Pater Seraphicus.

Thus from one or another form of impiety of the intellect there arise collisions with the Church from age to age.

A closer and closer definition of the dogma arises out of the struggle.

One of the greatest epochs of struggle in the Church arose in the time of the importation of Arabian pantheism into Spain, and thence into the other parts of Europe by reason of resort of Christian youth to the medical schools established by the Arabs.

The great commentators on Aristotle, Avicenna and Averrhoes, came to notice and caused great anxiety by their interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of the active Reason (*νοῦς ποιητικός*), which they held to exist only in God; and upon the death of the individual, the passive soul of reason (*νοῦς παθητικός*), which is conceived by them as a temporary manifestation of the active Reason, withdrew and was absorbed into the deity, losing its individual being.

To Christianity the doctrine of individual immortality is vital. Without it the world view of the Church would suffer dissolution.

The publication of the pantheistic version of Aristotle forced Christian scholars to study seriously the Greek philosophy. Piety of the heart and piety of the will did not suffice. Piety of the intellect was needed, and it came in a series of thinkers who wrote the expositions of Christian theology of which the *Summa Theologiæ* of Thomas Aquinas is the great exemplar. Piety of the intellect overcame the dangers of religious heresy.

After an epoch of rapid philosophical development—a period of a too exclusive devotion to the piety of the intellect—there came a decadence in the piety of the will and the piety of the heart, and when this began to have its visible effects in the neglect of the secular interests of the Church a reaction set in, which culminated in the triumph of the pestilent doctrine of nominalism through the dialectic skill of William of Occam, and as a consequence the great philosophy of Saint Thomas of Aquino fell into neglect. But this gave an opportunity for the triumph of the study of secondary causes. Natural science began new inventories of nature and new studies of mind which set forth theories almost mechanical in their results.

With nominalism no speculative investigations into the nature of a first cause are permissible. All that is left is an empirical study of things and events—an inventory and a classification; theories of forces; mechanical composition and decomposition of bodies; the transformation of sensations into ideas. Ideas were regarded as of the nature of mere opinions and of less truth than the sensations which furnished the only vivid certainty esteemed to be of real worth.

There is bound to arise a reaction against religious authority whenever the Church itself neglects the exposition of the intellectual insights which are the most vital part of its contribution to civilization. For if the Christian world view is rendered untenable, the piety of the will and the piety of the heart will soon decay.

A series of skeptical reactions not only against the Church but against the authority of the State have taken place, as a result of this movement away from theology and toward an exclusive study of secondary causes.

The German word *Aufklärung*, or clearing-up of the mind, has become more or less familiar to us as including the phases of this revolt against authority.

It holds to the study of secondary causes and the neglect of the First Cause.

There has been only one great *Aufklärung*, the French Revolution, which swept together all the negative tendencies into one movement of destruction to Church and State. But there are numerous, very numerous minor movements. In every department its influence is felt.

In the last half of the nineteenth century Herbert Spencer occupied, and still occupies, much attention. It is interesting to note that in his generalizations of science he adopted the agnostic view of his system from Hamilton and Mansell. Back of that view is Hume's skepticism, especially with regard to the category of causality, and it would not be difficult to trace his extreme nominalism to the stream of influence that William of Occam set flowing within the Church.

Herbert Spencer's theory of the world resembles in a marked manner the doctrine of the Oriental mind that the world process finally comes to nothing. One after another, things and events appear and then vanish again, and all remains as at first.[1] It is a Sisyphus movement with no permanent outcome and no worthy result. It begins with the homogeneous, undifferentiated condition of matter and moves toward heterogeneity, individuality, and complexity of function. Evolution is this process of individualization. But all evolution is to be followed by dissolution, a return to the chaotic and unindividualized state of the homogeneous which Spencer considered to be unstable and, so to speak, impelled to evolution, but which in the end becomes unstable again and seeks its equilibrium in chaos.

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[1] "Evolution," says Spencer, in that concise statement of his system found in his *Autobiography*, vol. i, p. 650–652, "Evolution . . . is a movement (6) not simply from homogeneity to heterogeneity, but from an indefinite homogeneity to a definite heterogeneity; and this trait of increasing definiteness, which accompanies the trait of increasing heterogeneity, is, like it, exhibited in the totality of things and in all its divisions and subdivisions down to the minutest. (7) Along with this redistribution of the matter composing an evolving aggregate, there goes on a redistribution of the retained motion of its components in relation to one another; this also becomes, step by step, more definitely heterogeneous. (13) Dissolution is the counter-change which sooner or later every evolved aggregate undergoes. Remaining exposed to surrounding forces that are unequilibriated, each aggregate is ever liable to be dissipated by the increase, gradual or sudden, of its contained motion; and its dissipation, quickly undergone by bodies lately animate, and slowly undergone by inanimate masses, remains to be undergone at an indefinitely remote period by each planetary and stellar mass, which since an indefinitely distant period in the past has been slowly evolving, the cycle of its transformations being thus completed. (14) This rhythm of evolution and dissolution, completing itself during short periods in small aggregates, and in the vast aggregates distributed through space completing itself in periods which are immeasurable by human thought, is, so far as we can see, universal and eternal—each alternating phase of the process predominating, now in this region of space and now in that, as local conditions determine. (16) That which persists, unchanging in quantity but ever changing in form, under these sensible appearances which the Universe presents to us, transcends human knowledge and conception—is an unknown and unknowable Power, which we are obliged to recognize as without limit in space and without beginning or end in time."

One of the chief leaders of the *Aufklärung* has thus returned to Orientalism, and his infinite and eternal is only an unknown and unknowable power—he calls it "unknown and unknowable," though he let us clearly see that there is a shuttle motion produced by it out of chaos into individuality, and from individuality back again into chaos.

A creative goodness which lifts into being an infinity of other selves of animals and men, only to swallow them up again by a jealous reaction, drawing them down into the homogeneous ocean of chaotic matter, deserves rather to be called, as Plato in the *Timæus*, and Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* called it, envy and jealousy (φθόνος), a quality of mind which they thought not possible to find in the idea of God as Creator.

The only effective counter-movement against the *Aufklärung* is the return to a study of the First Cause.

This does not mean the neglect of secondary causes, but their proper adjustment. It is an application of the great results of religious thought—a social institutional kind of thinking that should be gone over by every individual for his enlightenment. The Church should elaborate its application of the thought of the First Cause to all secondary causes, showing in each case how the divine goodness connects and explains the entire movement from the mechanical to the chemical, and from these to the crystal, the plant, the animal, and to man.

I review, in concluding my paper, the line of argument based on the second or causal aspect of experience:

1. The first religious step is taken when all secondary causes are aggregated into one group and included in the world order in what we have called the first pole of experience. Ancestor worship with its infinite series of finite spirits

belongs only to a world order. A true originating causality, a first cause, belongs to a second and higher order, to a self-determining or originating order of being which transcends the world of things and events; all things and events depending upon a being derived from beyond, and not in themselves possessing self-existence; and the true second order possessing independence, self-existence, and the power to produce duality by consciousness, will, or some other form of self-determination.

2. The first thinking of this transcendent being becomes absorbed in the contemplation of its transcendence or sovereignty over the first order. While the first order is dependent and must derive its support, all that it has, from a higher order of being, the second order is independent and can exist by itself. The religious contemplation is absorbed in this fact of independence or transcendence; it searches the origin of the dependent order in the sovereignty of the independent order; but it does not find at first, in the independent, the motive for the dependent. It halts in the thought of transcendence and denies reality to the world of things and events; it becomes pantheism or Orientalism; it denies creatorship in the first principle.

3. The result of the first insight into the presupposition of dependent being has reached an independent being which is devoid of true causality and which does not impart its true being to a derived world; this is pantheism. But, again, this result contradicts the presupposition on which the insight into the second order is based. For unless there is presupposed a true originating causality, a self-determining One, the higher order of being exists only in itself and not for itself; its causality is not real to itself; if its causality produces only a world of phenomenality and illusion, then the result of its causality is only to reveal to the independent being its own inefficiency as a cause; it is a cause which cannot produce anything real, hence it is not a true cause.

4. The history of the religions of Asia is a history of the discovery of the self-contradictions of pantheism—of a true causal being which does not truly cause. It is also a series

of attempted solutions to introduce true causality without destroying the transcendence or sovereignty of the First Cause. For to introduce any finite motive, that is to say, any motive depending upon another underived being, would destroy the perfection of the first original cause and reduce it to a secondary cause and thus throw back the entire investigation to the stage of ancestor worship. The escape from this dilemma, which offers a choice between the destruction of the imperfect world and the destruction of the perfect world, or its renunciation by philosophic thought, is found in the doctrine of the Logos and its complete exposition in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

5. True causality is the self-revelation of the highest order of being. But it does not in its pure self-determination reach secondary causes. Its action in itself is the revelation of a perfect in a perfect; this is the doctrine of the Logos. Perfect self-determination results in perfect revelation in another; an eternal object becomes an eternal subject whose thinking and willing are one, and hence goodness and righteousness. Through this thought it is explained how the primary causality in the Logos becomes secondary causality through the contemplation of goodness and righteousness as the inner essence of causality.

6. The Christian view of the world, therefore, does not compromise its idea of the transcendency or sovereignty of the First Cause, but preserves it perfectly and at the same time introduces transcendency into the world order by the doctrine of the immortality, freedom, and responsibility of the human soul, who through religious insight interprets the entire world order as a process of creation and salvation; the process of creating souls with independent individuality and infinite powers of self-development in will and intellect, in goodness and righteousness. Consciousness proceeds through science and philosophy and theology everlastingly toward a completer comprehension of the divine method of creation of real being, that is to say, of moral beings through the inorganic and the organic processes in time and space and through the discipline of moral beings by means of their historic experience of life.

This development of consciousness makes possible the co-operation of the human will with the divine will. This is the ultimate cause presupposed by secondary causation. It is the second aspect of experience.

7. This view of the world elevates it into the highest significance, not through its secondary causes, but through its first cause as the divine self-activity in its goodness and righteousness. It is infinite grace.

8. This view of the world makes secondary causes significant in the light of the First Cause. It makes the history of nature thus interpreted a part of the book of divine revelation.

9. With the pantheistic interpretation, the divine purpose disappears from the realm of secondary causes, and with this there vanishes all true causality and high significance to science. For the objects of science, namely, material nature and human history, when separated from the divine and devoid of a share in the causal activity of a transcendent being who is a real cause, become a chaos of illusion, the East Indian Maya.

10. In the ruder forms of religion, the varieties of ancestor worship and fetichism, science has no place, because all secondary causes become capricious activities of spiritual beings not subordinated to a first principle of goodness and righteousness.

11. It follows from these considerations that social culture in the form of the Church and the School as independent institutions becomes possible only on the basis of the religious world view of Christianity; and that the perennial continuance of the world view of Christianity through the special form of social culture which belongs to the Church is a necessary condition presupposed bv the forms of social culture intrusted to the School.

XXXVI

THE MYSTERIES

"WHAT HAS PSYCHICAL RESEARCH ACCOMPLISHED?"

BY

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PRESIDENT OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PSYCHICAL RESEARCH

WE approach the borderland of fainter knowledge. Religion has always had Superstition as a handmaid; and, following somewhere in her train, come vaguer, immaterial things, magic and mystery, half-hinted communications with an unseen world, the immaterial made manifest and visible in matter. There was a day not over long ago when we thought we could afford to laugh at all these "manifestations," when most of us took our ground in fancied security on the assertion that all matter and all life were subject solely to material laws, that spiritualism was to be classed with the ghost stories of our childhood, that thought transferrence was on a par with "sleight-of-hand" performances upon the stage, and that mesmerism was but another name for fraud. In brief, the "influence of mind on matter" was dismissed as an empty form of words, a figure of speech wholly dissociate from physical fact. That day has gone by. There is something behind all these studies of the occult, something toward which earnest scientific investigation is dimly reaching. Perhaps that weird "subconscious self" of which we grow dimly aware is becoming more developed, more positively assertive. Perhaps that extra "sixth sense," of which our poets have dreamed and prophesied, begins to stir within us. Such suggestions, of course, are still but fantasies, yet there is something underlying them, something as yet inexplicable, but *inexorable, inevitable. Science no longer laughs at psychical research, nor can any intelligent man afford to do so. Rather must we hold ourselves alert, receptive, eager to seize upon and welcome the kernel of truth when it can at last be separated from the husk of falsehood and deception in which it has been too long enwrapped. What has so far been done to separate husk and kernel is here pointed out for us by Professor Barrett, former President of the English "Society for Psychical Research." Mr. Barrett is no amateur investigator, but a leading educator of distinguished reputation, Professor of Physics in the Royal College of Science, Dublin.*

I AM sometimes asked what our Society has already achieved, what it has done to justify its existence? The reply to this is found in the eighteen closely printed volumes of our *Proceedings*, and the eleven volumes of our *Journal*, containing an immense mass of evidence, the record of carefully sifted observations or of stringent experiments. These form a storehouse of material which we have every reason to believe will become increasingly valuable to students of both psychology and philosophy in the not distant future. Unquestionably a change of opinion is gradually coming about through the work of our Society. The widespread and unreasoning prejudice which 25 years ago existed against all psychical inquiry is breaking down. This is seen in the list of distinguished men who have become members of our Society, and here I desire to welcome one of our great English savants, a man of European reputation, who has recently joined our ranks, and this coincidently with his election to the high position of joint honorary secretary to the Royal Society.

But although there is a more open mind on the part of science toward psychical research, it must be confessed it is still looked at somewhat askance by the leaders and organs of official science. It is worth a moment's attention to consider why this should be. No one asserts that the knowledge we are seeking to obtain is unimportant, for, as the learned Dr. Glanville said 200 years ago about similar subjects to those we are studying: "These things relate to our biggest interests; if established, they secure some of the outworks of religion." Nor, so far as I know, does any one assert we are hasty and incautious, or unscientific in our method of investigation. No doubt one reason for the present attitude of official science toward us has been the prevalence and paralyzing influence of a materialistic philosophy, which denies the possibility of mind without a material brain, or of any means of access from other minds to our mind except through the recognized channels of sensation. Both these propositions are of course denied by our religious teachers, who assert that a spiritual world does exist, and that the inspired writings were given supersensuously to man. Nevertheless, as a body, though with some notable exceptions, even *they* do not welcome us with open arms. The common ground and official view of both science and religion are that all extension to our existing knowledge in their respective departments can only come through the channels recognized by each; in the one case the channel is bounded by the five senses, and in the other case it is that sanctioned by authority. We must all admit that even unconsciously authority has a large share in moulding our convictions and determining our conduct; in fact, we cannot emancipate ourselves from its subtle influence. As a rule this is beneficial, unless it can be shown that authority is untrustworthy ; but the attempt to prove that it is so is sure to be an ungracious and difficult task, and almost certain to bring odium to bear upon those who, if they eventually prove to be right, are in a subsequent generation hailed as benefactors of the race.

Some years ago that most learned man, the late Professor von Helmholtz, visited Dublin. I had then recently published a paper, giving for the first time *prima facie* evidence of something new to science, called thought transferrence, now known as telepathy. Helmholtz, who was a great physiologist as well as physicist, had some conversation with me on the subject, and he ended by saying: "I cannot believe it. Neither the testimony of all the Fellows of the Royal Society, nor even the evidence of my own senses, would lead me to believe in the transmission of thought from one person to another independently of the recognized channels of sensation. It is clearly impossible." The respect that is due to so great a man renders it necessary to show in a few words why this statement (one that used to be common enough) is wholly indefensible. First, the phenomena in question, and all the phenomena within the scope of our Society, are not contradictions, but merely extensions of our existing knowledge; they may be strange and inexplicable, but that merely indicates that the evidence in support of the new facts must be recognized as adequate. As Laplace long ago said in his "Theory of Probabilities": "We are so far from knowing all the agents of nature, and their various modes of action, that it would not be philosophical to deny any phenomena merely because in the actual state of our knowledge they are inexplicable. This only ought we to do—in proportion to the difficulty there seems to be in admitting the facts, should be the scrupulous attention we bestow on their examination."[1] That this is the true spirit may be seen from the recent discoveries in connection with radium. These facts appeared even to contradict some of our previous knowledge. We always thought of an atom, as Lucretius did, "strong in solid singleness," as the most immutable and immortal thing in the physical universe. Now it appears to be capable of disintegration and transmutation, and the views of the alchemists are beginning to revive: soon we may be looking for the "philosopher's stone"—the substance that by its presence enables the transmutation of other heavy atoms to come about. Thus does the whirligig of time bring its revenges.

But to return. There is another fallacy in the scientific view expressed by Helmholtz. He said, as many do, that nothing could make him believe in such phenomena. But belief is not a voluntary act of the mind, it cannot be given or withheld at pleasure; it is, obviously, an involuntary state, which follows if our judgment considers the evidence adduced adequate and conclusive. We can, of course, as many do, refuse to listen to the evidence; and it is worth noticing that in all our minds there is a tendency to repel the intrusion of any ideas unrelated to our usual habits of thought and which therefore involve an uncomfortable dislocation of our mind: so that attention to evidence of this character is a difficult act of self-conquest. Hence every new departure in thought has to encounter great aberrations of mind. But when attention is given, and the evidence considered adequate, it is sheer nonsense to say you won't believe it.

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[1] Laplace, *Théorie analytique des Probabilités*, Introd., p. 43.

Is there any other ground why science should not ungrudgingly recognize the evidence so amply given in our *Proceedings?* I have recently made inquiries among some of my scientific friends who stand aloof from us, to know what is their reason for so doing. Of course life is short, the claim of each particular branch of scientific investigation becomes increasingly exacting, and but few have time to consider the evidence. This is obvious, but why do they shrug their shoulders when you mention, say, telepathy, or the faculty of dousing? Their attitude reminds me of an anecdote told by that remarkable woman, Miss Caroline Fox, and which I think is mentioned in the memorials of her life. The charming residence of Miss Fox in Cornwall was the meeting ground of many famous men of the last generation. On one occasion that great Irishman, Sir W. Rowan Hamilton, there met Sir G. Airy, then Astronomer-Royal. Hamilton had just published his famous mathematical discovery of quaternions, and was, I believe, explaining it to Airy. After a short time Airy said, "I cannot see it at all." Hamilton replied, "I have been investigating the matter closely for many months, and I am certain of its truth." "Oh," rejoined Airy, "I have been thinking over it for the last two or three minutes, and there is nothing in it." This is why some of our scientific friends shrug their shoulders at our researches. They feel competent, after a few minutes' consideration, to reject conclusions which may have cost us years of investigation.

In fact, nine-tenths of the positive opinions we are accustomed to hear about psychical research are given judicially. That is, the objector speaks of his conclusions as positively as if it were his office to know the truth, and implies that any opposition is a thing for *him* to judge of. "He is annihilated," as Professor De Morgan pointed out some time ago, "by being reduced, no matter how courteously, from judge to counsel.

But this is what must be done. The jurisdiction must be denied. The great art is not to pull him off the bench without ceremony, but to pull the bench from under him, without his exactly seeing how he came to tumble, and without proceeding to sit upon it yourself."

Inquiry among my scientific friends has shown me that the root of much, perhaps most, of the scientific skepticism toward our work is not because the phenomena are startling or inexplicable, but because they cannot be repeated at pleasure; hence so very few scientific men have the opportunity of verifying the observations some of us have made. They do not doubt our good faith, but they think we may have been mistaken in our conclusions, and until we can reproduce the phenomena before them they feel justified in distrusting our results. This might well give ground for suspense of judgment, but surely not for any hostile attitude. It is, of course, most desirable to be able to repeat our experiments at pleasure, but the very nature of our inquiry precludes this. We do not refuse to believe in the fall of meteoric stones unless we can see one falling. We may require a good deal of well-attested evidence for their fall, but once the fact is established the stringency of the evidence demanded immediately relaxes. Now, unquestionably there are at present more capable witnesses who can speak from personal and careful inquiry as to the fact of telepathy, or of what is called spiritualistic phenomena, than there are persons living who can testify to having seen the actual fall from space of meteoric stones.

The fact is, our scientific friends do not realize the profound difference that exists between the conditions of a physical and of a psychical experiment. We know what conditions are requisite in the former case, we do not know what they are in the latter, and hence the difficulty of all psychical investigation and the uncertainty of the reproduction of any given phenomenon.

A moment's consideration shows that the demand made upon us by science for the demonstration at any moment of a particular psychical phenomenon is inconsistent with the very object of our inquiry. Psychical experiments depend on the mental state of the subject; you may tell a person to do something, but whether he does it or not depends on the person addressed. Physical experiments are independent of our volition; a magnet attracts iron, or sets itself in the magnetic meridian, irrespective of our mental condition. This obvious difference between the two sets of phenomena is constantly overlooked. Physical science excludes from its survey the element of personality, with which we have to deal and over which we have little or no control. It regards all phenomena as strictly impersonal, and finds abundant field for investigation within the narrow limits it has marked out for itself: these things it regards as real, the rest as shadowy. The truth is, of course, exactly the reverse. The reality of which we are conscious is our self, our personality. It is the phenomena of external nature which are shadowy; shadows cast by some reality of which our senses tell us absolutely nothing.

There is, however, no reason why the methods so successfully pursued by science should not also be pursued in the study of the complex and shifting phenomena of human personality. Now, this is precisely the object of our Society—the accurate investigation of that wide range of obscure but wonderful powers included within the mysterious thing we call our self. Albeit we are but at the beginning of a task so vast that it may, in time to come, make all the discoveries of physical science seem trivial, all its labors seem insignificant in comparison with the stupendous problems that are before us.

We need, therefore, much more experimental evidence in every department of our work. So long ago as 1876, in a paper read before the British Association in that year, I stated that before science could attack with any hope of success the investigation of alleged spiritualistic phenomena, we must know whether definite ideas can unconsciously be communicated from one person to another: whether such a thing as thought transferrence does really exist. Evidence was adduced in favor of this hypothesis. We have done much since then, but much remains to be done before telepathy can take its place as an accepted axiom of scientific knowledge.

There is one question in regard to telepathy and similar psychical phenomena which is likely to remain an outstanding difficulty. By what process can one mind affect another at a distance? Physical science teaches us that there is no such thing as "action at a distance." Energy at a distance reaches us either by the translation of matter through space, like a flying bullet, which carries the energy; or by the intermediary action of some medium, like the transmission of sound-bearing waves through the air, or of luminiferous waves through the ether, the energy being handed on from wave to wave. We may talk of brain waves, but that is only unscientific talk; we know of nothing of the kind. Neither do we know how gravitation acts across space: by what means such tremendous forces as bind the solar system together are either exerted or transmitted we know absolutely nothing. We don't talk of gravitation waves, we wait for further knowledge on this mysterious problem; and in like manner we must patiently wait for more light on the mode of transmission of thought through space. It may well be that thought transcends both matter and space, and has no relation to either; that mass, space, and time may only be but the mental symbols we form of our present material system, and have no ultimate reality in themselves.

Another question is as follows: May not the uncertainty and difficulty of our experiments in thought transferrence partly arise from the fact that we are not going to work the right way? We try to obtain evidence of the transmission of a word or idea through some conscious and voluntary act on the part of the percipient. We wait for a verbal or written response. Is not this a mistake? Ought we not rather to seek for evidence of thought transferrence in the region of the subconscious life? I believe in the case of both agent and percipient the conscious will plays only a secondary part. This is also true, I think, in all cases of suggestion, and of the therapeutic effect of suggestion. It is notably seen in the cures wrought by what is known as Christian Science. I happen to have had occasion to study these somewhat carefully of late, and undoubtedly remarkable cures are effected, it may be by suggestion, but without the usual suggestive treatment; the only formula is the

"Allness of God" and the "non-existence of disease." But the healing processes are set going by a purely subconscious act. And so in telepathy, we need to hand over the whole matter to the subliminal activities. The difficulty is how to do this. Hypnosis is one way. And in the ordinary waking state the agent, who makes the suggestion or transmits the idea, would, I believe, do so more effectively if, after the intention had soaked into his mind, he left it alone, so far as any conscious effort was concerned. And the percipient should be as passive as possible, make no effort to guess the word, but allow the perception to reveal itself through some involuntary action. Automatic writing would be the most effective, but that is not very common; the twisting of the forked dousing twig might be utilized, indicating the letters of the alphabet by its motion; or in other ways. In the historical researches I have made on the so-called divining rod, I found it was used in this very manner two centuries ago. In fact what we need to learn is the language of the subliminal life, how it speaks to us, how we can speak to it. The voluntary action of the muscles in speech or gesture is the language of our conscious life; the involuntary action of our muscles, and emotional disturbance, appear to be the language of the subconscious life.

Then another point should be noticed, the frequent lagging of the impression in the percipient. I observed this again and again in my first experiments in thought transferrence twenty-five years ago. The correct reply to a previous experiment would sometimes come in answer to a later and different experiment. I have noticed the same thing also in dousing; with some dousers the motion of the twig lags behind the moment of the impression; it turns after the douser has passed a little beyond the right spot. We have precisely similar phenomena in physical science. The magnetic state of iron lags a little behind the magnetizing force it is subjected to; this is known as *hysteresis*, from a Greek word signifying to lag behind. So I believe there is a psychical as well as a physical hysteresis, and if so, it should be reckoned with in our experiments. It is improbable that any psychical action, even of telepathy, occurs without some preceding change in the nerve tissues; in technical phraseology, neurosis must always precede psychosis; and then this change must rise till it is of sufficient magnitude to create the reflex that moves the muscles. And all this involves time, which may be greater or less, and so account for the occasional lag we observe.

Other questions suggest themselves. Is it the idea or the word, the motion or the expression of the emotion, that is transmitted in telepathy? Probably the idea. If so, it affords a hint toward the interchange of thought among the race in spite of differences of language. Language is but a clumsy instrument of thought, and quite incommensurate to it; its arbitrary signs show it to be but the rudiments of a system which the evolutionary progress of the race may lead us to hope will be more perfect in the future. How much more accurately should we be able to transmit complex ideas and subtle emotions if thought could evoke thought without the mechanism of speech. This may now be the case in the state of life in the unseen. The sanctity and privacy of our minds will, however, require to be protected from unwelcome intrusion, and this, so far as our conscious life is concerned, will doubtless be within our own power to effect, so long as we retain control over our selfhood, our true personality.[1]

Then, again, may not animals share with man this telepathic power? They have in some directions keener perceptive faculties than man, and there is evidence that they are strongly affected by what we call apparitions. It may be that animals, and insects like the ant and the bee, do communicate with each other by some process analogous to telepathy. It is worth trying to find out whether, say, a favorite dog can respond to a telepathic impact from his master. In centuries to come it is just possible that through some such interchange of feelings we may get into closer communion with all sentient things.

There is one argument in favor of the existence of something analogous to thought transferrence, which—so far as I know—has not been used, and it is, I think, a legitimate argument, for it is based upon the underlying unity that exists throughout Nature. The theory of gravitation teaches us that every grain of sand on every seashore in this world, every particle of salt in every salt cellar, is forever pulling every grain of sand or salt, not only on this earth, but on every planet, or star, in the whole universe. And *vice versa*, for there is a reciprocal influence ever going on between these myriads of remote things. Nay, more, such is the solidarity of the universe that an interchange of radiation, as well of attraction, is ever taking place between things on this earth, and also between our planet and every member of the solar system. No fact in physical science is more certain than this. May not this "theory of exchanges," this mobile equilibrium, extend to the psychical as well as the physical universe? Tennyson, with poetic prescience, asks in "Aylmer's Field":

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[1] In that remarkable book published some seventy years ago, Isaac Taylor's *Physical Theory of Another Life* (chap. viii.), will be found a prevision of telepathy and of some of the ideas contained in the foregoing paragraph.

"Star to star vibrates light, may soul to soul
Strike through a finer element of her own?"

Certainly it seems very probable that every centre of consciousness is likely to react telepathically upon every other centre.[1]

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[1] Since this address was delivered my attention has been drawn to Mrs. Browning's striking sonnet on "Life," wherein the same idea is elaborated: poets are certainly wonderful pioneers of thought. Before telepathy was thought of, Mrs. Browning wrote:

"Each creature holds an insular point in space;
Yet what man stirs a finger, breathes a sound,
But all the multitudinous beings round
In all the countless worlds, with time and place
For their conditions, down to the central base,
Thrill, haply, in vibration and rebound,
Life answering life across the vast profound,
In full antiphony, by a common grace?
I think this sudden joyaunce which illumes
A child's mouth sleeping, unaware may run
From some soul newly loosened from earth's tombs;
I think this passionate sigh, which half begun
I stifle back, may reach and stir the plumes
Of God's calm angel standing in the sun."

It is hard to believe that the play of vital forces should be more restricted than that of the physical forces; that radio-activities should be confined to inanimate matter. If this unconscious radiation and reaction is going on between mind and mind, then observed cases of telepathy would simply mean the awakening of consciousness to the fact in certain minds. Why some and not all minds, and why so fitfully the conscious perception should be aroused, are problems we must leave to the future; they are quite consistent with what we find everywhere in nature. For my own part, I am disposed to think this interchange is common to the race, and is the chief reason why all men are insensibly moulded by their environment. Only, as I said just now, I believe the telepathic exchange emanates from and effects the subconscious part of our personality. It is potentially conscious, and may, and probably will eventually, become an integral part of our self-consciousness.

We know as a matter of fact that a vast number of impressions are constantly being made upon us, of which we take no heed; they do not interest us, or they are not strong enough to arouse consciousness. But the impressions are there, they leave a mark upon us, though we are not aware of it, and they may float to the surface, or be evoked at some future time. One of the most certain and striking results of the investigations made by our Society is that the content of our subconscious life is far greater than that of our conscious life. Our minds are like a photographic plate, sensitive to all sorts of impressions, but our ego develops only a few of these impressions; these are our conscious perceptions, the rest are latent, awaiting development, which may come in sleep, hynopsis, or trance, or by the shock of death, or after death.

But even here and now this subconscious radio-activity of thought may already play some part in the growing sense of sympathy and humanity we find in the race. And what a change would be wrought if it were suddenly to become an element of consciousness among mankind. To realize the brotherhood of the race would not then be a pious aspiration or a strenuous effort, but *the* reality of all others most vividly before us; involuntary sharers in one another's pleasures and pains, the welfare of our fellow-men would be *the* factor in our lives which would dominate all our conduct. What would be the use of a luxurious club and Parisian cooks if the privation and suffering of the destitute were telepathically part and parcel of our lives? Slowly the race does seem to be awakening to the sense of a larger self, which embraces the many in the One, to

> "A heart that beats
> In all its pulses with the common heart
> Of humankind, which the same things make glad,
> The same make sorry."

The instinct of true religion, like the insight of the true poet, arrives at some great verity without the process of reasoning or the need of proof. Thus it has been with the belief in prayer and in the efficacy of prayer. Skepticism scoffs at a mystery which involves the direct action of mind on mind and the still greater mystery of the movement of the Infinite by the finite—but faith remains unshaken. For us wayfaring men, however, reason needs some help in climbing the steeps attained by faith. And is not this help afforded by the steps slowly being cut in the upward path by means of psychical research? What is telepathy but the proof of the reasonableness of prayer? No longer need our reason rest content with the plausible explanation that prayer can do no more than evoke a subjective response in the suppliant; that it is unconceivable how the Infinite and the finite mind, the One manifest in the many, can have any community of thought. On the contrary, if telepathy be indisputable, if our creaturely minds can, without voice or sensation, impress each other, the Infinite mind is likely thus to have revealed itself in all ages to responsive human hearts. Some may have the spiritual ear, the open vision, but to all of us there comes at times the echo of that larger life which is slowly expressing itself in humanity as the ages gradually unfold. In fact the teaching of science has ever been that we are not isolated in, or from, the great cosmos; the light of suns and stars reaches us, the mysterious force of gravitation binds the whole material universe into an organic whole, the minutest molecule and the most distant orb are bathed in one and the selfsame medium. But surely beyond and above all these material links is the solidarity of mind. As the essential significance and unity of a honeycomb are not in the cells of wax, but in the common life and purpose of the builders of those cells, so the true significance of nature is not in the material world, but in the mind that gives to it a meaning, and that underlies and unites, that transcends and creates, the phenomenal world through which for a moment each of us is passing. "The things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are unseen are eternal."

I will now turn for a few minutes to another branch of our researches, which has special interest for me, as it was this subject that first aroused my interest in experimental psychology, and to which I gave many months of experimenting long before our Society was founded. I refer to hypnotism.

There are no doubt many present who remember the outcry that was once raised against the investigation of hypnotism, then called mesmerism. Constant attacks were made by the medical and scientific world on the one hand, and by the religious world on the other, upon the early workers at this subject. They were denounced as impostors, shunned as pariahs, and unceremoniously pitched out of the synagogues of both science and religion; and this within my own memory. Physiological and medical science can only hang its head in shame when it looks back upon that period. What do we find to-day—the subject of hypnotism and its therapeutic value recognized! It has now become an integral part of scientific teaching and investigation in several medical schools, more especially on the Continent. I think our Society may fairly lay claim to have contributed to this change of view, and the work of our members, Edmund Gurney, and Drs. Arthur Myers, Milne Bramwell, and Lloyd Tuckey, has added much to the knowledge of a subject the importance of which it is difficult to overrate. It is also worthy of note how the former neglect on this subject by science relegated it to the ignorant and the charlatan, and its practice to mysterious and often mischievous public amusements. These are now less common; and though the public apprehension of the dangerous abuse of hypnotism is grossly exaggerated, for it is less open to abuse than chloroform, I, for one, am strongly of opinion that we, as a Society, should discourage, and (as in many Continental countries) get the legislature to forbid, the practice of hypnotism except under proper medical supervision.

Now, I think it is the duty of our Society to cherish the memory of these courageous seekers after truth, who were the pioneers in this and other branches of psychical research. The splendid and self-sacrificing labors of those distinguished physicians, Drs. Elliotson and Esdaile, in the fields of hypnotic therapeutics and painless surgery under hypnosis, should never be forgotten, any more than the later work of Dr. Braid of Manchester. Dr. Elliotson, though at the head of his profession, sacrificed everything for the advancement of this branch of knowledge. The mesmeric hospital in London, and the similar hospital founded in Calcutta by an enlightened Governor-General and placed under the care of Dr. Esdaile, did remarkable work, too little known at the present day. I am therefore glad to see in Dr. Milne Bramwell's *magnum opus* on hypnotism that he draws special attention to the labors of Elliotson, Esdaile, and Braid. And it is to be regretted how completely these pioneers are ignored in the works on suggestive therapeutics by Dr. Bernheim, Dr. Liébeault, Dr. Schofield, and some others.

Leaving this part of our subject, now within the purview of science, let us pass to the extreme or advanced wing of psychical research; to that part of our work on which considerable differences of opinion exist even within our Society. I refer to spiritualistic phenomena. With regard to these we must all agree that indiscriminate condemnation on the one hand, and ignorant credulity on the other, are the two most mischievous elements with which we are confronted in connection with this subject. It is because we, as a Society, feel that in the fearless pursuit of truth it is the paramount duty of science to lead the way, that the scornful attitude of the scientific world toward even the investigation of these phenomena is so much to be deprecated. Hence, as in the case of those who were pioneers in the study of hypnotism, we ought not to forget the small band of investigators who before our time had the courage, after patient inquiry, to announce their belief in what, for want of any better theory, they called spiritualistic phenomena. No doubt we can pick holes in their method of investigation, but they were just as honest, just as earnest seekers after truth, as we claim to be, and they deserve more credit than we can lay claim to, for they had to encounter greater opposition and vituperation. The superior person then, as now, smiled at the credulity of those better informed than himself. I suppose we are all apt to fancy our own power of discernment and of sound judgment to be somewhat better than our neighbors'. But, after all, is it not the common sense, the care, the patience, and the amount of uninterrupted attention we bestow upon any psychical phenomena we are investigating that give value to the opinion at which we arrive, and not the particular cleverness or skepticism of the observer? The lesson we all need to learn is that what even the humblest of men *affirm* from their own experience is always worth listening to, but what even the cleverest of men, in their ignorance, *deny* is never worth a moment's attention.

The acute and powerful intellect of Professor De Morgan, the great exposer of scientific humbug, long ago said, and he had the courage publicly to state, that however much the Spiritualists might be ridiculed, they were undoubtedly on the track that has led to all advancement in knowledge, for they had the spirit and method of the old times, when paths had to be cut through the uncleared forests in which we can now easily walk.[1] Their *spirit* was that of universal examination unchecked by the fear of being detected in the investigation of nonsense. This was the spirit that animated the Florentine Academicians and the first Fellows of the Royal Society two hundred and fifty years ago; they set to work to prove all things that they might hold fast to that which was good. And their *method* was that of all scientific research, viz., to start a theory and see how it worked. Without a theory "facts are a mob, not an army." Meteorology at the present moment is buried under a vast mob of observations for want of ingenuity in devising theories; *any* working hypothesis is better than none at all. And so I agree with De Morgan that the most sane and scientific method in psychical research is not to be afraid of propounding a theory because it may seem extraordinary, but to have courage to do so and see if it works. The theory of thought transferrence led to the accumulation of evidence which bids fair, sooner or later, to place telepathy among the established truths of science.

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[1] See Preface of *From Matter to Spirit*, p. xviii.

The amusing feature in the progress of knowledge is that, usually, critics who resist as long as they can a new theory are apt afterwards, when the theory becomes widely accepted, to use it indiscriminately, as if it covered all obscure phenomena; and so it becomes a kind of fetich in their thoughts. We are all familiar with the imposture theory, with the coincidence theory, and with the telepathic theory; each excellent in its way, but most foolish and unscientific if we allow any one of them to obscure our vision or paralyze our investigation. What is to be reprobated, as De Morgan said, "is not the wariness which widens and lengthens inquiry, but the *assumption* which prevents and narrows it."

Instances are well known of the most acute and careful inquirers, trained physical detectives we might call them, who having begun with *a priori* reasoning and resolute skepticism, when they have thrown aside their preconceived assumptions, and given the necessary time and patience to the investigation of one particular case, have gone over to the spiritualistic camp. They may be right or wrong in their present opinion, but we must all admit they have far better reasons for forming a judgment than any of us can have. If they are right, it follows that the particular case they have investigated is not likely to be a solitary one, but typical of similar cases with us as well as with them.

Pray do not suppose I hold a brief on behalf of spiritualism either as a practice or as a religion. On the contrary, to my mind, few things are more dismal than the common run of spiritualistic séances. Sometimes they revolt one's feelings, and always they are a weariness to the flesh. Perhaps the manifold experiences I have had have been unfortunate, and I freely admit my remarks apply more particularly to sittings with professional mediums, where what are called physical manifestations take place, which always seem to be on a lower plane, even where the possibility of fraud has been carefully excluded. Nevertheless, if we can get at truth, what does it matter whether we draw it from a well or drag it from a bog?

It is impossible, however, not to feel some sympathy with the common objection of the doubter that the phenomena are of so paltry a character. But we cannot prescribe to nature, we cannot get rid of the leprosy of doubt by choosing rivers of our own to wash in. And so we must be content with what we find. After all, from a scientific point of view, nothing can be paltry or mean that manifests life.

Bacteriologists spend their days searching for evidence of the lowest forms of life. And surely any evidence of personality that gives us the faintest, rudest sign that life still persists, though the clothing of the body be gone, is worth infinite trouble to attain. Though it may be

> "Only a signal shown and a voice from out of the darkness,"

it is not paltry. In fine, it is this natural human longing that renders a dispassionate consideration of the facts, a calm and critical weighing of the evidence, so difficult and yet so imperative.

We must, however, bear in mind, as was pointed out by the present Prime Minister, in the remarkable address he delivered from this chair, that if science had first attempted to include in its survey not only physical but psychical phenomena it might for centuries have lost itself in dark and difficult regions, and the work of science to-day would then have been less, not more complete.[1] This is very true; the foundations of our faith in the undeviating order of nature had to be laid by the investigation of the laws of matter and motion and by the discovery of the orderly evolution of life. What science has now established is that the universe is a cosmos, not a chaos, that amidst the mutability of all things there is no capriciousness, no disorder; that in the interpretation of nature, however entangled or obscure the phenomena may be, we shall never be put to intellectual confusion.

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[1] *Proceedings S. P. R.*, Vol. X., p. 5.

Now, if instead of investigating the normal phenomena of the world in which we live, science had first grappled with supernormal phenomena, it would not have reached so soon its present assured belief in a reign of law. We believe that fuller knowledge of the obscure phenomena we are investigating will in time come to us, as it has in other branches of science, but the appearances are so elusive, the causes so complex, the result of the work sometimes so disheartening, that we need the steadying influence of the habit of thought engendered by science to enable us patiently and hopefully to pursue our way.

Possibly historical research among the most ancient records may give us fragments of unsuspected information; for it is very probable that many, if not all, the psychical phenomena we are now investigating were known, and the knowledge jealously guarded, in ages long past. The very high civilization which is now known to have existed thousands of years before Christ in the earliest Egyptian dynasties makes it almost inconceivable to imagine that subjects of such transcendent interest to mankind were not then part of the learning of the few, part of "the wisdom of Egypt." The seizure of this knowledge by the priestly caste and its restriction to themselves, with penalties to all intruders, were the natural sequence of the lower civilization that followed. Thus psychical phenomena became veiled in mystery, and ultimately degraded to a mischievous superstition. Mystic rites were added to impress the multitude; finally divination, enchantment, augury, and necromancy became methods of wielding a mysterious power held by the few. But such practices "wearied the people's intellect, destroyed their enterprise, and distorted their conscience."[1] The industry and politics of the people became paralyzed by giving heed to an oracle, or to gibbering spirits, rather than to reason and strenuous endeavor. The great Hebrew prophets, the statesmen of their day, saw this clearly and had the courage to denounce such practices in unmistakable terms; warning the people that by using these things as an infallible guide, or as a religion, they were being misled and reason was being dethroned from her seat. And so the burden of their speech was, "Thy spells and enchantments with which thou hast wearied thyself have led thee astray."[1] Hence these practices were prohibited, as a careful study of the whole subject shows, because they enervated the nation, and tended to obscure the Divine idea: to weaken the supreme faith in, and reverent worship of, the one omnipotent Being the Hebrew nation was set apart to proclaim. With no assured knowledge of the great world order we now possess, these elusive occult phenomena confused both the intellectual and moral sense, and so they were wisely thrust aside. But the danger at the present day is very different. Instead of a universe peopled with unseen personalities, the science of to-day has gone to the other extreme, and, as Mr. Myers once eloquently said, we are now taught to believe "the universe to be a soulless interaction of atoms, and life a paltry misery closed in the grave." Were the Hebrew prophets now among us, surely their voice would not be raised in condemnation of the attempts we are making to show that the order of nature contains an even vaster procession of phenomena than are now embraced within the limits of recognized science, and that behind the appearances with which science deals there are more enduring and transcendent realities.

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[1] Prof. G. A. Smith in his brilliant and scholarly work on Isaiah, Vol. II., p. 199.

I have ventured upon this digression in the hope that I may remove the misgivings with which a part of our work is regarded by some leaders of religious opinion, who from time to time have been in communication with me. Perhaps I may also add that the aversion which some feel toward any inquiry into spiritualistic phenomena arises, I think, from a misapprehension. With what is spiritual, with religion, these phenomena have nothing in common. They may afford us a rational belief in the existence of life without a visible body, of thought without material protoplasm, and so become the handmaid of faith. But they belong to a wholly different order from that of religious faith. Our concern is solely with the evidence for certain *phenomena;* and as Prof. Karl Pearson has said, "Whenever there is the slightest possibility for the mind of men to know, there is a legitimate problem for science." Hence all appearances, whether of microbes or of men, are legitimate subjects of investigation. Because they happen to be fitful, or phenomena occurring in an unseen environment, does not render the investigation improper or unscientific, though it makes it considerably more difficult.

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[1] *Cf.* latter half of Isaiah, ch. xlvii.

Now the investigations we have published undeniably establish the fact that human personality embraces a far larger scope than science has hitherto recognized. That it partakes of a two-fold life, on one side a self-consciousness which is awakened by and related to time and space, to sense and outward things; on the other side a deeper, slumbering, but potential consciousness, the record of every unheeded past impression, possessing higher receptive and perceptive powers than our normal self-consciousness, a self that, I believe, links our individual life to the ocean of life and to the Source of all life. It is a remarkable fact that long ago the philosopher Kant instinctively stated the same truth. He says: "[It is possible that] the human soul even in this life stands in indissoluble community with all immaterial natures of the spirit world, it mutually acts upon them and receives from them impressions, of which, however, as man, it is unconscious as long as all goes well."[1] This, of course, was Swedenborg's view. He tells us, "Man is so constituted that he is at the *same time* in the spiritual world and in the natural world." Plotinus, who lived in the third century, held a similar belief; this was in fact the view of the Neo-Platonists and of the later mystics generally.[1] In connection with this subject may I commend to you the perusal of Dr. Du Prel's "Philosophy of Mysticism," which has been translated with loving labor by one of the earliest and best friends of our Society, Mr. C. C. Massey; perhaps the most valuable part of the work being the suggestive introduction which Mr. Massey himself has added.[2]

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[1] "Es wird künftig, ich weiss nicht wo oder wann, noch bewiesen werden, dass die menschliche Seele auch in diesem Leben in einer unauflöslich verknüpften Gemeinschaft mit allen immateriellen Naturen der Geisterwelt stehe, dass sie wechselweise in diese wirke und von ihnen Eindrücke empfange, deren sie sich als Mensch nicht bewusst ist, so lange alles wohl steht." (Kant's *Sämmtliche Werke,* Hartenstein's Edition, 1867, Vol. II., p. 341.

There is one interesting point in connection with spiritualistic phenomena which is worth a little attention. As we are all aware, the production of these phenomena appears to be inseparably connected with some special person whom we call "mediumistic." This fact affords perennial amusement to the man in the street. But from a purely scientific standpoint there is nothing remarkable in this. Recent discoveries have revealed the fact that a comparatively few substances possess what is called radio-active power. Unlike ordinary forms of matter, these radio-active bodies possess an inherent and peculiar structure of their own. There is therefore nothing absurd in supposing that there may be a comparatively few persons who have a peculiar and remarkable mental structure, differing from the rest of mankind. Moreover, the pathologist or alienist does not refuse to investigate epilepsy or monomania because restricted to a limited number of human beings.

Furthermore, physical science gives us abundant analogies of the necessity of some intermediary between the unseen and the seen. Waves in the luminiferous ether require a material medium to absorb them before they can be perceived by our senses. The intermediary may be a photographic plate, a fluorescent screen, the retina, a black surface, or an electric resonator, according to the length of those waves. But some medium formed of ponderable matter is absolutely necessary to render the actinic, luminous, thermal, or electrical effects of these waves perceptible to our senses. And the more or less perfect rendering of the invisible waves depends on the more or less perfect synchronism between the unseen motions of the ether and the response of the material medium that absorbs and manifests them.

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[1] Vaughan's *Hours with the Mystics*, Vol. I., contains an excellent summary of the views of the Neo-Platonists. Philo Judæus, writing from Alexandria a few years B. C., says: "This alliance with an upper world, of which we are conscious, would be impossible, were not the soul of man an indivisible portion of the divine and blessed spirit." See also Thomas Taylor's translation of some of the works of Plotinus.

[2] Here perhaps I may add one line expressive of my own indebtedness to and affectionate regard for my dear friend C. C. Massey, whose knowledge of all that relates to the higher problems before our Society is more profound than that of any one I know.

Thus we find certain definite physical media are necessary to enable operations to become perceptible which otherwise remain imperceptible. Through these media energy traversing the unseen is thereby arrested, and, passing through ponderable matter, is able to affect our senses and arouse consciousness.

Now, the nexus between the seen and the unseen may be physical or psychical, but it is always a specialized substance, or living organism. In some cases the receiver is a body in a state of unstable equilibrium, a sensitive material—like one of Sir Oliver Lodge's receivers for wireless telegraphy—and in that case its behavior and idiosyncrasies need to be studied beforehand. It is doubtless a peculiar psychical state, of the nature of which we know nothing, that enables certain persons whom we call mediums to act as receivers, or resonators, through which an unseen intelligence can manifest itself to us. And this receptive state is probably a sensitive condition easily affected by its mental environment.

We should not go to a photographer who took no trouble to protect his plates from careless exposure before putting them in the camera. And I do not know why we should expect anything but a confused result from a so-called medium (or automatist, as Myers suggested they should be called) if the mental state of those present reacts unfavorably upon the sensitive. Infinite patience and laborious care in observation we must have (as in all difficult investigation), but what good results from any scientific research could we expect, if we started with the presumption that there was nothing to investigate but imposture?

In connection with this subject of mediumship, it seems to me very probable that a medium, an intermediary of some sort, is not only required on our side in the seen, but is also required on the other side in the unseen. In all communication of thought from one person to another a double translation is necessary. Thought, in some inscrutable way, acts upon the medium of our brain, and becomes expressed in written or spoken words. These words, after passing through space, have again to be translated back to thought through the medium of another brain. That is to say, there is a descent from thought to gross matter on one side, a transmission through space, and an ascent from gross matter to thought on the other side Now the so-called medium, or automatist, acts as *our* brain, translating for us the impressions made upon it and which it receives across space from the unseen. But there must be a corresponding descent of thought on the other side to such a telepathic form that it can act upon the material particles of the brain of our medium. It may be even more difficult to find a spirit medium there than here. No doubt wisely so, for the invasion of our consciousness here might otherwise be so frequent and troublesome as to paralyze the conduct of our life. It is possible, therefore, that much of the difficulty and confusion of the manifestations which are recorded in our *Proceedings*, and in the very valuable contribution which Mr. Piddington has just given us of sittings with Mrs. Thompson, are due to inevitable difficulties in translation on both sides.[1]

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[1] Miss Jane Barlow, who has made a close study of these communications, writes to me on this point: "The almost unimaginable difficulty in communicating may account for many of the failures, mistakes, and absurdities we notice. I think we are apt to lay too much stress on the want of memory. Apart from purely evidential considerations, there seems a tendency to regard it as a larger and more essential element of Personality than it really is. In my own case for instance, any trivial cause—a headache, a cold, or a little flurry—scatters my memory for proper names. I can easily imagine myself forgetting my own name without suffering from any serious confusion of intellect in other respects, or the least decay of personality."

Furthermore, if my view be correct, that the self-conscious part of our personality plays but a subordinate part in any telepathic transmission, whether from incarnate or discarnate minds, we shall realize how enormously complex the problem becomes. So that the real persons whom we knew on earth may find the difficulty of self-manifestation too great to overcome, and only a fitful fragment of their thoughts can thus reach us.

There is, however, another view of the matter which to me seems very probable. The transition from this life to the next may in some respects resemble our ordinary awakening from sleep. The discarnate soul not improbably regards the circumstances of his past life, "in this dream world of ours," as we now regard a dream upon awakening. If, even immediately upon awakening, we try to recall all the incidents of a more or less vivid dream, we find how difficult it is to do so, how fragmentary the whole appears; and yet in some way we are conscious the dream was a far more coherent and real thing than we can express in our waking moments. Is it not a frequent and provoking experience that while some trivial features recur to us, the dream as a whole is elusive, and as time passes on even the most vivid dream is gone beyond recall? May it not be that something analogous to this awaits us when we find ourselves amid the transcendent realities of the unseen universe? The deep impress of the present life will doubtless be left on our personality, but its details may be difficult to bring into consciousness, and we may find them fading from us as we wake to the dawn of the eternal day.

Whatever view we take, the records of these manifestations in our *Proceedings* give us the impression of a truncated personality, "the dwindling remnant of a life," rather than of a fuller, larger life. Hence, while in my opinion psychical research *does* show us that intelligence can exist in the unseen, and personality can survive the shock of death, we must not confuse mere, and perhaps temporary, survival after death with that higher and more expanded life which we desire and mean by immortality, and the attainment of which, whatever may be our creed, is only to be won through the "process of the Cross."

For it is by self-surrender, the surrender, that is, of all that fetters "What we feel within ourselves is highest," that we enter the pathway of self-realization. Or as Tennyson expresses it:

> "Thro' loss of Self
> The gain of such large life as match'd with ours
> Were Sun to spark—unshadowable in words,
> Themselves but shadows of a shadow-world."[1]

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[1] So also Goethe:

> "Und so lang du das nicht hast,
> Dieses: 'stirb und werde'!
> Bist du nur ein trüber Gast
> Auf der dunklen Erde."

XXXVII

HYPNOTISM

"ITS HISTORY, NATURE, AND USE"

BY

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Of all these vague reachings toward the occult, these mysterious influences of mind on mind, no other, as Professor Barrett has pointed out for us, is so definitely recognized and established as hypnotism. This force, weird and inexplicable as its action still remains, has been positively accepted within the domain of fact. It is medically employed in the treatment of disease. It begins to be matter of experiment in the inculcation of morality. This set of phenomena have therefore seemed to deserve special examination in our series, and the subject is presented from the pen of a man of the day and one of ourselves, a New York physician, in actual practice and of scholarly repute, Dr. Harold M. Hays. His discussion is reprinted by permission from the Popular Science Monthly, where its appearance drew much approving comment.

It is perhaps unnecessary to state that the word hypnotism brings to the mind of the average person timid recollections of many criminal acts. That is because few people hear of hypnotism in its proper sphere. It is clothed with the garb of shame; it is surrounded with all the horror belonging to the age of witchcraft. Newspapers delight in depicting its bad sides, in painting to the world the crimes that have been committed under its influence, the fearful results of its all-powerful spell. To most it means a giving up of one's will to another who is superior, the crushing of one's entity by the power of another, the total abstinence of individual self-control, the entire weakening of one's higher intelligence. Vivid imagination supplies the result—suffering, hardship, labor, and total subservience.

The question arises, "Why should hypnotism have been thus derided?" Simply and plainly because the ignorance of people in general has given it no opportunity to show its good sides. Unfortunately, people are always looking for the "eternal gullible" and are not satisfied until they get a taste of it. And, as hypnotism was first practised solely and is now practised mostly by men who have made the world their dupes, the world has had to suffer in the advancement of hypnotism on a scientific basis. But it has been so with other sciences. Astrology and alchemy are now things of the past; but astronomy and chemistry are their results—two great and everlasting sciences. There is, therefore, still great hope for hypnotism; for, although known under different names for so many hundreds of years, it is still in its infancy and the scientific aspect of the subject is yet in embryo.

Before, however, proceeding to cases in point, we may review briefly the history of hypnotism up to the present day. Call it what we may, since the beginning of the world, before Noah ever went on the Ark or the whale swallowed Jonah (much to the discomfort of both), hypnotism has been practised. The influence of one man over another by a certain innate quality or by personal magnetism has always been. Even Eve exerted an influence over Adam which has precipitated the world into misery and kept it there ever since. As time went on, people recognized this influence, gave it a name and called it the influence of the gods, the result being that those who were ordained with this wonderful power were called God's ministers. Soothsayers, divine healers, the oracle ministers, all made the Oriental people construe this power by religious means. Among the Chaldeans, Babylonians, Persians, Hindoos, and other ancient peoples, there were priests who, because of their power of exerting a superhuman influence over others, were considered divine. To this day the yogis and fakirs of India use this power and throw themselves into a state of hynotic ecstasy and revery. In the eleventh century it was used in the Greek Church, as it is now by the omphalopsychics. In the Middle Ages it was practised by Paracelsus, who maintained that the human body possessed a double magnetism, the first magnetism coming from the planets, the second from flesh and blood. All through the Middle Ages hypnotism was practised under different names, such as witchcraft, divinations, etc. It was supposed to be a supernatural power derived from Satan himself, and, therefore, the user of this power was expelled from society and sometimes put to death. Magic spells where people went into trances or out of their head were of common occurrence. Religious ecstasy, demon-possession, cures by shrines and relics, the cure by the king's touch, etc., were all phenomena of this same sort.

During the seventeenth century a number of faith healers sprang up all over the Continent and British Isles. Many of these men were noted for their skill, but the one who attained the greatest reputation was one by the name of Greatrakes, who was born in Ireland about 1628. This "healer" was sent for by a Lord Conway, who expressed his message in the following language: "to cure that excellent lady of his, the pains of whose head, as great and unparalleled as they are, have not made her more known or admired abroad than have her other endowments." At Lady Conway's was a miscellaneous gathering, chiefly engaged in mystical pursuits, "an unofficial but active society for psychical research, as that study existed in the seventeenth century." Says Mr. Lang: Greatrakes' special genius in these mystical pursuits was of divine agency; for he tells us that at one time "he heard a voyce within him (audible to none else), encouraging to the tryals: and afterwards to correct his unbelief the voice aforesaid added this sign, that *his right hand should be dead, and that the stroaking of his left arm should recover it again*, the events whereof were fully verified by him three nights together by a successive infirmity and cure of his arm." We are told that he failed to cure the lady's malady, but that he worked some wonderful miracles of healing among the sick of the neighborhood.

Henry Stubbe, a physician of Stratford-on-Avon, thus comments on Greatrakes' miracles. He says "that God had bestowed upon Mr. Greatrakes a peculiar temperament, etc., composed his body of some particular ferments, the effluvia whereof, being sometimes introduced by a light, sometimes by a violent friction, should restore the temperament of the debilitated parts, reinvigorate the blood and dissipate all heterogeneous ferments out of the bodies of the diseased, by the eyes, nose, mouth, hands, and feet." Indeed, he recognized the difference between functional and organic complaints; and he only meddled with such diseases as "have their essence either in the masse of blood and spirit (or nervous liquors) or the particular temperament of the part of the body" and attempted to cure no disease "wherein there is a decay of nature." "This is a confessed truth by him, he refusing still to touch the eyes of such as their sight has quite perished." None the less his cures were regarded as miraculous, and Dr. Stubbe tells us that "as there is but one Mr. Greatrakes, so there is but one Sonne"; Greatrakes' method consisted principally in *stroaking* and *passings* and in driving the pains from one point to another until they went out at the fingers or toes.

In the latter half of the eighteenth century many fakirs, alleged philosophers, quacks, and cosmongerers came to the front. Swedenborg, with his inspirations; Cagliostro, with his idea of personal power; Schrepfer, with the beginning of spiritualism; and then Gassner, the priest healer, who gave to Mesmer later on some of the ideas for the foundation of his theories.

Johann Joseph Gassner, a Swabian priest, appeared upon the scene in 1773. He was a forerunner of our modern spiritualist in a way, but had the added distinction of attributing all diseases to the devil. So his object was to pray for the expulsion of this satanic being. The patient had to have implicit faith and was made to give a detailed account of his malady. Gassner's next procedure was to chant various symptoms such as pain, weakness, stiffness, etc., and at his peremptory command to "stop," these symptoms would disappear and the patient be well again. At the words "You will cease being disabled," the patient's symptoms vanished. "Your right hand and arm will become somewhat weak," he says;

and no sooner are the words out his mouth than the right hand is cold and numb and the pulse is accelerated. "Your left hand will become as your right one was and this one will be normal," is his next invocation, whereupon the left hand is cold and numb and the right returns to normal. Gassner keeps up these incantations until the patient is entirely cured, each prayer being accompanied by the invocation that "this is accomplished in the name of the Lord, Our Father." Gassner's cures in theory and practice were identical with those of Greatrakes, except that the mystery was now clothed in a religious garb. In both, the predominant idea was the suggestion to the patient that he would get well.

The reason why hypnotism was not studied scientifically until the middle of the eighteenth century was that there was too much of an air of mystery surrounding the workings of the phenomena. Whenever hypnotic power was discovered in a person, he at once considered himself as one who possessed attributes which placed him above the plane of society. Suggestion was of course practised as it always has been, but the true idea of what the power consisted of was unknown. At last, toward the close of the century, Frederick Anton Mesmer rose before the world as a disciple of a new force which was destined to turn the scale on to the side of science and forever after to present hypnotism in a new light.

Frederick Anton Mesmer was born at Weil, near the point at which the Rhine leaves the Lake of Constance, on May 23, 1733. He studied medicine at Vienna under eminent masters, although at first his parents had destined him for the church. Interested in astrology, he imagined that the stars exerted an influence on beings living on the earth. He identified the supposed force first with electricity and then with magnetism; and it was but a short step to suppose that stroking diseased bodies with magnets might effect a cure. In 1776, meeting Gassner in Switzerland, he observed that the priest effected cures without the use of magnets, but by manipulation alone. This led Mesmer to discard the magnets, and to suppose that some kind of occult force resided in himself by which he could influence others. Mesmer's first practical work with magnets was in 1779, when he magnetized a young lady complaining of various functional disorders. This emotional young lady "felt internally a painful streaming of a very fine substance, now here, now there, but finally settling in the lower part of her body and freeing her from all further attacks for six hours." She was extremely sensitive to any of Mesmer's suggestions, but would obey no one but him. Thus we see the primeval workings of animal magnetism, afterward called hypnotism.

Mesmer removed to Paris in 1778, and in a short time the French capital was thrown into a state of great excitement by the marvellous effects of what he called mesmerism. Mesmer soon made many converts; controversies arose; he excited the indignation of the medical faculty of Paris, who stigmatized him as a charlatan; still the people crowded to him.

While at Paris his practice became so enormous that it was impossible for him to handle all his patients. So he invented a scheme by which a number of his patients could be magnetized at once. He had troughs filled with bottles of water and iron filings, around which the patients stood holding iron rods which issued from the troughs. All the subjects were tied to each other by cords so that they could not break away and thus spoil the contact. Perfect silence was necessary and soft music was heard. The patients were affected variously, according to the suggestion Mesmer gave them. Some became hysterical, others crazed, some became affectionate and embraced each other, while others laughed and became repulsive. This lasted for hours and was followed by states of dreaminess and languor. A picture given by Binet and Feret, two eminent French scientists, will present an idea of these meetings.

"Mesmer, wearing a coat of lilac silk, walked up and down amid this agitated throng accompanied by Deslon and his associates whom he chose for their youth and comeliness. Mesmer carried a long iron wand, with which he touched the bodies of the patients and especially the diseased parts. Often laying aside the wand, he magnetized the patients with his eyes, fixing his gaze on theirs, or applying his hand to the hypochondriac region and to the abdomen. This application was often applied for hours, and at other times the master made use of passes. He began by placing himself 'en rapport' with his subject. Seated opposite to him, foot against foot, knee against knee, Mesmer laid his fingers on the hypochondriac region and moved them to and fro, lightly touching the ribs. Magnetism with strong electric currents was substituted for these manipulations when more energetic results were to be produced. The master, raising his fingers in a pyramidal form, passed his hands all over the patient's body, beginning with the head and going downward over the shoulders to the feet. He then returned to the head, both back and front, to the belly and the back, and renewed the process again and again until the magnetized person was saturated with the healing fluid and transported with pain or pleasure, both sensations being equally salutary. Young women were so much gratified by the crisis that they wished to be thrown into it anew. They followed Mesmer through the halls and confessed that it was impossible not to be warmly attached to the person of the magnetizer."

Mesmer was not an impostor by any means. He had deceived himself and had thus deceived others. But the Academy of Sciences in Paris believed that he was a mystic and a fanatic, and made it so hot for him that he was finally forced to leave France, where, however, he returned later. He died in 1815, and for a time animal magnetism fell into disrepute and Mesmer was denounced as an impostor.

Before Mesmer's death, he moved from Paris to a secluded spot among the hills. We see him at the last—bitterly complaining of the treatment he had received, thoroughly convinced as to the truth of his pet theories, performing various cures for the peasants about him, and living the simple life of a hermit.

Throughout Mesmer's career, the streets were not paved with gold. Many people died under his treatment, giving the belief that the treatment itself was the cause of death. He was treated with ridicule wherever he went. Papers, plays, etc., brought him even more prominently before the public in a more ridiculous light than his own hypothetical and mystical performances. A comedy, "Docteur Modernes" brought his procedures on the stage. It severely criticised his "fanatical" enthusiasm for a quondam science and portrayed the supposed abuses of his treatment. In England notices like the following appeared in the leading journals:

"The Wonderful Magnetical Elixir. Take of the chemical oil of Fear, Dread, and Terror, each 4 oz.; of the Rectified Spirits of Imagination, 2 lbs. Put all these ingredients into a bottle of fancy, digest for several days, and take forty drops at about nine in the morning, or a few minutes before you receive a portion of the magnetic Effluvia. They will make the effluvia have a surprising effect, etc., etc."

Once, in 1785, a mock funeral oration upon Mesmer took place, making his exhibitions and theories seem more ridiculous than ever. Thus he was tossed about between ridicule and praise until, as we have seen, his life was hardly one of harmony or joy.

Braid.

Although a number of men followed Mesmer, appropriating his method, enlarging upon it and changing it somewhat—such men as de Puysegur—it will be impossible in such a brief essay to tell of all of them. However, there is one man who rose up in the chaos of the times and again added new facts and theories to the science. This man was Braid, a surgeon of Manchester, England. Braid was born in the year 1795 on his father's estate in Fifeshire. He received his education at the University of Edinburgh, later being apprenticed to Dr. Chas. Anderson, of Leith. After graduating, he was appointed surgeon to the Hopetown mining works in Lanarkshire, later moving to Dumfries, where he engaged in practice with a Dr. Maxwell. An accident happening at that time brought to his town a Mr. Petty, who finally persuaded him to move to Manchester. It was here that he carefully worked on his new discovery and practised his cures. He died on March 25, 1860.

There is very little in Braid's life of especial interest, except his investigations in animal magnetism. His life seems to have been particularly free from the early struggles of a young practitioner. His interest in animal magnetism dates from the time he witnessed a séance by a M. Lafontaine, a travelling mesmerist. He was extremely skeptical, but this one urged him to try experimenting himself.

In 1866 this M. Ch. Lafontaine, a travelling mesmerist, published his "Memoirs of a Magnetizer." If it had not been for this, the electro-biologists of America, under one named Grimes, might have claimed prior right to the discovery of hypnotism. M. Lafontaine thus describes the state of affairs at that time:

"Having accomplished the cure of numerous deaf and blind persons," says he with modest assurance, "as also numerous epileptic and paralytic sufferers at the hospital (this was in Birmingham), I repaired to Liverpool, but only to meet with disappointment; few persons attended the séance; and on the following day I proceeded to Manchester, in which city my success was conspicuous. The newspapers reported my experiments at great length, and to give some idea of the sensation I created I may say that my séances returned me a gross total of 30,000 francs. I put to sleep a number of persons who were well-known residents of Manchester. I caused deaf mutes to hear, operated a number of brilliant cures. After my departure, Dr. Braid, a surgeon in Manchester, delivered a lecture in which he proposed to prove that magnetism was non-existent. *From this lecture Braidism, afterwards called hypnotism, originated,* ardent discussions arising, even from the beginning, over this pretended discovery. I received letters from Manchester entreating me to return, and I did so on a date when Dr. Braid had announced a demonstration. His experiments were given, but unfortunately on this occasion none of them succeeded; neither sleep nor catalepsy was obtained, and every moment I was appealed to. In the facts that were advanced on this occasion by Dr. Braid, there was in my opinion absolutely nothing that was remarkable, and had not that gentleman been honorably known in the town I should have supposed that he was mystifying his audience. The next day, and for six days consecutively, I experimented after his own fashion on fifty or sixty subjects and the results were practically *nil.* I then gave a magnetic séance and the results on Eugene and Mary were marked and positive."

The value of the quotation rests solely on the opportune remark that Braid was the first to apply the name hypnotism to animal magnetism. One should not forget that Eugene and Mary were two subjects whom Lafontaine carried with him from town to town and on whom he could rely for phenomena.

Though Braid survived his discovery by not more than eighteen years, he lived to know that it was well on the road to acceptance by the competent opinion of the time. In the latter part of his life he said: "I feel no anxiety for the fate of hypnotism, provided it only has 'a fair field and no favor.' I am content to bide my time, in the firm conviction that truth, for which alone I most earnestly strive, with the discovery of the safest, and surest, and speediest modes of relieving human suffering, will ultimately triumph over error" ("Magic, Witch," p. 53).

The enemies of Braid were as vociferous in their denunciation of him as his friends were earnest in their praise. And what may seem the greatest surprise and yet what seems to be a natural consequence of opposition, the Mesmerists themselves were the ones who were the loudest in opposing him. However, his method has stood the test of years and still prevails among those who practise the art nowadays.

As was said before, the first exhibition that Braid ever attended was one given by this same Lafontaine. One fact, *the inability of the patient to open his eyelids*, arrested his attention. He considered this a real phenomenon and was anxious to discover the physiological cause of it.

"In two days afterward," he says, "I developed my views to my friend Captain Brown, as I had previously done to four other friends; and in his presence and that of my family and another friend, the same evening, I instituted a series of experiments to prove the correctness of my theory—namely that the continued fixed stare, by paralyzing nervous centres in the eyes and their appendages and destroying the equilibrium of the nervous system, thus proved the phenomenon referred to. The experiments were varied so as to convince all present that they fully bore out the correctness of my theoretical views. My first object was to prove that the inability of the patient to open his eyes was caused by paralyzing the upper muscles of the eyes, through their continued action during the protracted fixed stare, and thus rendering it *physically* impossible for him to open them. With the view of proving this, I requested Mr. Walker, a young gentlemen present, to sit down, and maintain a fixed stare at the top of a wine bottle, placed so much above him as to produce a considerable strain on the eyes and eyelids, to enable him to maintain a steady view of the object. In three minutes his eyelids closed, a gush of tears ran down his cheeks, his head drooped, his face was slightly convulsed, he gave a groan and instantly fell into a profound sleep, the respiration becoming slow, deep, and sibilant, the right hand and arm being agitated by slight convulsive movements. At the end of four minutes, I considered it necessary, for his safety, to put an end to the experiment."

Braid became so convinced that his interpretation of the phenomena was the correct one that he used it universally, succeeding in a remarkable number of cases. His method was as follows:

He would take any bright object, most often his lancet case, and, holding it about fifteen inches from the eyes, and in such a position as to strain them and still allow the patient to gaze steadily at it, he would carry it slowly toward them until the eyelids closed involuntarily. After a preliminary contraction of the pupils, they would dilate, and finally a tremulous motion of the iris would take place. If this did not succeed after a few minutes, he would try again, letting the patient understand that his eyes and mind had to be riveted on the one idea of the object before him. The primary fact was the fixation of the mind on a certain object. Nay, even the hypnotist himself, if he use the method of attraction, may be hypnotized, as Braid shows in the following example. Mr. Walker, Braid's friend, offered to hypnotize a certain person. When Braid went into the room where the experiment was going on he saw the gentleman sitting staring at Mr. Walker's finger. Mr. Walker was standing a little to the right of his patient with his eyes fixed steadily on those of the latter. Braid passed on, and when he returned he found Mr. Walker standing in the same position fast asleep, his arm and finger perfectly rigid and the patient wide awake, staring at the finger all the while.

After Braid, many men pursued the scientific investigation of the phenomena. The interest in the new science since 1875 has spread quickly over Europe. In Belgium, the eminent psychologist Delboeuf of Liège made a path for it. In Holland such men as Van Reuterghem, Van Eiden, and De Jong used hypnotism for curative purposes; in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden there were Johannessen, Sell, Frankel, Calsen, and Wetterstrand, of Stockholm, and finally Swedenborg. In Russia were Strembo and Tokarski; in Greece, Italy, and Spain hypnotism has greatly come into play in medical treatment. In England Carpenter, Laydock, Sir James Simpson, Lloyd-Tuckey, Mayo, and others have used it for curing the sick. In America the science also has its advocates. It is one of the subjects constantly appearing before the Society for Psychical Research. In South America it numbers among its adherents David Benavente and Octavio Maria, of Chili. The interest in hypnotism in France centred around two schools, the school of Salpêtrière and the school of Nancy. The former was led by Charcot, whose luminous researches in this subject are epoch-making.

The Paris school held that hypnotism is the result of an abnormal or diseased condition of the nervous system; that suggestion is not at all necessary to produce the phenomena; that hysterical subjects are the most easily influenced; and that the whole subject is explainable on the basis of cerebral anatomy and physiology. But lately the followers of Charcot, who had been numerous in the beginning because he was so highly reliable a man, have begun to dwindle away and have turned to the school of Nancy. The reason for this is obvious to any one who has studied hypnotic phenomena. The first objection to the school of Salpêtrière is that most of the experiments have been made on hysterical women. In the second place, this school ignores suggestion, which has been found to be one of the most important factors in hypnotism. They appreciate of course that it can be used, but assert that it is not necessary.

The school of Nancy, led by Bernheim, met with equal success and is now upheld by more people than the other school. The theory of the school of Nancy may be summed up in a few words: first, the different psychological conditions in the hypnotic state are determined by mental action; secondly, people of good sound physical health and of perfect mental balance can produce the best results; and thirdly, all the mental and physical actions are the results of suggestion. In fact suggestion is the all-important factor in producing the various phenomena.

Liébault and Bernheim, his pupil, by bringing forth the idea of suggestion, have made themselves in a way the equal of Braid, for in continuation of the latter's method the method of the former is always used nowadays. The influence of Bernheim over his patients is remarkable. His great success may be accounted for by the confidence his patients have in him. Of course the low intellectual state of the peasant class of France may have something to do with it, for one can hardly think that in any ordinary community this supreme belief and trust in a human being could exist. To Nancy people come from all over the provinces to visit this "Man of God," who performs experiments and cures which seem divine. Bernheim goes from one patient to another, shouting "Sleep!" Many of them having been hypnotized by him often, fall into the state immediately. When the experiments are over he goes the rounds of his patients, snapping his fingers, in which way he awakens them.

To sum up, then, we may say the history of hypnotism may be divided into five epochs. The first, before the time of Mesmer; the second, the age of Mesmerism, when personal magnetism was supposed to be the attractive power; the third, the age of Braid, when the science was put on a physiological basis; the fourth, the age of Bernheim and Charcot, when the idea of suggestion was brought to the front and hypnotism was used indiscriminately; and lastly, the fifth, the age we are in now, where the tendency is to restrict hypnotism and to classify it for specific uses.

The Nature of Hypnotism.

Each individual has a separate state of consciousness which changes as do the thoughts therein. It is in the waking state that we have separate individualities. Now let us see the gradations of this consciousness. At this present moment we shall say we are listening intently to a sermon. That is the thing uppermost in our minds, and as long as our minds are upon it we are exercising acute consciousness. But, even if our attention to this sermon is the central thing, in the fringe of our mental picture a number of other thoughts are jumping around, any one of which may be powerful enough to force its way into the middle of the picture and to usurp its place. For example, all the while we are listening to this sermon we are more or less conscious that the seats we are in are hard, that somebody is talking next to us, etc. Our seats may become so uncomfortable that it may occupy our whole attention, or something outside may seem of more interest. If our attention jumps from one thing to another, this is called diffused consciousness. The next step to diffused consciousness is the dreamy state where the mind is half way between waking and sleep. Anything may come into the mind while in this state and be the predominant idea, to be chased out again by a next idea. It is for this reason that dreams usually present such a chaos and jumble. Our thoughts tumble over one another to get from the fringe of consciousness to the foreground. Any external sensation will be greatly exaggerated and may turn the trend of our thought. A warm bed might feel like the fire of hell, a heavy dinner with indigestion like the battles of heroes using our poor bodies as the fighting ground. As dreams gradually fade away we approach our first hypnosis or sleep, which, in the beginning, is slight, but gradually deepens, finally consciousness being entirely lost.

Thus we have traced the process of natural sleep to which hypnotic sleep is closely akin. The person at first has a diffused attention, he then confines his attention to sleep, he next passes into a dreaming state, then into a light sleep and lastly into a deep sleep.

The differences between it and natural sleep are as follows: first, the state ordinarily is produced by another; secondly, the person must have faith; and thirdly, the phenomena in the sleep must be produced by suggestion. The two latter were fully recognized years ago and have formed the basis of all psychical cures ever since. How the sleep can be produced by another was seen in the experiments of Braid, where one appreciates fully that the person really hypnotizes himself by gazing at an object. The full understanding between hypnotized and hypnotist has never been really understood, and so here we are stopped short.

The theory of Dr. Hudson may put us on the right track. Because it is so convenient a theory and tends to make plausible a number of things which otherwise could not be understood, I am going to take the liberty of detailing it here. Dr. Hudson claims that every normal person is possessed of two minds, a subjective one and an objective one. The objective mind is the one we use every day, a mind fully capable of forgetting and the only one of which we are ordinarily cognizant. The subjective mind is the *perfect* mind wherein are stored up all the numerous thoughts that have ever come into it, there lying dormant, only to be reawakened when a new set of associations brings them forth.

It is this mind which we may say is used in hypnotism, in somnambulism, the one which shows itself in altered personality and in various other abnormalities. Some authors consider this the subliminal or subconscious mind.[1]

That there is another mind far more perfect and which brings to our recollection many things forgotten, seems to be an undisputed fact. When a drug like Cannabis indica is used, or when a person is drowning, there come before his mind's eye, in a single moment, the doings of years. And so in some recorded cases of trance states the same thing is proved. A highly interesting case is given by Mr. Coleridge in his "Biographica Literaria."

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[1] One cannot help realizing that this theory will never be fully accepted. Most psychologists are still quarrelling over concepts, and no two will agree as to what is meant by a subjective or an objective mind.

Mr. Coleridge says:

"It occurred in a Roman Catholic town in Germany, a year or two before my arrival at Göttingen, and had not then ceased to be a frequent subject of conversation. A young woman of four or five and twenty, who could neither read nor write, was seized with a nervous fever, during which, according to the asseverations of all the priests and monks of the neighborhood, she became possessed, and as it appeared, by a very learned devil. She continued incessantly talking Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, in very pompous tones, and with a most distinct enunciation. This possession was rendered more probable by the known fact that she was, or had been, a heretic. The case had attracted the particular attention of a young physician, and by his statement many eminent physiologists and psychologists visited the town and cross examined the case on the spot. Sheets full of her ravings were taken down from her own mouth and were found to consist of sentences, coherent and intelligible each for itself, but with little or no connection with each other. Of the Hebrew, a small portion only could be traced to the Bible; the remainder seemed to be in Rabbinical dialect. All trick or conspiracy was out of the question. Not only had the young woman been a harmless simple creature, but she was evidently under a nervous fever. In the town in which she had been resident for many years as a servant in different families, no solution presented itself. The young physician, however, determined to trace her past life, step by step; for the patient herself was incapable of returning a rational answer. He at length succeeded in discovering the place where her parents had lived, travelled thither, found them both dead, but an uncle surviving, and from him learned that the patient had been charitably taken by an old Protestant pastor at nine years old, and had remained with him some years, even till the old man's death. Of this pastor the uncle knew nothing, but that he was a very good man. With great difficulty and after much search, our young medical philosopher discovered a niece of the pastor's, who had lived with him as housekeeper and had inherited his effects. She remembered the girl; related that her venerable uncle had been too indulgent, and could not hear the girl scolded; that she was willing to have kept her, but that, after her parents' death, the girl herself refused to stay. Anxious inquiries were then, of course, made concerning the pastor's habits; and the solution of the phenomenon was soon obtained. For it appeared that it had been the old man's custom for years to walk up and down a passage of his house into which the kitchen door opened, and to read to himself, with a loud voice, out of his favorite books. A considerable number of these were still in the niece's possession. She added that he was a very learned man and a great Hebraist. Among the books was found a collection of Rabbinical writings, together with several of the Greek and Latin fathers; and the physician succeeded in identifying so many passages with those taken down at the young woman's bedside that no doubt could remain in any rational mind concerning the true origin of the impression made on her nervous system."

The same power of the subjective mind is many times seen in hypnotic phenomena. The case cited is but one of a number, all of which are just as wonderful. Being a mind so perfectly endowed, it is hardly too audacious to say that this mind exercises its influence over all bodily functions, so that any function may be inhibited or accelerated by its influence. For example, the following is related of Henry Clay.

"On one occasion he was unexpectedly called upon to answer an opponent who addressed the Senate on a question in which Clay was deeply interested. The latter felt too ill to reply at length. It seemed imperative, however, that he should say something; and he exacted a promise from a friend who sat behind him that he would stop him at the end of ten minutes. Accordingly, at the expiration of the prescribed time the friend gently pulled the skirts of Mr. Clay's coat. No attention was paid to the hint, and after a brief time it was repeated a little more imperatively. Still Clay paid no attention and it was again repeated. Then a pin was brought into requisition; but Clay was by that time thoroughly aroused, and was pouring forth a torrent of eloquence. The pin was inserted deeper and deeper into the orator's leg without eliciting any response, until his friend gave up in despair. Finally Mr. Clay happened to glance at the clock and saw that he had been speaking two hours; whereupon he fell into his friend's arms, completely overcome by exhaustion, upbraiding his friend severely for not stopping him at the prescribed time.

The fact that Mr. Clay, on that occasion, made one of the ablest speeches of his life, two hours in length, at a time when he felt almost too ill to rise to his feet, and that his body was at the time in a condition of perfect anæsthesia, is a splendid illustration of the synchronous action of the two minds, and also of the perfect control exercised by the subjective mind over the functions and sensations of the body ("Law of Psychic Phenomena").

I now propose to attempt to explain some of the phenomena of hypnotism by reviewing thoroughly a specific example.

On November 23, 1901, I was asked by a young lady to try to cure her of biting her fingernails. She was then about eighteen years of age. I immediately replied that I should be glad to do so if I had her full permission. Besides her and myself, there were four or five other persons in the room, including her father and mother. Getting her perfectly composed, I placed my hand on the top of her head, and told her to turn her eyes in the direction of the hand. This tired her eyes very readily. They became heavier, the eyelids twitched and inside of five minutes they fell and she was sound asleep. I first placed her in a cataleptic condition. I told her her arm was a piece of stone and therefore could not be bent. Two or three of those assembled tried to bend it, but failed. Then by more suggestions I placed her in an anæsthetic condition and rubbed the ball of her eye. She neither winked nor flinched. I then gave her a few post-hypnotic suggestions. For example, I told her that when she awakened she would go over and close the window, that she would then thank me for what I had done, and would feel no bad effects and also would remember nothing. Then I told her that the following Sunday I would come over, and, as soon as I told her to go to sleep, she would do so. When she awoke, she went over and closed the window, and then thanked me for what I had done. She remembered nothing and felt much rested. Of course, suggestions were constantly given that she would not bite her nails.

The following Sunday, I went over there again. She had not bitten her fingernails since the last time I saw her. I told her to lie down and that in three minutes she would be sound asleep. I used no method whatsoever. In fact, I was in another room. When the three minutes were up, I went in to her and found her in a deep sleep. I impressed on her a number of times that she would never bite her fingernails again. I placed her in a chair, telling her to open her eyes. She was to see or hear nobody but me. A number of people stood before her, but she could not see them. I asked her a question which she readily answered. Then somebody else asked her the same question, but no answer could be got from her. She seemed perfectly deaf to their words. I asked her if she heard anybody else and she answered "No." I next procured a needle which was perfectly clean, and telling her she would feel no pain I ran it into her forearm for over half an inch. Very little blood appeared, as I had suggested, and she felt nothing. In fact, after the experiments were over she did not know anything about the wound. Taking a glass of water, I told her it was whiskey. She took a little with some show of difficulty in swallowing, and when I told her to walk about the room she reeled around as though she were overcome by the liquor. I then procured some salt, telling her it was sugar and that it would cure her of her dizziness immediately. She took the salt, a half teaspoonful, said it tasted sweet, asked for more, and was entirely herself again. Finally I placed her between two people, putting her head on one's lap and her feet on the other's. She became cataleptic on my suggestion and when two hundred and fifty pounds were put on her body she sustained them very readily.

Before she awakened I gave her three suggestions: (1) That as soon as she awoke she would go into the front room and lie down on the sofa for a few minutes; (2) that she would go up to her parents and tell them that she was never going to bite her nails again; and (3) that two weeks from that night she would sit down after supper and write me a letter, thanking me for what I had done. All these suggestions were carried into effect.

On Monday, December 9, two weeks and a day after the experiment had been made, I received the following letter:

> "Dec. 8th, 1901.
>
> "Dear Mr. Hays:
>
> "I feel as though I owe you a note of thanks for the wonderful cure you have effected on me. I have not bitten my nails since three weeks ago to-night, and I am very proud of them. I am writing this to try to let you know how much I thank you. It seems remarkable that a little thing like hypnotism can do so much good, and I shall always feel grateful and indebted to you for this.
>
> "Yours sincerely,
> "E."

Not until after the letter had been sent did she find out that it had been I who prompted her to do it. This young lady has not bitten her fingernails since and is entirely cured.

We have already found the primary cause of the sleep when produced by the tiring of the eyes. The eyelids droop because the muscles become temporarily paralyzed. There is one advantage in placing the hand on top of the head. It is that it rolls the eyeballs upward, thus putting them in a natural position for sleep. The various other processes after the sleep has been produced are all dependent on the workings of the nervous system. Let us first try to explain the cataleptic state—how it is that the arm becomes so rigid that the bones can be broken before the arm will bend. The most plausible explanation to my mind is that impulses are sent from the brain which make one set of muscles counteract the influence of another set. For example, let us say that two men of equal strength are pulling with all their might on a thick stick. As long as the pull is the same on both sides, the stick won't move. How the mind can exert such an influence we do not know. This same idea of the counteraction of various muscles applies to the whole body as well as to one arm. Yet some one may ask how these muscles can have the power to stand more strain than they do in the waking state. It is only that as our normal selves we never use our full muscle power. This is because not enough stimulation is ever given to the muscle to make it work to its full extent. But in cases of great excitement or danger even the weakest seem to have superhuman strength.

The loss of the sense of pain or anæsthesia can also be accounted for by the brain. When we say we have a pain in our finger, we don't really mean that. The cut is in the finger, but the pain is in the brain, and consciousness is necessary for us to have pain. Suppose a man is going to have an operation on his finger and is made unconscious. Now the finger is there, but the pain has disappeared, showing that pain is not located in various parts of the body, but in the domain of consciousness. So if, under hypnotic influence, you tell the patient that he will have no pain, he thinks the pain away, so to speak—knocks it out of his consciousness.

How we can run needles into people and produce no blood seems still more remarkable, but physiologically it *can* be explained. Let me say here that if any one should pierce a large artery with a needle serious consequences might result. Let us say that we penetrate the skin in a place where there are thousands of little capillaries. Each one of these vessels is connected with the nervous system by two sets of nerve fibres—those which can dilate the vessels, those which can constrict them. Now, suppose I give the suggestion that I am going to run a needle through a certain part of the arm. An impulse, sent from the brain, constricts the blood-vessels at this spot, inhibits the sense of pain, and the needle comes out again without a drop of blood following it.

The explanation of the dizziness from water supposed to be whiskey and the cure by salt supposed to be sugar is that both are the result of an unexplainable force whereby the patient takes every word of the hypnotizer as gospel, though it is contradictory to his own ideas. For example, in one case a patient told me that he knew the glass contained water and yet it tasted like whiskey, and he also knew that the cellar contained salt and yet it tasted like sugar.

The cure of the fingernail habit and all the post-hypnotic suggestions may be summed up briefly. All we should do is to refer back to the perfect or subjective mind, where all these suggestions are stored up, and say that the objective mind draws nutriment from it, and in this nutriment these suggestions given under the hypnotic influence come into play.

Before closing this portion of the essay I should like to say that I believe hypnotism is not an occult power, but is a simple, natural, physiological process. And again, anybody can use the power just as any one can become a good piano player, or student, or business man by training. Yet it is only those with the natural tendency toward personal power who will make the greatest success.

It would indeed be pleasing to me to cite a number of wonderful cases where hypnotism has been used experimentally in order to show the great influence of the mind over the body—how a horse can be ridden over the outstretched body of a man in a cataleptic state, how illusions and hallucinations can be produced, how we may even obtain negative hallucinations, how we can turn an adult into a child, how we can conjure before the mind's eye vistas grand and superb, panoramas gorgeous and elegant, how the commonest man may become an orator, a saint, an assassin perhaps. But all these things would be far beyond the scope of this essay. However, one case seems to be of especial interest, as it shows how far hypnotism may be used in the cure of various inflammations.

"The experiment is on a nurse twenty-eight years old, who is not at all hysterical. She is a daughter of plain country people, and has been for a long time an attendant in the Zurich Lunatic Asylum, which Forel directs. He thinks her a capable, honest person, in no way inclined to deceit. The experiments were as follows: A gummed label was fixed upon her chest on either side; the paper was square. In no case was an irritating gum used. At midday Forel suggested that a blister had been put on the left side; and at six o'clock in the evening a moist spot had appeared in that place; the skin was swollen and red around it, and a little inflammation also appeared on the right side, but much less. Forel then did away with the suggestion. On the next day there was a scab on the left side. Forel had not watched the nurse between noon and six o'clock, but had suggested that she could not scratch herself. The other nurses said that the subject could not raise her hand to her chest, but made vain attempts to scratch. Forel repeated the experiment later; he put on the paper at 11:45 A.M. and ordered the formation of blisters in two and one-half hours. Little pain was suggested, and the nurse therefore complained but little. At two o'clock Forel looked at the paper on the left side, for which the suggestion had been made, and saw around it a large swelling and reddening of the skin. The paper could with difficulty be removed. A moist surface of epidermis was then visible, exactly square like the paper. There was nothing particular under the paper on the right side. Forel then suggested the disappearance of the pain, inflammation, etc."

In time everything disappeared.

Many investigators have been able to bring about a change in blood supply and other visceral changes of a similar kind. Changes in temperature have been made as much as three degrees centigrade. Bernheim found that by suggestion he could induce local reddening of the skin. This is undoubtedly a vaso-motor change. These local red spots were often found in the Middle Ages on the hands of monks and nuns after they had been looking steadily at a cross for hours. At that time it was supposed to be a miracle and a message from the Divinity. In 1860, a woman was found with these spots or blisters caused by something unknown. It was learned that she got these while in the hypnotic state. The wounds healed in the normal way, and all that remained to make it necessary for it to be commented upon was that it gave the investigators the idea of trying to produce these spots by artificial means. Krafft-Ebing, a noted German physician, produced certain results analogous to those cited above. He would put something in the patient's hand and give him the suggestion that it was burning. A reddening would appear. He would take a scissors, a piece of metal, and a postage stamp (saying it was a mustard plaster), and would produce the same results.

Wonderful as it may seem—that hypnotic suggestion can produce such grave organic changes—the physician has only to reflect for a moment on the powerful changes which the mind exerts over the course of a disease. He realizes only too well that the mental attitude of the patient toward his malady is of almost as much importance in the cure as the therapeutic measures he may advise. Processes of inflammation are purely physiological in the light of modern medicine, and yet there can be no inflammatory process which cannot be made worse by concentrated mental worry. A sore finger to the phlegmatic individual is a trifle: but the hysterical woman makes a "mountain out of a mole hill" of it and thereby actually makes the inflammation worse.

The Uses of Hypnotism.

The general tendency has been in the last decade to use hypnotism indiscriminately; but, like every therapeutic agent, it in time will become restricted and used only in certain complaints. It surely should be included by every physician in his "therapeutic arsenal." It has one thing in its favor which places it above all remedial agents, and that is that when it is used properly it can do no harm. We must recognize that in all the scientific literature on the subject there has not a single death been reported from its use. The unscientific application is its abuse.

We must also recognize that there are many cases that are practically incurable by medical treatment, cases which defy the greatest physicians, cases which are surprising because of their persistency. When the last extreme has been reached, when physicians consult and pronounce the case as practically incurable, hypnotism may be tried.

Before the advent of ether or chloroform, the possibility of using hypnotism for anæsthetic purposes was thought of and apparently its use in this direction met with success in a limited number of cases. In 1859, Dr. Guérineau announced that he had amputated a thigh under hypnotic anæsthesia. Some other reports are as follows: Jules Cloquent amputated a breast in 1845; Dr. Loysel of Cherbourg amputated a leg and removed some glands in 1846; a double amputation of the legs by Drs. Fanton and Toswel in 1845; amputation of an arm by Dr. Joly in 1845; and in 1847 a tumor of the jaw was removed by Drs. Ribaud and Kiaro of Poitiers—all under hypnotic anæsthesia (Bernheim's "Suggestive Therapeutics").

But hypnotism was found to have more drawbacks than advantages in these cases of major surgery. In the first place, hypnotic anæsthesia is a difficult state to produce and even a more difficult state to maintain. Secondly, there is always the possibility of the patient awakening unexpectedly and dying from the shock of the operation.

Although it has thus fallen out of use as an anæsthetic in these serious cases, still it is used constantly, and more and more every day, in minor surgery. In dentistry it certainly has its place; in outpatient departments of our hospitals it is often of value, as it has no after-effects.

The various medical cases that have been treated by the hypnotic method are too numerous to recount. They include nearly every form of mental non-equilibrium and also cases of general organic trouble dependent more or less on the mental attitude of the patient. They include habits of various kinds, such as onychophagie or fingernail biting, excessive smoking, dypsomania, nervous twitchings, etc., nervous headaches, insomnia and neuralgias; chronic nervous constipation and diarrhœa and dyspepsia; local and general pain, insomnia and neurasthenia. Nor is this all. Hypnotism's greatest blessing consists in the cure of psychic paralytics and psychic hysterics. In this connection we may say that it should be used unconditionally. Dr. Starr in a lecture at the College of Physicians and Surgeons cited a case of paralysis in the left arm from the shoulder to the elbow. A physician knows that it is impossible to get a true paralysis of this kind. Dr. Starr hypnotized the patient in his clinic and in less than three minutes the arm was in as good working order as ever. During the course of the past year, I have worked on a few hysterical cases for physicians where nothing but hypnotism could cure them. A remarkable case of true organic nature came to my notice over a year ago. A lady had a severe swelling on her finger which was so painful that I could hardly bandage it for her. I put her to sleep, suggested the pain away, told her the inflammation would subside the next day and awakened her. I could then do anything I wished to the finger without hurting her.

I have left aside the part that hypnotism plays in mental and moral culture—a phase of the subject so vast that it deserves more consideration than could be given here, but the possibilities of which must suggest themselves to all.

XXXVIII

THE WILL

"ITS CULTIVATION AND POWER"

BY

JULES FINOT

CLOSE allied to hypnotism and the vast field of new thoughts, new possibilities, which it is opening to man, come the problems and possibilities of the Will. Its power may be developed, trained, strengthened most amazingly, aroused to special lines of effort, set to special duties. Among the most interesting, perhaps the most valuable of its possibilities, is that here discussed by M. Jules Finot, the noted editor of the Paris Revue. *Can life be visibly and definitely prolonged, not at some distant day by our far-off descendants, but here and now, for each and every one of us, usefully, by the rightful direction of the will?*

What chances, what possibilities, does science thus hold out to us! What shifting of the whole machinery of civilization, if we may continue our individual work and our progress for a century or beyond!

I

To the nineteenth century may be ascribed the virtue of having sanctioned and explained the actual existence of certain disturbing facts which have been pointed out by chroniclers and historians for many centuries gone by. These facts, formerly regarded as lies, have suddenly changed their aspect. The power of suggestion, which has been verified, controlled, and admitted, has at the same time reduced the number of the impostors and miracles of past times. The most unlikely phenomena have regained their veneer of reality. They are no longer contested, because they appear to us natural, possible, verifiable.

Thus we admit that St. Francis of Assisi, or St. Catherine of Siena, may have felt the pains of the Passion. Their prolonged attention fixed on the points where legend says the nails and the sword blade pierced the body of Christ, caused wounds. The blood flowed from them. These persistent wounds may, indeed, have induced in St. Francis, as well as much later in Louise Lataud, certain thickenings of skin covered with blood, which recalled the nail heads of the cross.

Why should we deny this palpable effect of suggestion while so many others, much more strange, discover themselves to our own eyes? Charles Richet and Barthélemy quote the case of a mother, a very nervous woman, who was present one day at an alarming spectacle: a heavy curtain-rod threatened to become detached and fall on her child kneeling close at hand. On the neck of the terrified mother a ring of erythema formed at the very place where the child might have been struck.

The influence of our sensations and ideas on our bodies is as multifarious as the sensations and ideas themselves. Carpenter tells of a man who, in spite of great muscular weakness, lifted a very heavy weight one day because he thought it insignificant. Corvisart attended the Empress Josephine and obtained satisfactory results by the administration of bread pills. At all times faith in miracles has produced those very miracles. Those at Lourdes are only a repetition of the votive tablets recovered from the Tiber which testify to the extraordinary feats accomplished by the Asclepiads. "In these last days," we read, "a certain Gaius, who was blind, learned from the oracle that he must repair to the altar, offer up prayers there, and then cross the temple from right to left, rest his five fingers on the altar, raise his hand, and place it over his eyes. He immediately recovered his sight in presence and amid the acclamations of the people."

If we take up the narratives published by Mr. Henri Lasserre in his "Lourdes," or by the Abbé Georges Bertin in his

"Critical History of the Events at Lourdes," we find similar phenomena. A lady who had become epileptic as the result of a great fright, submitted herself for examination to a number of doctors. All the remedies of science proved powerless. But she was taken to the grotto, and that visit, together with a novena, restored her to health.

Parallel to this is a story related by the ancients. A Roman soldier, Valerius Aper, recovers his sight because he follows the advice of the gods. In conformity with their command, he made a pomade of the blood of a white cock mixed with some honey, and with that he rubbed his eyes.

We need only read once again what Charcot, Hack Tuke, and many others recount of recoveries by suggestion to doubt neither the miracles of Lourdes nor many other miracles disputed by the centuries, ancient and modern. Even Pomponace made the malicious observation that while on one hand certain cures were only the effect of imagination and of faith in certain relics, it sufficed on the other "to put in the place of a saint's bones the bones of quite another skeleton without any prejudice to the sick. The cure resulted as long as the sufferer was ignorant of the change that had been effected." Following in the path of merciful tolerance inaugurated by Charcot, certain of his adepts practise a residence at the grotto of Lourdes on their believing patients. They are put to sleep and the idea is suggested to them that they are in the sacred grotto. In the same way the Holy Virgin is made to intervene. The patients are given to drink of the water of the Marne or the Loire, and, with the help of saving faith, a gentle and kindly recovery is induced.

The action on the body of our psychic life manifests itself thus in all forms. The discovery of the vaso-motor nerves, made by Claude Bernard, has enabled us to introduce a little order among the numerous and complicated effects provoked by suggestion both from without and from within (auto-suggestion). We now know the controlling action of the brain, which by means of the vaso-motor nerves has an effect on all our organs. The beating of the heart may become slower, quicker, or may even cease under the stress of emotions such as anger or fear. A very great fright may even cause death through syncope.

Intense attention, concentrated on any portion of our body, provokes manifest changes there. Thus redness or paleness may be induced in the face, or swellings on different parts of the body. Certain monks were found with the red marks of flagellation or with the signs of Christ's suffering, as the result of too prolonged or too often repeated hours of ecstasy. Charcot relates numerous cases of the phenomena of burns or ecchymoses appearing on the bodies of people as a consequence of suggestion directed to that end.

By the aid of simple suggestion we can thus diagnose functional troubles, organic injuries and hemorrhages as well as curative vaso-constriction. The cases of cure by suggestion of the expectoration of blood, and especially of bleeding from the nose (*epistaxis*), are exceedingly frequent. This has been noticed chiefly in connection with loss of blood caused by wounds. Punctures, however deep, in the hypnotic state are never accompanied by a flow of blood.

The ancients, to take Homer's word for it ("Odyssey"), were already familiar with the force of suggestion in this respect. The wily Ulysses, injured by a boar, had recourse to a special incantation in order to stop the blood escaping from his wound. By founding our theories on Claude Bernard's vaso-motor system we are able to explain in the same way a number of other phenomena which we owe to suggestion. Thus, conditions of our mind, its passions and sentiments, cause the strangest reactions on the organism. Faith enables you to cross mountains, as our ancestors used to say. Courage gets the better of the most redoubtable enemies. It is often not the medicines which cure, but the confidence people have in the doctor.

In their most simple expression the passions cause phenomena which are easy to control. Strong emotions give rise to cold sweats, diarrhœa, anæmias, blood poisoning, arrested digestion. Hack Tuke relates the following interesting illustration of the curative effects of a railway catastrophe: a rheumatic subject, seized with a most painful attack of rheumatism, took train in order to go home. His sufferings continued in their most violent form. A collision occurred, caused the death of one of the travellers in his compartment, and suddenly put an end to all the patient's pains.

It would take whole volumes to state the case for the effect of mind on matter—that is to say, the effect of our ideas, sensations, and sentiments on the body. One incontestable fact nevertheless stands out from the examples cited above—viz., psychic influences frequently produce the same effects as stimulants or mechanical influences.

It would, however, be very difficult to place all the known cases under formal categories, for the simple reason that their number is unlimited. When individual impressionability lends itself to it we might call forth with the help of the psychic factors almost the whole gamut of phenomena yielded by material causes.

What, for instance, could be more disturbing than this singular story reported to me the other day? In a dining-room where there were about twenty people, one of the hosts, brusquely interrupting in a voice choked with strong emotion, shouted: "Alas! we are all poisoned; the cook has gone mad and put arsenic in all the sauces!" Thereupon several people were seized with vomiting, others experienced pains like those of arsenic poisoning, while a woman fell to the ground overcome. . . . The mistake was discovered a few moments later, for the supposed arsenic was only mouldy flour that the drunken cook had mistaken for poison.

Under the influence of severe grief the hair changes color in the space of a night. Certain emotions act in a special way on certain glands. The idea of sorrow experienced provokes tears; rage acts on the salivary glands. Shame produces a reddening of the cheeks just as the feeling of fear affects the functions of the heart and often of the digestive organs. Joy facilitates digestion, while anger poisons the organism and unsettles its primordial functions. On the other hand, serenity of mind quite appreciably induces well-being. In this condition all our organs perform their functions in a way which is nearer the normal, more healthy, and more in accordance with the prosperity of the body.

II

When we consider the undoubted reflex action of the mind on the body, we may easily realize that nature has placed certain means at our disposal for increasing our happiness on the earth. We are somewhat in the position of an owner of land in whose depths lie hidden rich veins of gold. What should we say of such a man who, while aware of his riches, refused to exploit them?

And yet this is the case with almost all human beings. We know how easily handled and how evidently certain are these moral instruments which nature has put into our hands, and yet how many are there who have recourse to them? The properly used forces of our mind may render us important services with regard to the prolongation of our life. As we have shown above, there is no doubt that ill-directed suggestion shortens it. Arrived at a certain age we poison ourselves with the idea of or with thoughts about our approaching end. We lose faith in our own strength, and our strength leaves us. On the pretext that age is weighing heavily on our shoulders, we take to sedentary habits and cease to pursue our occupations with vigor. Little by little our blood, vitiated by idleness, and our feebly renewed tissues open the doors to all sorts of maladies. Precocious old age lays siege to us, and we succumb earlier than we need have done, as a result of injurious auto-suggestion.

Now why should we not endeavor to live by auto-suggestion, instead of dying of it? We might keep before our eyes numerous examples of healthy and robust longevity and let our consciousness be invaded and conquered by the possibility of living beyond a hundred years. Goethe said somewhere: "Man can command nature to eliminate from his being all the foreign elements which cause him suffering and illness." However, negative action is not sufficient. One must also proceed to a positive piece of work. One must store up in one's brain beneficent, serene, and comforting suggestions. Every one knows the fundamental basis of the sect of the "Christian Scientists," so wide-spread in the United States. In face of an obvious illness, they affirm that it does not exist, and they suggest the idea that prayers can conquer every evil. Up to the period when, blinded by success, the representatives of this new belief pushed their method, which is excellent in itself, beyond the limits of common sense, unnumbered cures were effected by their invocations. These supposed "miracles" brought in thousands of adherents and millions of dollars to Mother Eddy, the celebrated foundress of this religion, which proves so lucrative for its priests.

III

On a closer study of the life of centenarians, we perceive how an optimistic belief in their strength has helped them to bear the weight of their years. Baron Waldeck, who died in Paris in 1875 at the age of 109, never ceased to entertain the "suggestion" that he had still long to live. At the age of 102 he undertook for the firm of Didot, so Pierre Giffard, his biographer, affirms, a three-volume encyclopedia, treating of archæology. Consumed with his idea that the Egyptian civilization descended in a direct line from the Mexican, he extracted from his ardent work reasons for going on living. Born under Louis XV. and having travelled at the time of La Perouse, this man breakfasted with Laharpe and the Abbé Delille, counted Camille Desmoulins among his friends, knew Bonaparte as a sub-orderly officer in Egypt and Thiers as a drawing master, was present at a series of revolutions, and passed away under MacMahon, almost in the plenitude of his intellectual forces.

M. Rigaud, the senior Mayor of France, whom I met during the Exposition of 1900, told me that at the age of 92 he was in the habit of rising at four in the morning and immediately beginning work, after rubbing himself with cold water.

"How about your 92 years?" I asked, smilingly.

"I never look at them," he said good-naturedly.

As a contractor for public works he was still at that period personally superintending his workmen.

One of my friends, a most distinguished Englishman,

M. W., whom, in spite of his 87 years, I am careful not to call an old man, leads as active a life as if he were no more than thirty. I shall never forget a walk of some hours' duration which we took together in order to visit, among other things, on the heights of Montmartre, the studio of L. Dhurmer, one of our greatest pastel painters. With intense curiosity M. W. set to work to study "the secret" of the master's procedure. The painter, who had heard tell of the venerable age of his visitor, said to him respectfully:

"There are no longer any secrets to you, Admiral."

"Don't you rely on that," said M. W., smiling. "I have plenty of time before me, and I may yet come into competition with you."

And, as a matter of fact, in the following year, M. W. renewed the lease of his London house for 99 years.

Mrs. Margaret Neave, who died in 1904 in the island of Guernsey, at her estate Rouge Huyshe, at the age of 111, was by no means cut off, up to the end of her days, from the outside world. She received visitors and questioned them on the affairs of the day. As long as Queen Victoria was alive, she never failed to send her an annual telegram of congratulations on her birthday. The Queen replied with affection and carefully examined the portrait of old Mrs. Neave, just as some women who are soon expecting to be mothers anxiously watch the faces of beautiful children.

Mme. Viardot, the great friend of Tourgeneff, in spite of her advanced age of 84, continues to give singing lessons. To her active life and to the absence of all depressing suggestions she owes her youthfulness of spirit, which makes her one of the most agreeable talkers in Paris. I shall never forget the vivid portraits she sketched for me of some of the celebrated personages she had met on her long journey. And is not "creation" the true gift of youth?

Such was also the case with the beautiful Mme. Scrivaneek, the glorious rival of Déjazet, whom I saw, toward the year 1900, giving lessons and private tutoring, at the age of about 80.

We ought to take a flying view in memory of the celebrated men who, as nonagenarians or centenarians, have always distinguished themselves by their untiring activity and their faith in "their youth." When we think over their cases, we realize that it was the suggestion of force, the innate conviction that resistance is possible, together with the absence of depressing ideas, which chiefly contributed to the preservation of their health and their prolonged life. So that we see how important it is to shut the door of one's heart, or rather of one's brain, to all injurious ideas as to stingy limits to life. Nature, who created poisons, has also created their antidotes. What, for instance, can be more painful to almost all mortals than the mere thought of inevitable old age? Nearly as many tears have been shed over this necessity as over that of death. For those, alas! who tremble at the dark, are quick to perceive its terrors. And yet this old age, so ill-spoken of and so feared, contains within it unsuspected delights. Everything depends on the angle at which we take up our position for observing and studying it. The author of the Epistles to Lucillus (XII.) goes into ecstasies over its charms. "Apples are not good," he tells us, "until they are beginning to go. The beauty of children appears toward the end. . . . Those who love wine take the greatest pleasure in the last draught they drink. All that is most exquisite in man's pleasures is reserved for the end."

Renan also ("*Discours de réception à l'Académie*") discovered an attractive canvas on which to paint old age, so abhorred of all. "Charming age," he says, "that of the Ecclesiast, the most appropriate to serene gaiety, when one begins to see, after a most laborious day's work, that all is vanity, but also that a number of vain things are worth tasting at leisure."

What a fragrant bouquet of delicious and fortifying herbs might be culled from the delicate thinkers who have meditated long on old age. Try to train yourself in it, and you will taste, little by little, under their influence, the charm of quiet, in the place of the worries of fear. Yet bad suggestions come to us from all sides. We think too much of the diseases of our organs, of the using up of our tissue, and of fatal decrepitude. We distrust our physical and intellectual forces, our memory, our conversational gifts and powers of work. For enemies to our happiness lie in wait for us everywhere. The necessity for keeping them out by good suggestions, and above all by deliberate auto-suggestion, thus becomes most obvious.

IV

We are more cruel to our own interests than nature has any idea of being. The human organism of which we speak so ill is marvellously solid. Probably there is not a single one of the mechanical inventions, on which we so pride ourselves, which could withstand with such impunity the many senseless shocks to which we subject our body. When one thinks of our way of life, which, from the tenderest age, constantly deranges the numerous wheels of the human machine, one cannot but be filled with admiration at its resisting power. Not content, however, with throwing it out of gear, we speak ill of it endlessly as well. Having used and abused our body for a certain number of years, we are then pleased to pronounce it old, senile, lost. And we proceed to neglect it with an absence of care which effects its ruin. After having suffered for many years from our excesses and our follies, it succumbs under the burden of our gratuitous contempt. And when the injury does not come from its own immediate proprietor, you may be sure that our neighbors, relations, or friends will not fail to throw it in its face. Poor human body! Source of so many joys which beautify, nourish, and sustain our life, it is nevertheless reduced to the *rôle* of a mere laughing-stock. The reproach of having a mind or a consciousness which is either senile or worn out creates in us a feeling of revolt. We cannot bear to have any one daring to doubt their strength or their youth. And yet how many are there who venture to animadvert on a sentence of senility unjustly passed upon them? Indeed, men who have reached a certain age bow all the more before such a reproach and do their best to deserve it.

Our superstitions also have a share of the responsibility here as in all other things. Almost all of us experience that of pseudo-senility. Thus we imagine that at sixty years of age or even earlier our hour of retirement has sounded. From this moment we give up our occupations, our exercise, our pleasures. We withdraw from life and it in turn withdraws from us. Now physiology is there to demonstrate to us that our organism may yet accomplish *all* the physiological functions of the preceding periods. And if our digestion or some other function is weak or paralyzed, we have not our years to thank, but the bad use to which we have put them. For, what is senility? It is the time of life at which a man, who has only a worn-out organism at his service, must die his natural death. Now this limit, which might theoretically be put at one hundred and fifty or two hundred years, exists even in reality much further off than we venture to believe.

For a proof of this I will take a series of curious statistical tables of deaths from old age in Paris during a period of eleven years, which were drawn up by Dr. A. Block (Bulletin de la Société d'Anthropologie de Paris, 1896). The result shows that even in this city of Paris, which has such an unwholesome effect on people's health and longevity, senility, such as we have just defined it, appears frequently at the age of from eighty to eighty-five, and even some years later. This is how the author shows the number of deaths from senility, for lack of other visible causes:

Year.	80–85.	85–90.	90–95.	95–100.	100 and Over.
1880	393	213	60	10	1
1881	465	177	36	9	2
1882	413	214	48	8	1
1883	454	264	64	15	0
1884	437	221	59	6	1
1885	398	238	63	15	0
1886	447	255	61	11	1
1887	387	262	58	12	0
1888	441	271	75	13	1
1889	555	293	116	32	3
1890	519	307	116	18	2

The critical period for an old man in Paris therefore appears to be between eighty and eighty-five, for in these five years there are the most numerous deaths from senility. The author, in comparing all these facts, arrives at the apparently paradoxical conclusion that from the age of eighty illness has less power over an old man the older he becomes. In other words, after having passed this critical age, man has more chance of dying of a natural death—that is to say, of crossing the threshold of his centenary. What is the reason of this? It is very simple. It often takes a man eighty years of experience to know how to direct the capacities of his organism with precision.

The most important thing for us is that death from pneumonia, heart disease, and cerebral congestion or hemorrhage, is by no means so frequent after the age of sixty as is ordinarily believed. In other terms, the respiratory apparatus, the circulation, and even the digestive organs continue their functions, or rather they have no special reason for not continuing their functions. In any case, it is not senile decay, a natural cause, which deprives us of their use, but all sorts of accidental causes. Which of us has not met men who have passed the age of eighty and yet digest and breathe very well and are still enjoying all their intellectual faculties?

Rational economy in the use of our organs may preserve them for their work far beyond a century. Often all that is required is that we should be saturated from an early age with this truth in order to enable all who are in love with life to pass beyond this long stage of the journey.

V

Intelligent men have yet another means of prolonging their existence, which the poor in spirit cannot practise. I mean the control of life and its rational use.

In his tract on the "Shortness of Life,"[1] Seneca asserts with reason that "it is not that we have too little time, but we lose so much," and that "the smallest part of our life is the part we live."

From that point of departure he combats the pessimism of Aristotle who poured out recriminations against nature which were hardly worthy of a sage. It is well known that the founder of Peripatetics complained bitterly against the immortal principle of things which had only considered "the animals whose existence was prolonged for five or six centuries, while man, born for so great and various a destiny, found himself pulled up while still far within these limits." But according to Seneca, long life itself only becomes short because of our inaptitude in using it. And the philosopher makes the profound remark, which has never ceased to be true in spite of the number of centuries which stand between us and its author:

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[1] *De brevitate vitæ. "Non exiguum temporis habemus, sed multum perdimus."* . . . *"Exigua pars est vitæ, quam nos vivimus."*

"No man permits any encroachment on his field, and for the smallest dispute about a boundary stones and javelins are let fly, and each suffers his life to be invaded. . . . You cannot find any one who will share his money, yet each lavishes his life on all comers. All attach importance to the management of their patrimony, but, as soon as it becomes a question of loss of time, they are prodigal to excess with the one good thing of which it would be beneficial to be stingy."

In taking up this point of view we see how cruel man is with regard to his own interests. We are all agreed as to the value of life and time, its supreme expression. Yet rare are those who really know how to honor it. Let each one pass in review the months and years lost in vices which shorten our existence, in a sort of moral or intellectual lethargy which ought to be deducted from life, and we can easily see that we are our own executioners. We must not believe in the control exercised by acts of the civil state, nor even in the outward signs of old age. Like the face of a clock, they perform the function of mechanical registration. The hidden truth rarely corresponds to these formal signs. Such and such a white beard or such and such a birth certificate pointing to two or three quarters of a century of human life, may perhaps only correspond to fifteen or twenty years. The squandering of individual lives only finds its equal in that of modern civilization with its armaments and its wars. Let each of us examine his conscience and he will tremble with indignation and horror at the lion's share of his life which has been destroyed by carelessness and lightness. Along with our own errors we must include those of our defective systems of education and instruction.

The illnesses which might have been avoided, as well as the evils of the education of youth, abstract from life more years than each would require in order to become a centenarian. Thus we see that the science of life, the art of using it intelligently would distinctly prolong its limits. The people who groan at the years which in slipping away bring them nearer the fatal *dénouement* remind one of the prodigals who lament the enforced outlay of a few halfpence, while they are tossing sovereigns out of the window.

How true is the neat saying of Charron: "It is characteristic of a great master to enclose much in a little space." It is perhaps in this quarter that we might easily find one of the numerous keys to long life.

VI

But how are we to counteract the depressing influences which lie in wait for us every moment of our lives? Consider the evil and the good, and what do we find? It is often quite enough for some one to tell us some thing nice and pleasant to produce a condition of peace and serenity in our minds. More important still: often in the grip of analytical melancholy or of unlimited despair we sit down to think over our case. After careful examination we find it by no means so exasperating. If we continue our thinking the calmer aspects of the event stand out with reassuring clearness. They even smile at us good-naturedly, and we may confidently abandon ourselves to their tender mercies. Thus unhappy impressions fade away, injurious or depressing sentiments become less acute, and, just as the surface of a lake which has been disturbed by the invasion of some body from outside regains its habitual stillness, so our conscious mind regains its equilibrium. For, in nature, there is nothing either absolutely good or absolutely bad. In the saddest things there is an element of sweetness, if not of gayety. It is our business to seek it, and having found it to make good use of it.

A wise man will do still more. Instead of having recourse, on special occasions, to this beneficent fairy, he will wish to keep her always close to him. Looking into her smiling face, he will acquire renewed strength for each misfortune. He will let life's furrows be smoothed away by her musical laughter. Cross-grained philosophers and psychologists will no doubt say that this is optimism unworthy of superior men. What does that matter? We may say what evil we like of optimism, but we must admit all the same that it is closely bound up with the fortunes of human beings. It is all very well to try to substitute the philosophy of ill-temper, in other words, gnawing pessimism, as the natural system of humanity. We have only to examine a man a little nearer and to observe with what joy he entertains the smiles of the good fairy and turns from the grimaces of pessimism to see which way nature draws him. If we cast a look round us we notice how instinctively a man lets himself be drawn along by his own optimistic tendencies. The many games of chance with their risks bordering on the unlikely; the thronging of the liberal professions where success is rare; the faith in political panaceas, and the spectacle of so many other of the games of life where impregnable belief in a happy issue constantly dominates the fear of misfortune all go to prove it. Humanity left to itself, as Dr. Max Nordau says somewhere, gives way by preference and by instinct to happy influences. Consequently these have more chance of possessing us. All we need is to utilize them for our own happiness.

I cannot contemplate the vast fields of international literature without emotion.

Millions of people of the writing profession make a living out of the misery and scorn of the public and the critics. Yet they continue to introduce their works often at the cost of appalling injuries to their self-respect. In their robust faith in the future they discount the glory of to-morrow and even that due to them from far-off generations. And yet they cannot ignore the fact that out of the thousands of works and of writers who preceded us, not more than a few hundreds have survived. In comparison with the chances which we have in the lottery of literary glory, a share in the Panama or the Crédit Foncier of Paris might almost be considered a certainty of a big haul.

What has become of the greatest poets of Greece? Which of us has ever read a single line of Simonides, who was fifty-six times a winner in the prize competitions; or of Philetas, whom Theocritus despaired of ever equalling? Max Bonnet, in his "Classical Philology," argues that Homer, Sophocles, and Euripides have only survived because they have been made subjects for the practical studies of our youth! This is how the glory of these immortal poets is maintained from among all the men who had the opportunity of living in an epoch when, as is said, mankind was not suffering from any embarrassment of talent or genius. Were it not for our rooted optimism the millions of writers who spring up all over the world would no doubt snap their pens and take to more peaceful and, O irony supreme! more durable work. Thus there is nothing easier than to reach the port of happiness by trusting one's self to optimist currents.

Yet those who feel incapable of putting this comforting philosophy in practice may have recourse to a surprisingly simple method. It is none the less efficacious. Every one knows the story of the sick man, who, while suffering from neuralgia, argued so well with his pain that it finally disappeared. What is required is auto-suggestion for each given case, instead of falling back on some general doctrine. Does not psychotherapeutics, the new departure in medicine, teach us that certain illnesses disappear as if by enchantment as the result of constantly repeated suggestions? Dr. F. Régnault relates that in treating a hypochondriac he advised him to write on the wall every evening the words, "I am happy," and to go off to sleep in full view of them. After a few weeks happiness began to steal into his spirit. Which of us, in speaking of God, does not instinctively turn toward the sky? Neither science nor reason can prevail against the mechanical repetition of the phrase, which is yet so contrary to the most elementary notions of astronomy: "Our Father, which art in Heaven." In moments of distress, astronomers themselves may be found seeking for their God in some hidden corner of the universe!

VII

What endless resource is provided in this way against the invading years! Let us accept them with confidence and look on them with the softness which befits men of wisdom. Let us ever keep before our eyes comforting examples of serene old age and probable longevity. Little by little our optimistic visions will become a guard of honor. They will be on the watch that poisonous fears do not take possession of our consciousness. Those who are not sensitive to this surrounding atmosphere of reasoned thought may, on the other hand, have recourse to direct and repeated suggestion. Let us then repeat every day and at every moment when the fears of helpless old age come back to memory, first of all that it is a long way off, and secondly let us remind ourselves of its attractions. This direct action on the mind will have extraordinary results. And as the hypochondriac comes to be always smiling by continually telling himself that he is happy, so people obsessed by the thought of old age and death may be restored to calm at their approach.

Our unreasoned fears, by demoralizing our minds, only accelerate their destructive advance. In facing them with the careful consideration worthy of a well-informed man, we remove our limits. Our apprehensions are put to sleep under the influence of thought just as, according to the Indians, the evil desires of love are by *malalis*.

Let us especially put ourselves under the most powerful influence of all, that of work. Let us prolong our youth under the protection of these illusions. Let us use our minds rather than enfeeble our bodies for want of occupation. In a word, let us not give ourselves time to grow old!

The inevitable visitation which must at some time lead in the two dreaded sisters, old age and death, will not only take place later, but, what is more essential, will become a thing almost to be desired. They will be awaited like guests who are to bring us at some distant, even at some very distant, day, the attractive charm of their sweet and peaceful melancholy.

XXXIX

THE HOPE

"THE UNKNOWN GOD"

BY

SIR HENRY THOMPSON

WE approach the close of our series. We have faced life from many sides, examined it in many aspects. From the immaterial side, the side of creation, of godhood, and of mystery, we are perhaps ready to ask ourselves the final question, What shall we, what can we, what at heart do we believe of an existence beyond and above us? Upon this mighty subject each individual has meditated perforce, with whatsoever of profundity and earnestness lies within his nature. Positive conclusions, drawn partly perhaps from an inherited faith, partly from a limited personal experience, are held by some among us with a passionate intensity which defies doubt almost as a crime. Others cry clamorously to their neighbors for fuller light. Others have pushed the question aside impatiently as beyond solution. What, let us ask ourselves, would a thoughtful man believe who had seen all life and studied all religions without, if such a case were possible, a preconceived partiality for any one among them? What in brief will the man of the future believe when he has come to know all that may be knowable on earth?

The first of these two questions we can answer partly, though not the second. We have here the words of a man famous in the annals of medicine, a noted English physician who until his recent death was not only a leader in his profession but a man of mark in the social world, a diplomat and "friend of kings." Sir Henry Thompson ranked as "physician extraordinary" *to more than one of the crowned heads of Europe. He was not a professional writer, but early in life he began that serious and untrammelled search into religion which here finds such striking literary expression. This summing up in a strictly logical way of the conclusions he had finally reached was Sir Henry's last important work, his legacy to the world. That he does not literally accept Christianity need afflict no Christian mind. Rather should each one draw encouragement from the fact that while wholly ignoring "revelation" this profound investigator has reached results so close akin to all its teachings.*

An attempt to seek, by a carefully made induction from available data, some certain assurance respecting the influence which the "Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed" has exercised on Man throughout his long career on Earth.

"But amid the mysteries which become the more mysterious the more they are thought about, there will remain the absolute certainty that he (the Astronomer) is ever in presence of an Infinite and Eternal Energy, from which all things proceed."—HERBERT SPENCER, *Nineteenth Century Review*, Jan., 1884.

I

I SUPPOSE there can be no doubt in the mind of any intelligent student of Nature, by which term is to be understood the numerous and multiform phenomena which any and every part of the Universe within his reach presents, that careful investigation inevitably leads to a conviction that all are subject to a uniform order and regularity in their varied operations. And this regularity is to be regarded as applying to all such phenomena, whether they be only mechanical movements of inert matter, or those more complicated forms of activity associated with what is termed—but not yet understood—as "Life," either in the animal or vegetable world. For an example, let us consider that magnificent array which we call the "Heavens," concerning which it is well known that millions of stars are individually identified and registered by the astronomer, and that each is a central sun, more or less like our own, pursuing a rapid course, absolutely uniform and therefore calculable, so that its exact position in the sky can be predicted for any future minute of time, even (say) in the next century. No less ordered in its movement is each of the smaller orbs constituting our own solar system; the eclipse of one by the intervening passage of another, or, may be, only by a shadow cast upon it in its course, being predicable with like certainty years before the event occurs.

One more example, but from the no less wonderful and extensive world of the exceeding small. A competent observer may, on seeing attached to a certain leaf a minute ovum, be able infallibly to predict the future career of the animal which will emerge therefrom, its coming changes in size and form, the duration of its existence, and the fact that it will assuredly give rise to other beings like itself. Hundreds of like illustrations might be adduced, but the above amply suffice for the present purpose.

II

Familiar with the apparently universal presence of a uniform order dominating the operations of all that is understood as Matter, roughly classed as organic and inorganic, it is almost impossible to conceive our observer capable of resisting a conviction that some marvellous source of Energy exists behind, or is immanent in, the "Universe," accepting this as an appropriate term by which to denote the sum total of all the phenomena within our reach. And thus the idea is naturally and strongly suggested, that what he knows as ordered arrangement as exercised among men is manifested in Nature, but with a more complete and far greater certainty and stability of result in the latter case. For "Man" being himself, beyond all question, the most perfect example of intelligent activity known to man, must necessarily be the type or measure by which he can attempt to estimate any other manifest source of analogous activity, however infinitely greater than himself, and conceived by him as the paramount and ever-present origin or Cause of all Existence.

Let me then venture in pursuing this inquiry to suggest that the "Infinite and Eternal Energy" thus postulated as the productive source of all Natural phenomena may be regarded by man, notwithstanding his necessarily limited purview, as to a certain extent analogous—being dissimilar rather in the transcendent vastness of its scope than in the mode—with that by which a human will is exercised. This being granted, I cannot but conclude that the unknown source may, and can only, be studied, with the view of acquiring any knowledge respecting its nature, by the single method or instrument which man has hitherto employed to acquire all the knowledge he has obtained during the long period of his existence in this world, viz., by the careful study of phenomena, and by collecting all data respecting them which are proved to be absolute facts. These being collated and carefully considered, may in time enable him to infer, with more or less certainty, the existence of manifest tendencies, denoting the possession of attributes or disposition manifested by the Unknown Power, and furnishing data capable of being appreciated or described as exercising a beneficial influence, or the reverse, on the Human Race, and also upon all lower forms of Animal Life.

III

But perhaps it might here be urged, Why not avoid the circumlocution involved by referring to a possible Supreme Cause of all things in such terms as "Infinite and Eternal Energy," or the like, and adopt one of the brief words which have been in general use, as "Jehovah," "Theos," "Jove," or "God"? I reply that they are avoided precisely because each of them has become so completely identified by long association of ideas with schemes of theological doctrine based on the alleged existence of personal appearances on the earth of the beings thus named, founded on ancient legends which have served without doubt as useful provisional working hypotheses during the early ages of man's history, but for the scientific inquirer, *i.e.*, the patient seeker after truth, are necessarily replaced by less defined and more abstract terms. For, as we have seen, no human mind can entertain, much less express, any definite idea of the nature or attributes pertaining to the Source of all power, "Infinite and Eternal," without conveying at the same time the idea of a Being or Personality; man's conceptions being limited by his knowledge of the highest achievements of his own race. Hence the universal use of anthropomorphic symbols, and the necessary formation of inadequate corresponding ideas, respecting the vast, inscrutable, and unknown source and origin of all things; whence an "eidolon" results, no better than those which have been carved by the hands of every race in its early history, possessing none but the crudest legends derived from necessarily ignorant ancestry. And thus every man to-day who has imbibed any idea of a material semblance representing in his mind a personal "God," conditioned by terms expressive of human attributes, has but made an idol for himself. And no two such men can ever by any possibility make the same; each of these impressions or concepts must be that of the individual alone, and from the very nature of things no two can be alike.

To return then to the subject of our proposed inquiry: there is but one mode of prosecuting it to its farthest extent with the faculties which man at present possesses, viz., the patient diligent examination of natural phenomena on a large scale. And let it be remarked here that by the phenomena of the Universe, or Nature, are to be understood not only those impressions on our senses which arise by contact with what is understood as the external world, but also those impressions which are derived from a study of what we know as our own consciousness—a distinction without a difference, retained in deference to popular habits of thought, since every acquisition of knowledge involves an act of consciousness.

In this way and by this alone can we be sure of attaining our object, at all events to some extent. It is impossible to comprehend the vastness and sublimity of the idea which the terms "illimitable space" and "endless time" express; although doubtless strictly applicable to the source of the Infinite and Eternal Energy, concerning the nature and tendencies of which we but crave, if possible, humbly to learn something more than heretofore, by the mode of inquiry already suggested. An object which beyond all others is, perhaps, the sublimest and most attractive which our life and its surroundings can offer.

IV

We will next consider the question, What has Man acquired during his long career by the so-called Supernatural revelations alleged to have been communicated to him by a supreme and all-powerful Deity?

Whatever he may have learned, "at sundry times and in divers manners," by means of "Divine Revelation," this fact at least must be universally admitted, viz., that the single object of all of them has been to inculcate Religious and Moral duties. The Religious duties have consisted chiefly in demanding constant and humble service to an Omnipotent Deity, one God, of whom, taking the words attributed to the Founder of Christianity as a command, he said, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment" (Matthew c. xxii., v. 37, 38)—a service the neglect of which, according to the tenets of Christianity, entails the severest punishment, not in the present, but in a future and eternal hell; while a never-ending life of supreme happiness is promised as the reward of faithful obedience.

The Moral obligations enforced, that is, the conduct of Man to his fellows, are signified and enunciated by impressive exhortations to charity and kindness to the poor and afflicted. The passage above quoted continues as follows: "And a second like unto it is this, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Matthew c. xxii., v. 39). Then follow the significant words, so opposed to the oppressive ceremonial of the ancient Jewish usages then in force: "On these two commandments hangeth the whole law, and the prophets" (v. 40).[1]

Subsequently Christianity, organized by the great Teacher's immediate followers, who were Greeks speaking and writing that language, took the form of the Greek or Eastern Church during the second century of our era. The doctrines of Christianity are still taught in that tongue throughout Russia, where it is the National Church to this day. From this source the

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[1] Revised Version used throughout.

Romish Church arose, and allying itself to the Imperial power the Bishop of Rome soon became the Pope, and an infallible head of the Catholic Church, requiring absolute obedience in all matters of faith and practice from her adherents. In England the Reformed or Protestant Religion is the National Church; and notwithstanding its evident and admitted defects, its inevitable division into numerous hostile sects, differing seriously respecting matters of belief, it has doubtless been in past ages well suited to the nations who have embraced it and have been influenced thereby. Thus the establishment of public hospitals and other institutions for the care of the poor and afflicted are found among the European races who have adopted the religious faith which is identified chiefly with the young Jewish devotee whose history, although imperfectly known as to matters of detail, affords little ground for doubt that he taught his followers very little or no dogma, but simply the worship of One God, "His Father"—and "Theirs" also—the practice of kindness, truth, self-denial and of a simple and blameless life; and that he set them the example of going about doing good to others, even to their enemies.

And such charity and care for the suffering is held in all parts of the world to be the duty of Man, wherever he has become civilized, as we shall hereafter see. And let it be added here once and for all, that each of the varied forms of Religion which have appeared on earth, although claiming to be supernaturally revealed, must be regarded as the natural outcome of Man's own wants and feelings, the sense of his desire to recognize a Power above him—"One that is greater than I"—worthy to be worshipped; trusted in for help in time of need, for justice when oppressed; One that might hear his prayers and accept his sacrifice. All have been useful aids in his progress, and have arisen as the natural result of his own development.

A brief sketch of the chief religions which have thus arisen in the later ages of the world's history may follow here. That with which we in this country are necessarily most familiar, by no means the oldest in point of date, is believed to have originated among the ancient Semitic race, and was known as Judaism, still largely prevalent, but modified at a comparatively recent date, that adopted to mark our own era A.D., by the outgrowth and separation of an important and powerful religious organization and creed, which has been already noticed, Christianity, now accepted by the greater part of Europe and its dependencies and by the United States of America. The most ancient of all known to us is the system of religious worship and rites of early Egypt, of which interesting records exist dating certainly to 5,000 B.C. After these should be named the religions of Babylonia and Assyria, which follow Egypt closely in respect of antiquity. An ancient lawgiver in China, Confucius, who flourished about 550 B.C., was remarkable for his honest and upright rule, led a virtuous life, and had many disciples. He sought knowledge from every available source, and after death his acts and sayings were collected by them in several books, the chief of which is his "Code of Morals," which contained among many other precepts the precise words of the Golden Rule of Christian Scripture. But he taught nothing respecting a god or religious worship. The ancient religion of the Persians, now that of the Parsees, was to a great extent founded by Zoroaster, who lived at least 800–900 years B.C., possibly earlier. Subsequently it became related in some degree with Sanskrit. Its ancient writings form "the Zend Avesta" or commentaries. One great and good creator was recognized ("Ormuzd"), regarded as dual at a later period, whose emblem was fire; and evil spirits headed by ("Ahriman"), the spirit of evil, opposed him. Numerous sacrifices and penances were enforced; strict purity of life was held essential in all the disciples of the faith. Somewhat later is the religion of Buddha, which possesses the largest number of followers of any religion in the world. Its origin dates from about 500 B.C., when its founder, a royal prince in Northern India (Prince Saddhartha), devoted himself to an ascetic life and contemplation, and to a study of the causes of things, regarding ignorance as the greatest evil. The records made by his adherents became sacred books, and the cult flourishes not only in India, but throughout a large part of China. It suffices only to mention briefly the religious Hierarchies of ancient Greece and Rome, constituted by large groups of deities, some arising out of historic legends. The divinities so-called of Greece were especially represented as exhibiting all the follies and vices of humanity. Those of Rome were related rather with the needs of husbandry, or of the shepherd and his flocks—as well as those of the house and the family: hence the "Lares and Penates." For the former the Greek poets and satirists had little respect; while the philosophers derided the rites and ceremonies which were largely performed by the common people, but they inculcated the advantages of a good life as acceptable to the Gods.[1] Of any future state their views were at first indistinct, but gradually a belief was established in some system of future rewards and punishments after death. There were no sacred books, and any idea of an evil spirit or devil was unknown. More recent than Christianity was the advent of Mahometanism (570–622 A.D.), in the divine origin of which its followers have the profoundest belief, adducing ample evidence thereof. It is more closely allied to Christianity than any other, since it recognizes one supreme God as the "Only God," together with the claims of Moses and the Jewish prophets, even those of Jesus Christ himself, to have received Divine authority; thenceforth, however, to be superseded by the Prophet. To its later date may perhaps be attributed his wise laws and regulations, which are minutely recorded in the Koran, and contain numerous incentives to the constant practice of charity, mercy, and kindness. Moreover, he absolutely proscribed the use of all intoxicating liquors, and also of betting and gambling, two vices which are disastrously prominent in all Christian countries.

V

I propose now to make a brief outline of the history of Man's long and painful progress while slowly acquiring knowledge of the objects by which he has been surrounded, that is to say, of the numerous and varied conditions and influences to which the course of Nature has everywhere exposed him; and thus to demonstrate that he has attained his present position solely by his own unaided efforts. For as before stated it is certain that no record exists to show that any divine or supernatural revelation has ever afforded man aid or instruction in matters relating to his physical well-being during the laborious course he has pursued throughout countless ages of tardy and difficult progress, from the earliest savage life to the present day. Every advantage has taken place by the gradual improvement of his faculties through the development of a more complex brain through lower forms, until it has attained its present condition, with capability of increase in coming ages to an unknown extent.

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[1] Socrates, born 469 B.C., concerned himself with Ethics, and taught that virtue is knowledge and vice is ignorance; Plato, born 427 B.C., was the master of Aristotle, born 384 B.C. Both taught that goodness and truth are among the highest virtues, although the latter differed in many other things from his master.

Man at first acquired an activity of brain and nervous system not possessed by those of his progenitors, now termed "Anthropoid Apes." These had gradually assumed a more or less upright position for special purposes of the body, thus differentiating the four legs of a lower animal into upper and lower extremities each employed for special and distinctive service. These large apes usually took shelter among the lofty branches of large forest trees, and lived chiefly on fruit and nuts, with now and then eggs and young birds. Like them, man probably at first used similar food, but in course of time added thereto the flesh of wild animals trapped in the forest and fish caught in the streams. Exposed to cold, wind, tempests, and inundations, he made himself clothes from the skins of the animals he learned to kill, and inhabited natural caverns which he probably excavated or improved for himself; at first, perhaps, by using for the purpose portions of the branches of trees blown down by the wind. Or of these he might also construct rude huts to protect himself and his young ones from the elements, and from the attacks of carnivorous foes of many kinds. He would soon learn to make long pointed stakes of hard wood, to be used as weapons for defence or to kill animals for food. Abundant evidence exists in many parts of the world that in prehistoric times flints were utilized as cutting instruments for such and other purposes; at first being rudely broken into thin flakes so as to produce a sharp edge. These have been found in great quantity, some of them very skilfully made, in caverns and in other places of deposit. When the use of the bow as an instrument of propulsion for killing prey and in fighting had been discovered, it was rendered more efficient by tipping the arrows with sharp flint points as arrow-heads. From very large flints were also fashioned axes for cutting wood, etc., and for weapons. They were attached to wooden handles by a strip of hardened animal hide. Some of these flint instruments were ultimately made with serrated edges for use as saws. The bones of small animals were utilized for making needles and other finely pointed instruments.

The Flint Age was succeeded by the discovery of copper and by the use of bronze, of which weapons and utensils were thenceforth largely made, and used almost universally for several centuries; to be superseded by the discovery in modern times of iron, and its conversion into steel for appliances of all kinds as at present.

The process by which man acquired the first rudiments of the great faculty of speech must have been a very gradual one. The earliest attempts probably consisted in improving upon the rude sounds, and even musical notes, by which the lower animals expressed tender emotions to their mates, and approached the rival or the enemy with loud and angry cries, which signified displeasure or even a challenge to combat. Language of a primitive kind followed, and took the place of signs, as association with his fellows slowly improved by experience; while the growth of family ties, often apparent among some of the lower animals, became naturally more highly developed by man, and the aggregation of families on some fertile or sheltered spot gave rise to the formation of a small community. These increased in size, until the larger combination of a tribe resulted, leading to the adoption of customs gradually acquired to promote the common welfare. By this means the principle of sacrificing a certain portion of personal liberty by each individual, for the good of the "commonwealth," was gradually discovered to be a wise arrangement and to promote the happiness of all. Man became social in his habits, and—without knowing it—learned the first lesson not only in law, but in ethics, the value of self-denial for the good of all. And it is worthy of note that each tribe, in course of time, generally became provided with its local Deity, and with some rudimentary form of religious worship.

Thus, various languages naturally arose in different parts of the world. The common objects daily seen, by the members of each tribe or community, would be identified by a sound or word, suggested perhaps by the appearance of the object, and adopted in order to denote it. All the first words were therefore nouns; and by the same process their qualities came to be indicated, and adjectives were employed to describe them. Action had to be expressed, and verbs came into use; applicable to the past, present, and future in respect of deeds. While articles and pronouns appeared, for obvious purposes, and so on. In this manner a spoken literature was formed, and was transmitted as "hearsay" from father to son, in the forms of tradition, story, proverb, or song. Long after, written symbols were invented and the permanence of these traditions provided for. Much interesting light on man's early history has been obtained by modern scientific researches in connection with ancient languages. The rights of personal ownership must have been recognized at an early period in man's social history. The maker of a flint axe or the builder of a hut would naturally be entitled to regard these as belonging to him for his own exclusive use, and the idea of property came to be realized. Then the mode of transferring of property from one owner to another had to be provided for. At first it was by barter only—a custom at present still extant among savage tribes. Then, as the community increased, some "common medium of exchange" was found, through objects generally prized, as skins, cowrie shells, etc., etc. It became necessary next to find some article which could be adopted as "a measure of value," and also one which could be stored without depreciation in quality; which led to the use of the precious metals, gold and silver, copper and bronze being employed for articles of small value; and ultimately to the circulation of portions of each metal—known weights—as coins, and stamped as such by the chief authority.

The discovery of fire, and the power of producing it at will, must have marked an epoch in his early history; friction between two pieces of hard wood is known to have been practised for the purpose of producing it by the isolated savage inhabitants of distant islands in the Pacific, discovered by some early navigator some centuries ago. And continuous light was provided for by rude oil lamps, which as well as common drinking-vessels were made of a primitive form of pottery.

Agriculture, in an elementary form, became an occupation at a very early period, by the sowing of seeds which produced edible vegetables; and selection of the seed-bearing grasses, by cultivation of the best growths, led in the course of years to the production of the grains now known as rye, oats, wheat, maize, rice, etc. Meantime the gradual domestication and breeding of animals for flesh and milk as food, and also for employment in draught, such as of carts on rollers and rude wheels, etc., increased man's resources considerably. The hollow trunks of trees were utilized, and trimmed into shape, to form canoes and boats; and these were equipped with sails when the art of weaving mats from dried wide-leaved plants from marshy soils had been attained.

Not only by sailors for the purpose of navigation at night, but by the shepherds with their flocks on extensive plains, attentive observations to the course of the sun and moon by day, and of the greater stars by night served the purpose of timekeeping. And the sun's rays by day were made to record themselves automatically, by marking the process of a shadow from an upright stake in the ground—a rudimentary dial. These early attempts were followed by careful observers among the Chaldæans, Chinese, and Hindoos. The first mentioned, probably some 3,000 years B.C., named the chief stars and grouped some of the constellations, divided the day into hours, etc. The Ptolemaic system followed, and is a record of researches first made by Hipparchus, the Greek philosopher (about 150 B.C.), by Ptolemy of Alexandria (middle of second century A.D.), who extended his predecessor's work and left voluminous records which more or less maintained their influence until the appearance of the great mediæval observers, soon to follow.

Here it may be appropriate to recall the fact that up to a comparatively recent period the Western nations universally regarded the earth as a large circular plain with an undulating surface, forming the centre of the universe. Those especially who were acquainted with the records known to us as "Sacred Writ," learned from it that the "Heavens above" formed the special dwelling-place of "Jehovah," "God" of the universe, surrounded by ministering angels who executed His will, often indeed appearing in bodily form to man to announce His behests. From the same source he learned also that, on the fourth day of creation, "God made two great lights"; the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the night; he made the "stars also" (Gen., chap. i., v. 16). All these were supposed to be fixed in "a firmament" which revolved round the earth, the latter having no movement of any kind.

Below this plain, at an unknown but not great depth, there was a region of gloom, which the spirits of the dead inhabited, known as "Sheol"; from which by means of the "Seer," they could sometimes be recalled to earth in order to foretell events; since a few of those who, during life, had been distinguished as favorites of Jehovah were believed to be capable of so doing.

The very "recent period" named above may be more distinctly indicated by devoting a few lines to define the views of three of the principal early astronomers.

Copernicus (1473–1543 A.D.) believed the sun was always at rest, and formed the centre of the universe; that the earth was a spherical body, which, with other planets, moved round it, but revolved on its own axis, thus causing day and night. He had no idea of the importance of the stars, but regarded them as lesser lights at an uncertain distance.

Tycho Brahe (1546–1601 A.D.), who believed that the sun moved around the earth, will be named as holding a distinguished position in the annals of the science. He had a noble observatory well furnished with instruments, and gave an impulse to astronomical studies.

Galileo (1564–1642) was the first to employ an arrangement of lenses, for the purpose of forming an astronomical telescope, by which means he discovered the Milky Way to be formed of separate stars. He afterward openly taught at Rome his belief in the rotation of the earth on its axis, and its annual passage round the sun; and was in consequence summoned before the Holy Inquisition, and was tortured and imprisoned when seventy years of age for persisting in his opinion, but he was ultimately set at liberty by the succeeding Pope.

It now only remains to be said that unceasing and intelligent study and greatly improved telescopes in every part of the civilized world, aided by the recently discovered arts of photography and spectrum-analysis, have led to the astonishing results achieved during the nineteenth century.

The astronomical discoveries which, as above observed, man's own unaided labors have achieved, demonstrate beyond all possibility of doubt that the so-called Mosaic records, above quoted, are quite untrustworthy. Nevertheless, they are still accepted by all Christian Churches, and are publicly read, in turn with other extracts equally questionable, twice or thrice a week as "Holy Scripture." The earth is now known to be an insignificant speck, a mere atom of dust in the universe, and that the millions of stars, visible with any good telescope, are suns like our own, many being much larger, and that these are almost certainly surrounded by encircling planets; since spectrum-analysis has proved that the same chemical elements which are so active in every part of our own system, are also the components of every one of the rest within our ken. Now it is impossible for any one familiar with scientific chemistry to conceive that those potent elements oxygen, hydrogen, chlorine, nitrogen, carbon, calcium, sodium, the metals, and the rest, can be present there without activity. Hence we are impelled to believe that the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms are in course of development in each of those innumerable systems, and will become active with the stage of fitness, varying, of course, according to the temperature at which each in its history has arrived; a certain very moderate range only of heat being compatible with the existence of vegetable and animal life. Hence it is impossible not to believe that a large proportion are inhabited by organisms more or less akin to those which flourish here. We, in our little home of earth, may well be devoutly humble in presence of the grandeur of the universe, and in the still greater grandeur of the Author, if we may descend for a moment to the use of an anthropomorphic term to designate the Power of whom nothing can be truly known but by the study of the phenomena around us.

VI

I shall not furnish in detail any further history of Man's progress to illustrate what he has accomplished by his own unaided efforts; but shall simply enumerate, in a tabular form, some of the chief results which he has achieved thereby:

I. All that is comprehended under the general term of "Fine Arts"—painting, sculpture, architecture, metal-work, fictile products, pottery, etc.

II. The discovery of gravitation, and the laws[1] which govern force. At a later period, the conservation of energy.

III. The discovery of the laws of light, heat, and sound.

IV. All that is comprehended by the science of chemistry, and its innumerable practical applications to every department of human activity.

V. The discovery of the existence and of the laws of electricity, the utility of which it is already impossible to overestimate.

The word "Law," as used here and in other parts of this essay, has always the restricted sense of implying any ordinary sequence of events which a faithfully observed experience has led man to believe will continue. As Huxley says in his well-known "Essay on Decartes": "'Law' means a rule which we have always found to hold good, and which we expect always will hold good." . . . He further observes—explaining that all knowledge is relative to the individual, and that all the phenomena of Nature are known to us only as facts of consciousness—that the conclusions logically drawn from them are always verified by experience. (*Vide* Decartes, *Discourse on Using One's Reason Rightly*, etc." Huxley's *Collected Works*, vol. i., pp. 176 and 193.)

"Thus the belief in an unchanging order—the belief in *law*, now spreading among the more cultivated throughout the civilized world, is a belief of which the primitive man is absolutely incapable. He is unable even to think of a single law, much less of law in general." —Herbert Spencer, *Princ. of Psychology*, § 488.

VI. The sciences of animal physiology, botany, and medicine; the microscope in connection therewith; the discovery of the circulation of the blood; of the functions of the brain and nervous system; the laws of health and the nature and cause of disease. The omnipresent activity and importance of bacteria, with all that is understood as sanitary science; the latter having had immense influence on the art of surgery, and enormously increasing the service it is capable of rendering to suffering humanity.

VII. Man's knowledge of the condition of the earth and of its inhabitants in prehistoric time, as learned by palæontological research, *i.e.*, the discovery of the remains of animals which lived many thousands or even millions of years ago, and found in stratified deposits far below the present surface. A science at present in its infancy, so small a portion of the earth's crust having been yet explored.

PART II

I have now finished that part of my work which has been devoted to the object of demonstrating two important statements:

First, that Man has, throughout a long and very gradual course of development from his pre-historic origin, acquired all his stores of natural knowledge—in its widest sense—solely by his own unaided efforts.

Secondly, that the authenticity of the ancient records, existing in several parts of the world, made at different periods of his history, and regarded as supernatural or "divinely" revealed, respecting the origin of the entire universe, especially that of the earth, including man himself and his duties to an alleged Creator, and asserting the existence of a future endless state of rewards and punishments for every individual after death, has never been substantiated, and is in fact unsupported by evidence.

VII

I now arrive at the interesting and important stage of our inquiry: What does our survey of man's history and experience, and of his relations to the phenomena of nature, teach us respecting the Tendencies, Disposition, and Purpose —if permitted to use terms suggested by purely human feelings and ideas to convey a meaning which cannot be otherwise expressed—manifested by that "Infinite and Eternal Energy" from which all things proceed? This inquiry has exercised the minds of many; nay more, has been an absorbing study for the thinking part of mankind from very early times to the the present. Hypotheses and speculations innumerable, some of which were at first crude and obviously untenable, need not be referred to further now. The fact which alone concerns us here is, that they evince the existence of a deep interest in an all-prevading desire to solve, if possible, the mighty problem here presented.

I declare my firm belief, and desire to repeat it, that one method alone can throw light on the subject, viz., a studious observation of the facts of nature and of the inferences which may be legitimately drawn from them.

I shall consider what we may thus attempt to discover respecting the "Source of Infinite and Eternal Energy" under three heads, regarding each as a form of its manifestation, viz.:

I. Infinite Power.
II. Infinite Knowledge.
III. Tendencies or Disposition.

I. Power; beyond man's faculties to grasp or comprehend. Eternal and all-pervading, therefore ever-present, wherever we may be, at every instant of our lives. In a certain sense by no means invisible, for its working is everywhere around us and within us, in every molecule of our bodies; in the curiously and beautifully arranged adaptations, not yet half discovered, by which we come into contact with external nature—the "not our self"— which meets us everywhere. Let me repeat that it is a fact beyond controversy, always to be borne in mind, that Man is the most finished product known on earth of "Nature's" work— that is, which has resulted from the "Infinite and Eternal Energy"; the noblest and completest manifestation, so to speak, of the "divine afflatus"—the "Temple of the Holy Ghost" in ancient language, used with undesigned prophetic purview in times when men were ignorant of Nature's laws, and when faith in the Invisible must necessarily suffice for their needs, until discovery of scientific methods had revealed the existence of hitherto unknown powers within and around us; facts in place of fables. Then much which was formerly invisible is now visible; and we might adopt for ourselves the old expressive but mystic saying of "the Master," "Behold the kingdom of God is within you."

II. INFINITE KNOWLEDGE AND INTELLIGENCE.—We possess no language adequate to express what must be the deep conviction of all religious persons—and even of men in general, if they consider the question—respecting this subject. By far the greater part of the present essay has been really devoted to illustrating the transcendent Intelligence which has ordered the organization of the Universe, so far as we know and are able to understand it; and I have no stronger terms in which to express admiration. Nothing then remains but to bow in humility, and confess in the words of the Hebrew poet, "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me: it is high, I cannot attain unto it" (Ps. cxxxix. v. 6).

III.—The third and last subject of inquiry is, What can we rightly infer relatively to the TENDENCIES, DISPOSITION OR PURPOSE[1] of the unknown "Source of Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed"?

I shall first revert to the unquestionable fact, on which I laid so much stress, and so fully illustrated at the commencement, of the history of Man's career and progress in this world—that it had been accomplished solely by "his own unaided efforts."

For it constitutes the most important fact in his history; and is for me a signal illustration not only of the wisdom but especially of the beneficence of the great Source we are studying. Nevertheless, the first and most natural feeling suggested by a survey of that long and difficult course which man has traversed through countless ages, may be for many one of pity—with a sense of regret that, had it been possible, aid should not now and then have been proffered, perhaps at certain turning points in his history, when apparently it would have been greatly serviceable. And not a few have expressed inability to believe in the beneficent tendencies of the Unknown Source of all power, and have inferred evidence of neglect, or of indifference, in regard to man's progress and welfare.

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[1] Applying these terms as we should to the action of human beings; an analogy which must be permitted to Man's limited means of expression.

But, on the other hand, it is next to certain that had the human race received at any time a revelation, say, of the means of obtaining fire, or of the elements of agriculture, or of the means of obtaining complete relief from suffering which modern science has discovered, man would never have become the efficient and highly endowed creature he is. He has fought his own way throughout, has overcome every obstacle himself, and passed through an educational course of the most perfect kind—self-taught, not "helped."

The result of this survey of man's long struggle with the forces of Nature, so often apparently hostile, but which he has so completely dominated and rendered subservient to his will and conducive to his well-being, has, I believe, established a fact which affords a complete and decisive proof of the beneficent tendency exercised by the Source of the Infinite and Eternal Energy.

Nevertheless, doubt as to the existence of that beneficence has arisen in some minds from the fact that life mostly entails the endurance of so much pain and misery as to invalidate the grounds for that belief. I reply that life is universally regarded as a precious possession, and is enjoyed—in different degrees—by every individual in the entire animal creation; not one will part with its share without a struggle, if it has the power to defend itself. The universal sentiment of Humanity is—"Skin for (upon) skin, yea, all that a man hath will he give for his life."

VIII

I shall next present, in a tabular form, the following statements derived from that knowledge of natural history which is common to all, reciting the chief sources of pleasure or happiness possessed by the animal creation.

1. Enjoyment of Food through the senses of taste and smell.	Enjoyed by the entire animal series, from the lowest conscious forms to the highest.
2. Acquirement of Power by growth, and the enlarged experience which it brings.	
3. The relations of love between the sexes.	
4. Social relations with others—Friendship.	Chiefly exemplified in Man, but embracing in a less degree some lower animals.
5. Appreciation of beauty—through the eye, of color, form—as presented in Man and especially in Woman. The charm of landscape, the cultivation of flowers (scents) and fruit; the garden. Impressions derived from grand scenery in all parts of the world—the pleasure of travel by land and sea.	
6. Delight from Musical Art, through the ear.	
7. The pleasure of Possession.	
8. The Practice of Art in all its branches.	
9. The Pursuit of Knowledge; acquisition of new facts—discovery in every department of life.	To Man only.
10. The pleasure derived from the exercise of Charity, from moral conduct, and in the exercise of the religious sentiment natural to Man, and already observed throughout all his history; becoming gradually developed and modified as he increases in his acquaintance with Nature, in the widest sense of the term, and in his power of reasoning from the facts thus acquired.	

By the long process of Man's evolution, ethical rules have been evolved. Men have learned that it was not only wise, but productive of satisfaction and often of pleasure, "To do unto others as you would they should do unto you"; that honesty was not only the best policy, but desirable for the reason just given. Thus it is that the "golden rule" has been enunciated in almost identical terms by the sages of other civilizations, even before the time of Christ. A code of morals has resulted by degrees as man himself has progressed, and is not the product of any supernatural revelation; a code which not only sets forth man's duties, but necessarily implies the existence of punitive consequences on any neglect of its articles. For due consideration will render clear the fact that every breach of Nature's laws, whether physical or moral, certainly brings with it punishment in this life, sooner or later. For example, the man who merely consumes improper food or drink, or takes more than he can digest, pays the penalty which the error entails. Again, if he exerts his strength far beyond his powers, as in athletic contests, etc., he runs great risk of injuring his heart and of damaging his constitution as the result; one indeed too often met with. If he wastes his health and strength in debauchery, his punishment often speedily arrives, involving disease and shortened life, that possession which every sane man prizes above all other. So with every breach of moral law; any unjust act committed equally involves its penalty in this life. It brings long and bitter remorse in generous natures; in others, it surely tends to debase the individual; he becomes habituated to dishonorable designs and acts, and sinks lower in the scale of morality, until he loses self-respect, that of others, and at last is trusted by none. No doubt an unprincipled man may have a successful career, but his punishment surely arrives after a time. On the other hand, in every department of life unblemished character is the highest attainment; whatever of talent or of genius a man may display, he who has been proved by a past career to be a possessor of that, is the most valued and esteemed in any rank or condition of life, and is the most certain to secure success in the long run.

To the foregoing let me add a quotation here, and ask attention to it, in which these sentiments are tersely and beautifully expressed by an ancient Hebrew poet, whose religious creed, *let it be remembered, ignored any scheme of rewards and punishments in a future life,* Psalm xxxvii., vv. 35–37: "I have seen the wicked in great power, and spreading himself like a green bay tree. Yet he passed away, and, lo, he was not: yea, I sought him, but he could not be found. Mark the perfect man, and behold the upright; for the end of that man is peace."

I shall conclude this section by simply observing that the religion of Nature, the laws of which and their working have thus been briefly illustrated, and which is based upon the determination not to believe anything which is not supported by indubitable evidence, must eventually become the faith of the future: its reception is a question for each man's personal convictions. It is one in which a priestly hierarchy has no place, nor are there any specified formularies of worship. For, "Religion ought to mean simply reverence and love for the Ethical ideal, and the desire to realize that ideal in life" (Huxley).[1]

IX

The facts of suffering and death which affect mankind—the former mostly, the latter universally—have been urged by many as incompatible with the attribution of goodness and benevolence to the Author of the Universe.

I shall first consider the last-named inevitable event, which each one of us must encounter. And I shall venture to state, as the known result of long and careful observation of the phenomena which then occur, that a really painful death from disease is never witnessed. Whatever of suffering may have previously occurred, which I shall deal with after this, the act of death is believed to be always preceded by a considerable period of insensibility. There may often be obvious automatic movements, not felt by the subject of them, but naturally distressing to bystanders, because resembling those of pain.

Acute and sometimes long-continued sufferings precede death, it may be for periods of considerable duration, sometimes for years. But thanks to man's scientific researches, especially to one of the most recent, the inhalation of anæsthetic vapors, all acute sufferings can be completely avoided. What untold and agonizing tortures would have been spared throughout his long history had this precious secret been revealed! *How evident it is that "Revelation" was no part of the plan.* In the course of most chronic diseases it is well known that some form of anodyne, of which several notable examples exist, can almost always be utilized so as to avoid severe suffering. No man should be a martyr to pain who can obtain a tolerably skilful medical attendant; and such are provided in all the public institutions for the care of the poor, or at the hospitals which abound in London, and exist in almost every small country town.

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[1] Huxley's *Collected Works*, vol. v., p. 249. *Vide* also the following extract bearing on this subject: "There is a striking expression of Diderot's that all Revealed or National religions are only perversions of the Religion of Nature; and it is true, if the words Religion of Nature be taken in the highest sense."—Extracts from a letter by Jowett to Professor Caird, *Life of Jowett*, vol. i., p. 445.

The sufferings of the lower animals are very far less than those of man. The sense of pain corresponds with the extent or the development of the nervous system; and this is extremely small among countless species of active living beings, *e.g.*, the insects—flying, creeping, or jumping—and furnishing a population far exceeding the sum total of the human inhabitants of the globe on any five acres of cultivated land, to say nothing of the inhabitants of the waters which wash our sea-coasts. Among insects may perhaps be partially excepted those which form social communities, as the ants, bees, wasps, etc., who have highly developed instincts, and concerning whose possession of some degree of consciousness it is impossible to speak with certainty. Shakespeare greatly erred when he said that the poor beetle we tread upon feels a pang as great as when a giant dies. Like ancient authors of all time, he could, when dealing with natural history, only reflect the knowledge of his age. His insight into human character, and his knowledge of the human heart, have never perhaps been surpassed by any, and his mastery in expressing thought has made him a poet for all time. Similar qualities existing, more or less, among some of the poets and prophets of the Hebrew race give their productions a high value in no way lessened by the fact that they were ignorant, when writing, of the earth and its origin, and of its relation to the rest of the universe.

It is impossible to state with certainty what amount of consciousness is present throughout the numerous species of animals which rank below the vertebrate series, but there is certainly ground for believing that they are incapable of suffering much pain, and that even the fierce carnivora inflict little or none in the act of killing their prey, although belonging to the same order. For all are led by what is called instinct—probably inherited habit—to seize their victim at a vital spot, as by the neck, at the top of the spinal cord, which mostly destroys the power of movement and of sensation, of course in order to prevent struggles or acts of retaliation when possible.

Some of the higher vertebrata, especially those who have long held intimate associations with man, have had their intelligence and emotional powers much developed; for two obvious examples take the dog and the horse. Such are susceptible to pain and suffer much, and when inflicted, either by accident or design, should invariably be relieved, when possible, by the same anæsthetics employed for man.

There is another consideration supporting the view here taken of the beneficent tendency of the great but unknown Source of Infinite Energy, not to be overlooked. Granting this view to be correct, it is impossible not to believe that the influence of the Supreme Source must not merely equal, but greatly transcend any like or analogous quality—such as care, compassion, or kindness—which man can and does very largely exercise toward his fellows or dependents, all like himself having derived their being and its inherent qualities from that same Energy which pervades the universe.

X

Finally the cultivated and truly religious man finds his greatest happiness in the active and healthy exercise of all his functions—moral, intellectual, and physical. He is careful to promote the welfare of his fellow-creatures, not merely by works of charity but by enabling them to help themselves, and exercises his judgment to that end. Whatever he does it is his aim to attain the best result possible, and thus to make the most of the priceless boon of life. His religious feelings do not suggest to him the validity of the Christian practice of prayer to a Deity for gifts of any kind, even for the purpose of obtaining moral or mental improvement, nor for the recovery of the sick or protection from personal dangers, etc.—a practice which is so common—well knowing that all events must follow the laws of nature, which are unalterable. · No doubt the act of prayer, on the part of one who believes in its power to move the Deity to bestow a precious boon, brings consolation to the feelings of the applicant. It is a spiritual sedative which affords indescribable relief and enjoyment to many. Nevertheless, "Thy will, not mine be done," is the only prayer of the truly sensible Christian, and he may be grateful indeed that no other prayer can be acceptable. What a chaos would the world present if short-sighted men could interfere with the working of the laws which determine the course of events! For the religious man here described, adoration of the grandeur and of the beneficence which pervade the universe is the only sentiment suitable for public or for private religious service. "Lord, how manifold are thy works, in wisdom hast thou made them all" (Ps. civ., v. 24), expresses the same sentiment in the language of the Hebrew poet, in terms suitable to his day.

To conclude, he is grateful, yet proud to feel himself a participant in the great and endless procession of the wise and good throughout the ages; trustful, without shadow of a doubt respecting any kind of future there may be in store, and concerning which it is needless for him to inquire or speculate. He "lives a life of Faith" in the Source of the Infinite and Eternal Energy, confident in the knowledge that the laws of the Universe are the outcome of perfect Wisdom and Beneficence. The old Faiths, founded on so-called "revelation," have long been tested and are found wanting, and a natural religion will ultimately replace them. It is no part of this inquiry to dilate on what this comprehends. It is sufficiently defined in few and simple words at page 23 and note.

But it is not to be forgotten that a large proportion of the population in all Christian countries is ignorant of, or indifferent to, the subject of religious belief, unless the formal compliance with a certain slight ceremonial is considered to be religious worship. Concerning these it is not necessary to speak. On the other hand I have no desire to disturb the beliefs of those who derive comfort from the hope of a happy future in another world, and a motive for well-doing in this, which they derive from the Christian faith. It is especially undesirable to do so in relation to the poor and uneducated, whose lot is mitigated thereby, and also to those who, possessing an ordinary share of intelligence, have confidently and happily rested on its hopes and promises for many past years.

I now close this essay, the materials for which in the shape of sundry notes I began to collect upward of twenty years ago. Others were frequently added, as I pondered much and often over what has long been a favorite theme, and it was not until a few years later that I copied into my note-book, on its first appearance in 1884, that striking passage from Herbert Spencer which is now quoted as a motto on the title-page. This indeed suggested the subject, respecting which, as it appeared to me, systematic research might be not only practicable, but might also be expected to yield some definite results.

I commenced my task solely for the purpose of seeking the truth for my own personal needs and enlightenment, incited thereto by the numerous and conflicting claims of the various sects, some diametrically opposed to each other, into which what is termed "Christianity" is divided. The original paper was written without any intention that it should be seen by any other eye than my own; nor has it been so seen until, having been considerably amplified, I submitted it to the judgment of a friend during the past year. For myself it has been a veritable "Pilgrim's Progress." The title, together with the form of the essay as it now stands, has been the result of the whole inquiry, and was not a predetermined intention.

I am now approaching the end, and find myself compelled to arrive at a conclusion, contrary, I gladly confess, to that which I at first entertained when engaged with the former part of the inquiry, and depressed by mentally realizing the miseries and hardships to which Man was exposed during the tardy development for unknown ages of what may be deemed the infancy and childhood of the race: a career which will probably continue many ages more before he approaches maturity.

But when that long inquiry came to an end, and not until then, the Truth—as I profoundly believe it to be—almost suddenly impressed me: to wit, that interference of a supernatural kind with man's doings (supposing its exercise to be possible within the limits of the great scheme of Nature) would have marred, if it did not arrest, the course of that development which has issued in the remarkable progress he has made, especially during the last three centuries.

I was now assured, by evidence which I could not resist, that all which man—with his limited knowledge and experience—has learned to regard as due to Supreme "Power" and "Wisdom," although immeasurably beyond his comprehension, is also associated with the exercise of an "Absolutely Beneficent" influence over all living things, of every grade, which exist within its range.

And the result of my labor has at least brought me its own reward, by conferring emancipation from the fetters of all the creeds, and unshakable confidence in the Power, the Wisdom, and the Beneficence which pervade and rule the Universe.

Finally, let me add that no one can feel more forcibly than myself that the foregoing pages offer only a very slight sketch of a most extensive and important subject. It is but a syllabus thereof, and in this sense I venture to offer it to the consideration of my readers. Moreover, I desire to state my belief that the subject of this paper, "The Unknown God"? may be regarded as in progress of solution by following the process suggested, and that "the Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed" will not ever remain wholly unknown or "unknowable," but may be still further elucidated as human faculties become highly developed in the progress of time, and rendered capable of receiving additional enlightenment respecting it.

XL

OUR GOAL

"THE MAKING OF A NATIONAL SPIRIT"

BY

EDWIN A. ALDERMAN

PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

AND

"EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY"

BY

GEORGE HARRIS

PRESIDENT OF AMHERST COLLEGE

WHAT then is the meaning, what the purpose, we have discovered in modern life? We have sought to glance over the whole broad field of human thought and human endeavor, to summon at each turning of the road the voice of some master spirit to direct and inform our feebler knowledge. One would fain sum up the final result in a few simple words such as a child might understand. But, alas, no such simple answer to the problem has as yet become clear to all men. Here and there we find the enthusiast who believes he has solved all difficulties with a single potent word; but to most of us the meaning of life seems manifold, and its purpose, if that may indeed be expressed by a single term, must find expression in organ tones as yet too vast for human tongue.

Some effort, however, we can make toward understanding. Some effort we offer here in two remarkable speeches, delivered on notable occasions by two of our leading college presidents. At the last annual meeting of the New York Chamber of Commerce, its one hundred and thirty-seventh anniversary dinner, the speech of the evening by President Alderman, D.C.L., LL.D., of the University of Virginia, was upon the future of our American race, "the making of a national spirit." By Dr. Alderman's permission we print it here entire, except for one section in which *he turns aside to refer to his beloved South. The address must be read of course in the mood in which it was delivered to the eminent business leaders who sat listening; yet it manages to tell, with no uncertain note, high truths both brave and proud as to the progress and the spirit of our nation.*

We present also the address made by President Harris, LL.D., of Amherst, on the occasion of his inauguration as head of his college. Some portions of this noteworthy speech were, of necessity, personal to the occasion; these we have, with Dr. Harris's consent, omitted. The main address was, however, general, an analysis of life and its needs to-day. Confronting the reader with this thoughtful, comprehensive view, we shall leave him to answer for himself, in accord with his own hopes, his wisdom, and his fortunes, "the meaning of modern life."

I APPRECIATE, as a teacher, the privilege of speaking to this ancient and powerful Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York at a moment when I do think it not assembled to discuss commerce alone, or to scan the balance of trade, but to discern the movement of the national spirit and to contribute to the health and strength of the national consciousness and character.

The speakers of the olden days proudly called you merchants, as they called my tribe schoolmasters and teachers. Now they call us—and a palatable brand of cracker—educators, and they call you names—largely—plutocrats and magnates, oligarchs, and other jagged-looking epithets. Other points of likeness between the schoolmaster and the merchant encourage me in the effort to make this speech, which I do not mean to be hortatory, for I agree with Charles Lamb that it is difficult to feel quite at ease with a schoolmaster, because he comes, like Gulliver, from among his young folks, and cannot easily adjust the stature of his understanding.

What we call business and stupidly think of as a coarse material machine is really the great cosmic university, to which nine-tenths of human beings go to learn truth-speaking —though they do not always learn it—and faith in men, and so prove themselves by suffering and service. What we call trade is a great university-extension scheme for civilizing and keeping the peace among nations. The teacher inculcates ideals, and the merchant incarnates them for good or ill to this generation. An unfaithful merchant indicates social disease as surely as and more vividly than an immoral schoolmaster, for the master rules of both are fidelity, truth, and honor. The rewards and the power of both are great. The merchant's reward, if he be of intelligent mind, rich in social sympathy, far-seeing in conception, is above the valor of the soldier or the opportunity of the statesman in this modern world. The schoolmaster's reward sometimes comes too late to sweeten the toil of his day, and is of a kind not greatly molested by thieves or rust, or even the most absent-minded of moths. But it has some infinite satisfactions, and its power is simply symbolized by some cultivated, clean, and fearless youth ready for life and fit to illustrate the majesty of republican citizenship.

I, therefore, do not think of you this evening as great magnates, or as the "beaked and taloned graspers of the world," as some one has gently called you, but as my fellow-craftsmen, as plain, extraordinary men, whose proudest fortune is the legacy of American opportunity and citizenship, and whose proudest achievement will be to hand down that inheritance untarnished and undiminished.

It is fairly difficult these days to make a speech without mentioning Wall Street. I will begin pleasantly by saying that Wall Street is bracketed with Gehenna as a sort of symbol of sin in the minds of many good people. That is probably going too far. The reflection that its giant activities are grounded on faith and integrity and credit gives even to it and its fellow-sinners, Lombard and State Streets, a certain aspect of goodness, and, considering all things, increases my pride in the essential dignity of the race. Sometimes I go down there, impelled by that wonder which Plato called the beginning of knowledge. I seldom stay long, for the atmosphere leaves something to be desired in the way of academic peace, and enables a mere human to understand the psychology of the lamb. But I do not come away ever without stopping for a look at the finest thing down there—the regnant figure of an old Virginia country gentleman, who was the richest man and the most public-spirited citizen of a simple age, standing upon the steps of the Sub-Treasury Building, looking out with honest, fearless eyes over that sea of hurrying men. That statue is the most remarkable allegory that ever got placed, by historic chance, at just the right spot in the history of the world, and points forward surely to the higher social order, when the Place Vendomes and Trafalgar Squares of the world will celebrate the glory of the great citizen. My speech is not going to wander far from that statue.

The conviction in the heart of George Washington that enabled him to be the richest man and the most public-spirited citizen of his time, this same conviction in the hearts of men in this Chamber, and everywhere in this nation, that enables them to be something of both, is the conviction with enough strength in it, if it be a conviction and not a spasmodic emotion, to carry this democratic experiment past a very serious peril. It is, therefore, pertinent to know what the conviction is, and to ask further if it can be reinfused in manly fashion into our republican life. Briefly put, it was the belief that a republic is the final form of human society, and the common individual man the sublimest asset of the world, that power rests on fitness to rule, that the sole object of power is the public good, and that service to the republic is a glory quite sufficient in itself.

To Washington these ideas had a religious sanction, for they were in the air of an age of moral imagination and superb human enthusiasm which counted the dual standard for private and for public life as the essence of republican treason. These ideas had the force of religious sanction, too, to Jay and Hamilton and Clinton, whose figures adorn your building down town, and one cannot look into St. Gaudens's face of Lincoln in Chicago, with its commonness and plainness, and yet with its sublimity and gentleness, without seeing those ideas shining there, revealing the real glory of that great common man, and teaching through that melancholy world-face the whole splendid rise of man to soul and mind and will. That noble and pathetic scene at Newburg, when Washington put aside all ambition, was not hard for him, and he probably did not realize what a type of self-effacement Newburg would become because of it. A century of trial has somewhat dulled the halo about democracy to fools and those of little faith, though the great optimism has abated sectarian fury, abolished legal slavery, protected and enlarged manhood suffrage, mitigated much social injustice, increased kindness and gentleness, preserved the form of the Union, conquered its wildernesses, developed great agencies of culture, and made it a symbol of prosperity.

But it has also developed new and hateful masters in politics and new shapes of temptation and wrong-doing, and after a generation of amazing constructive effort, without sufficient leisure for ethical considerations, it is in danger of its own strength, and it must protect itself with its own strength. I am not railing against great constructive forces, or uttering cheap prophecies of damnation, or doubting that the future will be an industrial world, which means a republican world. I am simply claiming that democracy, like a man's character, is never out of danger. It is not selfishness or corruption alone which we have to fear, for we have vanquished these before, but as much the temper of despair and faithlessness which blinds the eyes of the youth to the heroic simplicity and love of freedom at the heart of the American people. And my concern is for youth, for the grown folks are generally past saving. The chief weapon of the protective strength of democracy I conceive to be the acceptance of the Washington type of public spirit as a working form of patriotism upon as large a scale in the social and political order as the instinct for co-operation and combination has been accepted in the industrial world. By the measure in which United States Steel surpasses the blacksmith's shop in efficiency, by the measure in which municipal government surpasses the rural township in complexity of politics—in that measure must both politics and business cease to be regarded as a game or as war, or as a fixed code, or as a treasure-trove, and come to be thought of as a public function, as a public trust, not only in method and organization, but in moral responsibility. Does this involve a moral miracle, or an utter change in human nature, or a surrender of democracy to state socialism or some other order? It certainly involves the reaffirmation of the founder's idea of public spirit as a dominant national motive and as a sort of inner well-spring of conduct, in place of the idea of headlong strength and achievement and speed, following, as a sort of spiritual corrective, the gigantic system of modern business, and the new brood of political conditions with which neither statute law nor public morals have been able to keep pace. In short, as an industrial democracy has carried to high efficiency a new philosophy of business and politics, so it must reaffirm and reincarnate its old philosophy of citizenship and patriotism.

Patriotism, therefore, which is hard to define and new with every age, must redefine itself. It meant manhood rights when Washington took it to his heart, as it means to the Russian to-day. It meant culture and refinement and mental distinction when Emerson, in his Phi Beta Kappa address, "besought the sluggish intellect of his country to look up from under its iron lids." It signified ideals and theories of government to the soldiers of Grant and Lee. It meant industrial greatness and splendid desires to annex nature to man's uses when the great leaders of the generation, whose statesmanship and imagination no man will deny, built up their business and tied the Union together in a unity of steel and steam.

To-day it means a vast reaction from an unsocial and predatory individualism to self-restraint and consideration for the general welfare, expressing itself in a cry for fairness and honor and sympathy in use of power and wealth, as the states of spirit and mind that alone can safeguard republican ideals.

If in our youth and breathlessness there has grown up a spreading insanity of desire for quick wealth and a theory of life in lesser minds that esteems money as everything, and therefore is willing to do everything for money, that very fact has served to define the patriotic duty and mood of the public mind. And is not the theory of our overlooking special Providence borne out in the fact that, as in the period seeking to establish manhood rights there stood forth at the head of the government the figure of Washington, a republican saint around whom a young nation should rally, so now in a period pausing to search its heart, after a certain madness of spirit, there stands forth the figure of a bold prophet of common righteousness and common service and common decency strong enough to be everywhere, and sincere enough and unconscious enough to preach his doctrine in a thousand voices? This reawakened patriotism of the common good has the advantage of appeal to a young public conscience not yet unbalanced by hysteria, and of being supported by a valid and unauthoritative public opinion, not yet dulled by contentment. Sound public conscience and valid public opinion are the last unbreached strongholds of our old democracy. In proof of their soundness and authority I claim that if there be a man in America to-day who has an unjust fortune, and a pagan ideal of its use, he will not bask as cosily in the respect of his fellows, nor have as much fun, as Crœsus or Louis XIV. The gift of one hundred and seven millions of dollars in one year by private individuals to the general welfare, a colossal development of the sense of social obligation barely dreamed of by Washington, is the testimony on the affirmative side of this opinion. A servant of the people, in city or state, who is afield for exploitation rather than service is not as highly honored a man as was Robert Walpole, or Warren Hastings, or Aaron Burr, as the roll-call of some prison houses will show. The disposition which democracy has just shown, at the most inconvenient moment, to ask the powers that be whether they are the powers that ought to be, in Mr. Lowell's phrase, and the answer to the question, are the testimonies on the affirmative side of that opinion. Plain people, it is true, are not as awestruck at the names of the powerful as they once were, but one may note a growing ability to render awe where awe is due, which is a beautiful growth in discernment. In a nobler, truer light shine for the people of America the names of those upright souls, in business and politics, in this Chamber and out of it, who have held true in a heady time, who have kept quick and human their popular sympathies and their republican ideals, and, by so doing, have kept sweet their country's fame.

What is the influence of the schools and the universities, the public conscience and public opinion, in this ever new remoulding of the national spirit? These schools and universities have been changing their form from simplicity to power under the pressure of this same era of passionate strength, and educational ideals are more often the result of social pressure than social ideals are the result of educational direction. What are the results? I claim this much for the schools: they are to-day more helpfully related to the public life of states and cities than ever before. They are closer to the needs of that body who are neither rich nor poor, and upon whom rests the solution of our problems. They are producing more abundantly and scattering more widely the results of their production. They speak with the authority of knowledge. The same protest of our time has therefore come out of them. The scholarship in them, neither radical nor subservient, is thoroughly permeated with a sense of public spirit and informed with a note of hopefulness and seriousness and old-fashioned belief in the mission of the republic. To be sure, this scholarship is not mere goodness, for untrained goodness does not count for much in this world, whatever may be its felicities in the next; but it is scholarship that cannot be frightened, because it is capable, and cannot be corrupted, because it is fortified with faith and ideals; and it is unweakened by cynicism or despair, because it is made possible by the beneficence of the individual and the capacity of states. Therefore, I reckon, as Mr. Bryce did, that the most helpful aspect of the republic is the spectacle of the schools and colleges struggling to fashion the right sort of an American, tempting the rich to service, conveying to states the idea of civic duty, preserving the great popular heart from envy and hatred, and establishing a standard where men may repair and make a stand for the eternal values.

OUR GOAL

“EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY”

BY

GEORGE HARRIS

The objects and methods of education engage the attention of thinking people at the present time as never before. This great interest was left, until lately, to professional educators, while the people were comparatively indifferent, but now it is a theme of discussion in magazines and newspapers, on the platform and in conversation. All the way through, from kindergarten to professional school, the aims of education are undergoing severe scrutiny. The college does not escape, but is required to give an account of itself in justification of its achievements and in ready adaptation to the instruction of all who are entitled to the advantages of liberal culture. The decisive question is the question of fitness, which the college as truly as the grammar school must answer. Fitness for what? Education is a means to an end. What end? Since, directly or indirectly, the people are taxed for the support of the college, since the college is a public institution, a liberal education should prepare men for service in society, for citizenship in the free state. The subject, therefore, to which, without further preface, I invite your attention is “The Man of Letters in a Democracy.” The function of cultivated men in the modern state determines the aims and methods of their education. Every question of the college concerning choice of studies, modes of instruction, physical culture, and religious life must be answered in view of the function of the man of letters in a democracy. He is not always successful in finding his place, nor, indeed, in finding any place among the people. Yet no man is capable of rendering greater service, and therefore of sustaining greater obligation to the state, than the man of letters.

A few axioms, briefly stated, define democracy. It is more than a form of government, since it exists under various forms of government. The function of the citizen involves more than voting and holding office, although these duties are important. Every value of life is included in the state, or, better, all values are co-ordinated in the state. For democracy maintains and assures two things, freedom and justice. To every man his right—that is justice. It also is freedom. Every man, therefore, must defend the right of every other man, must see to it that his own objects do not conflict with the righteous and rightful objects of others, for thus only can all have freedom with justice. The right of every man is this: that he should make the most and best of himself, that he should possess and enjoy all the values he is able to possess and enjoy. Hence the material, intellectual, domestic, æsthetic, moral, and religious values are included and are protected in democracy which insures justice and freedom to all and to each. The attainment of one man is more largely in this direction, of another in that, but the state guarantees the right of every man in that freedom which regards the right of others to possess and enjoy all the legitimate values of life. Democracy is the true individualism, for it regards every person as an end, never as a means or a tool. It makes for the well-being of each, and therefore guards every institution, the family, the school, the church,—protects every pursuit that creates values, from the material to the spiritual; in a word, is itself the institute of justice and so of the freedom that is grounded in justice. Democracy is the true socialism, which is not paternalism, but is self-government by which free individuals so regulate society—that is, regulate themselves—that each may have the utmost freedom that is compatible with the freedom of other individuals in attaining the values of personal and social life. These axioms, put concretely, mean bread winning and bread eating, that is, just economic conditions. They mean home and friendship, they mean science and art, they mean free religion, they mean the things the state does as a state—laws, rules, courts, tariffs, taxes, expansion or limitation of territory. In all these things, democracy protects and even helps every man in coming to his own.

This is no other than the religious conception of society, or at least is largely included in the religious conception. It is not too much nor too little to say that Jesus came preaching and founding democracy—the true individualism and the true socialism—in which every human institution, interest, and ideal has its rightful place. He called it the kingdom of God, which is God's purpose for humanity seen in the moral order of history as it has evolved, seen in the Christian ideal of personal worth and mutual service, seen in the kingdom of God on earth in which we are brothers one of another. Define the true democracy, then define the kingdom of God on earth; and you will find you have simply given two titles to the same thing. Find me the man who is making the most and the best of himself in such ways that others may do the same and you have found me the modern saint.

I need not say that democracy has not yet in any state fully secured its object, but the social ideal of democracy is the divine order of humanity, and it is the duty of every one to promote that ideal; by criticism, by reform, by eternal vigilance; by intelligent voting, by active influence, by fraternity; above all and through all, by acting his own part as the righteous citizen in the free state, making the most and the best of himself, making his pursuit contribute to the common weal and thus converting the actual into the ideal republic. Surely modern democracy, if this view of it is correct, is roomy enough even for the man of letters—especially for the man of letters.

Three attitudes, now, may be taken toward the democracy in which we have our habitation. One attitude is withdrawal. One may insulate one's self from vital concern in the actual life of the people. Having an assured income provided by others, a man may devote himself to pleasure, to travel, to literary culture, putting himself practically out of relation to the world of human struggle and attainment. Religiously this was the monastic life of the Middle Ages—out in the wilderness, out of the world. The gentleman of leisure leading a luxurious life is the secular monk. The literary dilettante is the intellectual or æsthetic monk. The pietist who would save his soul by not doing certain things is the modern religious monk.

The second attitude is the parasitic, or, even more strongly, the piratical. One may go into the democracy for what one can get out of it for one's self, looking on the existing order as an arrangement out of which something can be had for one's own comfort or pleasure. Such a one would exploit democracy for his own benefit and pay as light a tax as possible. The generations and contemporaries have established a society holding certain values, and the exploiter, like a thief in the night, breaks through and steals. The State saves him the trouble of maintaining a band of armed retainers. Laws and courts are good, for they protect him in his thieving. The army is at his back that he may till his vineyard and run his mill. The one maxim of the pirate in a democracy is, "My rights, your duties."

The third attitude is the reciprocal. A man looks out on democracy and contributes to it, putting in as much as he takes out, or more, paying his full tax, making his pursuit part of a whole which is for good. He is a Christian citizen of the modern world. His maxim for at least half of his life is, "Your rights, my duties."

The man of letters, by whom I mean the man that is liberally educated, the cultivated man, for practical purposes the college man—although there are men of letters that never saw a college and college men that are uneducated—the man of letters is expected to take this last attitude of contributing his part in promoting the ends of democracy, putting in as much as he takes out. He has been loudly accused of taking the first attitude, of insulating himself from public affairs, or at best of holding aloof as an impractical critic of the order of things, of standing on the shore declaring with many gesticulations how the ship of state should be sailed, but never handling a tiller or pulling a rope. There has been enough of this to bring reproach on academic discussion of affairs. By academic discussion of politics, for example, is meant theoretical, impractical, doctrinaire. But there is an important and indispensable part for the man of talent and education to play. I do not say that his part is more essential than that of the average working man, for all parts are necessary in the social organism. The eye cannot say to the hand, "I have no need of thee." But also the hand cannot say to the eye, "I have no need of thee." The state needs citizens of intellectual ability, of character, and of high standards, for leaders, rulers, and teachers, and has a right to look to the college for them. The college is an integral part of the system of education maintained by the state, and therefore the state has claims upon college-bred men. It is of little consequence whether colleges are established directly by the state or are privately endowed. In the latter case, the state grants immunities and exemptions and refrains from maintaining colleges and universities of its own. By cherishing higher educational interests, the state signifies its need of cultivated men in the professions, in business, in legislation. By a process of selection, young men of promise and ambition continue their education for several years that they may render service of a higher order than manual labor—the service of leadership, which is as much needed as manual labor, without which manual labor is inefficient. That is to say, the state expends on a selected class a thorough training that they may be fitted for highest service to the state, whether they hold political office or not. And this class is the real aristocracy.

We have outgrown the crude notion that democracy is equality and that it has no use for an aristocracy. Some belated doctrinaires are still proposing schemes for equalizing the condition of men, and so for equalizing men. But it is not the problem of democracy to raise all men up nor to draw all men down to a common level. Its problem is to place its best men in its highest places, to put power in the hands of the wisest and most capable persons, to recognize superiority, always to put the right man in the right place. For the aristocracy of birth it has no great regard, although it does not forget that blood tells. For the vulgar aristocracy of wealth it has supreme contempt. To the accident of rank and title it is indifferent. But it recognizes the aristocracy of merit, knowledge, character. Democracy would replace the aristocracy of birth by the aristocracy of worth; would set aside the aristocracy that buys place with gold for that which earns place by capability and distinguished service. Democracy needs nothing so much as it needs such an aristocracy. Otherwise it is a mob, a crowd, a horde, a mass of unorganized and disorganized units. The very word "aristocracy" means the rule of the best, the best men in power. If the best men have guidance and control, progress is constantly made. If they are set aside in favor of the incompetent, there is confusion and every evil [illegible] There are enough capable men in the United States to [illegible] positions of trust and honor, to be a political, economic, intellectual aristocracy. Put them in their rightful places, let the aristocracy of merit be enthroned as well as acknowledged, and there will be that government, that national welfare, that prosperity which constitute social well-being and insure progress. So the state does not regard all citizens as equal and draw rulers and leaders by lot, but wants true, wise, able, educated men for guidance, organization, and service. Therefore in a democracy there must be higher education for the few who are fit by nature and may become fitter by training for leadership. Professor Paulsen, tracing the educational ideal of the future, says that "The society corresponding to that ideal would be that of an aristocracy of mind," and asks, "is this the type toward which we are leaning? Is the aristocracy of birth and wealth to be supplanted by the aristocracy of personal worth and merit?" "This," he says, "has been the philosopher's dream from the day of Plato's republic to the present hour. It is the tendency of nature. It would be the aristocracy of nature to have every individual stand independently upon his own personal merit, and not upon the achievements of his father, while the influence of heredity, in the sense of the transmission of personal characteristics, would not be diminished. This is the aristocracy to which historical development seems to point. Both church and state have made considerable advancement toward the realization of this ideal of a personal *élite*, by bestowing position and influence according to the degree of personal talent and efficiency without regard to birth and position."

Education makes this ideal definite. The educated man is aware of the personal and social ideal of democracy, and can direct his energies intelligently toward its realization in the sphere of his own action. The movements of our time affect many who do not understand them. Not until changes have occurred do the uneducated discern them. Anybody can compare the close with the middle of the century and perceive advance in means of locomotion and communication—even in edu[illegible] politics, and religion. Many who do not understand [illegible]nificance of great movements are borne along by them to their own material, intellectual, and moral advantage. But educated men perceive tendencies in the making and foresee results not yet attained. To be sure, no one can read the future as one reads the past, for God's purposes in humanity are partly disclosed, partly concealed. Yet there is a direction of the path of progress out of the present into the future, a direction tolerably plain to one who knows the past and knows men. All liberal studies are for the one purpose of showing the ideal—the personal and social ideal—not only that it may be perceived but that there may be direction toward it in new and changing conditions.

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